R v Akram Miah

This is an appeal against sentence brought by leave of the Single Judge.

On 10 March 2025 in the Crown Court at Norwich, the appellant, who is now 26 years old, was sentenced by Mr Recorder Turner for a series of offences of violence, and for an offence of controlling and coercive behaviour, all committed against his partner over a period of some 2½ years. He had pleaded guilty to the offences at different stages. The total sentence imposed was an extended determinate sentence of 17 years and 9 months' imprisonment, pursuant to section 279 of the Sentencing Act 2020, comprising a custodial term of 12 years 9 months and an extended licence period of 5 years.

That was the sentence imposed on count 2, wounding with intent, contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 which the judge took as the lead offence. Concurrent sentences were imposed on all other counts.

On count 1, section 20 unlawful wounding, the sentence was 4 years' imprisonment. On count 3, controlling or coercive behaviour, contrary to section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, the sentence was 5 years. On count 4, making a threat to kill contrary to section 16 of the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861, the sentence was 6 years. On count 7, criminal damage, the sentence was 28 days' imprisonment.

The victim of all these offences was the appellant's ex-wife. They met online and commenced a relationship almost immediately. When she became pregnant the appellant told her she had to move to Norwich to live with him, which she did. During the course of the relationship they married in an Islamic ceremony and they had two children together.

Count 1, section 20 wounding, reflected a specific incident when the appellant deliberately stabbed the complainant in the thigh with a knife. The offence took place while the couple were staying in temporary accommodation. The appellant suspected she was communicating with an ex-boyfriend on Instagram. He took her mobile phone to check her activity and, having apparently confirmed his suspicions, he took a knife and pressed its point into her thigh. He did so initially as a threat, or to frighten her, but it was done with sufficient force to break the skin. This took place in the presence of their young son. The appellant left the premises to get some bandages and plasters. When the police attended next day she covered for the appellant saying that she had had an accident.

Count 2, section 18 wounding, was treated by the judge as the lead offence. The appellant attacked the complainant with a hammer, beating her about the body and particularly the legs. She had brought the appellant some food which he did not want and this was his response. He also punched her in the mouth causing it to bleed. Her newborn child was present during the attack. The appellant then left the house to purchase some cannabis and told her he wanted the home "immaculate" when he returned. There were photographs of the injuries which the judge rightly described as "graphic and disturbing".

Count 3, controlling and coercive behaviour, covered the 2½ year period from August 2021 to February 2024. The behaviour in which he repeatedly or continuously engaged was set out in the indictment in the particulars of offence. He controlled her finances, refused to allow her to leave the house, isolated her from her family and friends, refused to allow her to use a mobile phone, subjected her to slapping and punching, and called her derogatory names. She felt pressured into converting to Islam faster than she wanted. The police were eventually alerted to the appellant's offending when concerns were raised by one of her close friends. Her family had encouraged her to report the appellant to the police but she was frightened that if she did so she might lose her children.

The relationship was characterised by the appellant's violence towards her. There were repeated incidents in which he punched, kicked and slapped her, and on one occasion he sprayed bathroom cleaner into her mouth before kicking her in the face. On another occasion he repeatedly struck her with the leg of a metal stool. He set fire to a photograph of her late mother in front of her. He would place sharp objects close to her skin, telling her that if she moved she would get hurt. He would accuse her of being disrespectful to his parents and would then slap her.

Count 4, threats to kill, reflected a specific incident which took place at the appellant's parents' house. It was described by the judge as a "mock execution". The appellant had made her say goodbye to the children and give them a kiss. The appellant forced her to remove the cord from the dressing gown she had been wearing. He tied the cord around the banister and around her neck, and told her to walk backwards otherwise he was going to push her. As she walked backwards the cord became tighter around her neck so that she could hardly breathe. She pleaded with him, asking how he could do this to her, the mother of his children; did he not love her? He said no he did not, he felt hate for her. Then he said: "Actually you can live". He allowed her to untie the cord. She was extremely distressed, crying and attempting to control her breathing. He offered her a mobile phone, telling her to call the police if she wished. She refused to do so fearing that, if she did, it would result in worse treatment from the appellant.

Count 7, criminal damage, related to one of many incidents during the relationship when the appellant would destroy her mobile phones, preventing her from communicating with family and friends.

The appellant's offending had a devastating effect on the complainant. There was a powerful victim personal statement. She described how the appellant would use anything he could get his hands on to assault her including knives, forks, kitchen utensils, and scissors. On several occasions she thought he would kill her. In the hammer assault, with every blow she thought she was going to die. He repeatedly hit the same parts of her body. The incident with the dressing cord around her neck still played repeatedly on her mind. He controlled every part of her life - what she wore, what she was allowed to spend money on. She was not allowed to use social media and not allowed to leave the house unless he knew where she was going. Her mental health had declined. She could not bear to be on her own. She was terrified every time someone knocks on the door. She feels she can no longer form relationships. She has nightmares. She bears the marks of some of the injuries. She still had bruising on her shins and stab marks on her legs. These were, she said, a constant reminder of the abuse she had suffered. It had affected her children too, particularly the older boy. When people approach him he will often say "No. No" . This is because the appellant would ask him: "Should I hit mummy?", and the child would nod because he was so young he did not understand what was going on.

The appellant had two previous convictions. In July 2017, five months before his 18th birthday, he pleaded guilty to an offence of section 47 assault occasioning actual bodily harm, for which initially a referral order was made and a restraining order. When he breached the referral order it was replaced with a youth rehabilitation order. That offence involved a joint attack with two other young men. The victim was repeatedly punched in the face by one of them. The appellant joined in by kicking the victim repeatedly while he was being pinned down. In October 2018, aged 18, the appellant pleaded guilty to offences of supplying cocaine and heroin, for which he was sentenced to a total of 40 months' detention in a young offender institution.

There were two psychiatric reports from Dr Galappathie, consultant forensic psychiatrist. He had originally been instructed to consider whether the appellant was fit to plead and whether the drugs he had taken could have impacted upon any mental illness from which he was suffering. In the second report, prepared for the sentencing hearing, it was Dr Galappathie's opinion that the appellant was likely to have been suffering from a psychotic illness in the period leading up to and during the offences, most likely a drug-related psychosis. The appellant had described to Dr Galappathie his use of cannabis from the age of 14 and cocaine from the age of 20. Since his remand in prison, 6 or 7 months before sentence, his mental state had improved remarkably, although Dr Galappathie had not seen any GP records or medical records. Dr Galappathie's opinion was that the appellant suffered from ADHD, and that his use of illicit drugs at the time of the offences would have had a disinhibiting effect upon him and a destabilising effect on his ADHD, making him more likely to be impulsive and to act without thinking fully about the implications or consequences of his actions. There was no recommendation for treatment under the Mental Health Act.

There was a very detailed pre-sentence report. The author of the report observed that the appellant had demonstrated a significant level of manipulative and predatory behaviour which he minimised in interview. The appellant reported that he was out of his head on drugs and had made wrong choices. He reported that he was suffering from drug psychosis at the time of the offences which made him disgusting, bitter and nasty. It seemed to be his explanation for all his actions. The report assessed the appellant as posing a high risk of harm to known adults, to members of the public, and to children,. Until he has addressed his offending behaviour he poses a high risk of serious harm. That risk, the author of the report said, is not manageable in the community.

There were supportive character references from members of the appellant's family. His mother described the problems they had with the appellant from a young age, for which they had tried unsuccessfully to get him the help he needed.

The appellant had written a letter himself to the judge, apologising for his "disgusting behaviour" and saying it was "wrong of me to harm someone I was meant to protect." He described how he had changed completely whilst in prison on remand for several months, having completed psychological workshops. That progress had been maintained and we have reports from the prison where he was remanded and from the prison where he is now serving his sentence.

The sentencing hearing took a somewhat unusual course in that it went on so late in the afternoon that although the judge announced the sentences at the end of that day at about 5.30 pm, he gave his detailed reasons orally in court the following day, reading aloud the very full, comprehensive and well structured written sentencing remarks which were then made available to counsel.

We note that in granting leave the Single Judge did not have sight of the judge's full sentencing remarks but only the transcript of the actual sentences announced at the end of the first day. She did not have the benefit of the detailed reasons the judge gave in his full sentencing remarks delivered the following day.

It is clear that although the judge had come late to the case he had mastered the detail and had considered his approach very carefully. He set out the facts of each count in detail. In relation to the suggestion of a drug-induced psychosis in the psychiatrist’s reports the judge said that the offences arose because of the appellant's abuse of illegal drugs. That involved conscious decisions on his part which aggravated rather than mitigated the offences. He noted that Dr Galappathie had concluded that the appellant was unlikely to be suffering from any other mental health diagnosis such as schizophrenia and that the psychosis was self-induced by the appellant's excessive voluntary drug consumption. The judge said that ADHD did not begin to explain the cruelty and sadistic nature of the appellant's actions which were prolonged and wholly terrifying to the victim.

The judge said that the appellant's actions had scarred the victim for life. He had turned her from a happy, confident, popular and outgoing personality, whose mental health was stable, to a mere husk of the person she was. What he had done to her had left her significantly mentally scarred and she may well never be able to rid herself of the awful memories she has of him and of their relationship.

The judge referred to the supportive character references and to the report from HMP Norwich where the appellant had been remanded. The judge said he could accept to an extent that the appellant was now more mature, but that in no way excused or explained this sustained behaviour demonstrated over 2½ years, nor the shocking level of violence inflicted on the victim which had left her very significantly damaged. The judge said that the extreme deliberately sadistic and sometimes ritualistic nature of the appellant's conduct could not be explained away by his age, lack of maturity or drug taking, and far outweighed the progress made whilst in custody.

Turning to the Sentencing Council guidelines, the judge said he was taking count 2, the section 18 hammer attack, as the lead offence. There were factors which placed that offence squarely in high culpability level A. The victim was obviously vulnerable due to her personal circumstances as the mother of a young child who was present, and she was the victim of long-term coercive behaviour. There was the use of a highly dangerous weapon, a claw hammer, and that weapon was used because the victim kept knives away from him in view of his propensity to use them on her. It was a prolonged and persistent assault.

As to harm, the judge said there were very serious injuries, as was self-evident from the photographs. He had also caused ongoing psychological harm, which she described in her victim personal statement and which evidence the judge accepted. It was significant psychological harm which had had a substantial long-term effect on her ability to carry out her day-to-day activities or her ability to work. Nevertheless he assessed harm as being in category 2 rather than in count 1, albeit at the top end of category 2.

The starting point for a category 2A offence under the guideline was 7 years, with a range of 6 to 10 years' custody. The judge concluded that an increase from the starting point to 10 years was appropriate to reflect the multiple features of culpability and the enduring significant harm.

The judge then considered aggravating factors. The appellant's previous conviction for section 47 assault, resulting in a restraining order, was clear evidence that he was quick to rise to violence. The convictions for supplying illicit drugs indicated that he had easy and willing access to drugs. That was relevant given the way in which mitigation was put, namely that his self-induced psychosis should be regarded as a medical condition and a mitigating factor rather than an aggravating factor. The judge repeated that he regarded the appellant’s deliberately harmful ingestion of cocaine over an extended period as an aggravating factor in the case.

The judge said it was a significant aggravating factor that the offending was in a domestic abuse context. The appellant's behaviour amounted to a gross breach of trust towards his wife who was “particularly vulnerable”.She was entitled to feel safe and be kept safe from harm by the appellant. It was an aggravating factor that their child was present when the hammer attack in count 2 was committed. It was an aggravating factor that the offence was committed under the influence of drugs. And because the judge was treating count 2 as the lead offence, it was an aggravating factor that there was a long and unchallenged history of violence over a 2½ year period.

The judge was satisfied that all these factors required an increase from the notional starting point of 10 years on count 2 to 17 years.

Turning to mitigation, the appellant's age, an element of lack of maturity, his remorse and shame, his ADHD (although unrelated to the offending) and his determination to address his offending behaviour, merited a reduction of 2 years to 15 years.

Finally, the judge allowed credit of 15 per cent for the late guilty plea to count 2, reducing the sentence to 12 years 9 months' imprisonment.

Having arrived at that figure the judge said:

The judge was satisfied that an extended sentence was necessary to protect the public from serious harm by the commission of further specified offences. The extension period was 5 years. An indefinite restraining order was made to which there was no opposition.

In particular, the judge made it clear that, but for the imposition of an extended sentence for the lead offence, he would also have imposed an extended sentence on count 4, the threats to kill. That, he said, was a sadistic planned event, a mock execution throughout which she was genuinely terrified for her life. The appellant's actions were chilling, planned and sadistic. The concurrent sentence imposed on that count was 6 years.

We are grateful to Ms Yangye for her written and oral submissions. In short, she contends that the judge's starting point of 10 years for the section 18 hammer attack was too high and that the uplift of 7 years to reflect the totality of the offending was too great. In particular, she submits that although the victim suffered really serious psychological harm, it did not amount to the level of harm envisioned by category 1, or even category 2. There was no irreversible psychological condition identified that had been caused by the appellant's offending. She submits that the judge placed disproportionate weight on the victim's personal statement and submits that the offending in count 2 should have been placed in category 3A not 2A.

As to the uplift of 7 years, Ms Yangye submits that such a large increase must have involved double counting aggravating factors and that the judge failed properly to apply the principle of totality. She submits that insufficient weight was given to the appellant's mitigation, in particular his genuine remorse and the significant steps he had taken whilst in custody to address the root causes of his offending.

She submits that the judge should have made some downward adjustment to reflect the fact that the appellant might have been suffering from a psychotic illness in the period leading up to and during the offences. She submits that the fact that the psychosis was self-induced does not detract from the mitigation that the appellant was suffering from a mental health condition. She accepts that the judge was entitled to treat the drug abuse as an aggravating factor but she submitted, in writing at least, that there should have been some reduction in the sentence to reflect the deterioration in his mental health and his ADHD.

Finally, although she does not challenge the imposition of an extended sentence, Ms Yangye submits that the extended licence period of 5 years was manifestly excessive having regard to the work the appellant had already done to reduce his risk.

We have considered all these submissions carefully but we are unable to accept them. In the end, the sole question is whether a total sentence of 15 years' imprisonment, before credit for plea, was manifestly excessive for this catalogue of very serious offending.

The judge was right to take count 2 (the section 18 wounding) as the lead offence, as it was the offence with the longest maximum sentence (life imprisonment) and reflected the most serious physical violence inflicted by the appellant. We have seen the photographs, which confirm how sustained and brutal this assault must have been, leaving extensive bruising to many parts of the body.

By reference to the relevant Sentencing Council guideline, there was plainly high culpability and indeed there were three separate such factors: the victim was obviously vulnerable due to her personal circumstances; there was the use of a highly dangerous weapon, a claw hammer; the assault was prolonging and persistent.

As to harm, category 1 would have required a permanent irreversible psychological condition which had a substantial and long-term effect on the victim's ability to carry out their normal day-to-day activities or their ability to work. Category 2 by contrast required a permanent irreversible condition not falling within category 1. As Ms Yangye rightly concedes, the victim had suffered really serious psychological harm as was demonstrated by the harrowing description in her victim personal statement. That psychological harm has had a substantial long-term effect on her ability to carry out her normal day-to-day activities and the judge was satisfied that it was likely to endure. We agree with the judge that this was harm within category 2, and at the upper end.

The starting point for a category 2 offence is 7 years with a range up to 10 years. As the guideline makes clear, an adjustment upwards from the starting point may be necessary to reflect particular features of culpability and/or harm - for example, the presence of multiple factors within one category, or where a case falls on the borderline between categories. Here, there were multiple factors of culpability as we have explained. Furthermore, the level of harm was well up in category 2. We note that 10 years is the top of the range for category 2 and also the bottom of the range for category 1. We think that the judge was fully justified in taking the guideline starting point up to 10 years before considering aggravating and mitigating factors.

The judge identified the discrete aggravating factors for the offence in count 2. It was committed in a domestic abuse context; it was committed in the presence of a child; there was abuse of a position of trust within the marriage; the offence was committed under the influence of drugs. There was also the statutory aggravating factor of the previous convictions. All those aggravating factors would in themselves have justified a significant increase from 10 years.

However, the sentence also had to reflect the criminality of all the other offences to which the appellant had pleaded guilty.

Although the judge did not expressly apply the individual relevant Sentencing Council guidelines to them one by one, we have found it instructive to do so.

Count 1, the section 20 offence of stabbing the victim in the thigh with a knife, was a category 3A offence under the relevant guideline with a starting point of 2 years.

Count 3, coercive control, was a category 1A offence under the relevant guideline, with a starting point of 2½ years. However with multiple culpability factors, it could easily have gone up to 4 years.

Count 4, threats to kill, was a category 1A offence under the relevant guideline, with a starting point of 4 years and a range up to 7 years. It could easily have gone up to 6 years for multiple culpability factors.

We suggest that these would have been the appropriate individual starting points. We bear in mind that the general aggravating factors were taken into account already in arriving at the sentence for count 2 alone, in particular the domestic context. However, had the judge considered consecutive sentences for these other offences, they would have totalled 8½ years based on the guideline starting points alone and could easily have gone up to 12 years. In principle, one or more consecutive sentences would have been justified bearing in mind that the wounding in count 1 and the threat to kill in count 4 were completely separate incidents from the hammer attack in count 2.

Only 15 per cent credit for plea was appropriate because the guilty pleas to the principal offences (counts 2, 3, 4) came very late and not long before trial.

Viewed in this way and respecting the principle of totality, the increase from 10 years to 17 years for all the criminality represented by the offences on the indictment was by no means excessive. The judge made a reduction of 2 years for mitigation, remorse, ADHD and the appellant's addressing his offending behaviour. That, in our view, was ample.

We think the judge was quite right to view the appellant's self-induced psychosis from excessive cocaine ingestion (if that is what it was) as an aggravating factor rather than a mitigating factor. We note from the pre-sentence report from the appellant's 2018 drug supply conviction, that his mother had told the probation officer then that the appellant could become angry and abusive towards her (his own mother) if he does not get his way. That seems to have been a long-standing character trait revealed again in the commission of the present offences.

We return to the question posed at the outset of this analysis: can it be said 15 years' imprisonment, before credit for plea, was manifestly excessive for all this offending? We are quite satisfied that it was not, and that the custodial term the judge imposed was fully justified.

Finally, we turn to the extended sentence which was plainly necessary and is not challenged in principle. It is said that an extension period of 5 years was unnecessary in view of the progress the appellant had already demonstrated in prison. We disagree. Having regard to the nature and the seriousness of this offending and his abuse of cocaine, the judge was right to conclude that a lengthy period on licence was necessary for the continued protection of the public, and this was entirely consistent with the view expressed in the pre-sentence report. The extension period of 5 years was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

For all these reasons, and despite Ms Yangye’s valiant submissions for which we are grateful, we are satisfied that this lengthy sentence was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.