Peter Paul Zeberian Green v R

This is the hearing of applications for an extension of time and for leave to appeal, and if leave is granted, an appeal, against conviction referred to the full court by the single judge. The applicant is Peter Green, who is now aged 93 years.

On 7 April 2022 in the Crown Court at Lincoln, following a trial before His Honour Judge John Pini KC and a jury, Mr Green, then aged 90 years, was convicted of rape (counts 1 and 2), attempted rape (counts 3 and 4) and indecent assault (counts 5 to 8). The offending was contended to have taken place after September 1992. There were two separate victims of the offending who I will refer to as C1 and C2, and who have the benefit of lifelong anonymity pursuant to the provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992. On 6 July 2022 Mr Green was sentenced to a total of 24 years imprisonment, with a 1 year extended licence period. The judge imposed a sentence of 12 years on count 2 in respect of C1, with a concurrent sentence on count 1, and a consecutive sentence on count 4 of 12 years imprisonment with a year extended licence, on count 4, with concurrent sentences on counts 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8.

There are three grounds of appeal. They relate to: (1) the directions on the issue of consent in relation to C1 and counts 1 and 2; (2) the directions on cross admissibility and bad character evidence; and (3) the judge’s failure to warn the jury to ignore any comments that he made.

Mr Henry KC and Mr Scott, who did not appear below, submit on behalf of Mr Green that: (1) the judge misdirected the jury on the issue of consent, referring to the test under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (the 2003 Act) and not the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (the 1956 Act). It was recognised that this only impacted the conviction for the rapes of C1 because Mr Green’s case in relation to C2 was that there had never been any sexual relations and there was no issue on consent; (2) the judge failed to give adequate bad character directions on cross admissibility and other reprehensible behaviour adduced by agreement at trial; and (3) the judge failed to warn the jury to ignore any comments he made, particularly as it was contended that he had: (i) made unhelpful interventions in the cross examination of one victim; (ii) asked questions of defence witnesses which suggested that Mr Green deceived or misled friends and family; and (iii) made observations supportive of the prosecution case in the summing up.

Miss Knight submits on behalf of the prosecution that: (1) it is accepted that the judge gave a direction on consent by reference to the wrong statutory test, but submits that it made no difference because there was no issue about consent, the case was that the offending had not happened; (2) the standard directions in relation to the separate consideration of the counts was, in this case, sufficient and the other bad character evidence was before the jury by agreement; and (3) the judge had properly directed the jury on their respective roles. There was nothing to make the conviction unsafe.

By the conclusion of oral submissions it was apparent that the following matters were in issue on the appeal: (1) whether Mr Green should be granted an extension of time to seek leave to appeal against conviction and if so whether leave to appeal against conviction should be granted; (2) whether the misdirection on the issue of consent made the convictions on counts 1 and 2 unsafe; (3) whether the judge should have given a direction on cross admissibility and, if so, whether the failure to do so made the convictions unsafe; (4) whether the judge should have given directions on bad character evidence about Mr Green and if so, whether the failure to do so made the convictions unsafe; (5) whether the judge’s failure to warn the jury to ignore his comments made the convictions unsafe; and (6) whether, if any of the convictions were unsafe, there should be a retrial.

We are very grateful to Mr Henry, Mr Scott (who identified the misdirection on consent) and Miss Knight for the helpful written and oral submissions.

The extension of time is necessary because at first Mr Green was originally advised that he had no grounds of appeal, and he was advised that any appeal would require fresh evidence. A private investigator was instructed, and transcripts were obtained. Fresh counsel were instructed who identified grounds of appeal. The necessary inquiries of previous counsel were made and the application for leave to appeal against conviction was lodged.

In these particular circumstances, where fresh counsel has identified an agreed legal error made by the judge, it is in the interests of justice to grant an extension of time. We also grant leave to appeal against conviction because there was an admitted error made in the legal directions.

C1 is the mother of C2. In 1992 C1 was about 30 years old and C2 was aged between about 11 and 14 years old at material times. C1 was divorced and lived in a small house with C2 and her son, C2’s brother, who was 3 years or so younger than C2.

From about September 1992 to April 1999 C1 had a relationship with Mr Green. He was married. C1 described Mr Green as being controlling and stated that if he wanted to have sex with her then that was what would happen. C1 said that he did not take no for an answer. He had a key to her property and would on occasion come to her house at night and have sex with her. She said that her self-esteem plummeted, and she felt undermined by Mr Green. She recalled Mr Green sharing various fantasies with her and on occasion stating that he liked the idea of having sex with C2 who was 11 at the time. C1 told him to never say anything like that again or she would disclose their affair to Mr Green’s wife. Mr Green said that he had not meant it and only wanted to be with her. C1 said that the offending mostly occurred at her home address but on one occasion he had taken her to his home address and had raped her.

C1 said that on one occasion following an altercation with Mr Green she had attended hospital as she suspected that she may have broken her wrist. That was dated to September 1997 by some hospital records. Following her attendance at hospital, Mr Green forced his way into her house and remonstrated with her. C1 said that she subsequently spoke to the police and a counsellor at the charity Women’s Aid. C1 obtained an injunction to prevent any further harassment from Mr Green, but she said that he breached the terms of the injunction within hours. There were no police records of the complaint, but there were some records about the injunction. Thereafter, C1 said that she continued to see Mr Green.

C1 stated that on 13 April 1999, C2 disclosed that Mr Green had sexually assaulted her. C1 said that she confronted Mr Green when he came to the house the following day. She retrieved her set of house keys from him and told him to leave. She wanted to report the allegations to the police but C2 did not want to at the time. In 2019 C2 did decide to report matters to the police and having spoken with the officer in the case, she also decided to make a statement.

C2 stated that Mr Green used to tell her that he loved her and ask for kisses. She said that he would take them on day trips to the seaside and give her piggyback rides during which he would place his hands under her shorts and touch her vagina. She said that she disclosed what was happening to her mother who tried to end the relationship. However, C2 said that Mr Green managed to charm her mother back and the relationship continued.

Thereafter, C2 said that Mr Green would come to the house when C1 was giving students their music lessons at the house. C2 would be in C1’s bedroom with her brother watching television. Mr Green would come in, lie on the bed and ask her to lie with him. C2 said that he would try to kiss her, tell her that he loved her and then after a while this progressed to him touching and digitally penetrating her vagina. He would also ask her to stroke his penis, kiss it and put it into her mouth. That was not a specific count at trial but, as the judge put it in the summing up, part of the evidence relied on. C2 said that her brother was engrossed in watching the television so did not see what was happening.

On another occasion, C2 said that Mr Green came to the address whilst her mother was out with her brother. She said that he laid her on the living room floor and digitally penetrated her vagina. C2 said that this caused her to orgasm for the first time. She said that it felt horrible, however Mr Green had said that this showed that she loved him. C2 recalled on a subsequent occasion when her mother was out with her brother, that Mr Green had tried to lay on top of her and have vaginal sexual intercourse with her. He had however been unable to penetrate her.

C2 recalled an occasion where she was with Mr Green in his car and they stopped in a layby near to her house. He said that he wanted to have sex with her. He kissed her, pulled her trousers down and digitally penetrated her vagina until she orgasmed. She was 13 or 14 years old at the time. He told her not to disclose to anyone what he was doing as no one would believe her. Mr Green had also attended the home address and banged on the door to be let in. She said that she apologised, and Mr Green said that he would forgive her if she gave him a kiss. Mr Green then laid C2 on the floor and digitally penetrated her vagina with his fingers.

C2 said that she disclosed what had happened to her mother but did not want to report matters to the police as she was scared that no one would believe her. However, seeing Mr Green years later and carrying out safeguarding training at the school where she worked, triggered the memories and she decided to report the allegations.

C2’s husband gave evidence in relation to the disclosures that C2 had made to him about the abuse. There was evidence from C1’s son, who was C2’s brother, in relation to his recollection of the relationship between C1 and Mr Green being sour and abusive. He recalled being given piggyback rides by Mr Green during their trips to the seaside. He could not recall if C2 had been given them. He recalled an incident where C2 had entered his bedroom and said that their mother had ended the relationship with Mr Green as he wanted to have sex with both C1 and C2.

There was evidence from Detective Constable O’Shea, the officer in the case, in relation to Mr Green’s interviews. In interview Mr Green had accepted that he had had an affair with C1 but denied committing any offences, saying that C1 had a tendency to invent things and she had been asking him for money, and he said that the stories from C2 had been manufactured against him.

The case for Mr Green in relation to C1’s allegations was that all of the sexual activity that had occurred between them had been consensual. In relation to C2’s allegations, Mr Green’s case was that the allegations had been fabricated, potentially at the behest of C1.

Mr Green did not give evidence at trial but relied upon the account given in his police interviews namely that C1 had a tendency to invent things and that she had been asking him for money and that the allegations were complete and utter lies. He had never been left alone with C2 and therefore had not had any opportunity to commit the offences. C1 and C2 had had ample opportunities to disclose the offending but had failed to do so. This delay had a negative impact upon their credibility.

There was evidence from his son, Jeremy Green in relation to his relationship with his father. Mr Jeremy Green was surprised to hear that his father had had an affair as he saw no signs of this at home. His father did not have a temper.

Mr Green also relied upon evidence of his previous good character. There was character evidence from Rachel Richardson, Hannah Johnson. Dawn Dodds, Helen Snell and Katherine Banks in relation to his character and the care that he provided for his wife who had suffered from dementia.

The judge directed the jury on the elements of the offence of rape saying: “To prove this offence, the prosecution must make you sure that, one, the defendant intentionally penetrated with his penis the vagina of [C1]. Two, she did not consent to it and, three, the defendant did not reasonably believe that she consented.” (emphasis added).

The judge told the jury that there was no issue that C1 and Mr Green were in a relationship which included consensual sex. The judge recorded that C1 says “that it was not always consensual and the defendant knew this. Therefore, consent and the defendant's reasonable belief in it is what you must focus on when considering counts 1 and 2.” (emphasis added)

Later the judge said “Now, just a few words on what she had to say about the all-important question of consent. I've touched upon it a few times already in what I've reminded you of. But she said this: "I would say that I didn't want it, please, I'm not comfortable with this. But it didn't bother him because if he wanted sex, he had sex. He knew I wasn't happy. Sometimes it was all right. But I said no. But he just wanted it to happen. He would say, 'You're a good girl. I can do anything with you.' On more than one occasion [she said] he raped me." When he poured the wine down her, she was not consenting to the sex: "I've said on more than one occasion I don't want to but he would just carry on. He would say, 'I'm here, I can do what I want with you.'" She said she would make it clear she was not consenting, and sometimes she'd be crying. She said, "I have, on more than one occasion, said to him, 'I don't want to have sex with you, I don't want to. No.' And he could hear and understand but he would still go ahead. He just took over my body."

The judge directed the jury on separate consideration of the counts saying: “Next topic is separate consideration of each count. There are eight counts or charges on the indictment. You must give separate consideration to each, and return separate verdicts on each. Your verdicts do not have to be the same. They may be but do not have to be. So, you can convict of all, you can acquit of all, or any combination of the two.”

On the functions of the judge and jury the judge said at the start of the trial “As I will tell you when I sum the case up, you and I have got different functions during this trial. My responsibility is the law. Yours are the facts. So, when you retire to consider your verdict, I won't be sitting there discussing your verdict with you because the facts are for you.” In the summing up the judge, having told the jury that the law was for him said: “I've put it in bold, the facts are for you, because that's key. You make the important decisions in this case, not me. You decide what evidence you accept and which evidence you do not accept. You decide what happened. You decide what conclusions you draw from facts as you find them to be, and where you are sure the truth lies.”

In the course of the summing up the judge gave a good character direction for Mr Green. He directed the jury to re-read the interviews because Mr Green had not given evidence. He reminded the jury of the point made on behalf of Mr Green that it was absurd to think that Mr Green would touch C2 in the presence of her brother, but pointed out that the other side of the coin was that if it was all made up, why would she say something like that concluding “Well, those are the two sides of the coin. It’s for you to consider”. The judge made some other comments on the evidence.

To establish rape under the 1956 Act, the prosecution must prove the complainant’s absence of consent and also that the defendant did not believe she was consenting, or was reckless as to the possibility that she was not. Under the 1956 Act a man who believed genuinely, even if unreasonably, that the complainant was consenting was not guilty of rape, see DPP v. Morgan [1976] AC 182.

The position was confirmed by the Sexual Offences Amendment Act 1976 which provided that a man committed rape if: “(a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who at the time of the intercourse does not consent to it; and (b) at that time he knows that she does not consent to the intercourse or he is reckless as to whether she consents to it.” This provision was introduced by amendment into the 1956 Act as section 1(2) of the 1956 Act.

Reckless was defined to mean a state of mind in which: “a man is … either ... indifferent and gave no thought to the possibility that the woman might not be consenting in circumstances where if any thought had been given to the matter it would have been obvious that there was a risk she was not, or, that he was aware of the possibility that she might not be consenting but nevertheless persisted regardless of whether she consented or not.”

The net effect of this was, as Archbold 2025 confirms at 20-375, under the 1956 Act if a man “may genuinely have believed that she did consent, even though he was mistaken in that belief, he must be acquitted.”

The statutory position changed in 2003, with a definition of consent and the presumptions set out in sections 75 and 76 of the 2003 Act. Where there had been no consent to the relevant penile penetration, a defendant’s genuine, but unreasonable, belief in consent would no longer lead to an acquittal.

Mr Henry identified that there were passages in the evidence of C1 which might have led to a genuine, albeit what must have been on the jury’s verdict an unreasonable, belief that C1 was consenting to sexual intercourse. Mr Henry pointed to a passage in the evidence when C1 said, in answer to a question about what made the offending stop, either that she would pretend to climax or Mr Green would be knackered. It was submitted that a pretence of sexual satisfaction might lead to a genuine but mistaken belief in consent. Mr Henry accepted that the failure to give a correct definition did not affect the case of C2, where Mr Green’s case was that there were no sexual relations between him and C2, but pointed out that Mr Green was having an affair with C1, at least part of which was consensual.

Miss Knight identified that Mr Green’s defence at trial was that C1 had fabricated her allegations of rape in order to support C2’s false allegations. As trial counsel, under a waiver of privilege, pointed out Mr Green’s case was that the allegations against him by C1 were a lie. It is right to note that Mr Green did not give any specific examples of any instance in his interview with the police about where there could have been a misunderstanding. It was therefore submitted that the issue of consent was not a central issue in the case and the error did not render the convictions unsafe.

It is common ground that the judge gave a mistaken direction on the issue of consent, because he gave the direction by reference to the 2003 Act and not the 1956 Act. C1 and Mr Green were having a consensual relationship at the time of the alleged offending by Mr Green against C1. The judge referred to consent as “the all important question” in relation to C1 (see paragraph 27 above). There was evidence from which a jury might find that Mr Green had a genuine, albeit unreasonable, belief that C1 was consenting to sexual intercourse. In these particular circumstances we are unable to be sure that the convictions relating to C1 on counts 1 and 2 are safe, and we quash those convictions.

A direction on the cross admissibility of complaints by separate complainants may be required where the prosecution either rely on the evidence of offending against one complainant as showing a propensity to commit offences of this type, or rely on the evidence of the existence of separate complaints, where there has been no collusion, as reducing the likelihood of an innocent explanation for the complaints, see generally R v Freeman [2008] EWCA Crim 1863; [2009] 1 WLR 2723.

In this case there was a brief discussion about the need for a direction on cross admissibility. The judge made it clear that his provisional view was that one was not required, and Miss Knight for the prosecution agreed. Trial counsel for Mr Green did not make any contribution to that discussion, and has responded, under a waiver of privilege to criticisms about the failure to obtain such a direction, stating that it was in Mr Green’s favour not to get such a direction in this case.

Mr Henry submitted that in this case the jury were given no information about how to address issues of cross admissibility, that the law had not yet developed so that the defendant’s bad character could be left as a free for all, and that the failure to give a direction meant that the conviction was unsafe. Miss Knight submitted that there was no general rule requiring a direction about cross admissibility to be given in every case, that the matter had been properly raised by the judge with counsel in this case, and that such a direction was not necessary.

In R v H [2011] EWCA Crim 2344; [2012] 1 Cr App R.30 no directions on cross admissibility were given and the jury were warned that they should consider the evidence of each count separately. It was held that a judge’s directions to a jury were sufficient and did not render the convictions for sexual offences unsafe. The victims of the offending in that case were two sons of one of the appellant’s partners, and another son of a later partner. The court held that there was no danger of the jury misusing the evidence of the complainants as cross admissible or as evidence of propensity. In R v H the Court referred to earlier cases making it clear that when cases were tried together but were not the same facts, it was essential that the jury be directed that each set of allegations was to be treated separately and that the evidence in relation to an allegation in respect of one victim was not proof against another victim, and to other cases where it was sufficient to tell the jury to treat the charges separately, see R v H at paragraphs 24 to 30. It was recorded at paragraph 31 that everything would depend on the directions and facts of a particular case.

The case of R v H was considered in R v Adams [2019] EWCA Crim 1363; [2020] Crim LR 69-71. Mr Henry placed considerable reliance on R v Adams. In R v Adams the court said “… we have not yet reached the point where evidence of a defendant’s bad character can be left as a free for all. The particular ways in which evidence that a person has committed one offence may or may not be relevant in deciding whether that person is guilty of another offence are not always immediately obvious even to legal professionals and have had to be worked out by the courts in a number of cases. Lay jurors are entitled to assistance on these questions and cannot be expected to work out the approach which the courts regard as proper for themselves. It therefore seems to us to be essential that, in a case of this kind, the jury should be given clear directions on whether, and if so how, evidence relating to one count may be taken into account in deciding guilt on another count.” The court in R v Adams at paragraph 20 said it had difficulty in understanding how the standard direction as to separate treatment of the counts was sufficient in R v H, but went on to say “everything depends on the directions and facts of a particular case, and the danger that the jury might seek to use the evidence of one complainant as evidence of his on counts concerned with another complainant”.

In R v AHC [2022] EWCA Crim 925 the Court considered the judgment in R v Adams and emphasised that everything would turn on the particular facts of the case. In AHC it was held that it was sufficient to direct the jury to treat each count separately.

As noted in paragraph 28 above, the judge did give the jury a standard direction about separate consideration of each count. Neither the prosecution nor defence sought a direction on cross admissibility in this case. This is because there was, in our judgment, no room for the jury to misuse the evidence of C1 to support C2, or vice versa. It was apparent that, as mother and daughter, they had discussed C2’s allegations against Mr Green, so the prosecution could not seek a direction to the effect that it was unlikely coincidence that C1 and C2 would both make allegations against Mr Green. It was apparent that the offending against C1 and C2 was different in important respects. The offending against C1 was against a grown woman with whom Mr Green was having a consensual sexual relationship. The offending against C2 was against a child under 16. Further the defence case was that C2 had manufactured her allegations, and that C1 had manufactured her allegations to support C2. It was important for the defence to attempt to demonstrate that C1 and C2 were involved in making false allegations together. A direction that the jury should not consider the timing of their respective allegations, or their shared motivations to lie about Mr Green, would have been unfair to the defence.

We are sure that, in the particular circumstances of this case, the standard direction in relation to the separate consideration of the counts was sufficient. As was noted in R v H and approved in AHC, everything will depend on the particular circumstances.

It is necessary, however, to reflect on this conclusion and our finding that C1’s convictions on counts 1 and 2 were unsafe because the judge directed the jury to consider whether Mr Green had a reasonable belief in consent, and not (as the judge was required to do under the 1956 Act) whether Mr Green had an unreasonable but genuine belief in consent. In our judgment this does not affect the issue in relation to cross admissibility. As already indicated there was no basis for the jury to misuse C1’s evidence in support of C2’s complaint, and Mr Green was entitled to use the evidence to attempt to demonstrate that C1 and C2 were making false complaints against him. Further it is apparent, from the jury’s verdict, that they must have found that C1 did not in fact consent to sexual intercourse, and that Mr Green did not have a reasonable belief in consent, but that left open the possibility that, if properly directed, they might have found that he had a genuine but unreasonable belief in consent. In those circumstances the quashing of C1’s convictions could not have affected the safety of Mr Green’s convictions on counts 3 to 8.

Both C1 and C2 gave evidence about Mr Green’s behaviour. This included evidence about: Mr Green’s controlling behaviour to C1, which he denied; Mr Green being verbally aggressive and finishing off every argument, which he also denied; an incident where Mr Green was alleged to have bent C1’s arm necessitating hospital treatment, it seems that it was common ground that there was hospital treatment, but there was a suggestion that this was because there was a ganglion which had been hit so that it would disappear; threats and intimidation, which were denied; other sexual offending which did not form counts on the indictment; and the relationship being toxic.

This evidence was admitted by agreement pursuant to section 101 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. This was because it seems to have been part of the defence strategy at trial to show that C1 was exaggerating and making up complaints, in what was said to be an obvious attempt to support the evidence of C2. It seems that some of the evidence was to do with the facts of the offence for the purposes of section 98 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, for example the type of relationship that existed between C1 and Mr Green. This was because that evidence had a real relationship with the offences alleged against C1 and C2, see paragraph 37 of R v MA [2019] EWCA Crim 178. There was, however, other evidence which was also clearly not to do with the facts of the offences, for example the evidence of other sexual offences which had not been indicted.

Mr Henry complains that the judge gave no direction on how the jury should approach the bad character evidence. It is only fair to the judge to point out that the judge was not invited to give any such directions, other than a good character direction for Mr Green, who had no previous convictions, which the judge did give.

In our judgment the judge was not, in the particular circumstances of this case, required to give separate directions about the approach to the evidence of Mr Green’s behaviour. This was because it was all part and parcel of the respective cases between C1 and C2 and Mr Green. C1 and C2 gave this evidence to explain what had happened. Mr Green’s case was that this was a fiction put together by C1 and C2. The judge gave proper directions to the jury on the burden and standard of proof, the elements of the offence, and the respective cases of prosecution and defence. There was, in this case, no need for anything more. The need for directions on bad character evidence becomes more acute when the evidence of bad character is either admitted or proved by evidence independent of the parties.

The judge gave directions to the jury in relation to his and their respective roles. This was at the start of the trial, and as part of the summing up, as appears from paragraph 29 above. It is correct that the judge did not tell the jury in terms to ignore comments that he might make, but it is right to record that the judge did put in bold that the facts were for the jury.

We agree with Mr Scott, on behalf of Mr Green, that the judge should have given a direction that the jury should ignore his comments, if they did not agree with them. That said it is clear that not every departure from proper practice will make a trial unsafe, see Bernard v The State of Trinidad and Tobago [2007] UKPC 34; [2007] 2 Cr App R 22 at paragraph 27. The test for this court is whether the failure to add in the usual statement that a jury should ignore any comments from a judge if it does not agree with them, renders the conviction unsafe. Mr Scott referred to a number of specific parts of the summing up, including that part referred to in paragraph 30. Miss Knight referred to other parts, including the fact because Mr Green did not give evidence, the judge directed the jury to “re-read both of the interviews in full”, and the fact that the judge set out fully and fairly the defence.

We have looked carefully through the judge’s interventions during the trial, the questions asked of witnesses, and the summing up. In our judgment the conduct of the trial, and the summing up, was fair.

For the detailed reasons set out above, we quash Mr Green’s convictions on counts 1 and 2. This means that the sentence of 12 years imprisonment on count 2, and the concurrent sentence on count 1, are set aside. We are sure that Mr Green’s convictions on counts 3 to 8 are safe. This means that the sentence of 24 years with a 1 year extended licence period is set aside. Mr Green remains subject to a sentence to 12 years imprisonment on count 4, with a 1 year extended licence period, with concurrent sentences on counts 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8.

The Crown did not seek a retrial on counts 1 and 2 for Mr Green, who is now aged 93 years. We therefore order no retrial for counts 1 and 2.

Miss Knight, on behalf of the prosecution, did seek a restraining order on acquittal, pursuant to section 5A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (the 1997 Act). Miss Knight also pointed out that the Court of Appeal could, pursuant to section 5A(3) of the 1997 Act, remit the case to the Crown Court to consider whether to proceed under that section.

We have not made an order under section 5A of the 1997 Act, and we do not remit the case to the Crown Court. This is because the court may make a restraining order on acquittal under section 5A(1) of the 1997 Act “if it considers it necessary to do so to protect a person from harassment by the defendant” (underlining added). In this case there was evidence from which a jury might have been sure that Mr Green had raped C1 before 1999. There was no evidence of any recent contact. Mr Green is now aged 93 years. He has served 3 years of a sentence of 12 years imprisonment with a 1 year extended licence period. Any release of Mr Green before the expiry of the custodial period of his sentence (the custodial period will not expire until Mr Green will be aged over 100 years) would be subject to licence conditions. Whatever the desirability of imposing such a restraining order on acquittal from the point of view of C1, it is not possible to show that in the particular circumstances of this case, which include the absence of contact and Mr Green’s age, it is necessary to protect C1.

For the detailed reasons set out above we allow Mr Green’s appeal against his convictions on counts 1 and 2, and quash the sentences for counts 1 and 2. The convictions for counts 3 to 8 are safe, and the sentence of 12 years imprisonment with a 1 year extended licence period on count 4 remains, with the concurrent sentences on counts 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8.