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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL DIVISION ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT WARWICK (HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER COOKE) (T20217273 CASE NO:202402079B2 NEUTRAL CITATION NUMBER:[2025] EWCA Crim 879 |
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
Before:
LORD JUSTICE DINGEMANS
MRS JUSTICE THORNTON
HIS HONOUR JUDGE ST JOHN-STEVENS
REX
v
CRAIG LEA
(The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence)
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Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,
Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE
Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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Non-counsel application
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APPROVED JUDGMENT
MRS JUSTICE THORNTON:
The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act.
Introduction
The applicant renews his application for an extension of time of approximately 1 year and 7 months (595 days) in which to apply for leave to appeal against conviction, and a representation order following a refusal by the single judge.
Background
The facts are set out in the note produced by the Court of Appeal office and accordingly we only need summarise them as follows.
On 10 December 2021 the applicant and complainant engaged in consensual sexual activity before the complainant asked the applicant to stop. She was in pain and crying. The applicant did not stop. The complainant used her phone to record the incident. We have watched the recording. It was the prosecution case that the complainant's protestations were clear and acknowledged by the applicant, however he continued to rape her. In light of the recordings the applicant could not have reasonably believed the complainant was consenting.
On 14 September 2022 the applicant changed his plea to guilty to rape, contrary to section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
On 6 December 2022, before the same court and constitution, the applicant applied to vacate his guilty plea on the basis he had been placed under significant pressure to plead guilty by his advocate at the time, a Mr Haddock.
The judge refused the application. The judge acknowledged Mr Haddock's unconventional approach towards client care, but considered those matters were not particularly relevant to the issues in the application. It was apparent there had been a lack of professionalism and that Mr Haddock had departed from best practice by failing to obtain an endorsement of his brief or to make any form of contemporaneous note of the applicant's decision to change his plea on the morning of the trial. However, the applicant would have been aware of the significance of the recording, having listened to it in a courtroom. The applicant's mother had been a truthful witness, who recalled the circumstances in which her son told Mr Haddock he would plead guilty. Having heard him and Mr Haddock give evidence, the judge regarded it as inconceivable that the applicant - an articulate, intelligent businessman - would simply bend to the will of Mr Haddock. The change of plea was a grudging capitulation to the reality of the case. The applicant was not overborne by pressure from his advocate to change his plea.
On 3 January 2023, before the same court and constitution, the applicant was sentenced to 62 months' imprisonment.
Grounds of appeal against conviction
The grounds of appeal are set out in the summary produced by the Court of Appeal office and we only need summarise them as follows. The conviction is said to be unsafe due to:
the conduct of the trial advocate, Mr Haddock, who had a disciplinary case pending against him at the time of the trial.
improper pressure from Mr Haddock to enter a guilty plea.
the conduct of the judge in refusing the change of plea was unfair and the judge should have recused himself.
Refusal of leave
Refusing leave to appeal against conviction, the single judge gave the following reasons:
"Ground 1: Conduct of Solicitor-Advocate: You submit that the verdict is unsafe because your solicitor-advocate (Mr Haddock) was, on 31 July 2023, struck off for serious professional misconduct and those proceedings must have been pending at the relevant time; and he was poorly prepared. However, as the Crown points out, the evidence of him being struck off is legally inadmissible in these criminal proceedings; and, in any event, is irrelevant. Mr Haddock was struck off for dishonestly dealing with client funds, which has (as a matter of fact, as well as law) no relevance to the issues in this appeal. The Judge, who heard all the relevant evidence on the application to vacate, accepted that Mr Haddock’s approach was unconventional and, at times, not best practice (e.g. in that he did not make an endorsed brief note in relation to the change of plea), and took those matters fully into account when considering the determinative issues in the application to vacate.
Ground 2: Conduct of the Judge: You suggest that the Judge’s refusal of your application to vacate was flawed because (i) at an earlier hearing, he had already made adverse comments about the likely sentence, and (ii) he should have recused himself. However, there is no evidence that the Judge made any such comments. He did prepare draft directions on consent, which he asked Mr Haddock to discuss with you, no doubt because of the strength of the evidence against you in the form of contemporaneous recordings of the alleged rape. That was entirely proper. So far as recusal is concerned, the suggestion that you might seek recusal was made in the application to vacate, at a time when you were represented by different Counsel, but was not pursued. It is not only too late to pursue that issue now, but also there was no reason why Judge Cooke should have recused himself. The application was fairly dealt with by the Judge, and his ruling on the application is fair and balanced.
Ground 3: Improper Pressure to Plead Guilty: This is the only potential ground upon which the guilty plea could be vacated. However, Judge Cooke clearly had the right legal test in mind – it is succinctly set out in the final paragraph of his ruling: were you put under such pressure that the plea was not truly an admission of guilt? – and he considered the evidence on that issue with patent care. That evidence included an admission by you that you supposed Mr Haddock was giving you the option of having a trial and possibly being found not guilty, the time for which you discussed matters with Mr Haddock and your mother, the independence of mind you showed when changing your solicitor for the first time and in not engaging with the Probation Service, and the fact that you considered the contemporaneous evidence with Mr Haddock in that conference. The Judge was in the best position to assess all of the evidence; and, upon it, he was clearly entitled to conclude that your mind went with your plea when you made it. Given the strength of evidence against you, that plea is understandable; as, on the evidence before him, is the Judge’s decision not to vacate your plea.
We agree with the single judge. Whilst unfortunate, the misconduct of Mr Haddock is not relevant to the criminal proceedings, as to which the core issue was consent. We have read the transcript of the judge's ruling on the application to vacate and consider the judge conducted an entirely proper and fair hearing. Having watched the video, we agree with the judge that the decision to change plea was consistent with a pragmatic decision by the applicant to accept the reality of the evidence against him.
Decision
Accordingly, the applications are refused.
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