R v Luke Humphreys

This is an appeal against sentence which is brought with the leave of the single judge.

On 1 April 2025, in the Crown Court at Canterbury, having pleaded guilty on 21 January 2025, the appellant was sentenced for three offences: causing serious injury by dangerous driving, contrary to section 1A of the Road Traffic Act 1988; driving a motor vehicle with excess alcohol; and failing to stop after an accident. The appellant had pleaded guilty to these offences at the plea and trial preparation hearing. He was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment for the offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving. No separate penalty, apart from licence endorsement, was imposed on the other two offences. He was disqualified from driving for a period of 39 months and until an extended re-test is passed.

We say at the outset that the pronouncement of a sentence of imprisonment, rather than detention in a young offender institution, was made in error. The appellant was 20 years old at the time of sentence, and so he should have been sentenced to detention in a young offender institution. However, this error does not affect the length of the sentence or otherwise affect the outcome of this appeal. It is clear from the sentencing remarks that the judge was well aware that the appellant was aged 20 at the time that he passed sentence.

The offence took place late on the evening of 6 January 2024. At the time the appellant was a few weeks short of his 20^th birthday. He had been to a public house with friends. He admitted to the author of the pre-sentence report that he had drunk four pints of beer during the course of the evening.

The appellant drove off towards his home in his Volkswagen Scirocco. He drove out of a side road, Felderland Lane, and crossed both lanes of the A256 at excessive speed. He lost control of his vehicle and crashed into the front passenger side of a Ford Fiesta that was being driving along the A256 by Joshua Gamble. The force of the impact caused the Ford Fiesta to spin out of control and to end up on the opposite side of the carriageway, facing oncoming traffic. The appellant's vehicle continued across the carriageway, still out of control, and collided with a tree.

16 year old Scarlet Prothero was in the front passenger seat of Mr Gamble's car. The force of the impact was such that she was thrown from the vehicle, with the seatbelt she was wearing wrapped around her neck. She was rendered unconscious. As the judge observed in his sentencing remarks, she was lucky not to have been killed instantly.

Mr Gamble, the driver, was also injured, though not seriously.

By good fortune, a police vehicle had been driving along the A256 and happened to come across the collision.

We have seen footage from the body-worn camera of one of the officers. It shows an officer speaking to the appellant. The officer asked the appellant if he was the driver of the Volkswagen car. He said, "No", and walked away from the scene.

The appellant told the author of the pre-sentence report that he had heard the passenger in the other car screaming that her leg had gone, and that he had panicked and fled the scene. He walked a considerable distance away from the crash site to his home.

The police were able to identify that the vehicle belonged to the appellant and attended his home. The appellant told the police a false story, to the effect that his car had been taken from him in an armed robbery in which he had been left at the roadside. The sentencing judge rightly described his story as "ridiculous". It was a transparent attempt to avoid being identified as the driver, and the police were soon able to establish that the story had been concocted by the appellant.

The appellant was breathalysed. The reading was 69 micrograms in 100 millilitres of breath (almost exactly twice the legal alcohol limit for driving). A blood reading taken sometime later was not over the limit, but this is not significant.

The appellant was arrested. He declined to comment when interviewed.

As we have said, he pleaded guilty to these offences at the PTPH. A further count of fraud was left to lie on the file.

Miss Prothero was taken to William Harvey Hospital by ambulance. Her injuries included a fracture to the right thigh bone which subsequently required an operation to fix the fracture and which required two nails to be inserted to hold the broken segments of the bone together. Miss Prothero was in a great deal of pain and remained in hospital for 12 days after the accident. A follow-up operation also had to take place. Miss Prothero also suffered back pain, neck pain, feet pain, cuts and bruises to her feet, arms, chest, stomach and legs and a burn to her forehead from the deployment of the airbag. She also sustained pain to her ribcage, some of her teeth were broken and cracked and she had ongoing body stiffness, all as a result of the collision.

By the time of the trial, Miss Prothero had been discharged from further medical treatment for her injuries. The medical reports and records that we have seen did not state specifically that she would suffer from any long-term consequences from the injuries, apart from scarring and the fact that one leg is slightly shorter than the other.

The court was provided with three victim impact statements from Miss Prothero. The first was given some weeks after the crash, on 9 February 2024. She said that she had feared that she would lose her right leg. She said that her life had been catastrophically ruined by the accident. She had been in very great pain. She said that she had wanted to be a flight attendant and to travel the world, but she did not think that this would now be possible. For a while her father had become her full-time carer, and both parents had to support her to dress and to carry out everyday tasks, including taking her to the bathroom.

Two further victim impact statements were provided shortly before the sentencing hearing, dated 17 and 20 March 2025. By this stage Miss Prothero had been discharged by the medical consultant and her injuries were healing well. However, as we have said, there was significant scarring on her leg, and one leg was shorter than the other. This is likely to be permanent. In the March 2025 statements, Miss Prothero said that she was still having trouble sleeping. She had been obliged to leave the travel and tourism course that she had been undertaking at college and so had had to abandon her ambition of becoming a flight attendant. She said that she will not now be able to take a job that requires standing for long periods, and so was unable to return to a part-time job working at Iceland. She said that she had been interviewed for jobs but that she had been unsuccessful because employers were concerned about her ability to stand for long periods and that this was affecting her employability. Her application for an apprenticeship for dental nursing had been turned down because of concerns about her mobility. Her ability to socialise had been affected and this had led to feelings of depression. Miss Prothero said:

In the Notice of Appeal, Mr Nicholas Hamblin, counsel for the appellant, noted that a few days after the sentencing hearing several social medica postings disclosed that Miss Prothero had been successful in obtaining employment as an apprentice at a riding stables near Dover. This apprenticeship is for 30 hours a week and includes riding horses. Mr Hamblin does not suggest that either the prosecution or the judge was aware of this job opportunity at the time of the sentencing hearing. He says, however, that it shows that Miss Prothero has employment opportunities, notwithstanding the injuries sustained as a result of these offences.

At the time of the accident the appellant was of previous good character. He worked as a plumber. He provided the court with a number of positive character references. He expressed remorse. The appellant does not suffer from addiction to either drink or drugs. He was in a stable relationship with his partner of five years. The author of the pre-sentence report said that he has a low likelihood of re-conviction for serious offending.

It is apparent from his sentencing remarks that the judge imposed a sentence for the lead offence (causing serious injury by dangerous driving), which took account of the other two offences (driving with excess alcohol and failure to stop after an accident). This was plainly sensible and avoided any risk of double counting. No criticism is made of this approach.

The prosecution had submitted that the appellant's offending fell within category A1 of the relevant guideline for the offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving.

The defence had submitted that the offending fell within category B2.

The judge agreed with the prosecution. The judge said that the case fell within culpability category A, because the appellant was highly impaired by drink, being twice the drink-drive limit. He was also driving at a speed that was inappropriate for the road conditions. That was demonstrated by the fact that he was unable to stop at the junction and drove across both carriageways. This was a highly dangerous manoeuvre.

As for the appropriate harm category, the judge placed the offending in category 1, because the injuries sustained by Miss Prothero have had a substantial and long-term effect on her ability to work, resulting in her having to alter her career path.

The starting point for an offence in category A1 is four years' custody, with a category range from three to five years. The judge took account as aggravating features of the fact that the appellant left the scene, although he was well aware that a passenger had been seriously injured, and thereafter told a series of lies in an attempt to exonerate himself and to obstruct the investigation, even to the extent of alleging that he had been the victim of a very serious crime.

As for mitigation, the judge took account of the appellant's youth, his previous good character, the positive character references and his remorse. He also accepted that the appellant had matured in the year or so since the incident.

The judge decided that the appropriate sentence after a trial would have been 40 months' imprisonment. He reduced this by 25 per cent for the guilty pleas at the PTPH, which resulted in the sentence of 30 months' imprisonment. There is no criticism of the extent of the reduction for the guilty plea.

As we have said, the sentence should have been one of detention in a young offender institution, but nothing rests on this for the purposes of this appeal.

The appellant has been represented before us by Mr Hamblin, who was trial counsel. There are two grounds of appeal. The first is that the sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle in that the case should have been placed in culpability category B, not category A. Mr Hamblin submitted that none of the criteria required for this case to fall within culpability category A was present.

The second ground of appeal is that the correct for harm is category 2, not category 1. Mr Hamblin submitted than none of the criteria for harm category 1 applies to this case.

Since the sentencing hearing the victim has been able to secure employment, which is a matter, it is submitted, that this court should take into account. Mr Hamblin further submitted

In his careful and thorough sentencing remarks, the judge expressly took account of all of the considerations that were relevant to the sentencing exercise. In our judgment, the judge was plainly right to place this offending in culpability category A. Three of the factors which point to culpability category A were present in this case. First, the appellant's driving was highly impaired by the consumption of alcohol. He was twice the legal limit and admitted to drinking four pints of beer over the course of the evening. The circumstances of the collision demonstrate that the appellant's alcohol consumption had highly impaired his driving ability. There is no suggestion that he was, when sober, a bad driver.

Second, the appellant engaged in what was obviously a highly dangerous manoeuvre. He drove out from a side road onto a main road at high speed and without stopping. This was not a case of a driver who simply misjudged his braking.

Third, his speed was highly inappropriate for the prevailing road conditions. This incident took place at night, in darkness.

As for the categorisation of harm, there are three circumstances which bring a case into harm category 1. The first two do not apply to this case. One is where a particularly grave or life-threatening injury was caused. Whilst we do not for a moment underestimate the pain and suffering that has resulted from the leg injury and the other injuries suffered by Miss Prothero, in the context of the range of injuries that a dangerous driving offence may cause, this does not count as a grave injury for the purposes of the guidelines. Nor is there any suggestion that Miss Prothero's injuries were life-threatening.

The second criterion which would lead to category 1 harm applies if the injury results in physical or psychological harm which necessitates life-long dependence on third party care or medical treatment. Once again, there was no evidence of this.

The third criterion is where the offence results in a permanent, irreversible injury or condition which has a substantial and long-term effect on the victim's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities, or on their ability to work. It was this criterion that the sentencing judge decided applies in this case.

We accept that the judge should have placed this case in harm category 2. There was no evidence of a substantial or long-term effect on Miss Prothero's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. The question is whether the injury has had a substantial and long-term effect on Miss Prothero's ability to work.

There was no evidence or suggestion that Miss Prothero was unable to undertake work of any kind at all. However, contrary to what was submitted before us by Mr Hamblin, there may be circumstances in which this criterion is satisfied, even though the victim is able, despite their injuries to do some work, if many jobs or professions are closed off from the victim. As has been said by this court many times, the sentencing guidelines should not be read as if they are a statute.

The victim in this case was only 16 years old when she sustained her injuries. As she said in her victim impact statement, she had been obliged to drop out of her travel and tourism course at college and had been rejected for other jobs and for a dental nursing apprenticeship because of concerns about her mobility. However, these events took place in the months after the collision, when Miss Prothero's mobility was substantially impaired. She was unable to carry on with her college course because at the time when she dropped out she was on crutches. By the time of the sentencing hearing, however, Miss Prothero was no longer on crutches. She had been discharged from medical treatment sometime before.

A medical report dated 15 August 2024 said only that Miss Prothero had a slightly tired feeling at the fracture site after a long walk.

There was no medical evidence, therefore, to the effect that Miss Prothero's injuries had a substantial and long-term effect on her ability to work. They certainly had a substantial temporary effect and for a considerable time. But this is not enough to bring the case within harm category 1.

It is true that Miss Prothero's recent victim impact statements indicate that she has concerns about whether the injuries will have a long-term negative impact upon her career ambitions, but, as we have said, there is no expert medical evidence to back this up. We hope that the injuries caused to Miss Prothero by this serious offence will be no more than a temporary setback for her career aspirations.

We should make clear that we have not been influenced by the evidence referred to in the grounds of appeal to the effect that after the sentencing hearing Miss Prothero was successful in obtaining an apprenticeship at a riding stables. This cannot retrospectively undermine the factual basis upon which sentencing took place on 1 April 2025. Also, as we have said, the fact that a victim can obtain some work, which may not be the type of work that she would have preferred to do, does not necessarily mean that the criterion for harm category 1 is not satisfied.

For those reasons we accept that the appellant's offending falls within category A2, not category A1, of the relevant sentencing guidelines. However, we do not accept that this means that the sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.

The starting point for category A2 is three years' custody, with a category range of two to four years. It follows that a sentence of 40 months (three years and six months), before credit for the guilty plea, was well within the sentencing range for a category A2 offence. Even though the injuries that were suffered by Miss Prothero, and their effects upon her, did not bring the case within category A1, they merited a substantial increase from the starting point. She was 16 years old when the offence took place. The injuries were severe and very painful. She spent 12 days in hospital. She will always have scarring and is likely always to have one leg shorter than the other. The impact upon her career aspirations and social life has been very significant.

The aggravating and mitigating factors must then be taken into account. There are significant aggravating factors and significant mitigating factors in this case, including the fact that the appellant was twice the legal drink-drive limit, he injured two people, he fled the scene, despite being aware that his principal victim was seriously injured, and he made up a story about a robbery in an attempt to put the police off the scent. These are broadly balanced by the mitigating factors, principally youth, previous good character and remorse.

In our judgment, when the circumstances of the offence and the aggravating and mitigating factors are taken into account, a sentence of 40 months' custody, before credit for the guilty plea, was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle for this category A2 offence.

For these reasons the appeal is dismissed.