R v Sufyan Afzal

The appellant, Sufyan Afzal, who is aged 19, appeals against his sentence of seven years and one month's detention in a young offender institution for arson offences imposed upon him in the Crown Court at Birmingham by His Honour Judge Kershaw.

On 11 June 2024, at the start of his trial, the appellant pleaded guilty to arson, contrary to section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 (Count 1), and to arson being reckless as to whether life is endangered, contrary to section 1(2) of the 1971 Act (count 2). On 1 August 2024, he was sentenced respectively to four years' detention in a young offender institution on Count 1 and to a concurrent term to seven years and one month's detention on Count 2.

He appeals against his sentence with limited leave granted by the Single Judge. The ground of appeal for which leave was not granted has been renewed before this court.

On 1 December 2023, when he was still aged 18, the appellant travelled in a vehicle at 4 am to a targeted address in Birmingham. Within that address a family was present and asleep. A neighbour's CCTV camera provided evidence of what took place. As the vehicle came to stop outside the property, one of the males from within the vehicle (not the appellant) went to the front of the house and threw bricks through the front doors of the property. That person then returned to the vehicle and took out more bricks, which were then thrown at an expensive car parked on the driveway. He then took a cannister of fluid which he poured over the vehicle on the driveway and the door of the house. This was an accelerant which he ignited before making his escape in the vehicle in which he together with the appellant and two others had arrived.

Fortunately for the family within the property the noise had disturbed them. They were unable to leave their home through the front door because of the fire, and so had to exit out of the rear. The emergency services were called.

The family vehicle was destroyed. It was valued at approximately £40,000. Also, £6,000 worth of damage was caused to the driveway and to the front of the house.

The appellant was later arrested for an unrelated matter and his mobile phone was seized, evidence from which revealed his involvement in the arson attack. When he was interviewed by the police he made no comment.

The appellant, who is still aged 19, has no previous convictions.

In the pre-sentence report the appellant described how he had become involved in the offending as a result of his association with his cannabis supplier. The author of the report found some evidence of immaturity, although it could not be described as being very markedly so.

In sentencing the appellant, the judge concluded that the offence of arson being reckless as to whether life is endangered should be the lead sentence, with a concurrent sentence for the simple arson offence. The judge adopted category B1 of the guideline on the basis that the culpability arose through recklessness and that harm was a high risk of very serious physical or psychological harm to the family. This assessment was based upon the evidence that the accelerant used to cause the fire was poured over the front door of the property, as well as the car, at a time when the family were asleep in bed.

We have observed the video evidence from both the neighbour's CCTV camera and the mobile phone used by one of the occupants in the vehicle which contained the appellant. We are satisfied that it shows a clear effort to set fire to the front of the house.

Category B1 of the guideline provides a starting point of six years' custody, with a range of four to ten years. The judge found that there were aggravating factors of seriousness in that an accelerant had been used and that there was clear planning and premeditation for the attack, given that bricks and accelerant were taken to the scene. The video evidence supports the assessment.

In mitigation, the appellant has no previous convictions and was aged 18 at the time. There was some evidence of immaturity, as we have identified.

The judge took into account both aggravating and mitigating factors and increased the sentence from its starting point to seven and a half years, before allowing a discount for the guilty pleas of slightly more than five per cent, to impose a custodial term of seven years and one month.

On behalf of the appellant it is argued by Mr Ahmed, for whose submissions we are grateful, that there are three grounds of appeal: firstly, that the judge adopted too high a starting point because the offending should have been categorised as B2 and not B1; secondly, that insufficient weight was given to the appellant's mitigating factors, in particular his age; and thirdly, Mr Ahmed renews his application concerning the extent of guilty plea discount.

Mr Ahmed submits that there was no evidence that the appellant had been involved in the purchase or carrying of the accelerant to the scene, and that he did not leave the vehicle. Further, it was not the appellant who threw the bricks or poured the accelerant; nor did he ignite it. It is also submitted that no accelerant was poured into the house, although it must be accepted that it was poured on to the front of the house, as can be observed within the video evidence. Mr Ahmed submits that, taking into account these factors should have reduced the category within the guideline to B2, with a lower starting point. Mr Ahmed also relies on the above submissions as mitigating factors. In addition, he relies upon the absence of previous convictions and the appellant's age, which together he submits caused the mitigating factors to outweigh the aggravating factors and required a reduction in the sentence from its starting point. Further, he argues that the appellant should have been given ten per cent plea discount, rather than five per cent discount.

We are not persuaded that the judge fell into error in assessing this offence of arson being reckless as to whether life is endangered as falling within category B1 of the guideline. The pouring of an accelerant onto a vehicle with its windows smashed, followed by smashing the windows of the home and pouring the accelerant over the front door, clearly created a high risk of very serious physical harm. This was an offence committed at 4 am, whilst the family were asleep in bed. The judge might also have included as a category 1 harm factor, that very high value damage was caused. An expensive car was destroyed, and there was £6,000 worth of damage to the property. Therefore, we are satisfied that the correct starting point was used when approaching sentence.

The aggravating factors of seriousness were significant: the use of an accelerant and the planning and premeditation involved required a substantial increase in the sentence from the starting point. The judge might also have included the fact that this was a group offence – the appellant was one of four offenders. However, the mitigating factors, in particular the appellant's age and lack of previous convictions, were also important. The judge took into account both aggravating and mitigating factors and increased the sentence by a modest amount within the range.

We do not share the observations made on behalf of the appellant that insufficient weight was given to the appellant's mitigating factors.

In our judgment, the sentence of seven years and one month after guilty plea discount was well within the appropriate range of sentencing for this serious offending.

Finally, we are not persuaded that the guilty plea discount was insufficient. The appellant entered his guilty plea on the second day of the trial, whether or not the case had been opened to the jury. We refuse the application to renew this ground.

Accordingly, we are not persuaded that this sentence was excessive, nor that it was wrong in principle. The appeal is therefore dismissed.