R v Chinedu Nwakwesili

The provisions of section 45A of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 are engaged in this case because the victim is under 18, being 14 years old at the time of the offence against him. We shall refer to the victim as "V" in this judgment.

On 21 May 2025 in the Crown Court at Manchester, the appellant (who was then aged 18) pleaded guilty to an offence of robbery. On 26 August 2025 he was sentenced to 32 months in a young offender institution. He appeals that sentence with leave of the Single Judge.

On 6 January 2025, V (aged 14) was given an e-scooter as a Hanukkah present. At 1.40 the following afternoon, V was trying out the e-scooter on the street when he was approached by the appellant. The appellant charged at V shouting: "I'm stronger than you". The appellant knocked V to the ground and wrestled the e-scooter from him before riding it away.

The incident was reported to police. The appellant was arrested on 13 January and answered "no comment" to all questions in interview, subsequently pleading guilty, as we have noted.

The appellant was aged 17 at the time of the offence (18 at conviction and sentence). He had seven convictions for 12 offences in the 3-year period between 9 March 2022 and 19 March 2025. These offences included three offences of robbery, possession of a bladed article, two offences of theft and a section 20 wounding. There was a pre-sentence report which we have read carefully. Referring to the appellant's previous convictions the author observed:

There was also a victim personal statement from V, which we have likewise considered carefully. V reports being scared to go out alone now and this is affecting his social life.

The judge described sentencing the appellant as a "troubling" exercise with two competing considerations. First, the appellant's age and the fact that he was 17 when he committed the offence. Second, his record of recent serious offending giving rise to a concern about the risk he presented. The judge referred to three previous robberies in January and February 2022 for which the appellant received a 12-month detention and training order. He had been returned to custody in October that year for failing to comply with the training requirements of the order. There was a further detention and training order imposed in February 2023, for the section 20 wounding offence, in which the appellant had produced a knife at school which he had used to slash at another pupil's chest.

The judge said that he had taken into account the guidance in the Sentencing Council guideline Robbery Sentencing Children and Young People ("the Child Robbery guideline") and the adult robbery guidelines for street robberies. He also referenced the case of R v Ahmed [2023] EWCA Crim 281 in addressing what sentence was likely to have been passed on the appellant had he been dealt with shortly after the offence when he was still aged 17. The judge observed that, had the appellant been of good character, then he may not have received a custodial sentence for this offence. However, looking at the seriousness of the offence itself and the aggravating features, including the appellant's "quite appalling record for previous offences and similar offences to this", the judge concluded that a Youth Court faced with this appellant aged 17 would most likely have sent him to the Crown Court for sentence, treating the robbery as a grave crime for the purposes of section 25 of the Sentencing Act 2020. The offending would be categorised as B2 in the Adult Guideline with a starting point of 4 years and a range of 3 to 6 years. The judge took the view that the previous like offending together with the vulnerability of the victim would move the sentence for an adult up to the top of the range (6 years) which he reduced to 4 years for the appellant's youth before applying a one-third reduction for plea, resulting in the sentence of 32 months to which we have referred.

Mr Watkins, who appeared for the appellant at sentence, as he does today on this appeal, submits that the judge placed too much weight on the appellant's previous offending as an aggravating factor. He suggests that, particularly for a young person, the aggravating nature of previous convictions ought to be tempered and that the judge erred in moving to top of the range. The sentence, he submits, was thereby overinflated before the reduction for youth and a discount for plea.

We note from the document entitled "modus operandi previous robbery offences" that the appellant had previously received detention and training orders of 12 months and 4 months on separate occasions in 2022 and 2023, despite which his offending continued. We agree with the judge that a Youth Court would, in view of this appellant's history of offending, have been bound to consider a custodial sentence and would very likely have remitted the case to the Crown Court for sentence. As the judge observed, this was a mean and violent offence perpetrated against a much younger boy whom the appellant no doubt saw as unable to withstand a violent attack on him. The vulnerability of the much younger victim and the number of recent convictions were together very serious aggravating factors. We cannot find that the judge erred in concluding that for an adult these aggravating factors taken together would have lifted the sentence to the top of the range in the guideline.

Other than the appellant's age, there was very little mitigation. There was nothing in any of the reports to suggest that the appellant was particularly immature for his age, quite the opposite. The judge correctly followed the Child Robbery Guideline in arriving at his conclusion that custody was inevitable, and then in allowing a full one-third reduction for youth notwithstanding that the appellant was just 3 months off his 18th birthday when he committed this offence. Entirely properly the judge then allowed a further one-third reduction for the appellant's plea at the first opportunity.

The resulting sentence of 32 months' detention was severe for a young man of the appellant's age but we are unable to conclude that the judge erred in his application of the relevant guidelines and principles or that the final sentence which he passed was excessive. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.