R v Tyrone Henn

On 12 February 2025, following a trial in the Crown Court at Warwick before His Honour Judge Andrew Lockhart KC and a jury, the applicant was convicted on seven counts of theft, contrary to section 1 of the Theft Act 1968 (counts 8, 9, 11, 12, 16, 19 and 23 on the indictment), eight counts of handling stolen goods, contrary to section 22(1) of the 1968 Act (counts 7, 10, 15, 17, 18, 24, 25 and 43), and one count of going equipped for theft, contrary to section 25 of the 1968 Act (count 41).

On 21 March 2025, the applicant was sentenced along with his four co-defendants by the trial judge. The full particulars of the sentences which the judge passed in relation to the applicant are set out in the Appendix to this judgment. However, in summary, the total sentence was one of ten and a half years' imprisonment. This comprised a term of nine years on count 18, terms of five years on each of the theft counts, and terms of between six and eight years on the other handling counts. All of those sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other. On count 41 (going equipped for theft) the sentence was one of 18 months' imprisonment, which was ordered to run consecutively

The applicant now applies for an extension of time (13 days) in which to renew his application for leave to appeal against sentence, following refusal on the papers by the single judge.

It is not necessary to give a detailed account of the facts of the offending. The applicant and his co-defendants were charged on a 43 count indictment which included counts of theft, handling stolen goods, robbery, attempted robbery, burglary, going equipped for theft, having an offensive weapon, and dangerous driving. All of the charges under the Theft Act related to relatively high value cars, and the total value of the cars stolen was £780,000. The offences took place in a period of a little over a year between July 2022 and August 2023.

In the case of the applicant, his offences were committed between 15 December 2022 and 21 August 2023. The total value of the stolen cars which were the subject of his convictions was a little over £410,000, comprising cars to the value of £209,000 (the subject of the theft convictions) and cars to the value of £177,500 (the subject of the handling convictions).

For present purposes it is also relevant to note that there was a gap of five months between the last of the applicant's theft and handling offences: count 25, which was committed on 24 March 2023; and count 41 (going equipped for theft), which was committed on 20 August 2023.

The trial took place over a period of five weeks, between 6 January and 12 February 2025. During the trial the other defendants pleaded guilty, so that ultimately the applicant's case was the only one which went to the jury. He contested all of the charges against him on the basis that he was a victim of modern slavery – a basis which the judge found to be "fatuous", pointing out that in fact the applicant had acted towards many in a bullying and abusive way.

The judge produced a 58 page Note for Sentence, to which we pay tribute. It is a model of clarity and conscientiousness, and the product of a huge amount of hard work. We have, of course, also read the transcript of his sentencing remarks.

The judge began with the impact of the offending of the group of defendants as a whole by reference not just to the value of the cars stolen by them, but also to the community impact and the impact on the individual owners. He noted the evidence before the court that a large number of the vehicles which had been targeted were high value Jaguar and Land Rover variant motor cars which were manufactured in the Midlands. In 2022 or 2023 there had been a wave of thefts of this type of vehicle across the United Kingdom which exploited the then vulnerability of these vehicles to theft using key cloning, and this had caused enormous financial and reputational loss to Jaguar Land Rover. The judge found that the applicant and his co-defendants revelled in the fact that they were participants in this wave of crime.

The judge also noted, by reference to various victim personal statements which were before the court, that there was extensive evidence of an adverse impact on the individual owners of the stolen vehicles in terms of distress, feelings of insecurity, inconvenience and consequential cost, in addition to the financial value of the cars themselves.

The judge then gave an overview of the offending before making detailed chronological findings of fact about what had happened in relation to each of the counts on which each of the defendants had been convicted. He went on to set out the relevant parts of each of the relevant Sentencing Guidelines. This included a section on the Guideline on sentencing children and young people. He cited relevant passages from that Guideline and noted that, even in the case of the applicant, who was a young adult, some of the principles in the Guideline were important. He also cited the following passage from R v ZA [2023] EWCA Crim 596:

The judge also noted that "this authority also properly re-emphasises that there must be an individualistic approach to the case of each young accused who is before the court. Each accused will have applied to his individual case the appropriate credit that applies under the mitigating feature of age".

The judge went on to say that he would give effect to the totality Guideline. His approach would be to select a lead offence in the case of each of the defendants and pass an aggravated sentence on that count to reflect overall criminality. He also specifically directed himself on the need to ensure that the overall terms for each individual were just and proportionate and were the least that could reflect the seriousness of his offending.

The judge started with the applicant and then turned to the particular cases of each of the co-defendants. In relation to each he made findings as to his involvement in the offending, before considering the application of the relevant sentencing guidelines to his case in terms of categorisation, aggravating and mitigating features. He then imposed a sentence for each.

The judge found that the applicant was the leader and organiser of the group of offenders who were on the ground taking the cars and then moving them on for sale. He had key readers and was skilled in accessing cars, disabling alarms and producing duplicate keys so that the vehicles could be driven off in seconds. He led his team to gain the expertise that they held and that enabled them to target and then to steal high value Jaguar Land Rover vehicles. He would take orders for, and then steal, vehicles. Having obtained the vehicles, he would then move them on either for breaking or for sale. The applicant was the oldest member of the group and had the most senior role by far. He also had a level of intelligence which made him dangerous. He was a hardened criminal who was used to working in cut-throat and dangerous circles associated with serious crime. He made significant sums from his criminality. He also drove time and again when he was neither licensed nor insured.

Applying the Sentencing Guideline on handing stolen goods, the judge found that the applicant's offending fell into category A - high culpability - on the basis of four of the six factors on the Guideline:

The judge found that the harm was in category 1, both on the basis that very high value goods were stolen and that there was significant additional harm. The financial value of the goods stolen on the eight counts of handling was £77,000 above the threshold of £100,000 for "very high value goods stolen". In addition, the vehicles were of substantial value to the losers, regardless of monetary worth.

This gave a category starting point for 1A offending of five years' custody, with a range of three to eight years. But the judge noted that under the Guideline the fact that the financial value of the offending greatly exceeded the £100,000 threshold may mean that it was appropriate to move outside the range.

Applying the Sentencing Guideline for theft, the judge found that the counts of theft with which the applicant was charged also involved category A offending. Again, he had a leading role in offending which was part of a group activity; the nature of the offending was sophisticated; and there was significant planning.

The harm was in category 1: there was significant additional harm for the reasons which the judge had set out. Here, the value of the vehicles was £109,000 above the £100,000 threshold for category 1 offending.

The category starting point for category 1A offending on the theft Guideline is three and a half years' custody, with a range of two and a half to six years, although the judge again noted that it may be proper to go above the range for multiple thefts and/or thefts involving goods of a value which greatly exceeds the financial threshold for category 1 harm.

Applying the Guideline for going equipped for theft, the judge found that this was a high culpability offence for the same reasons as he found in relation to the thefts. He also found that this was a greater harm case, given that the applicant was in possession of items which had the potential to facilitate offences involving high value items. The starting point for category 1A offending is one year's custody, with a range of 26 weeks to one and a half year's custody. The judge said that he considered that this case was at the top of that range.

The judge noted the following aggravating features in the applicant's case:

The judge identified the following mitigating features:

The judge said that having carried out the exercise of balancing out the aggravating and the mitigating features of the applicant's case, he had arrived at the shortest overall sentence commensurate with his offending.

On behalf of the applicant, Mr Whitehouse, who appears pro bono and for whose able and focused submissions we are grateful, makes four particular criticisms of the judge's reasoning in support of the applicant's overall contention that the sentence of ten and a half years' imprisonment was manifestly excessive.

The first ground is that the judge erred in the factual findings which underpinned the lead sentence on count 18. The judge found that, at 5.20 pm on 7 January 2023, the victim pulled up outside his home address in Coventry in his BMW M340 and was approached by two males, who arrived in a Fiesta. One brandished a machete at him and shouted that he should hand over the keys to the BMW. The victim was frightened and threw his keys, which were picked up by the second male who got into the BMW. The male with the machete went back to the Fiesta and both cars then drove away, in convoy. The applicant videoed the stolen BMW that day at 6.43 pm, so under an hour and a half later. Further images were created the following day from inside the vehicle, with the applicant also discussing selling it.

The first criticism of the judge's analysis which Mr Whitehouse makes, relates to the judge's finding that:

In dealing with count 17, the judge had also said that in the days after that offence, which occurred on 3 January 2023, the applicant was:

Mr Whitehouse submits that the judge therefore found that the handling which was the subject of count 18 took place with the knowledge that the BMW would be taken in the course of a robbery and that the basis for this finding was that Smith had requested German cars "with keys". In fact, it was common ground – and we accept – that Smith's request was not made until 8 January (i.e. the day after the offence charged in count 18 was committed). Mr Whitehouse submits that the judge was therefore in error as to the chronology and the significance of the conversation with Smith in relation to count 18.

Secondly, Mr Whitehouse submits that the judge was in any event mistaken in finding that obtaining cars "with keys" meant that the car key had to be taken from the owner and therefore necessitated a robbery or a burglary. He points to a passage in the sentencing remarks where the judge said:

Mr Whitehouse says that there was in fact no evidence that the applicant was unable to produce duplicate keys for German cars and that the judge therefore misinterpreted the request for cars "with keys" and was wrong to rely on this interpretation as an aggravating feature of the case.

Overall, Mr Whitehouse submits that the judge was therefore wrong to rely, as he did, on his finding that the applicant knew that some of the cars which he handled had been taken (or would be taken) by robbery as an aggravating feature.

Ground 2 alleges that the judge's factual findings in relation to count 17 were also wrong. On this count the applicant was charged with robbery of a Fiesta ST on a joint enterprise basis. One of his co-defendants, Jason O'Farrell, was convicted of robbery. The applicant was acquitted of robbery, but convicted of handling.

The judge found that the applicant and O'Farrell arrived at the scene having just stolen a Jaguar. The Jaguar and another car screeched to a halt and then people were out of the cars and intent on taking the Fiesta. One man went to the Fiesta, ascertained that there was someone in the car (in fact it was the owner of the car) and then went back to the Jaguar for support. Two men went backwards and forwards before the robbery was carried out by them, using a huge machete and with at least the encouragement of O'Farrell. The Fiesta then joined the convoy and it moved off. The judge said:

Mr Whitehouse argues that there was no evidence that the applicant came into possession of the Fiesta "seconds after the robbery", let alone that he "plainly would have known by then that a robbery had taken place". He makes various points in support of this contention, including that the jury found that the applicant had not participated in the robbery. The applicant was in a car some distance away. It was dark and, submits Mr Whitehouse, he could not have seen what had taken place.

Mr Whitehouse acknowledges that the sentence on count 17 was ordered to run concurrently, but he submits that the judge's findings on this count aggravated the lead sentence on count 18.

In ground 3, Mr Whitehouse argues that the judge's sentence on count 41 was, in itself, manifestly excessive. The facts of count 41 were that on 20 August 2023 the police stopped a car in which the applicant was the front seat passenger. An OBD device was found in the front driver's side door pocket. This is an electronic device (like a relay) which is used to steal cars. Also found were tools, a signal jammer and cloned registration plates. Two further OBD devices were found in the applicant's coat, which was at his feet. The applicant and the driver were arrested. The judge found that it was plain that the applicant was back to offending, and noted that at that time he was on police bail for other matters.

Mr Whitehouse does not challenge the judge's categorisation of the offence charged in count 41. Moreover, his submission for the purposes of the sentencing hearing was that the applicant's offending had come to an end after the commission on 24 March 2023 of the offence charged in count 25, and that he had been taking steps towards rehabilitation in the nearly five month period which had elapsed before the commission of the offence charged in count 41. Indeed, he had been re-united with his family and was moving towards a more stable lifestyle.

Under ground 4, Mr Whitehouse submitted that the judge gave too little weight to the following aspects of the applicant's personal mitigation:

We do not accept these submissions.

As far as count 17 is concerned, the judge was fully entitled to reach the findings of fact which he reached. He had presided over a lengthy trial and had heard all of the evidence. As the appellate court, we have seen and heard barely any of it. We have not even been provided with a transcript of all of the evidence which was relevant to this point. Even if we had been, it would be wrong for us to interfere with the judge's interpretation of the evidence on count 17, given that it was reached in the context of the evidence as a whole. We therefore reject ground 2, which in any event relates to a sentence which ran concurrently with the sentence on the lead offence.

As far as count 18 is concerned, it does appear that the judge was mistaken as to the timing of the conversation with Smith. However, this was not the only evidence which led him to find that the applicant was quite prepared to, and did, handle cars which had been stolen in the course of robberies or burglaries. He reached this view on the basis of the evidence as a whole. For the reasons we have given, we are not prepared to go behind his interpretation of the evidence in this regard, or, indeed, his interpretation of the request for German cars "with keys".

In relation to both counts 17 and 18 we also note that, in any event, the judge placed limited reliance on his findings that the applicant knew that the cars would be taken by robbery if necessary; and, indeed, that in specific cases he knew that they were the fruits of a robbery. He relied on this feature in relation to the handling offences only and, as we have noted, he said in relation to advance knowledge that "sometimes this was robbery and sometimes dwelling house burglaries, always sophisticated theft". There is no challenge to the finding that the applicant had advance knowledge of the matters which we have italicised. The judge also said that "there was very recent possession of goods from robbery, at least twice", which he permissibly found was the case.

Moreover, these were two of four factors which led the judge to find that these were high culpability offences for the purposes of categorising them on the relevant sentencing guidelines, which obviously they were, regardless of the findings about knowledge of robbery. Plainly, the omission of the references to robbery in these findings would not have made any difference to his decision on the categorisation of the handling offences. Moreover, having regard to the applicant's offending as a whole, any error in this regard on the part of the judge did not have a material effect on his sentence. More importantly, even if these findings were omitted or taken to be wrong, the judge's sentence would not be manifestly excessive.

As for ground 4, the judge expressly took account of the mitigating factors on which Mr Whitehouse relies, such as they were. The most important of these was the applicant's age at the time of the offending. However, having directed himself in accordance with the then current guidance (we note that further guidance is now provided in the imposition Guideline), the judge made trenchant findings about the applicant's maturity and his character, having observed him over the course of a lengthy trial. On the judge's findings, which we accept, the applicant's maturity was not just an impression of him which the judge formed, it was also reflected in the sophistication of his offending and his role and actions as leader of the group. Moreover, this was not a case in which the judge mistook bravado for a lack of remorse. The applicant had fought the case over a period of five weeks on a "fatuous" basis, which was a strong contraindication to genuine remorse. On the judge's findings, nor was this a case in which the applicant's young age would mean that the effect of prison would be more severe for him than would generally be the case.

As far as count 41 and ground 3 are concerned, we agree that 18 months' imprisonment was a severe sentence for this offence taken in isolation; but, of course, this offending was aggravated by the applicant's offences charged in the 15 other counts and the fact that he committed the offence whilst on police bail.

Apart from considering Mr Whitehouse's specific criticisms of the sentences passed by the judge, we have stood back and asked whether it is reasonably arguable that they were manifestly excessive in any event. We do not consider that it is. We note that there is no dispute about the judge's categorisation of the offences on the relevant guidelines. Save for the specific points which we have addressed, there is no dispute as to the factors which the judge took into account in coming to his decision. Even in the light of the judge's undisputed findings, his sentence on count 18 might well have been more than one year above the top of the range for category 1A handling offences. There were multiple handling offences to be taken into account, but the multiple thefts also aggravated the offending on this count. The applicant played a leading role in group offending which was sophisticated and highly impactful in the ways that the judge identified. Given that the judge clearly applied the principle of totality, any severity in the sentence on count 41 was, in effect, compensated for by a degree of leniency on count 18.

Accordingly, for all of these reasons we refuse the renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence. We would have granted the extension of time sought had there been merit in any appeal, but in light of our decision, we also refuse the application for the extension of time.