R v Louise Payne

LORD JUSTICE DOVE: The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence. Under those provisions, where a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall, during that person's lifetime, be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act.

On 18 August 2025 the appellant was committed for sentence by the Leicester Magistrates' Court to the Crown Court after she pleaded guilty to an offence of intimidating a witness, contrary to sections 51(1) and (6) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order act 1994.

On 12 November 2025 she was sentenced to eight months' imprisonment, together with a restraining order and a victim surcharge of £187. She appeals with leave of the single judge.

The facts of the offence are as follows. The complainant in this offence is the ex-partner of the appellant's brother who was on trial at the time for offences allegedly committed against the complainant, including an allegation of rape.

The appellant spotted the complainant and slowed her car down to a walking pace and then followed the complainant making the following explicit threats to her: "Your problem lying about my brother, I'll fucking batter you." "Pregnant or not, I'll fucking batter you". "I don't care if you're with your kid or not, that's it. I'm getting out of the car, I'm going to batter you."

Having received that and other threats, the complainant was frightened and at the scene called 999. The appellant carried on threatening whilst the complainant's call was being connected: "I don't give a shit. You put my brother in prison. You're going to pay for it."

The complainant was so concerned and disturbed by these threats that she did not go home but instead hid in somebody else's garden. Afterwards the appellant messaged her friends about the incident and was completely unrepentant about her conduct. She said words to the effect: "I'm going to curb her head, the silly witch." Subsequently, the appellant was arrested and in interview gave no comment.

At the time of the offence the appellant was 32. She had no previous convictions. She was the sole carer for her five children who are aged between 3 and 14, one of those children having Autistic Spectrum Disorder. She lived in housing association accommodation and there was a clear potential for her to lose that accommodation were she sent to custody.

A psychiatric report was prepared on the appellant and was before the court. This report described the appellant's difficult childhood and adolescence and the fact that she had herself been the victim of serious crime and as a consequence developed PTSD. The report went on to explain that the appellant had a longstanding history of low mood and anxiety as a result of a depressive disorder and obsessive compulsive disorder. The psychiatrist also diagnosed a depersonalisation/derealisation disorder. These mental health difficulties impacted on her behaviour at the time of the offence. The pre-sentence report also concluded that the offence was driven by an acute emotional response. She was assessed by the author of that report as a medium risk of offending if she again encountered the complainant. It was noted that a custodial sentence would have a significant detrimental impact on her children. Supportive references were provided and the appellant herself wrote to the judge expressing her remorse at what she had done.

At the sentencing hearing there was no dispute in relation to the categorisation of the offence in the sentencing guidelines. It was category A2 with a starting point of one year and a range which extended up to two years' imprisonment. The judge concluded the aggravating features in this case were the presence of the complainant's children and the fact that she was pregnant. However, these aggravating features were, in his judgment, balanced by the mitigation available to the appellant in terms of her mental health, her remorse and the impact on her dependents and her good character. Ultimately, the judge concluded that the factors balanced out and that the sentence after trial would have been 12 months. Giving the appellant appropriate credit for her plea, the sentence came out at eight months' imprisonment.

There is no issue in this appeal and indeed leave to appeal was not granted on the basis that that sentence was in and of itself inappropriate. The issue that the judge then had to conclude, and the issue which is at the heart of this appeal, is whether or not it was appropriate for that sentence to be suspended or whether it was appropriate for it to become an immediate term of imprisonment.

The judge, having taken account of the relevant mitigation, the appellant's good character, the issues with her mental health (albeit the judge concluded the offence was also borne out of a real hostility to the complainant) and the appellant's role as the primary carer for her five children, took the view that the seriousness of this offence was such that only a custodial sentence was appropriate. That is the issue which is raised before us and by Miss Butterworth in her helpful submissions.

In support of the appeal, Miss Butterworth makes seven points in favour of the sentence being suspended. First, the appellant's good character supports compliance with court orders. Secondly, the appellant was assessed in the pre-sentence report as being at a low risk of re-offending. Thirdly, the appellant is remorseful and thus there is in Miss Butterworth's submission a real prospect in this case of rehabilitation. Fourthly, the appellant made arrangements to enable unpaid work to have been imposed as a condition of any suspended sentence were that appropriate. Fifthly, the appellant's mental health issues are significant and were a significant feature in litigation on her behalf. Sixthly, and perhaps most prominent amongst Miss Butterworth's submissions, were the appellant's caring responsibilities and in particular the impact which a sentence of imprisonment would have upon her five children, including in particular a child with ASD. That impact spreads not simply to the children but to those who would have to shoulder the caring responsibility in the event of her being sent to prison. Seventhly, the appellant's loss of her home, the housing association accommodation being precarious once she was in prison.

These features of the submissions made by Miss Butterworth are all keyed into the elements of the sentencing guidelines which address the question of whether or not a sentence should be suspended. She also draws our attention to the progress which the appellant has been making in prison and which obviously stand significantly to her credit, seeking training to make her equipped to seek employment upon her release and achieving and still enjoying a status as an enhanced prisoner.

These are all cogent submissions grounded in the criteria set out in the guidance. However, as is well-known and has been regularly observed by this court, the question of whether or not to suspend a sentence is one which is discretionary and on appeal that means there must be adequate and appropriate grounds to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the judge. Simply that it may have been exercised differently is not sufficient. It is necessary to show that there is a proper basis to interfere with that discretion.

In our judgment in this case the judge took account carefully of all of the factors which were in favour of suspension. No material considerations were overlooked or misunderstood and the weight which the judge attached to those factors is a weight which we are unable to interfere with. The judge clearly took proper account of the mental health issues which were affecting the appellant but could not accept that it was the sole explanation of this offending. It is clear also that he took account of the impact of not suspending the sentence upon the children of the family and those who would have the responsibility of caring for them in their mother's absence.

The judge was nonetheless right to observe that the seriousness of this offence was a key feature in the exercise of his discretion and indeed it was appropriate for the judge to conclude that the offence was so serious that only a sentence of immediate custody could properly reflect that seriousness.

This was in truth a determined and successful effort to intimidate the key witness central to the very serious allegations, including rape, which were shortly to be tried. It was a direct attempt to thwart the judicial process. As the judge observed, offences of this type strike at the heart of the justice system. Witnesses should be free to come forward and give evidence without fear of intimidation or reprisals and their co-operation is obviously vital to the administration of justice. Thus in our judgment the judge's assessment was unimpeachable.

Notwithstanding the mitigation and the consequences for the appellant's family, which will undoubtedly be considerable, her conduct in this case was so serious that the judge was entitled to conclude that only an immediate custodial sentence would follow. Thus, notwithstanding Miss Butterworth's able submissions on behalf of the appellant, this appeal must be dismissed.