R v Clive Thomas Leonard

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence. Under these provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. That prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the 1992 Act.

On 31 October 2024 the appellant was convicted after trial of two counts of rape. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 12 years' imprisonment on both counts. A surcharge order in the sum of £228 was imposed but this should have been imposed in the sum of £190 and so we accordingly amend the order to reflect the appropriate sum. Restraining orders and notifications were also ordered.

The appellant appeals with the permission of the single judge.

The first offence occurred in the early hours of 26 August 2021. As the victim, a 19-year-old student, was walking home from a nightclub the appellant encountered him and they struck up a conversation. The victim mentioned that he was bicurious but did not intend that there be a sexual encounter. They ended up in a dark area and the appellant said, "Let's do it here". The victim asked what he meant, and the next thing he recalled was being crouched down and the appellant having taken his own penis from his trousers aggressively pushing it into the victim's mouth, pulling the victim's head towards it and forcing his penis into oral rape. The appellant ejaculated into the victim's mouth. The victim was distraught at what had happened, and he was helped by a passerby, who he told he had been raped. He was then assisted by a friend whom he telephoned, who he also told he had been raped.

In his victim personal statement the victim explains the impact the events had on him, particularly given his diagnosis of ASD and the significant impact the rape and the trial had had on his emotional wellbeing.

The second offence of rape occurred in the early hours of 2 May 2024. The victim had attended a family funeral and afterwards gone drinking in bars in the city centre. He had spoken to the appellant before and when they met on that evening they stayed out drinking until the bar they were in closed at 3 am. After this the victim and the appellant returned to the victim's flat and the appellant started kissing and cuddling him on the sofa. The appellant undressed and asked the victim to do likewise, which he did. The appellant then performed oral sex on the victim. He then turned the victim on to his hands and knees as the appellant wanted to have anal sex with him. The victim asked if he had a condom and the appellant said he did not. The victim made clear that they should not have sex without a condom, but the appellant said that it did not matter. The appellant then penetrated the victim's anus without his consent. The victim said that it was uncomfortable but the appellant persisted. The victim said "no" and told him to stop, but he did not. The appellant ultimately dressed and left the flat just before 5 am.

The victim provided a victim personal statement detailing the on-going emotional toll that the offence was having on him. He was struggling with having the sofa on which it had occurred still in in his flat and having difficulty going out and engaging in social interactions with friends and family. He also had a diagnosis of ASD.

The appellant was 52 at the date of his sentencing. He has two completely irrelevant earlier convictions.

The judge concluded that the offences both fell into category 3B, with a starting point of 5 years and a range of 4 to 7 years in the Sentencing Guidelines. The judge concluded that the victims were not particularly vulnerable; they had diagnosed conditions and were intoxicated but had also been able to interact with the appellant at the material times. The judge noted the adverse conclusions of the pre-sentence report on the appellant but concluded that he had power to pass a sufficiently lengthy sentence which, taken with the associated licence period and court orders, would provide adequate protection to the public.

The judge concluded that the sentences which would have been imposed would have been a sentence of 6 years on count 1 and a sentence of 7 years on count 2. He did not impose consecutive sentences but a concurrent sentence to reflect the overall criminality of both offences. He specifically took account of the principle of totality in arriving at a sentence of 12 years concurrently on each count.

Permission to appeal was granted principally on the basis that the judge failed to make a sufficient reduction to reflect totality in passing the ultimate sentence; only allowing 1 year's deduction for that principle was inappropriate.

In the course of his helpful submissions this morning, Mr Evans has advanced two principal themes on the basis of which he contends that the sentence was manifestly excessive.

Firstly, he submits that the appellant's culpability was lessened and significantly diminished by the contention that even though the jury rejected that he had reasonable belief in consent, nonetheless the facts came close to such a proposition and that has a significant impact on his culpability in relation to both of these offences.

Mr Evans also submits that insufficient regard was paid to the principal of totality and that a further reduction in the sentence ought to have been made notwithstanding the fact that these were two similar offences.

Having reflected on these submissions, we are not satisfied that there is material substance in the appellant's complaints. The judge fully and properly reflected the guidelines in the sentences for each offence — indeed it might be said that some would have concluded that there were aspects of the impact on both of these victims which brought the case far closer to category 2B.

There had to be in this case either consecutive or, as the judge concluded, concurrent sentences to reflect the totality of the offending in respect of these two offences. A discount for totality was made by the judge and in our judgment that discount was in the circumstances reasonable. The overall sentence had to reflect the judge's assessment of criminality, having heard the evidence in the trial and formed his own view directly of the two complainants.

Standing back, the sentence of 12 years was entirely merited by two serious offences. They were rapes of victims to some extent vulnerable through drink and their own personal circumstances. It is clear from the victim personal statements in each case that the rapes had a devastating impact on the emotional wellbeing of the victims and cast a deep shadow over their day-to-day lives. Whilst Mr Evans has submitted that the appellant's evidence could have amounted to a reasonable belief in consent, it is necessary to do justice to the verdicts of the jury, which rejected that as an explanation of how these offences had come about.

Overall, in the light of these reasons, we are satisfied that the sentence which was imposed in this case was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle, and ultimately this appeal must be dismissed.