R v Tina Walton

This is a renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction following refusal by the single judge. The application has been renewed before us on the papers only, and in that regard we have received a letter from the applicant, Tina Walton, which we have taken into account.

The applicant was convicted of murder on 24 February 2023 in the Crown Court at Preston before Mr Justice Linden and a jury. She had been on trial together with others who were accused of murdering the deceased together. The fatal blow was struck by Stephen Pugh but the others, including this applicant, were said to have pursued the deceased, and to have attacked him together. The role of this applicant was that she was accused of having assisted and encouraged the others in a joint attack on the deceased, Mark Gibson.

The case was advanced by the prosecution on the basis of some eye-witness evidence, evidence from witnesses who had heard things happening and being said and also, very significantly, on the basis of CCTV footage which showed a good deal of what had taken place although not absolutely everything. It was clear that the group, including Pugh and this applicant, had confronted Mr Gibson in the street in Blackpool over a short period of time and had pursued him in order to do that. Pugh, who had the knife which inflicted the fatal wound, was not the only one who had a weapon. It was not alleged that this applicant herself had a weapon but it was alleged that the CCTV footage showed her enthusiastically accompanying the group which inflicted a variety of different physical attacks on Mr Gibson, culminating, as we have said, in his death.

The grounds of appeal state, first, that there was confusion about when the deceased was murdered. It was alleged that the applicant had blocked his exit when he was murdered whereas, in fact, he had been assaulted whilst the applicant was on the floor, herself having been assaulted. She was concussed and had a head injury and was incapable of blocking any exit. It is, indeed, true that the spur which caused the group to behave in the way it had was an altercation between the applicant and Mr Gibson in which she may well have suffered some concussion because it appears clear that she did, indeed, have a head injury. This was shortly before the pursuit of Mr Gibson in the street and was the provoking fact but was separate from the series of violent acts which resulted in his death. We shall return to this ground in a moment. We should refer to two further grounds before we do.

Secondly, the applicant disputes that she encouraged anyone to do anything following the assault on her by the deceased. She could not see any weapons, she did not have a weapon and did not assault anyone.

Thirdly, she says that the prosecution paused the CCTV footage at a point where there was an expression on her face which she described as a grimace which, she says, was out of context. This originated when the prosecution had said that she was in a rage. Her case was that she was in pain from the multiple injuries which she had suffered.

These three grounds, as we have called them, in fact, are pleaded in the grounds of appeal as grounds 1, 2, 3 and 6. What they have in common is that they all express disagreement with the conclusion of the jury about the jury's findings on the evidence which the jury had received. These points which the applicant seeks to make before this court were made on her behalf and in her evidence before the jury. They were dealt with by the judge in summing up the case to the jury and the jury were well aware that they had to decide whether these points had force and, if so, whether they required them to return a not guilty verdict to murder.

The place where points of this sort have to be determined is the trial. This court does not engage in substituting its own views of factual matters for that of the jury. For that reason, these points, having been properly dealt with in the trial in Preston, raise no arguable ground of appeal against the conviction.

This leaves two matters which we should deal with separately.

The first of these relates to the service on the jury of a female juror who, at the start of the process when the jury were being impanelled, sent a note to the judge saying that she worked as a practice nurse at a general practitioner's practice in Blackpool but she did not know the names of anybody involved in the case and did not recognise anyone in the dock. The judge concluded that this did not present an obstacle to her serving on the jury. That conclusion was not only a conclusion that was open to him, it was quite obviously the right conclusion. The juror was behaving responsibly in making the judge aware of the fact that she worked in the relevant area in Blackpool and also of the fact that she had no reason not to be a juror. The applicant points to no particular prejudice or disadvantage which she can say flowed to her from the presence of this woman on the jury, and there is no reason at all to suspect or believe that this juror was in any way affected by anything that she was aware of through her work in this practice as opposed to the evidence and argument which she had heard during the trial. In those circumstances it is not arguable that the presence of this woman on the jury gives rise to any lack of safety in the conviction which the jury returned.

Finally, the applicant makes a complaint about her legal team. That has resulted in the waiver of privilege and in her leading counsel supplying information to the court about how the criticised aspects of her representation were dealt with. The principal complaint that she makes is that she was not offered the opportunity to plead guilty to manslaughter. Leading counsel says that there was some discussion about manslaughter but the position is that the prosecution never suggested that if she pleaded guilty to manslaughter that it would not proceed to trial for murder. Her case, as advanced in evidence on oath from the witness box, was that she had done nothing wrong and that she had herself been the victim of an assault by the deceased. She said that she did not recall events clearly but gave evidence that she did not know that anybody was armed with weapons or had chased the deceased with violent intent. Accordingly, there was no basis on which she could admit guilt for manslaughter and offer that plea. As we have said, in any event, even if she had decided to do that, that offer would certainly have been rejected.

In those circumstances, how the possible alternative of manslaughter was dealt with in pre-trial discussions between her and her legal team is entirely irrelevant when considering the safety of the conviction for murder. In those circumstances this ground also affords no arguable basis on which the conviction could be said to be unsafe. And for all of those reasons this application is refused on its merits.

There has been some delay in its prosecution by the applicant, but if we had found any merit in the grounds of appeal which were advanced we would not have allowed that to stand in the way of the appeal. Since there is no merit, leave is refused.