R v Mohammed Ibrahim

On 21 May 2024, following a trial in the Crown Court at Birmingham before His Honour Judge Rochford and a jury, the appellant was convicted of theft, contrary to section 1(1) of the Theft Act 1968. This was count 2 on the indictment. He was acquitted on count 3 (handling stolen goods) and count 7 (having an offensive weapon), but the jury were unable to reach a verdict on count 1, aggravated burglary, contrary to section 10(1) of the 1968 Act. A re-trial was ordered on that count.

On 1 September 2025, the appellant then pleaded guilty to burglary contrary to section 9(1)(b) of the Theft Act 1968 as an alternative to count 1. This was effectively at the door of the court in relation to the re-trial.

On 14 November 2025, in the Crown Court at Warwick, the appellant was sentenced as follows by Judge Rochford: for the burglary, 27 months' imprisonment; and for the theft, 12 months' imprisonment. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other, making a total of 27 months' imprisonment. He was also disqualified from driving for a period of three years, with an uplift of 13 months and two weeks to take account of the period which he would serve in custody.

The appellant now appeals against the custodial part of his sentence with the leave of the single Judge.

Shortly after midnight on 19 June 2023, Daniel Ha and his partner, Ms Somjettana, were asleep at their home in Coventry when they were awoken by the sound of their front door being kicked in. A group of between three and six men, all wearing ski masks or balaclavas and each armed with a knife or machete, burst into their bedroom. They demanded watches, car keys, and money. At one point, Ms Somjettana was forced to her knees and threatened. Mr Ha was dragged downstairs and told to hand over his belongings. He pleaded with the offenders that he had given them what he had.

The group stole goods to the approximate value of £45,000. These included a Suron electric dirt bike, a Rolex watch, iPhones, the keys to Mr Ha's BMW, and the car itself. The Rolex was later recovered but nothing else was.

Neighbours were awoken by the noise made by the offenders, and a neighbour saw Mr Ha's BMW being driven away along with a Citroen Berlingo van. She wrote down the number plate of the Berlingo, and the police established through Automatic Number Plate Recognition enquiries that the Berlingo had been driven in convoy with the appellant's Mazda car. The appellant and others involved were arrested in simultaneous raids on 4 November 2023. They all made no comment in interview.

The appellant and seven others were prosecuted in relation to this and related offending. Six defendants, including the appellant, were charged with aggravated burglary on Count 1. Three of them pleaded guilty on Count 1 prior to the first trial in May 2024; and two were convicted by the jury. The jury could not reach a verdict on this count in relation to the appellant, as we have noted.

The other offenders who were involved were sentenced in September 2024 when the appellant was awaiting re-trial. As will be apparent, it was not until a year later that he pleaded guilty to burglary.

The appellant was born in April 2003 and was therefore 20 years of age at the time of the offending. He had a previous conviction for four offences which were committed on 25 January 2021, when he was aged 18. These were for using a vehicle whilst uninsured, driving without a licence, and two assaults on emergency workers, for which he received a community order which expired on 19 January 2023. The judge found that these offences occurred when the police were trying to stop the appellant in relation to the driving offences and that he had deliberately reversed his vehicle into the police car with some force.

The judge found that the appellant was recruited by one of his co-defendants on the day of the burglary. His role was to drive a group of men from Birmingham to Coventry in his Mazda car to carry out the burglary at night. He had driven the group to the property in convoy with the Citroen Berlingo van which was to be used. He had known that the purpose of the journey was to commit a burglary, but he had not been aware that the other members of the group were armed. He had waited outside the property whilst the burglary was being committed and he had then driven other offenders away from the scene.

The applicant was sentenced on a basis of plea which was accepted by the prosecution. This was: that he had been recruited late, indeed only shortly before he travelled; that he was not made aware that the house was occupied and believed that it was not occupied; that his role was simply to drive others; and that he never entered the premises. However, the judge found – and we agree – that it must have been plain to the appellant from the number of people involved, the distance being driven to commit the burglary, and the fact that a specific property was being targeted, that he was involving himself in a significant and serious criminal enterprise.

The judge took the burglary as the lead offence for the purposes of sentencing. He accepted the defence submission that the case fell within medium culpability – B - on the Sentencing Guideline for burglary of a dwelling. He accepted that he should focus on the appellant's blameworthiness rather than the blameworthiness of the enterprise as a whole, given that the appellant had not been convicted of aggravated burglary. But he found, as the defence accepted, that there was a degree of planning on the appellant's part. He had agreed to become involved, he had gone along with the plan and he had provided his car.

The judge specifically found that no lower culpability factors were present. Save to the extent that the appellant obviously enjoyed associating with the other offenders, many of whom had more criminal backgrounds than him, there had been no exploitation. Nor had there been any intimidation or coercion of the appellant, and this was not an offence committed on impulse or with limited intrusion. Nor had any mental disorder or learning disability played any part. The case was firmly within B.

As far as harm is concerned, the judge placed the offending into Category 1. He said that he must look at the harm caused by the burglary as a whole. People were on the premises. Violence was used and serious violence was threatened against the victims. They were caused substantial psychological injury and were emotionally impacted. Although the appellant did not realise that this was going to happen, having become involved in the burglary he had to take the consequences of what other members of the group did. There was theft to a significant degree, substantial loss, and extensive damage to the property in that the front door was damaged, although that factor alone would not put the offending into category 1. The judge's view was that the case fell squarely within category 1 and, indeed, higher in that category.

This gave a category starting point of two years' custody, with a range of one to four years.

The judge did not deal separately with the theft of the BMW in terms of categorisation on the theft guideline.

The judge said that he took account of the appellant's mitigation, including his age at the time of the offending, which he noted was not long after the appellant's 20^th birthday, the progress which he had made since then and the character references which he had received. The judge also noted that there is good evidence that at the age of 20 the brain is not fully developed and able to think things through.

However he said that, against that, he took account of the appellant's previous conviction. The appellant had known the trouble that cars could get him into, and of the risk of being egged on or encouraged by a group, but had not learnt his lesson. The fact that the offending involved a relatively large group and the conviction for the theft of the BMW were also aggravating features, although the judge said that he would treat the latter as minor in that he was required to take it into account as a matter of totality.

After balancing the mitigating and aggravating features, the judge moved up the range to 30 months' custody.

He then turned to the question of credit for the guilty plea on the burglary. He noted that the appellant had pleaded not guilty at the first trial. His case at that trial had been that he had driven to the property but that he had understood that the purpose of the journey was to help someone move house. He had denied any knowledge of any burglary. Although there had been some discussions about pleading guilty to burglary, it was never put forward by the appellant as a formal proposal, and his position remained that he was not involved in any burglary. With reference to the relevant Guideline, the judge said that he would make a reduction of ten per cent, which brought the sentence down to 27 months.

The judge then reminded himself that 27 months was only slightly above the level at which he could make a suspended sentence order. He said that he would therefore stand back and ask himself whether he could reduce the sentence further. He said that he was afraid that he could not, as 27 months was the lowest sentence that he could properly pass. In any event, even if he had been able to reduce the sentence to two years or below, bearing in mind the Guideline on the imposition of community and custodial sentences, he would have considered that this was a case where the seriousness of the offence meant that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate custody.

On behalf of the appellant, Mr Ivers KC puts forward the following grounds of appeal:

In support of these contentions, Mr Ivers accepted the judge's categorisation of the burglary as medium culpability, but argued that the short time during which the appellant was involved would move the case down to the bottom of the range for category B offences.

Mr Ivers questioned the judge's finding that the harm was category 1. He said that nearly all of the factors which led to the judge's categorisation were features of the aggravated burglary, but not of the burglary to which the appellant had pleaded guilty. Even if the judge was entitled to find that this was category 1 harm, Mr Ivers submitted that he should have moved down the range for category 1 offences.

There were therefore good reasons, Mr Ivers submitted, to move towards the bottom of the range for category B1 offending before aggravating and mitigating features were considered.

Save for the previous conviction for offences which were committed in 2021, when the appellant was a youth, there were no aggravating features.

As far as mitigation is concerned, Mr Ivers emphasised that the appellant was not a sophisticated criminal, particularly relative to the other members of the group, some of whom had serious previous convictions. The view of the author of the pre-sentence report was that the appellant’s age and immaturity, and his susceptibility to peer influence, had contributed to his behaviour. There was also evidence of a lack of a sense of self-worth and confidence which may have contributed. On the basis of plea, the appellant had been naïve and had been manipulated by his fellow offenders into thinking that the house was empty, and their possession of weapons had been concealed from him.

The appellant had also put himself at risk at trial in relation to the other offenders in that he had named as present people who had denied presence. In addition, he had had a traumatic experience of custody when he was remanded for a week, as he had been assaulted by another prisoner.

Mr Ivers said that the key feature, however, was that the appellant had turned his life around and was settled at the University of Plymouth studying for a BA in Civil Engineering. A letter from his personal tutor, Dr Ellis, stated that he had begun in September 2023, had completed a foundation year and then the first year of the course. He was in the second year at the time of the sentencing hearing. He had moved away from those with whom he had previously associated and which had led to the offending. There were letters before the court which indicated that he had strong family support to assist him to preserve and build upon the progress that he had made. His siblings, one of whom had written to the court, and his mother, an general practitioner in the NHS, gave some idea of the expectation of his family and their determination to have him turn his life around.

In addition to this, the author of the pre-sentence report said that the appellant accepted his poor judgment and his responsibility for his part in the offending; he had expressed remorse and embarrassment, albeit that he appeared to be minimising his awareness of the fact that he was involving himself in a burglary. In interview he had "demonstrated a credible pattern of reform and engagement. The offence represents a serious but isolated lapse in judgment rather than a sustained criminal trajectory. His current functioning reflects stability, improved maturity and genuine motivation to pursue a law abiding life". The probation officer therefore recommended a non-custodial sentence.

Mr Ivers also suggested that a reduction for the guilty plea of ten per cent was insufficient. Before the first trial the appellant's then counsel had indicated that a plea of guilty to burglary would be offered if it would be accepted by the prosecution, albeit that the offer of such a plea had not been formally made.

Overall, Mr Ivers submitted that the judge had been overinfluenced by the facts of the aggravated burglary when the appellant was only guilty of burglary. This was not a case for an immediate custodial sentence, given the progress towards rehabilitation which the appellant had made. On the contrary, custody would only serve to set back the appellant's progress and would serve no useful purpose. Even if there was to be a custodial term, it should therefore have been suspended.

We agree with the judge's categorisation of the burglary as falling into category 1B on the Guideline for domestic burglary, and so the category starting point for the burglary was two years' custody. For the reasons which he gave, the judge was also fully entitled to take all of the harm caused by the burglary into account and to consider that the case was higher up the range than the starting point, rather than lower as Mr Ivers submitted, before aggravating and mitigating features were taken into account. We also note the judge's findings that none of the lower culpability factors was present – findings which the judge was fully entitled to make.

We do not agree that the only aggravating feature was the appellant's previous conviction for four offences. There was also the fact that he was part of a large group of offenders and the fact that the burglary was committed at night. The mitigation was principally the appellant's age at the time of the offending, his more peripheral position in the group, his remorse and the progress which he had made since his offending, as described in the pre-sentence report, albeit his approach to the criminal proceedings prior to his guilty plea did not sit comfortably with the argument that he had turned his life around.

It is clear from his sentencing remarks that the judge took all of these matters into account. How they balanced out was a matter for judgment and the judge had the advantage of having presided in the first trial. He was therefore well placed to reach a view. In our judgment, it cannot be said that 30 months' imprisonment, before the reduction for the guilty plea, was manifestly excessive.

As far as the discount for the guilty plea was concerned, this was a matter for the discretion of the judge. The appellant can have no complaint in relation to the figure of ten per cent. That is what he would have received, had he pleaded guilty at the beginning of the first trial. What he did instead was to fight the first trial on a basis which he subsequently accepted was false. He then failed formally to offer a guilty plea until nearly a year and a half later, at the door of the court so far as the re-trial was concerned.

It follows that we do not accept that the judge's sentence was manifestly excessive. Accordingly, the question of a suspended sentence order does not arise. However, we note that the judge did step back and consider whether he could reduce the sentence further so that it would be capable of suspension. His conclusion was that he could not. 27 months' imprisonment was the lowest sentence he could properly pass.

This, then, was a judge who considered the sentence carefully and took into account all relevant considerations before coming to a final decision. We see no basis on which we could properly interfere with that decision.

Accordingly, this appal against sentence is dismissed.