R v Bhadresh Gohil & Anor

We have an adjournment application on behalf of the applicant Ibori who seeks to vacate the hearing today of his renewed application for leave to appeal against the confiscation order imposed by HHJ Tomlinson on 24 July 2023 in the sum of approximately £101 million, following refusal by the single judge, has been listed for hearing today. He seeks to have the current hearing used to give directions with a view to his application being heard at a later date.

The relevant chronology is as follows. Following the order made by HHJ Tomlinson, grounds of appeal on behalf of Ibori were drafted by counsel Mr Krolick and lodged in time on 21 August 2023. The Criminal Appeal Office directed a respondent's notice on 9 April 2024 which explained:

A respondent's notice was filed on 3 June 2024. The grounds and the respondent's notice were considered by the single judge who refused leave to appeal on 14 November 2024. The applicant renewed his application on 18 November 2024. That was a renewal as a litigant in person on the grounds previously settled by counsel Mr Krolick. The hearing of the renewed application was originally listed for 27 June 2025 but that date had to be vacated by the court. On 5 August 2025 the renewed application was relisted for hearing today. It is listed to be heard together with a renewed application by the applicant Gohil for leave to appeal against the confiscation order made against him, also by HHJ Tomlinson on the same date, in the sum of approximately £28 million. Although the grounds for the orders being made and the grounds of appeal against the orders were different for the two applicants, they were listed to be heard together because conduct underlying both orders included Gohil money laundering criminal proceeds on behalf of Ibori. The time allocated to the listing was 15 minutes for both applications. This was because Mr Gohil was a litigant in person who had no right to make submissions orally and the office were informed that Ibori was not represented and did not intend to appear. Gohil subsequently made an application to be permitted to make oral submissions. The court considered that and rejected it for the reasons which were given last week. The 15 minutes was therefore intended to allow for the court to deliver judgment in open court, having considered the applications on the papers in the normal way.

On Wednesday 29 October, that is to say just under two weeks ago, CLP solicitors wrote to the Criminal Appeal Office seeking to have the hearing vacated. The letter stated in summary the following:

As we have said, the letter did not in fact identify when CLP or Mr Eissa had been instructed. Although the letter did not say so, CLP had represented Ibori throughout the confiscation proceedings. The letter did not explain why Mr Krolick could not represent the applicant but it did say, "leading counsel whose call is 1966" -- that was a reference to Mr Krolick -- "who acted in the underlying confiscation proceedings between 2012 and 2023, withdrew from the case and is now semi-retired."

The registrar of criminal appeals replied to the letter promptly the next day, Thursday, 30 October. She stated the following:

There was no response to that letter or suggestion that the application would be pursued until a letter sent eight days later, that is to say last Friday, 7 November. By that stage the members of the court had spent days reading into the case in order to be able to give its decision and judgment today. The 7 November letter reiterated the assertion that counsel could not be instructed before resolution of the costs dispute between the defence and the CPS. In relation to Mr Eissa's advice it said:

That letter of 7 November came to the attention of the members of the court the same afternoon, that is to say last Friday, together with, for the first time so far as they were concerned, the 29 October letter.

Yesterday morning the court gave the following directions:

“Copies of the two CLP letters are to be provided immediately by CLP to the respondent, if that has not already occurred. [We interpose to say that that had not occurred, although it should have done]. The respondent may make responsive submissions in writing if so advised. The court will deal with the application on Tuesday. If it intended that counsel for Ibori will attend on Tuesday, prompt notice should be given to the office and to the clerk to Popplewell LJ today and at the same time to the respondent including counsel. ... If counsel attend for Ibori the court with then deal with whether any and if so what time may be allocated for oral submissions."

As we have said, the CLP letters had not previously been copied by CLP to the respondent as they should have been, but pursuant to the order they were, and yesterday the respondent made written submissions opposing the application.

At 8.40 this morning CLP solicitors sent an email to my clerk with copies to the CAO office and to other counsel in the case which said the following:

Mr Eissa duly appeared before us seeking to make the application to adjourn orally. In order to assist us in deciding whether he should be allowed to do so, we asked a number of questions. We first asked why it was that there had been non-compliance with the direction that the court gave yesterday. Mr Eissa said that he had left that all in the hands of his solicitors, CLP Partners. Mr Mahmood, who is the solicitor at CLP responsible for the conduct of the case, said to us that it had simply been an oversight and he had been very busy yesterday. That is entirely unsatisfactory. When the court makes orders, it expects them to be complied with. This was not a complex order. It was not difficult to understand and it would not have taken any time at all for it to be complied with by the court being informed yesterday and in good time that it was intended that there would be an appearance on behalf of Mr Ibori. That would have enabled an exploration earlier of the matters which we were only able to explore this morning with Mr Eissa which are of relevance to equality of arms. We asked Mr Eissa whether he intended to make any points which were different from those which were contained in the two CLP letters of 29 October and 7 November. He indicated that that was only so in respect of amplification by way of response to the submissions which had been put forward on behalf of the CPS and by way of specific points as to why it would not have been possible for other counsel who were identified in that note to have been instructed.

We have concluded that it would not be appropriate to allow Mr Eissa to advance further oral submissions in those circumstances. We will take account of the matters which he has identified as arising out of the Crown's response. However, were we to allow him to make further oral submissions there is a real danger that he would go beyond the content of the two CLP letters and that would be quite unfair to the Crown who would have had no prior notice of those matters, no opportunity to consider them and therefore would not have had a fair opportunity to respond.

We have to say that the way in which this matter has come before the court smacks very much of ambush. We do not make that accusation against Mr Eissa personally, but the application is not merely to vacate but to set a date by which counsel may perfect grounds for the assistance of the full court. That suggestion, and the suggestion that an adjournment is necessary because it requires a complete reassessment of all the documents in the case and the transcripts, misunderstands the nature of the renewed application and suggests to us that what is in fact desired is starting again from scratch. We are very conscious of the need to avoid Ibori being allowed by stealth to effectively advance a number of new and different grounds through Mr Eissa in what are ostensibly grounds for a vacation of the trial date. That being so, we will address the application on the basis of the points which have been addressed in the CLP letters and which Mr Eissa confirmed were the only points which were intended to be advanced.

We reject the application to vacate the date for the following reasons:

The correspondence does not show any good reason why instruction of counsel on this application needed to await the settlement of fees incurred earlier. That would not be a matter of professional obligation in relation to private funding. There is no evidence before the court that Ibori did not have funds available to instruct CLP or counsel in relation to the renewal application apart from those which were the subject matter of the restraint order. Indeed, in the confiscation proceedings the judge found that he had hidden assets capable of satisfying at least the benefit figure. Moreover, there is no reason why counsel newly instructed after the settlement with the CPS could not sufficiently prepare for the application in the time available, even assuming that the time available was after the settlement on 19 September.

Implementation of that was within an unidentified period of a few weeks. It is, as we have said, entirely wrong to suggest that preparation of the renewal application required review of thousands of pages of transcripts and underlying documents. The application is a renewal of the application made on the grounds of appeal settled by Mr Krolick. Those are the only grounds which can be advanced in the absence of any application to amend those grounds. No such application has been made. They are readily comprehensible and although the background to the matter is indeed complex, we have been able to consider them with the benefit of a few days' reading with the documents necessary to do so. Counsel coming fresh to the case would have had sufficient time for such preparation. In short, therefore, there is no good reason shown why counsel could not have been ready for a hearing today and had that occurred and proper notice been given of it, no doubt the listing would have been able to accommodate it. In fact, the other cases listed today had a total of less than half a day and have taken a good deal less because one of the appeals was abandoned.

By contrast, to vacate the hearing now would cause unfair prejudice and would be contrary to the interests of the proper administration of justice.

No dates are identified in the proposed directions order, but it is clear that if such direction were to be given, they would result in further very substantial delay in what is already a much delayed process. As we have said, we find the suggestion that time should be afforded to "perfect" the grounds of appeal troubling. The grounds have already been put before the court, they have been advanced and rejected by the single judge and that looks very much like an attempt to have the opportunity to mount an appeal on completely different grounds, an impression reinforced by the suggestion that counsel would need to review all the underlying material afresh and all the transcripts, rather than simply apply their mind to the grounds drafted by Mr Krolick. If that were to be allowed it would lead to the waste of considerable court time and resources which have already been incurred in relation to today's hearing, including our reading time, for no good reason, and would cause unfair prejudice to other parties. The prosecution has a legitimate interest in finality in these much delayed proceedings. There is also a very real possibility of unfair prejudice to Mr and/or Mrs Gohil, and that arises because in the family proceedings Lady Justice King has stayed the applications for permission to appeal from the judgment of Williams J pending resolution of these renewed applications for leave to appeal the confiscation order.

For reasons which we will explain in due course, we are currently minded to give leave to Mr Gohil and to Mr Ibori on their applications but on a very limited basis, and the nature of that leave in each case does not mean that King LJ's stay will necessarily be extended until after an appeal on those points is heard. It might very well not. We do not pre-determine that matter because it may well be a matter for further consideration in the family court. In short, therefore, there is no good reason for the hearing not to be effective and to vacate it would cause unfair prejudice and is contrary to the interests of justice.

For those reasons we reject the application.