R v Vitalie Tanga

This is an application by His Majesty's Attorney General, under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, for leave to refer a sentence to this court which he considers to be unduly lenient. The application raises the issue whether the judge was wrong not to impose consecutive minimum terms for murder.

On 27 June 2025, following a trial in the Crown Court at Birmingham before Tipples J and a jury, the offender, Vitalie Tanga, who is 42 years old, having been born in August 1983, was convicted of the murder of Tajinder Kular, contrary to common law. The offence took place in HMP Birmingham on 29 or 30 September 2022. On 3 July 2025, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 26 years and four months.

At the time of the trial for the murder of Mr Kular, the offender had six convictions for nine offences, as well as a caution. One of those convictions was for the murder of Alfred Mattox, which occurred on 10 May 2021. The conviction for the murder of Mr Mattox postdated the murder of Mr Kular. The offender had relevant previous convictions before either the murder of Mr Mattox or Mr Kular. In 2015, he was cautioned for criminal damage. There was then a delay of six years or so before he was convicted of any other criminal offending. In January 2021, he was conditionally discharged for common assault. On 7 January 2021, he was in possession of an offensive weapon (a hammer). On 8 January 2021, he was sentenced to 14 days' imprisonment, suspended for six months. On 2 February 2021, he was drunk and disorderly. He then failed to attend court. On 26 February 2021, he was sentenced to 14 days' imprisonment. On 15 April 2021, he was in possession of an offensive weapon (an iron bar). On 10 May 2021, (so after the last offence had been committed, but before he was sentenced for it) the offender murdered Mr Mattox and committed an assault occasioning actual bodily harm against Vadimas Astrakevicius. He was arrested the following day but released under investigation. It is necessary to set out the facts of that offending.

The incident occurred at a flat in Wolverhampton. Mr Mattox and Mr Astrakevicius went out shopping. They met another friend called Sergei. They purchased a bottle of vodka. The three went back to the flat to celebrate the anniversary of the end of the Second
World War. The offender then joined them. Mr Mattox agreed that he should come back. Vodka was drunk. They went out and bought some more. All was well in the flat at 4.34 pm when Mr Mattox's brother spoke to him on the phone.

At 5.31 pm, neighbours heard noises and called the police. That was in fact when the fatal assault occurred. Police attended about 15 minutes later. They found Mr Mattox unconscious. He had sustained extensive fractures to both sides of his face. He had brain damage which led to organ failure. He died on 24 May 2021. The sentencing judge found that there must have been at least three heavy blows to the head, consistent with kicking. The judge was sure that the violent assault went beyond any reactions to what had been said and that the evidence was consistent with hostility to the deceased's sexual orientation, which aggravated the offence.

That brings us back to 15 April 2021, when the offender was sentenced to six months' imprisonment for possession of an offensive weapon. On 25 August 2022, he committed battery, when he approached a male who was sitting on a bench and punched him in the face, breaking his glasses. At that time the offender, who had been released under investigation for the murder of Mr Mattox, was again released under investigation. He was charged and remanded in custody in relation to the offence of battery. It was whilst he was remanded in custody at His Majesty's Prison Birmingham for the offence of battery that he murdered Mr Kular by attacking him on either 29 or 30 September 2022.

On the evening of 29 September 2022, the offender was moved to share a cell with Mr Kular. At some point between that time and 11.20 am the following morning, the offender assaulted Mr Kular by punching him twice to the head and inflicting a cut on his cheek. He then strangled Mr Kular, using a kettle cord or cable as a ligature, with "approaching severe" force. Mr Kular died on 21 October 2022, nearly a month later.

At trial, the offender claimed that he had acted in self-defence. In due course, the trial judge found that the offender intended to kill Mr Kular. The motive may have been an argument over vapes, but the judge was not able to make such a finding to the requisite criminal standard in relation to that.

On 10 November 2022, the offender was charged with the murder of Mr Mattox.

On 2 May 2023, he was sentenced for the offence of battery to a hospital order.

On 19 April 2024, the offender was convicted by a jury of the murder of Mr Mattox and the assault occasioning actual bodily harm against Mr Astrakevicius.

On 3 May 2024, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 25 years (less a period of one year and 175 days spent on remand) for the murder of Mr Mattox. The judge had taken a starting point of 30 years' imprisonment, because it was an assault on a person in his own home. There was significant mitigation: there was no intention to kill; the attack was spontaneous; and the offender was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. There was no evidence that he was receiving treatment for mental illness prior to his arrest. There was no suggestion that he was psychotic at the time but he was highly intoxicated. The doctors' view was that he had had a psychotic condition for a number of years. Accordingly, there was a background of mental illness, which reduced culpability, but not significantly. That was why the overall minimum sentence was one of 25 years.

On 27 June 2025 the offender was convicted by a jury of the murder of Mr Kular.

On 3 July 2025, the offender was sentenced for the murder of Mr Kular. The sentencing judge had reports from Dr Brennan and Dr Kennedy. The evidence of Dr Brennan was that the offender had come to the attention of the mental health team when he was in custody. So far as was relevant, the judge accepted that he had problems with his temper. On all the evidence which was before the court, in relation to the killing of Mr Kular and what had happened before and after he was discovered unconscious in his cell, the judge was sure that the offender understood the nature and consequences of his actions. The judge said: "You knew what you were doing and you intended to kill him". Although it is right that the offender had a psychotic illness and that he had delusions which would have arisen from psychotic illness around the time of the offence, it was impossible to say that they had any effect on the offending at the time.

The judge stated that the only sentence was life imprisonment. The case did not meet the criteria for a whole life order and did not otherwise fall within paragraphs 2 to 4 of Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020. The starting point, therefore, was a minimum term of 15 years.

The judge had been referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal of R v Stewart [2022] EWCA Crim 1063; [2022] 4 WLR 86 and said:

The judge identified the aggravating and mitigating features, and then set the minimum term for the sentence of life imprisonment to reflect the murder of Mr Mattox and Mr Kular at 27 years and six months.

So far as the effect of that sentence was concerned, as a result of the life sentence imposed for the murder of Mr Mattox, and taking account of the time served, the offender's earliest possible release date on the expiry of his minimum term, was 10 November 2047. The effect of the sentence imposed by the judge for murder of Mr Kular was that the earliest possible release date was moved back by a period of five years and two months to 3 January 2053.

It will be necessary to consider whether that is an unduly lenient sentence given the serious offending carried out against Mr Kular.

We have had an updated report from the prison, dated 8 August 2025, which shows that the offender has been abusing drugs in prison, as a result of which he has had two collapses. He has also smashed a television. He continues to deny offending. There has been limited engagement with him because the offender has limited English.

Section 1 of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 provides:

In passing a mandatory life sentence, the Sentencing Act 2020 requires the court to make a minimum term or a whole life order. A minimum term is an order that the early release provisions are to apply once the offender has served the length of the minimum term. In determining the length of that minimum term, the court must have regard to the principles set out in Schedule 21.

Paragraph 5 of Schedule 21 provides:

Paragraph 7 of Schedule 21 provides that the court should take into account aggravating or mitigating factors to the extent that the court has not allowed for them.

So far as is relevant, the overarching guideline on totality published by the Sentencing Council provides that the principle of totality applies when sentencing an offender for multiple offences or when sentencing an offender who is already serving an existing sentence. The guidance notes that consecutive sentences will ordinarily be appropriate where (a) offences arise out of unrelated facts or incidents. Examples include:

As far as the imposition of an indeterminate sentence where an offender is already serving an existing indeterminate sentence, the guideline states:

Section 384 of the Sentencing Code reproduced section 154 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, and it was to the effect that a sentence imposed, or other order made by the Crown Court, shall take effect at the beginning of the day on which it is imposed, unless the court otherwise directs.

In the course of submissions we were referred to R v O'Brien [2006] EWCA Crim 1741; [2007] 1 WLR 833, and in particular to [57] which was to the effect that it was agreed that there is no provision of law which prevents the imposition of consecutive indeterminate sentences. Reference was also made to R v Hills [2008] EWCA Crim 1871, which was again to the effect that there is no reason in principle why the court should not impose a sentence structured as that sentence had been, which was a determinate sentence which was ordered to run consecutively to a life sentence. Reference was also made to Stewart, to which we have already referred, where in addition to a sentence for murder, a second sentence for murder had been the subject of a whole life sentence. The court adjusted the minimum term that had been imposed. In Stewart the court said:

At [48] the court said:

In relation to setting the minimum term in relation to the second conviction for murder, the court said at [50]:

It is further relevant to note that the editors of Sentencing Principles, Procedure and Practice 2025, 5^th edition, have commented at paragraph A4-669:

In our judgment, it is possible to identify the following propositions of law:

Having regard to these propositions, we turn to the submissions in the case with which we are concerned. We have well in mind the principles which govern Attorney General's References, which are set out in Attorney General's Reference (No 4 of 1989) 11 Cr App R(S) 517, to the effect that the court should only interfere where the judge has gone wrong and where the sentence is not only lenient but is unduly lenient. The court has a discretion as to whether or not to exercise its powers to increase an unduly lenient sentence.

It is submitted by Mr Polnay KC on behalf of the Attorney General that there should have been consecutive minimum terms, with a second minimum term starting at some point in the future, to enable transparency. Secondly, he submits that, in any event, the overall sentence did not reflect the murders involved because the second sentence for murder led only to an increase in the minimum term, before the offender might be considered for release, of five years and two months.

On behalf of the offender, it is submitted by Mr Malik KC that a consecutive minimum term for a further sentence of life imprisonment may be an available sentence, but that the judge was not wrong to structure the sentences as she did. Further a sentence of 27 years and six months for the murder of Mr Kular, where the starting point was 15 years, could not sensibly be described as lenient.

We are very grateful to both Mr Polnay and Mr Malik for their helpful written and oral submissions.

In our judgment, the judge was entitled to structure the sentences as she did. The judge was not referred to any of the authorities to which we have been referred. It appeared to have been common ground before the judge that it was not possible to order a consecutive minimum term, which is not an accurate statement of the law. We consider that the judge was entitled to pass a sentence of life imprisonment for the second offence of murder and to set the minimum term for that second offence of murder without making that second minimum term consecutive to that minimum term. The judge, however, had to reflect all of the criminality reflected by both murders, taking account of time served.

We do consider that the issue about whether the overall sentence reflects the criminality of the two murders committed by the offender is arguable. Therefore, we will grant leave for the Reference.

It is apparent that the judge considered carefully the approach that had been taken in Stewart when she calculated the uplift for the second murder in this case. It seems from the exchanges in the transcript of the prosecution opening, the mitigation and the sentencing remarks, that the judge measured her sentence by reference to the approach that had been taken in Stewart in relation to the uplift to the new minimum term, rather than fully reflecting on the separate criminality involved in the murder of Mr Kular.

The most important point about Stewart, which did not appear to feature in the submissions before the judge, is that in that case the appellant was 61 years old when the whole life order was quashed and the minimum term of 35 years was imposed on him. That meant that he could not be considered for release after the service of his minimum term until he was 96 years old. That must have been a very relevant factor in making the sentence proportionate to the offending as a whole, which the court had to do. Indeed, it was the exercise which the court identified that it was undertaking. It is however capable of causing judges who refer to the actual increase in the minimum term in that case, to be misled.

In our judgment, for a 42 year old offender, an uplift to the minimum term of five years and two months was simply not a fair reflection of the additional criminality represented by the second offence of the murder of Mr Kular. It is clear that, having regard to the principles of totality, it is impermissible simply to add on the total of the second minimum term to the first minimum term. If the second minimum term had been consecutive, some adjustment for totality would need to be made. However, with a starting point of 15 years for the murder of Mr Kular, the aggravating factors of previous convictions (including a previous conviction for murder), the commission of an offence while released under investigation for the first offence of murder, the use of a weapon, the fact that the murder was committed in custody – which is particularly important – balanced out with the mitigating factors, such as a lack of premeditation (although there was an intention to kill), and the fact that the offender was suffering from a schizoaffective psychosis which fluctuated, in our judgment a minimum term of at least 17 years would have been required for that second murder alone, before considering a reduction for totality.

In order to achieve the transparency that was not apparent from the judge's sentencing remarks, it is then necessary to add on, in practical effect, a period of time to the existing sentence which was imposed. In our judgment, to reflect that separate 17 year minimum period, and to reflect issues of totality, we add a period of ten years on to the minimum term which remained outstanding from the first minimum term.

That means that the judge's sentence, which added only five years and two months, was, in our judgment, unduly lenient. The overall minimum term of 27 years and six months which commenced immediately on pronouncement should have been increased to a minimum term of 32 years and six months.

Accordingly, we allow the Reference to the extent that we substitute a minimum term of 32 years and six months for the minimum term of 27 years and six months imposed on the offender.