R v Nicholas Green

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of the offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act. In our judgment we will refer to the person in question as "Ms B".

On 1 September 2025, following a trial in the Crown Court at Inner London before Her Honour Judge Baraitser and a jury, the offender, Nicholas Green (now 37 years old), was convicted of two counts of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, contrary to section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, one count of having a bladed article in a public place, contrary to section 139(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and one count of assault by beating, contrary to section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. He was acquitted of two alternative counts of attempted murder and one alternative count of sexual assault.

On 4 December 2025, the offender was sentenced on each of the counts of wounding with intent to an extended determinate sentence of 16 years, comprising a custodial period of 11 years and an extended licence of five years, which were ordered to run concurrently. No separate penalty was imposed in respect of having a bladed article in a public place. In respect of the count of assault by beating, a sentence of three months' imprisonment was imposed, to be served concurrently.

His Majesty's Solicitor General now applies, under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1998, for leave to refer the sentences to this court. The short point relied upon is that the judge incorrectly categorised the level of harm on the wounding offences, resulting in a sentence that was unduly lenient. We grant leave.

At around 22.30 hours on Wednesday 27 March 2024, Philip Thomas (aged 45) and Chintz Patel (aged 43) entered Kennington Underground Station and took the lift down to the platforms. Mr Thomas walked onto the northbound platform and Mr Patel onto the southbound. At around the same time, the offender entered the station and walked down the spiral staircase towards the platforms. CCTV at the station captured the events. The offender walked onto the northbound platform at 22.31.23, followed a few seconds later by Mr Thomas. They stood close to each other for around one minute. At 22.32.52, Mr Thomas walked past the offender. Without any warning, the offender then approached, grabbed hold of and started to strike Mr Thomas repeatedly with his clenched right hand. He was holding a knife with a blade approximately six centimetres in length and the blows appeared aimed at Mr Thomas' neck. Mr Thomas fell to the ground. The offender persisted with his attack. He stabbed Mr Thomas in the back. Mr Thomas was barely able to resist. The attack lasted for about 20 seconds.

At 22.33.03 Mr Patel, hearing a commotion on the neighbouring platform, rushed across to assist Mr Thomas. Mr Patel's intervention brought the offender's attack on Mr Thomas to an end. However, the offender then turned on Mr Patel and stabbed him repeatedly. Mr Patel was lying on the ground as the offender continued to stab him for a further 20 seconds, before other bystanders also bravely intervened and pulled the offender away. As this took place, the offender could be heard shouting, "I just lost my compensation because my neighbour set me up".

At 22.33.41, the offender walked away from the platform and back up the stairs leading towards a lift which he entered with another passenger, Ms B. When the lift reached street level, the offender grabbed Ms B's breast over her clothing for around two to three seconds. The force of the grab caused her pain and left a bloodied handprint on her clothing. Ms B shouted, "What the fuck", before the offender walked out of the station, pushed through the barriers and returned home. He took the offending weapon with him. It was later recovered from his home address.

Both Mr Thomas and Mr Patel were taken to hospital. The injuries they sustained were set out in Agreed Facts before the jury.

As a result of the attack, Mr Thomas suffered the following physical injuries:

An ultrasound of his chest showed that there was an abnormal collection of air around the right lung and an abnormal amount of fluid in the chest cavity.

A scan of his chest, abdomen and pelvis showed an abnormal collection of air and blood around the right lung and the right side of the chest cavity (haemopneumothorax); an abnormal collection of air around the left lung; and soft tissue injury to the lower back. Soft tissue stranding was noted in the right iliac region, which indicated the site of injury and contusion.

An X-ray of the left upper arm showed an open fracture to the bone, comprising the left upper arm resulting in bony fragments that were not aligned and were exposed to the environment.

In total, Mr Thomas had suffered 18 stab wounds.

His medical records were assessed by Dr Michael Kim, a consultant in Emergency Medicine. Dr Kim prepared a report dated 17 August 2024. The Agreed Facts included his assessment of the cumulative effect of these injuries, as follows:

In his report, Dr Kim also addressed whether the potential for harm was greater than that actually caused. He said:

Mr Thomas also suffered psychological injuries, which we will describe later.

As a result of the attack, Mr Patel suffered the following physical injuries:

Mr Patel suffered a total of 13 stab wounds.

The medical records regarding Mr Patel's injuries were assessed by Dr Sammy Sadek, an expert in the field of Accident and Emergency Medicine and Critical Care. As set out in the Agreed Facts before the jury, Dr Sadek concluded:

Dr Sadek's assessment of whether the potential for harm was greater than that actually caused was as follows:

Both prosecution and defence counsel submitted to the judge at the sentencing hearing that harm in both the cases of Mr Thomas and Mr Patel fell within category 1 of the Sentencing Council Guideline applicable to offences of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm (“the Guideline”).

The judge also had the benefit of reports from four consultant forensic psychiatrists who had assessed the offender for the purposes of trial. Three had found the offender fit to plead. Their consensus was that he had not been suffering from a mental illness at the time of the offending, but instead was suffering from a personality disorder which did not impede his ability to make rational choices or to understand the nature and consequences of his actions. As the judge noted, there was no medical report dealing specifically with the extent of the offender's culpability for the offences, as post-conviction the offender had refused to co-operate in the preparation of further reports.

The judge also had the benefit of a pre-sentence report, dated 4 November 2025, which concluded that the offender gave no thought to the impact or harm that his conduct would cause his victims, and that he lacked victim empathy in its entirety.

In addition to the physical injuries detailed above, the judge noted the psychological impact of the attacks on all three victims, as set out in their Victim Personal Statements. Mr Thomas had been unable to work since the attack and suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. He described the psychological impact of dealing with the knowledge that he might have died that day.

Mr Patel had also suffered a long-term impact on his mental health. His scars were a constant reminder of what had happened to him. He took medication for depression and anxiety.

Ms B had started to have panic attacks after the incident and could no longer use the underground. She had been forced to leave the job that she loved and move away from the area where she lived. She had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.

As a result of audibility issues with the recording of the sentencing hearing, we do not have a transcript. However, we do have the judge's full speaking note of her sentencing remarks.

The judge first considered the position relating to the attack on Mr Thomas. She placed the offending within category 2A of the Guideline, with a starting point of seven years' imprisonment and a range of six to ten years' imprisonment for a single offence after trial. Regarding culpability, she found that it was a persistent assault which only came to an end when Mr Patel bravely intervened to stop it, and that it was also premeditated in the sense that the offender had entered the underground with a knife and an intention to use it. In arriving at this conclusion, the judge undertook a detailed review of the psychiatric evidence. She concluded that, whilst his personality disorder might mitigate his offending to some extent by providing an explanation for it, it did not reduce the offender's culpability within the guideline category range.

Regarding harm, the judge placed the harm within category 2. She noted that, but for good fortune and the timely intervention of the Emergency Services, the consequences could have been much more severe. Whilst Mr Thomas' mental health continued to be affected, the judge said that he had made real progress physically, including managing to run a marathon for charity. She concluded that his injuries could properly be described as grave, but that there was "no evidence" that the injuries inflicted were life-threatening. She continued: "and in my judgment the risk that they might have been does not move the case into category 1", albeit that it did feature in increasing the starting point within the category 2 range.

As to aggravating factors, the judge found that the attack took place on a busy station platform and so was witnessed by other passengers (including a young girl), and that at the time of the offending the offender was subject to a Community Order for a previous conviction of harassment.

The judge acknowledged two mitigating factors: that the offender has no relevant previous convictions; and that the extreme stress that he was under at the time of the offending was likely to have exacerbated his severe personality disorder.

Regarding the attack on Mr Paterl, the judge placed the offending again within category 2A of the Guideline. The culpability assessment was the same as for the attack on Mr Thomas. The harm assessment was also category 2 because, whilst Mr Patel's mental health had continued to suffer, his physical health had recovered sufficiently to enable him to return to a life of relative normality. His injuries could, she stated, properly be described as grave; but they were not life threatening, although the risk that they could have been increased the starting point within the category 2 range.

The mitigating factors were the same as those in relation to Mr Thomas, but the judge acknowledged the additional aggravating factor that Mr Patel had been attacked whilst he was acting in defence of Mr Thomas.

The judge placed the assault on Ms B within category A1 of the Sentencing Council Guideline for common assault and imposed a concurrent sentence of three months' imprisonment.

Taking account of the totality of the offending, the judge then imposed a determinate sentence of 11 years' imprisonment, which was just above the category sentencing range, to reflect the fact that there had been two wounding attacks.

She then considered whether the seriousness of the offence justified a life sentence, but found that it did not on the basis that the jury did not find that the offender intended to kill his victims and the fact that the offender had had no previous experience of custody.

The judge made a finding of dangerousness and accordingly imposed an extended licence of five years, which raised the total sentence to one of 16 years.

Mr Richardson, for the Solicitor General, submits that this was a terrifying episode of extreme and unprovoked violence which involved senseless acts of gratuitous violence. His overarching submission is that the section 18 offending was wrongly placed within category 2, rather than category 1, for harm; and that a custodial term of 11 years, with a five-year extended licence did not therefore reflect the gravity of the offending.

In support of his argument, he made three broad submissions:

Mr Richardson submits that, had the judge correctly placed harm in category 1, the proper sentencing range would be ten to 16 years' imprisonment, with a starting point for just one of the offences being 12 years' imprisonment. On the basis that the aggravating and mitigating factors cancelled each other out, he submits that the correct sentence to reflect totality would have been in the region of 18 years' imprisonment, together with an extended licence period of five years.

Miss Ahluwalia for the offender has made a vigorous defence of the judge's sentencing decisions. She made five central submissions:

The Guideline (effective from 1 July 2021) provides as follows:

Section 63 of the Sentencing Act 2020 requires that, when assessing the seriousness of any offence, a court must consider:

The Sentencing Council “General Guideline: overarching principles” includes the following in relation to the assessment of harm:

The first appellate case to interpret the Guideline was R v O'Bryan [2021] EWCA Crim 1472; [2022] 1 Cr App R(S) 53, at [34] and [35]. First, the phrase "life-threatening" does not cover every wounding causing injury which, left untreated, might lead to death. Secondly, the Guideline must be read as a whole, and it must always be remembered that the harm caused must already be "really serious" to come within Guideline at all. Thirdly, the court should assess the level of harm with reference to the impact on the victim. Fourthly, category 1 is reserved for cases of exceptional seriousness, even within the class of section 18 cases. Fifthly, since the Sentencing Council did not define "life-threatening injury", it would be unwise to attempt to give a comprehensive definition or to substitute wording for that of the guideline. This guidance was endorsed in R v McGowan [2023] EWCA Crim 247, at [44].

The meaning of "life-threatening" in this context was considered further in R v Dixon [2023] EWCA Crim 280; [2023] 2 Cr App R(S) 31. In that case a woman had suffered injuries which included a serious fracture to the eye socket and a stab wound that perforated part of her voice box. The medical evidence was that death could have been possible, had medical treatment been delayed. The court stated at [30] that category 1 harm requires that particularly grave or life-threatening injuries are actually caused. It is not enough for category 1 harm that such injury could possibly have resulted if certain contingent events had occurred. In other words, a risk of injuries becoming life-threatening is insufficient. The court found (at [29]) that without a further medical report there was insufficient evidence that particularly grave or life-threatening injuries had actually been suffered within the meaning of the Guideline, although the nature and the extent of the injuries were such that the judge should have moved upwards from the starting point to the borderline between category 1 and category 2. At [26] and [27] the court referred to paragraphs C.1.11 and D.1.19 of the earlier Overarching Principles: Seriousness Guideline, including the indication in the latter paragraph that if much more harm or much less harm has been caused by the offence than the offender intended or foresaw, the culpability of the offender, depending on the circumstances, may be regarded as carrying greater or lesser weight as appropriate.

In R v Kelly [2024] EWCA Crim 1177, the judge had assessed the offending as coming within category 1 harm on the basis that life-threatening injuries had been sustained, as the victim could easily have bled out on the floor had the police and medics not reached him in time. Allowing the appeal, the court observed at [26] that the Guideline made clear that when considering harm, the judge must have regard to the injury caused; in this case the victim had made a near complete recovery and there was no medical evidence indicating that his injuries were life-threatening. At [28] to [30] the court said that, whilst the judge was right to have regard to the risk of life-threatening injury, in accordance with Dixon and paragraph D.1.19 of the Overarching Principles: Seriousness Guideline, conduct which carries the risk of foreseeable life-threatening injury should increase the offender's culpability, rather than placing the offence within category 1 harm. In Kelly, the court said that it was one of the multiple factors that put the offending into culpability A (see [32]).

References under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 are made for the purpose of the avoidance of gross error, the allaying of widespread public concern at what may appear to be an unduly lenient sentence, and the preservation of public confidence in cases where a judge appears to have departed to a substantial extent from the norms of sentencing generally applied by the courts in cases of a particular type: see Attorney General's Reference No 132 of 2001 (R v Johnson) [2002] EWCA Crim 1418; [2003] 1 Cr App R(S) 41 at [25]. As was emphasised in R v Mohammed Arfan [2022] EWCA Crim 1416 at [34], sentencing is an art and not a science, and leniency itself is not a vice. For appellate interference to be justified, the sentence in question must be not only lenient, but unduly so. We remind ourselves that the hurdle is a high one.

As indicated, the Solicitor General's submission is that the harm actually suffered by both Mr Thomas and Mr Patel fell within category 1. The relevant question is whether the injuries that they actually suffered (as opposed to the injuries that they were at risk of suffering) were "particularly grave or life-threatening". That is the first question for us.

The medical evidence relevant to these questions was contained in the Agreed Facts and written reports. Thus the trial judge had no particular advantage over this court in this particular respect.

From Dr Kim's report, the most serious of Mr Thomas' injuries appears to be the combination of haemopneumothorax in the right lung and pneumothorax in the left lung, leading to severe hypoxia. The consequences of these injuries were assessed by Dr Kim as being that, "without immediate intervention, this could lead to respiratory failure and death".

This is sufficient to classify the injuries Mr Thomas suffered as life-threatening. The medical expert concluded that, absent immediate medical intervention, the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered by Mr Thoms could have led to his death.

We do not consider it necessary for the medical report to have particularised the likelihood of death occurring absent immediate medical intervention in order to place the harm within category 1. Dr Kim's conclusion that death could have occurred was not, unlike the expert's opinion in Dixon, or the judge's assessment in Kelly, based on the occurrence of any contingent events. It was not that Mr Thomas was at risk of suffering an injury which could have killed him; it was the injuries from which he was actually suffering that were ones that could kill him. Accordingly, we consider that the judge was wrong to conclude that there was no evidence that Mr Thomas' injuries were life-threatening.

We note also that whilst Mr Thomas continues to struggle with his mental health, as the judge emphasised, he had made real progress with his physical health following the attack; he had been, for example, able to run a marathon. But the fact that a victim may have made a near complete physical recovery does not mean that the injuries suffered at the time of infliction were not life-threatening.

We have reminded ourselves that category 1 harm is reserved for cases of exceptional seriousness, even within the class of section 18 cases. We consider this to be such a case. The attack on Mr Thomas left him on the ground of an underground station platform with 18 stab wounds. The medical evidence of Dr Kim concluded that if he had not received immediate medical intervention, he could have died. We therefore agree with the Solicitor General and with the submissions of counsel before the judge that the actual harm suffered by Mr Thomas was life-threatening and should have been placed within category 1 harm.

Dr Sadek's report indicates that Mr Patel suffered injuries which, whilst extremely serious, were not in his view life-threatening. The blood loss which could have bled to a life-threatening degree "does not appear to have occurred, however, and whilst they required surgical closure it does not appear that any of them required emergency packing, the use of tourniquets or blood transfusion".

However, there is also the question of intended and foreseeable harm to consider, in accordance with section 63 of the Sentencing Act 2020. As we have explained, in Dixon and Kelly the court held that a foreseeable risk of life-threatening injury, whilst relevant to the seriousness of the offending, increased the offender's culpability rather than the assessment of harm. However, this approach was based on paragraph D.1.19 of the Overarching Principles: Seriousness Guideline, which is no longer in effect. There is no comparable indication in the current General guideline: overarching principles. As we set out earlier, the relevance of intended or foreseeable harm is addressed under the "Harm" section of the Overarching Guideline.

When the actual harm suffered by Mr Patel together with the risk of greater harm is placed alongside the intended and foreseeable harm, in our judgment the correct categorisation for harm in the case of Mr Patel was also category 1. We acknowledge of course that the offender was acquitted of the count of attempted murder; but, as Mr Richardson has submitted, this was a frenzied attack on Mr Patel involving no fewer than 13 stab wounds. Thus we consider that harm in Mr Patel's case also fell to be placed in category 1.

As we have indicated, Miss Ahluwalia submitted that, irrespective of whether or not the classification was increased, as we have increased it, the overall sentence of 11 years' custody with an extended licence of five years was nevertheless not unduly lenient.

We cannot accept Miss Ahluwalia's submission. The change in classification produces a significant increase in the starting point for a single offence. As is rightly accepted for the offender, that is before aggravating and mitigating factors are considered, and, crucially, before account is taken of the fact that there were two section 18 offences and one assault in order to reflect the totality of the offending.

We have concluded that the custodial term of 11 years, with an extended licence period of five years was unduly lenient.

Accordingly, we must consider what new sentences to impose. As we have indicated, the proper characterisation of harm for the attack on both Mr Thomas and Mr Patel was category 1. Alongside the unchallenged assessment of the offender's culpability, that places the offending on both counts of section 18 wounding within category 1A.

The starting point for a single category 1A offence is 12 years' custody, with a range of ten to 16 years.

We have considered the aggravating and mitigating features identified by the judge, whose approach in this respect is not challenged. The aggravating factors are: the presence of the public on the underground station platform, within a confined space, and the fact that the offence was committed whilst the offender was serving a community order. In addition, and as the judge noted, the attack on Mr Patel took place as Mr Patel went to the assistance of Mr Thomas.

The mitigating factors are: that the offender had no previous offences for violence and his previously undiagnosed extreme personality disorder. Although that did not reduce his culpability, it is a significant and material factor. We do not accept Miss Ahluwalia's submission that the fact that is a reference by the Solicitor General provides any additional mitigation. This is not one of those rare cases of the type identified in R v X, Y and Z [2026] EWCA Crim 845, at [168] and [169] as justifying any allowance in this regard.

We must also consider the totality of the offending. These were two extremely serious section 18 attacks; and we must also take account of the assault on Ms B.

Standing back, we consider that the minimum sentence which reflects the totality of this offending is a custodial term of 18 years.

Accordingly, we quash the sentences imposed for the two section 18 offences on counts 2 and 4. We do not interfere with the extended licence period of five years imposed by the judge following her finding of dangerousness. The total sentence on count 2 is an extended sentence of 23 years, comprising a custodial term of 18 years and an extended licence period of five years. The same concurrent sentence is imposed in relation to count 4. The sentence on count 7 in respect of the assault on Ms B is undisturbed.

Finally, we record our gratitude to both counsel who have appeared before us for their written and oral submissions. Miss Ahluwalia indicated to us at the outset of today's hearing that the offender has expressed dissatisfation both with her services and those of her instructing solicitors. We would wish to record that she has discharged her role as counsel for the offender before us with great skill.