R v Fayaz Ahmed & Ors

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall, during that person's lifetime, be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act. For the avoidance of any doubt we do not waive or lift the prohibition.

His Majesty's Solicitor General applies for leave to refer three sentences that she regards as unduly lenient. We give leave.

Each of the sentences was passed on 17 January 2025 at Bradford Crown Court by His Honour Judge Ahmed Nadim after a trial at which each of the three offenders had been convicted of offences of rape. Each had separately raped the same victim, to whom we shall refer as V, when she was a young girl. In summary the sentences passed on each offender were as follows:

For the first offender, Ibrar Hussain, on count 4 of the indictment he faced, on conviction for the offence of rape he was sentenced to six-and-a-half years' imprisonment. On count 5, which was another offence of rape, upon his conviction he was sentenced to six-and-a-half years concurrent. The total sentence was therefore six-and-a-half years' imprisonment.

The second offender, Imtiaz Ahmed was convicted of one offence of rape for which he was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

The third offender, Fayaz Ahmed was convicted of two offences of rape, which were counts 10 and 16 of the indictment. For each of those two offences he was sentenced to seven-and-a-half years' imprisonment concurrent. The total sentence was therefore seven-and-a-half years' imprisonment.

The offending happened in the mid-1990s when V was aged 14 or 15. The first offender was 18 at the time of the offending and 47 when sentenced. The second offender was 34 or 35 at the time of offending and 62 when sentenced. The third offender was 17 or 18 at the time of offending and 45 when sentenced. Only the first offender was present when sentenced, the other two having absconded and fled to Pakistan. The second offender was represented at the trial and for the sentencing hearing, the third offender was not.

The trial involving the three offenders was the second substantive trial against multiple defendants all of whom were accused of serious sexual offending against V and her twin sister, to whom we shall refer as S. At the first trial, which was also presided over by His Honour Judge Nadim, four defendants were convicted and received sentences ranging between six-and-a-half years and 14 years' imprisonment. The most relevant of those sentences, for reasons which will appear, was a sentence of six-and-a-half years imposed on Zehroon Razaq who was 47 at the time of being sentenced on 12 July 2024. The sentences imposed on those convicted at the first trial were not the subject of a Reference by the law officers.

There were co-defendants at the offenders' trial. It is not necessary to say anything more about them for the purposes of this Reference.

In briefest outline, the Solicitor General submits in relation to each offender that although it cannot be said that the judge miscategorised the individual offences of rape of which the offenders were convicted, he failed to adjust the starting point sufficiently to reflect the level of harm and to reflect the overall gravity of the case. He then failed properly to reflect the proper balance between the aggravating and mitigating features of the case with the result that the sentences he passed were unduly lenient.

We should say at the outset that it is clear that the judge took considerable care to pass sentences that were consistent over the two trials with which he was concerned. We recognise the advantages that he had as trial judge in assessing the gravity of the offences that had been found proved against each of the offenders. We undertake our task of deciding whether the sentence passed on one or more of these offenders was unduly lenient such that we should intervene, bearing in mind at all times the advantages available to the trial judge.

At one point Mr Howard acting for the second offender raised the question whether the References against his client, and by implication the third offender, had been properly served. In the light of information disclosed by the Crown, he no longer maintains that suggestion. In our judgment he was right to withdraw it. We are satisfied that the References have been properly served on the Registrar and the second and third offenders and that there is no impediment to our hearing the References. Furthermore, it is highly desirable that we should hear them.

The victim, V, was born on 13 September 1982. She has a twin sister, S. V and her twin sister grew up initially in Norwich. They endured a traumatic childhood. There was violence and abuse within the family home from their father and then from their step-father. They spent time as a result on occasions in a domestic violence refuge.

In 1996, V and S moved with their family to Keighley. V was badly bullied at school. Both of the sisters began to go out and socialise and did so frequently late at night. They were unsupervised and would walk the streets. Asian men would stop their cars and approach them. There was an occasion when V was taken in a car and then thrown out of the car. She was then helped by a sex worker.

Given their home circumstances and their unhappiness at school, the twins began to appreciate the attention and compliments that they were given by local men, most of whom were Asian. As a result, and as the judge found, they were vulnerable to the sexual exploitation that subsequently took place. They were given drugs and alcohol and went to unsafe places where they could spend time. The exploitation and abuse were undertaken by many men, most of whom have not been identified or prosecuted. The victims' mother would go to Keighley Police Station to report that her daughters were missing but nothing was done about it. The two trials were of those who were identified as alleged perpetrators and who were prosecuted.

The victim knew the first offender as "Ibby". He would pull up in his car when she was in the street. He would take her to a basement flat in Beechcliff. This was a flat where a number of men would take young girls. V was 14 years of age at the time and the first offender was 18 years old. The first offender knew her age. The victim was taken to the flat by the first offender on two occasions. Whilst at the property they smoked heroin together before they had sexual intercourse. The victim described sex with the first offender as being rough, hard and painful. The first offender was convicted of two offences of vaginal rape relating to the victim. Each offence represented a single incident of rape.

V was 14 or 15 years of age at the date of the single offence of rape committed by the second offender. The second offender would have been 34 or 35 years old at the time. At the material time V was introduced to a woman called Nicola Carter and her boyfriend/pimp called Shahid. Nicola Carter and Shahid would give the victim drugs and take her to the red-light area of Bradford in order for her to have sex with a number of different men in return for drugs.

Nicola Carter and Shabid also rented a flat above a shop in Keighley. The entire building, including the flats and the shop, were owned by the family of the second and third offenders. The shop was run by the second offender. Both the second and third offenders worked in the shop. The second offender was involved in the letting of the flats and rented the one referred to above to Nicola Carter and Shahid.

In general terms, Nicola Carter and Shahid organised for a number of men to come to the flat to have sex with V. The sexual intercourse that occurred in the flat with V would be one man at a time, with another sometimes waiting for their turn. The victim described in evidence that there were four men connected with the shop, which must have included the second and third offender, who would use the premises to have sex with her. The victim said that she did not enjoy sex with any of the men and she just lay there and waited for it to be over.

V described how she was extremely vulnerable at the time of these offences and this would have been apparent to those having sexual intercourse with her. She described how there was a lot of hate and anger going through her at the time of the offences.

V was given money by the second offender after having sexual intercourse with him on a single occasion in the flat. In general terms V would give the money that she was given to Shahid and Nicola Carter. They would then use it to buy drugs and would then give some of the drugs to V.

The second offender was convicted of a single offence of vaginal rape which would have taken place in the flat.

V knew the third offender as "Prince". He is a younger brother of the second offender. V would have been 14 or 15 at the time of the offending and he would have been 17 or 18 years of age. The third offender would approach V when she was in the local area and asked her for sexual acts.

The third offender was accompanied by another man called Nigel and they took V to some woods near Oakwood School and both had sex with her, one after the other. The third offender also had sex with the victim in the flat above the shop referred to above. Again, both the third offender and Nigel had sexual intercourse with V one after the other. The third offender was convicted of two counts of rape, each reflecting a single incident of rape: one incident in the woods and the other in the flat above the shop that is referred to above.

It was therefore clear that both the second and third offenders were aware that the flat was being used by Nicola Carter and Shahid as a base from which to conduct their business, involving the grooming and sexual exploitation of V.

The first offender had a number of previous convictions. None were for sexual offending. He had a large number of convictions for drugs offences, including convictions for possession and possession of heroin with intent to supply.

The second offender had no previous convictions.

The third offender had a number of previous convictions. None were for sexual offending. He had a number of convictions for driving offences and a conviction for offences of conspiracy to defraud.

Zehroon Razaq was born in July 1977 and raped V vaginally on one occasion between 1996 and 1998 when V was 14 or 15 and he would have been about 19. He took her to a specific property for the purpose of raping her, which he did roughly, ejaculating inside her, which the judge rightly considered to be an aggravating feature. He did not ply her with drugs but she was intoxicated when he raped her, as he would have known.

It was submitted on his behalf that he would not necessarily have known that V was being systematically abused by many other men. The judge heard mitigation which persuaded him not to increase the sentence because of the aggravating features he had identified. Zehroon Razaq had one significant previous conviction for an offence of violent disorder and assault for which he received a 30-month sentence in 2014.

The judge treated the rape of V as a Category 2B offence and, as we have said, the sentence imposed on him for that single offence of rape was six-and-a-half years.

The prosecution submitted that the combination of (a) the severe psychological harm caused by the offending and (b) that V had been particularly vulnerable due to her personal circumstances, had had an extreme impact so that each offenders' case should be treated as Category 1 for harm. It was submitted that each rape offence had elements that placed the offences in Category A for culpability. On that basis the starting point for each offence would have been 15 years' custody with a category range of 13 to 19 years' custody. At an early stage in the offenders' submissions on sentence the judge gave an indication that he considered the appropriate category was 2B which would indicate a starting point of eight years with a category range of seven to nine years.

The judge had various additional materials that it is not necessary to detail here, save to say that after probing by the judge the second offender's counsel felt unable to rely upon character references that had been submitted.

The judge gave a concise summary of the facts and expressed his overall view as follows:

Turning to the individual offenders, the judge summarised the factual background to the first offender's conviction and identified that giving heroin to a 14-year-old child was an aggravating feature. His conduct contributed to V suffering serious psychological harm, placing the case in Category 2, and the judge said he was not satisfied that culpability Category A was made out. He therefore sentenced the offender as a Category 2B offender.

The judge accepted that the first offender had been immature but no longer suffered from a character deficit that made him prone to sexual offending. He noted the impact on the first offender's wife and family but observed, correctly, that their pain is insignificant compared with the pain suffered by V over the years. He then continued:

Turning to the second offender, the judge summarised the background of V now being under the malign influence and Shahid and the woman Nicola who exploited her vulnerability and made her yet more vulnerable by putting her to work as a sex worker. The judge said that the second offender knew of her vulnerability and was "at the very least highly reckless as to whether [V] was consenting". He was at the time a married man who "in reality ... appeared to recognise neither legal nor moral values that would have warned him against sexually abusing a 14-year-old girl." The judge treated the offence as Category 2B and found that it was an aggravating feature that he raped V as a result of the arrangements made with him by Shahid and Nicola who were his tenants. In doing so he was supporting their pimping and prostitution business and supporting an arrangement designed to exploit V further. He then passed the sentence of nine years to which we have referred, without further explanation of how or why he moved from the starting point by one year to nine years.

Turning to the third offender, the judge noted that there were two offences of rape and that the offender would have been either 17 or 18 at the time of the offending. The judge considered that the circumstances of his offending was similar to those of his brother (the second offender). The judge continued:

It therefore appears that the judge reduced the notional sentence that he would have imposed on an older and more mature adult by about 31 per cent for his age and associated immaturity.

The Solicitor General submits that the extent of the particular vulnerability of V, both by reason of her young age and her personal circumstances and that she was groomed, was very marked. This, alongside the level of psychiatric harm to which each offender played their own part and with an awareness that others were committing sexual offences upon her in circumstances albeit not necessarily the totality of the offending, should have merited a very significant upward adjustment to the Category B starting point for a single offence before consideration of the aggravating and mitigating features.

The Solicitor General submits that the combination of severe psychological or physical harm and V's particular vulnerability due to personal circumstances was so extreme that each offence should have been treated as falling within Category 1 for harm. That said, the Solicitor General does not go so far as to say it was frankly wrong for the judge to have treated the offences as falling within Category 2 for harm. But if he was going to adopt that approach, the gravity of the offences should have caused a significant upwards movement from the Category 2B starting point of eight years, before consideration of any aggravating or mitigating features. V's particular vulnerability was sufficiently known to each of the offenders for the severity of the psychological harm they were inflicting to be not merely foreseeable but predictable. On this basis the Solicitor General submits that the adjusted starting point should have been in the region of 10 years.

Turning to the impact of aggravating and mitigating features:

On behalf of the first offender, Ibrar Hussain, Mrs Beckett who represents him before us as she did at trial submits that the sentence imposed on the first offender was not unduly lenient. She submits that not all of the psychological damage inflicted on V can be attributed to the first offender and that in cases of vitiated consent grooming is often an integral part of the substantive offence of rape. She therefore submits that neither V's extreme vulnerability nor the fact that she had been groomed by being given heroin should be treated as factors exerting an upwards pressure on the notional starting point.

For the second offender, Mr Howard emphasises that he was convicted of one rape only and submits that too much weight should not be placed on his connection with the flat, there being no evidence that the second offender knew that men were queuing up to have sex with V. Not all of the damage to V was caused by his single rape. Overall it is submitted that the judge's sentence was proportionate and fair and he reminds us, as did Mrs Beckett, of the advantages that the sentencing judge had as a consequence of having heard V give her evidence on at least two, if not three, occasions.

Before turning to the case against each offender, we reiterate that we have been conscious at all times of the advantages available to the trial judge and the care that he took in attempting to impose sentences that were consistent across the two trials. For that reason, before reaching the conclusions we set out below we have stood back and considered whether, whatever our analysis might indicate should be the outcome, it is appropriate and necessary to intervene.

Common to each offender's case is the question whether, assuming that the offences were properly to be characterised as Category 2B offences, the judge adopted too low an adjusted starting point before considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Although the question is to some extent fact-specific, and the facts relating to each offender are not congruent, we accept the Solicitor General's submission that the combination of these particular vulnerabilities and the level of entirely foreseeable psychological harm inflicted by the offenders required an upward adjustment from the Category 2B starting point of eight years.

We do not accept that each offender should only be treated as responsible for a small share of the overall damage inflicted on V, which would have the perverse effect that the greater the number of rapists the less their proportional responsibility would be. The better and correct view in our judgment is that each rapist should be treated as contributing to the overall outcome.

The category range for Category 2B offences is very narrow from seven to nine years. It therefore requires only a modest uplift before one is pressing at the limits of the category range. In our judgment we should not regard the category range as in any way determinative, particularly in a case when it can be said with some force that to categorise the case as involving Category 1 harm would not have been wrong.

Without being too mathematically precise about it, our assessment is that an upward adjustment to the Category 2B starting point in the region of one-and-a-half to two years was required to reflect the gravity of the offences committed by these offenders before making further adjustments for aggravating and mitigating features. In the first offender's case the main aggravating feature for each offence was the grooming involved in plying V with heroin, which is serious in the context of the offences of rape, quite apart from contributing to her development of heroin addiction. Had the first offender been older a notional sentence of ten-and-a-half years would have been at or close to the bottom of the acceptable range of sentences to be passed for each offence viewed individually. On the information that is available to us, the first offender's mitigation, other than his comparative youth at the time of the offending was slim. It would in our judgment have been distinctly lenient to impose a sentence of seven years even if he had committed one offence of rape. The age difference between the first offender and Zehroon Razaq was not great and the first offender's offences were arguably more serious because of the provision of heroin. Where the comparison with the case of Zehroon Razaq breaks down altogether is that whereas Zehroon Razaq committed one rape, the first offender committed two. We can see no justification at all for imposing a sentence of six-and-a-half years concurrent for each of the two offences. It is certainly not justified by comparison with the case of Zehroon Razaq.

For these reasons we consider that the aggregate sentence of six-and-a-half years for the two offences of rape committed by the first offender was unduly lenient by a significant margin. In our judgment having due regard for the principle of totality, the least aggregate sentence that could properly be imposed for the two offences of rape was one of 10 years. We achieve that by quashing the sentence on count 4 of the indictment and substituting a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment concurrent.

We have outlined the aggravating features of the second offender's case above. In our judgment an appropriate adjusted sentence before considering aggravating and mitigating features would have been not less than 10 years. The judge should then have made a further significant adjustment for the aggravating features he correctly identified. Given the uplift that has already been notionally applied because of the overall gravity of the offence, we consider that an additional upwards adjustment of a further year would have been justifiable, although a greater adjustment could have been made without the judge being in danger of imposing a sentence that could be criticised as being excessive. It follows that in our judgment a sentence of 11 years was the least that could properly be imposed for the offender's single offence.

Should that lead to a finding that the sentence imposed by the judge was not merely lenient but unduly lenient? In our judgment it should because the leniency is attributable to a significant error in approach, as we have explained. We therefore quash the sentence of nine years imposed on the second offender and substitute a sentence of 11 years' imprisonment.

The third offender fell to be sentenced for two offences. We have outlined the aggravating features above. The judge regarded his offending as similar to that of his older brother, the second offender. But he appears to have made no adjustment for the fact that the third offender had committed two rapes, not one. Subject to one point, it will be apparent from what we have already said that had the third offender been the same age as his older brother a sentence of 11 years would have been fully justifiable for a single offence and a sentence of ten-and-a-half years should properly be regarded as the bottom of the reasonable range.

Making generous allowance for his age, it will be difficult to justify a reduction for a single offence to less than seven years. On that basis an aggregate sentence of 10 years for the two offences would once again be regarded as the bottom of the reasonable range of sentences.

The outstanding point is that in the case of the third offender there is an additional consideration stemming from the fact that he was either 17 or 18 years old at the time of offending. But, as we have said, the judge was not referred to Ahmed, doubtless because the third offender had absconded and was not represented. The Solicitor General however has properly drawn our attention to it. The Solicitor General's submission is that the offending here occurred in between the judgments in R v Billam and others[1986] 1 WLR 249 and R v Millberry and others [2002] EWCA Crim 2891, [2003] 1 WLR 546. In the latter case, the rape of a child starting point was eight years. Although the starting point in R v Billam and others would have been five years for a single offence, the reality is that sentencing practice in 1998 which had developed since Billam would not have been markedly different in outcome to the approach in Millberry. It is therefore submitted that for the rape of a highly vulnerable child in these circumstances and given the aggravating features here and the fact that the third offender committed two such offences, a sentence of longer than seven-and-a-half years would have been imposed in 1999 and should also have been imposed again here.

We agree with that submission and do not consider that the reference to Ahmed affects or alters the view that we have reached on the appropriate sentence for the third offender's two rapes. For these reasons we consider that the aggregate sentence imposed on the third offender was not merely lenient but unduly lenient. We therefore quash the sentence on count 10 and substitute a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment concurrent.