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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL DIVISION ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT WORCESTER (WALL J) [22CA1072121] Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWCA Crim 1861 CASE NO 202403128/B5 |
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
Before:
LORD JUSTICE GREEN
MR JUSTICE JAY
MR JUSTICE JOHNSON
REX
V
DIRK HOWELL
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NON-COUNSEL APPLICATION
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JUDGMENT
(Approved)
LORD JUSTICE GREEN:
There is before the Court a renewed application for permission to appeal. The provisions of sections 45 and 45A of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 apply in this case largely because of the age of the victims. To remove any risk that the victims might be identified, we omit any reference to the victim save in anonymised form.
In June 2022 the applicant pleaded guilty to four counts of cruelty to a child. In June 2023, the applicant was convicted by the jury of murder. No verdict was taken in relation to alternative counts of manslaughter or causing or allowing the death of a child.
The applicant was charged alongside his partner. She was convicted of manslaughter and of four counts of cruelty to a child.
On 15 June 2023, the applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the count of murder and to 6 years' imprisonment on each count of cruelty to a person under the age of 16 to run concurrently with a sentence of murder. The applicant's partner was sentenced to a term of 27 years' imprisonment for her conviction for manslaughter and cruelty to children. In relation to the applicant, the Court fixed the minimum term as one of 32 years' imprisonment less days spent on remand.
The Court has very full papers before it which include the judge's sentencing remarks, a detailed exposition of the relevant facts, a thorough Respondent's Notice and submissions, and the analysis and conclusions of the Single Judge when refusing permission to appeal.
The facts can be shortly stated. The applicant was convicted of murdering a child who was found under water in a bath having also sustained serious injuries to the head. The precise cause of death was unknown. At trial a variety of alternative hypotheses were advanced, including that the victim had suffered an epileptic fit. This possibility was explored fully during the trial, and the jury heard all sides of the evidence including medical and expert evidence. There was no further testing that could reasonably have been expected and no further adjournments were requested by the defence in relation to possible causes of death.
The central issue for the jury was whether the applicant had used unlawful force upon the deceased child, and whether that force had led to the child's death and whether, at the time the force was used, the applicant intended to kill the deceased or cause him to be really seriously injured. The jury was directed about the cause of death including what they had to be sure of. The jury was also directed to examine the case of each defendant separately. On the evidence it was possible for the jury to reach different conclusions as between each defendant, as indeed they did.
The grounds of appeal can be briefly summarised as follows. First, the cause of death could not be ascertained and epilepsy could not be ruled out. Secondly, if the experts could not identify the cause of death, then the jury must have unlawfully speculated as to what actually happened, demonstrating that there had been a miscarriage of justice. Thirdly, that there was a disparity between the verdicts in relation to the applicant and his partner, who was not convicted of murder even though the case against each was the same. Fourthly, statements made by all child witnesses were circumstantial, contradictory and unreliable, and the evidence of the children had been coerced and the police had made corrupt payments to those caring for the children. Fifthly, certain pieces of evidence relied upon by the prosecution served only to bolster a weak circumstantial case and should never have been admitted by the judge into the evidence. Finally, the applicant was improperly and unprofessionally represented at trial, though in relation to this (the unfair representation at trial) the applicant has refused to sign a privilege waiver form permitting disclosure of otherwise protected material.
The Single Judge considered all of these complaints carefully and concluded, on the basis of the material before him, that none of the grounds were reasonably arguable. The judge concluded that all the issues now raised were squarely canvassed in evidence before the jury, and that the directions given by the judge were comprehensive and fair. Further, the judge examined the very extensive evidence given at trial, relating to the violence perpetrated by the applicant towards the victim and other children on a routine basis. The judge rejected the submission that in the light of the evidence as a whole the case against the applicant was circumstantial and weak. We also have read the file with care, and we unreservedly agree with the conclusion of the Single Judge that the proposed grounds of appeal are unarguable. It follows that the application for permission to appeal is refused.
The application is 410 days out of time. Given our conclusion that the application for permission to appeal must be refused, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether, had the grounds been arguable, we would have refused permission to appeal in any event.
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