R v Catherine Pearl

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence. Under those provisions, where a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall, during that person's lifetime, be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act. This appeal is brought with the leave of the single judge.

On 12 November 2024, having pleaded guilty before Oxford Magistrates' Court, the appellant was committed for sentence, pursuant to section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2020, in respect of two offences of abuse of trust by sexual activity, contrary to section 16 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The offences related to the same victim, who was a pupil at the school at which the appellant worked as a senior member of the leadership team. The appellant was sentenced to a total of 28 months' imprisonment. In addition, an indefinite restraining order was imposed on the appellant preventing her from contacting the victim whether directly or indirectly. Further, a sexual harm prevention order ("SHPO") was imposed to last for a period of 10 years.

As she was convicted of an offence listed in Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the appellant was required to comply with the notification requirements for 10 years and, having been convicted of an offence specified in the Schedule to the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 (Prescribed Criteria and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2009, the appellant has now been included in the relevant list by the Disclosure and Barring Service. The practical reality is that the appellant will never again be employed in a school or similar institution.

The appeal is concerned only with the SHPO. The appellant does not contend that the sentence of 28 months' imprisonment was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.

The appellant has been represented before us by Mr Peter Du Feu of counsel. We are grateful to him for his clear and helpful submissions.

The appellant was a qualified teacher. She met the victim when she was the victim's head of year, when the victim joined the appellant's school in Oxfordshire in Year 7 at age 11. The appellant continued as the victim's head of year until 2018, when the appellant was promoted to Deputy Headteacher. The victim was a very vulnerable child suffering from Tourette's Syndrome and OCD. At the age of 17 she was diagnosed with ADHD. She struggled with her mental health, self-harming, and suffered from an eating disorder. The victim required significant additional support which, from the outset, was given to her by the appellant. They became very close and would speak and email consistently.

When the victim reached the age of 15 the appellant became still more heavily involved in looking after her, both at school and at home. From that stage onwards the conversations between them became more sexualised and the relationship became sexual shortly after the victim completed her GCSEs. They had penetrative and non-penetrative sexual relations at school and elsewhere, on a very regular basis, sometimes in semi-public or risky circumstances. The sexual relationship was initiated by the appellant. The appellant told the victim that she loved her. There was an age difference of 27 years between the appellant and her victim.

After the victim reached the age of 18 and after she left home to go to university the relationship continued. The victim eventually ended the relationship. She twice attempted to take her life. After one of these attempts the victim informed a friend, and then her mother and the police were informed.

The appellant admitted the relationship straightaway after she was arrested. The victim impact statement made clear that the relationship with the appellant had had a devastating effect on the victim.

The appellant was aged 50 at the time of her conviction. She was of previous good character. She was married with two children, one of whom attended the same school as the victim. Her husband has stood by her. After her arrest the appellant voluntarily sought counselling.

In her sentencing remarks the judge described the appellant's actions as amounting to "predatory, prolonged and destructive sexual abuse" and to a gross breach of trust. The judge said:

The judge took the view that it was appropriate to impose a sentence that fell above the relevant sentencing range in the Sentencing Guidelines. As we have said, there is no challenge to the length of the custodial sentence.

So far as the SHPO is concerned, the judge said:

On behalf of the appellant Mr Du Feu submitted that the judge's imposition of the SHPO was wrong in principle because it was unnecessary and/or was disproportionate. He submitted either that the SHPO should not have been imposed at all or that its scope should have been very much narrower than it was.

In the well-known case of R v Smiths and Ors [2011] EWCA Crim 1772, this Court said that sexual offences protection orders, the predecessors to SHPOs, should be tailored to the exact requirements of the case, especially as breach of such orders is a criminal offence. The Court said that the restrictions imposed by the orders must be necessary and proportionate.

The guidance given by the Court in relation to sexual offence protection orders applies equally to SHPOs. In R v Parsons and Morgan [2017] EWCA Crim 2163, the Court of Appeal said at [5]:

The maximum sentence for breach of an SHPO is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years (see the Sentencing Act 2020, section 354). The SHPO that was imposed on the appellant was in a common form. The restrictions can be divided into three parts. First, paragraphs 1 to 7 were concerned with restrictions on the use of any device that is capable of accessing the Internet. Amongst other restrictions the appellant is required to notify the police within 3 days of acquiring such a device and must make the device available for inspection by the police at any time. There are also restrictions on the disposal of any such device and upon tampering with it. There are similar restrictions on using any Internet chat forum, electronic chat application, VPN and other IP addresses unless they notify the police and make them available for inspection when required. Finally, these restrictions include a restriction which prevents the appellant from using the Internet to contact a child under 18.

We consider that these restrictions are unnecessary and disproportionate and should not have been imposed. Unlike so many sexual offences that come before the courts the appellant's offending had nothing to do with the Internet or with accessing indecent images. Put bluntly, this was simply not that sort of case. The appellant's offending grew out of a wholly inappropriate relationship with a single individual. As the court said at [20] of Smith, the use of the Internet is nowadays a part of everyday living for a large proportion of the public and it is essential for most jobs and lawful recreation. Given that this is not a case which gives rise to any concern that the appellant will make use of the Internet to contact other potential victims or to access unlawful pornography, it was unnecessary and disproportionate to impose this class of restrictions upon the appellant.

The second part of the restrictions and the SHPO is contained in paragraph 8. This states that the appellant may "not seek or hold any voluntary or paid employment which would result in them working or having any position of authority or care of children under the age of 18." In our judgment, it was wholly appropriate for the judge to impose this restriction. The appellant's offending took place in the course of paid employment in which she had pastoral responsibility for children under the age of 18. She acted in a manipulative and secretive way. It is true that the appellant currently has no intention of taking on such work and has been debarred from remaining in the teaching profession. This restriction is nonetheless necessary and proportionate. The appellant's intentions may change and she and her family plan to settle in a different part of the country where her history will not be known.

The third and final part of the SHPO (paragraphs 9 and 10) impose restrictions upon dealing with children under 18. The appellant is barred from living in the same household as any child under the age of 18 or entering or remaining in any household where a child under the age of 18 is present, unless with the written approval of Children’s Social Services and the Police Service for the area. In addition, she must not have any contact with a child under 18 unless it is inadvertent and unavoidable, it is supervised by the child's parent or guardian or someone appointed by them, in each case with knowledge of the appellant's convictions. Unsupervised contact with a child under 18 is prohibited unless it is with the consent of the child's parent or guardian, who has knowledge of her convictions and the parent or guardian has received written consent from Children Social Services in the area. These are very onerous restrictions. In Smith, at [22], this Court said that care must be taken in considering whether prohibitions on contact with children are really necessary.

In our judgment, these restrictions too are unnecessary and disproportionate. This is for several cumulative reasons. At the heart, however, is the fact that this offending, though very serious, took place in the context of an intense relationship with a single individual. That individual is protected by the restraining order. There is no evidence that the appellant poses a threat to children in general. She is not a predatory paedophile. She made full and frank admissions of her offending. She was of previous good character and exhibited no concerning behaviour in the period between arrest and sentence. She benefits from the support of her family. The writer of the pre-sentence report said that the appellant poses a low risk (0.54 per cent) of committing an offence involving serious harm. In addition to the protection afforded by the restraining order there is the further protection from the notification requirements and the appellant's inclusion in the Disclosure and Barring Service List.

In Parsons and Morgan the Court of Appeal said at paragraph 71 that "there must be an identifiable risk of contact offences before prohibitions on contact can be justified." There is no identifiable risk of contact offences concerning any other person but the victim in the present case. Set against that background the impact of paragraphs 9 to 10 of the SHPO would be very serious indeed upon the appellant and her family. It would be disproportionate. The appellant's youngest child is 18 years old and is likely to have friends or acquaintances who are under 18 years old and so would trigger the restrictions.

Before leaving this appeal we should make clear that nothing we have said detracts from the seriousness of the appellant's offending. It is hard to think of a more grievous breach of trust. It is behaviour that had a terrible impact on an extremely vulnerable child. The sentencing judge was plainly right in our opinion to take a very serious view of it in her clear and thorough sentencing remarks. Nevertheless, for the reasons we have given we allow the appeal and quash the SHPO. We substitute a new SHPO with a single restriction, namely that contained in paragraph 8 of the SHPO which we have set aside restricting the appellant from seeking or holding any voluntary or paid employment which would result in her working or having any position of authority or care of children under the age of 18. The SHPO will last for 10 years from the date of sentence, namely 23 January 2025.