R v Kelvin Clark

This is an appeal against sentence, leave having been granted by the single judge.

The provisions of section 45 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 are engaged in this case because the victim is aged only 16, having been born in May 2010. At the time of the offending he was aged only 14. Restrictions imposed under section 45 in respect of a victim, a witness, or a defendant apply until that individual reaches the age of 18. An order under section 45 was made in relation to the victim in the proceedings in the magistrates' court. It does not appear that an order under section 45 was made in relation to the proceedings in the Crown Court; but whether it was or was not, we make clear that we make an order that section 45 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 applies in this case. Accordingly, reporting restrictions apply. No reporting is permitted that would enable any person to identify the victim. For the avoidance of doubt, that applies to proceedings both in this court and also in the Crown Court. We shall refer to the victim in this judgment as "G". That is an initial that has been chosen randomly. No disrespect is intended by doing so; it is done solely to protect the victim's identity and to ensure that he has the necessary anonymity to which he is entitled.

On 5 August 2025, the appellant (who was then aged 43) was convicted following a summary trial at Willesden Magistrates' Court. On 3 September 2025, the appellant was committed for sentence by the magistrates to the Crown Court, pursuant to section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2020 in respect of an offence of making threats to kill, and pursuant to section 20 of the Sentencing Act 2020 in respect of an offence of assault by beating (or common assault). These were the two offences of which he had been found guilty by the magistrates.

On 29 October 2025, in the Crown Court at Harrow, the appellant was sentenced by His Honour Judge Johal to a term of four years' imprisonment for the offence of making threats to kill and imposed no separate penalty for the offence of assault by beating. A restraining order was also imposed upon the appellant for a period of five years.

The facts may be stated shortly, without diminishing their seriousness or the considerable effect that they had upon the victim.

On 15 March 2025, the appellant approached G, who was on his way to school. G had been expecting to meet the appellant's 13 year old daughter with whom he had been communicating on a variety of social media platforms since earlier in 2025. G had arranged to walk to school together with the appellant's daughter.

G became nervous at the presence of the appellant who was there with other family members and he began to walk behind the appellant's daughter. This was at about 7.30 am. The appellant, along with other members of his family, approached G. The appellant grabbed G by the jumper and pinned him against the wall. The appellant was handed a screwdriver by the daughter's brother (one of the other people present), which he used to wave in G's face and to threaten him. The appellant told G that he was lucky that his heart was still beating and that if his family were there then he would have killed G in front of them.

The police became involved. The appellant was arrested. He was tried and convicted by the magistrates' court. The magistrates committed the appellant to the Crown Court for sentence, because they concluded that their sentencing powers were insufficient. We agree with them about that.

The appellant had no previous convictions, although he had four cautions for damaging property, burglary, theft and possession of an article with a blade in a public place.

The pre-sentence report identified what it described as a pattern of violence in the appellant's history, although, as we have said, he had no previous convictions. He was not in employment. He has not worked since 2016 due to his considerable health issues. He is a single parent who lives with his two teenage daughters in a small flat. His partner is currently serving a lengthy prison sentence.

In sentencing him, the Recorder took account of his mitigation and accepted that he was remorseful, albeit in the context that he had not pleaded guilty, but had been convicted after a trial.

The Recorder also identified that the life of the young victim had been turned upside down. He was now afraid to go out, was fearful of strangers and could no longer concentrate at school.

The Recorder took account of the relevant sentencing guidelines and he treated the making of threats to kill as the lead offence. He said:

We observe that one of the appellant's daughters is a minor; the other is 18 years old. We have up to date information on them and their caring arrangements, as this was ordered by the single judge who granted leave and who also directed expedition of the appeal.

The appellant's grounds of appeal are threefold:

We observe that at the date that the appellant was sentenced, the length of a sentence which could be suspended was 24 months. That length of sentence was subsequently changed in March 2026; it therefore does not affect this appeal. We mention that point solely for completeness.

The appellant has been represented before us this morning by Miss Watts, who has very ably and helpfully emphasised certain points in the appellant's favour. She makes clear that she does not for a moment seek to minimise the impact of what in fact had happened. She accepts, as does the appellant, that there is a high level of harm in this offending. She draws attention to the appellant's remorse, and this morning she proffered an apology, both to the court, but also to everybody else involved, in particular the victim. She explains that the background to the offending is a degree of protectiveness that the appellant had towards his two daughters. She submits that the appellant's mitigation was not taken sufficiently into account in the sentencing exercise. She drew attention to the appellant's health condition, his previous good character, the fact that there is a reasonable prospect of rehabilitation, and the impact upon his minor child, which is a factor we are obliged to take into account under the authorities.

In our judgment, this offending was serious. We can well understand that the Recorder saw fit to pass a stiff sentence upon the appellant. Attacking anyone in the street in the way that the appellant did is serious enough; but it is even more serious when that is done with a screwdriver, although it was thankfully not used to inflict any physical injuries. However, it is a significant aggravating factor, in our judgment. What makes the offending even more reprehensible is the young age of the victim. He was only 14 years old and he was on his way to school. The effect upon him must have been – and in fact was – profound. Not only that, but the appellant was accompanied by other members of his family.

The sort of teenage interactions which had taken place between the victim G and the appellant's daughter were really nothing more than normal teenage communications. Miss Watts has explained to us that the appellant effectively was monitoring his daughter's social media communications and saw some messages that gave him cause for concern, not least because the identity of the person sending the messages initially was not clear. However, to react to that normal teenage behaviour in the way that the appellant did almost defies belief. As explored with Miss Watts during her submissions, this court is well used to violent offending committed in a wide range of circumstances by people with an enormous range of backgrounds, including significant previous convictions. This appellant had no convictions at all. He was obviously in other respects a caring father to his two children whom he was bringing up single-handedly in difficult conditions; and the impact on everybody of what he did that morning has been extremely significant. He has lost his home. His two daughters are now homeless. In addition, the victim, who has provided a powerful Victim Personal Statement, has been significantly affected.

We address here the issue of suspension which, as we have identified, would only apply in any case (due to the date of sentence) if the resulting sentence were a term of 24 months or less. Whether to suspend a sentence is an exercise of discretion and is highly fact specific in each case. However, even if it were applicable here in other circumstances (had the the term been sufficiently short to qualify for consideration) , we would like to make it clear that an unprovoked offence of this type against a young teenage victim, with the use of a screwdriver, would be a significant factor when considering any sentence other than immediate custody.. However, the term under consideration on this appeal is in excess of that which could properly have been suspended in any event and so that does not arise.

We are of the view that the A1 categorisation for this offending was undoubtedly correct. This was a culpability A offence, because of the visible weapon and the threats made in the presence of children. In passing, it was not only made in the presence of children, it was made specifically to a child. It caused category 1 harm, because very serious distress was caused and there has been a considerable and enduring significant impact on the victim. The starting point for a category 1A offence is therefore four years' imprisonment. There is a further aggravating feature in that there were two offences, not one, and we re-emphasise that the victim was a very young teenager. The offender was also supported by other family members, one of whom handed him the screwdriver which was brandished as a weapon. These features would merit an upward movement from the starting point within the range, before the application of a reduction for mitigation.

However, in our judgment, in this difficult case, there is substantial mitigation. The incident was very short, although in our judgment that is of limited weight. Of greater importance are the lack of previous convictions, the serious medical problems from which the appellant undoubtedly suffered, the loss of the family home, and the factor that we have to take into account also, which is the impact on the younger daughter, for whom the appellant was the sole carer. We also accept that there is some remorse, although that has to be taken into account in circumstances where he contested the trial.

This offence was so serious that only an immediate custodial sentence was justified. Nevertheless, in our judgment, four years' imprisonment fails to take account of the significant mitigation which we have identified.

In our judgment, after careful consideration, we have concluded that four years' imprisonment is manifestly excessive. The suitable and appropriate sentence in this case is one of three years' imprisonment. The question of suspension simply does not arise, because that term is greater than the length of any sentence that could properly be suspended at the time or date that this sentence was passed. Therefore, the question of the exercise of the discretion to suspend that sentence does not arise in this case.

Accordingly, we quash the sentence of four years' imprisonment and we substitute a sentence of three years' imprisonment. The restraining order remains in place and unaltered. This appeal therefore succeeds to that extent.