R v Kai Howitt

The applicant, Kai Howitt, was born on 13 March 2005 and he is now aged 20.

On 7 June 2024, following a trial in the Crown Court at Nottingham before Turner J and a jury, he was convicted of murder. He now renews his application for leave to appeal against conviction following refusal by the single judge.

A co-defendant, whom it is unnecessary to name in this judgment, was also convicted of murder. He was aged 13 at the time of the offence. His application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused by the single judge and has not been renewed. Because of the age of the co-defendant, the provisions of section 45 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 are engaged in this case. An order under that provision was made in the Crown Court preventing any reporting of his identity, or anything tending to identify him. That order, we direct, extends to these proceedings as well, although it is unnecessary in fact to name the co-defendant for the purposes of this judgment.

There is an application for an extension of time of 19 days in which to apply for leave to appeal, following the refusal of the single judge. No reason has been given for that. However, without treating that as a formality, we make it clear that if we considered that there was arguable merit in the grounds of appeal which have been presented, we would have extended time. In fact, we have concluded that there is no arguable merit in those grounds and therefore an extension of time would serve no purpose and we refuse it.

It is unnecessary to set out the facts of this tragic case in any great detail. The deceased died because the applicant and his co-accused became involved in an argument with him, during which each of them threw pieces of brick at him, causing a fatal head injury.

The applicant's case at trial was that he did not intend to cause really serious harm or to kill and that whatever he did was in reasonable self-defence of himself or of another. He gave evidence in support of that defence. He explained that he did throw the brick at Mr Edwards, but he said that he did not intend it to hit him or to injure him, and that he had no idea that his co-accused was doing the same thing at the same time in the same place.

In those circumstances it was necessary for the judge to direct the jury about the element of the offence of murder which requires proof of an intention to do at least really serious harm. It was also necessary for the judge to direct the jury about the law governing self-defence. The judge prepared written directions and a route to verdict. The route to verdict contained five questions and is a model of clarity and analytical accuracy. The questions which the jury was required to answer are identified with complete clarity.

The proposed grounds of appeal suggest that the conviction is nevertheless unsafe because: first, the judge did not include a "focused self-defence direction" in view of the applicant's age and characteristics; and second, the judge failed to provide assistance to the jury as to how the age and characteristics of the applicant might assist in their considerations.

Those grounds seek to rely on the decision of this court in R v ZA [2023] EWCA Crim 596, which is a decision about how the youth of a young offender ought to be dealt with in the course of criminal proceedings, in particular in relation to sentence.

The single judge gave full reasons for rejecting those contentions. He quoted the relevant directions given by the trial judge in written directions to the jury, which included a completely standard direction about self-defence which was tailored to the case by including a direction that the age and characteristics of the defendant should be taken into account when deciding whether he had believed that it was necessary to use force and that the amount of force used was reasonable at the time when he did what he did.

The trial judge reminded the jury that the applicant was 18 years old at the time and that he had a developmental disorder and autism. He said this:

As the single judge concluded, that direction was entirely apt to deal with the particular circumstances of the case. It informed the jury and reminded them of the relevant matters which they had to consider when answering the questions which had been set out for them.

In our judgment, the proposed grounds of appeal against conviction in this case are simply unarguable. The decision of the Court of Appeal in R v ZA is not a decision about how a jury should be directed in the case of a young person standing trial. It is of no relevance to the complaint in this case.

For those reasons this renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction is refused, as is the application for an extension of time for the reason already given.