R v Callum McManus

On 7 March 2025 in the Crown Court at Chester, at the pre-trial preparation hearing before HHJ Leeming, the appellant pleaded guilty to one offence of breach of a restraining order and one offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. On 14 March 2025, before the same judge, the appellant (who was then aged 36) was sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment for the breach of the restraining order and a consecutive sentence of 22 months for the assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The total sentence was therefore 28 months’ imprisonment. He now appeals against that sentence with the leave of the single judge.

The appellant and Ms Samantha Hannon had been in an on-off relationship for 25 years. There was a significant history of domestic violence by the appellant towards her. On 30 October 2024, in the Crown Court at (Minshull Street) Manchester, the appellant pleaded guilty to an offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm committed against Ms Hannon. He was released the same day on time served and made subject to a restraining order, which prohibited him from contacting Ms Hannon until 2029.

The very next day the appellant telephoned Ms Hannon and asked to meet her. The couple drank wine together at a hotel in Ellesmere Port but were eventually asked to leave. Ms Hannon rang a taxi. The appellant became angry and began shouting. As Ms Hannon went to leave, the appellant ran up behind her. Ms Hannon ended up on the floor. The appellant then kicked her repeatedly. We have seen photographs of Ms Hannon’s injuries from which it is clear that he kicked her in the head and face many times.

The appellant appeared intoxicated upon arrest. While in custody he made offensive comments to the police and spat at the holding cell door. He answered “no comment” to all questions in his police interview.

The appellant had a terrible record of previous offending including many convictions for offences of violence. He had 34 convictions for 62 offences from 2005 to 2024. His relevant convictions included offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm in 2005 and 2024, common assault in 2005 and 2006, battery in 2009 and on other occasions, breach of a suspended sentence order (2009 twice), failure to comply with the requirements of a community order in 2016 (three times) and 2017, racially religiously aggravated harassment alarm/distress in 2018, assault by beating of an emergency worker in 2019, 2020 and 2021, possessing an offensive weapon in a public place in 2021 and threatening words or behaviour with intent to cause harassment, alarm or distress in 2023.

There was a victim personal statement from Ms Hannon, dated 1 November 2024, that being the day after or the day of the incident. In it she spoke of the appellant having had a hold over her, that had only been broken when he assaulted her knowing that she was a cancer survivor. She subsequently made a retraction statement but that was for fear of repercussions rather than her original account was not true.

The sentencing judge had and evidently read a probation update report. The appellant was assessed as posing a very high risk of serious harm to Ms Hannon and a very high risk of serious harm to her children. He was also assessed as posing a high risk of harm to the public should he be involved in a road traffic accident. The report was, as the judge noted with a degree of understatement, unfavourable.

In mitigation advanced on behalf of the appellant it was submitted that the judge should take into account the fact he had been recalled and spent 3 months in custody for breaching the order that had been imposed on him on 30 October. He had become an enhanced prisoner in custody and had undertaken a family relationship course, being determined to be a better partner.

In sentencing the appellant, the judge placed the breach offence in category 2B under the relevant guideline, which indicated a starting point of 12 weeks’ custody with a range of sentencing up to 12 months. He said that it was category 2 in terms of harm “because Ms Hannon suffered harm as a result of the breach.” He identified as aggravating features the appellant’s previous convictions, the fact that the breach was committed the day after the restraining order was imposed and his long history of disobedience to court orders. In his view, mitigating features were “hard to find”.

Turning to the assault the judge held that it was category A culpability because Ms Hannon was vulnerable as a cancer survivor and because she had her back to him when she had been drinking and so had no opportunity to take evasive action. The offence was committed against a background of domestic violence and it was committed while he was subject to post-sentence supervision, having been released the day before.

Having regard to the photographs of Ms Hannon’s injuries, the judge held that it was a category 2 harm case. That gave a starting point of 18 months’ custody. The aggravating features were once again his previous convictions, being on licence, domestic violence and that the offence was committed while the appellant was under the influence of alcohol. The judge imposed consecutive sentences as we have outlined above. On count 1 he took a notional sentence of 8 months’ imprisonment before reducing it by 25 per cent for his guilty plea to the sentence of 6 months that he imposed. Turning to the assault occasioning actual bodily harm, he reached a notional sentence of 30 months which he reduced by 25 per cent to 22 months. Adding those two sentences together led to the aggregate sentence of 28 months’ imprisonment against which the appellant now appeals.

On the appellant’s behalf Mr Saffman makes three principal submissions. He has done so with clarity and has said everything that could possibly be said on behalf of the appellant. First, he submits that the judge double counted when categorising the breach offence as category 2, because the harm to which he referred as justifying that categorisation was the harm resulting from the assault and would be taken into account in sentencing the appellant for that offence. Second, when passing consecutive sentences, he submits that the judge made no reduction for the principle of totality. Third, despite saying that he had taken into account the 3-month period before charge, which did not count towards his sentence because he had been recalled, it appears that he did not do so as he increased the starting point to the very top of the range for the assault.

The only question for this Court is whether the sentence imposed on the appellant was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. We accept that the judge did not appear to make any adjustment for totality when passing consecutive sentences. We also accept that it is at least arguable that he should have done so. But any such adjustment on the facts of this case would have been minimal because the two offences were distinctly different and, subject to one point, did not materially overlap. Mr Saffman’s second ground is therefore insubstantial.

Turning to the first ground of appeal. We consider that there is more substance in Mr Saffman’s factual submission since in one sense the assault resulted from the breach and was caused by it. That said, even if the offence had been categorised as falling into category 3B, which would be the logical result of this submission on the basis there was little or no harm or distress caused over and above that caused by the assault, the top of the category range would have been 26 weeks. In our judgment, the appellant’s appalling record and the other aggravating features would have fully justified going beyond the category range for category 3B or going up a category to sentence the offence once more as a category 2B offence. Once again therefore, we consider that the first ground of appeal is insubstantial.

That leaves the third ground. The judge said that he was taking into account the 3 months’ delay and there is no reason to think he forgot to do so. We stand back and look at the case overall. Even without reference to his previous convictions and the other aggravating features of the case, it is difficult to conceive of a more calculated and reprehensible breach of a restraining order than this. The assault was gratuitous, cowardly and serious and the offences were committed in a domestic context which increases their seriousness yet further. When due regard is had to the appellant’s appalling record and the other aggravating features correctly identified by the judge, the objections taken by Mr Saffman on the appellant’s behalf pale into insignificance. From this viewpoint, we are satisfied that the aggregate sentence imposed by the judge was well within the range of sentences that was reasonably open to him. It was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive. This appeal is dismissed.