R v Chay Thornton

This is an application by His Majesty's Solicitor General for leave to refer a sentence to this court on the ground that it is unduly lenient and ought to be increased. The reference is made under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. We give leave.

The relevant sentence was imposed on 30 September 2025, in the Crown Court at Gloucester, by His Honour Judge Lawrie KC. On each of three counts on an indictment the offender was sentenced to a community order for three years, with 200 hours of unpaid work, 20 days of rehabilitation activity requirement and a programme requirement. There was an order for what has been termed "judicial oversight". Although there is reference in the papers to regulations made further to section 217 of the Sentencing Act 2020, it appears that this order, which may be highly beneficial in many cases, was made outside that scheme.

The three counts on the indictment were as follows. Count 1 charged an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship, contrary to section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. Counts 2 and 3 each related to a specific incident of intentional strangulation during the course of the relationship which was the subject of count 1, contrary to section 75A of the Serious Crime Act 2015. The judge imposed the appropriate surcharge and made a restraining order.

The offender had entered guilty pleas to each of those offences in circumstances which we shall explain a little more fully later in this judgment.

The offender is 22 years old, having been born on 2 April 2003. In July 2024 he began a relationship with the victim, Millie Bray, whom he had known for about five years. Their relationship appears to have started happily, although one of the events of which she was later to complain occurred as early as July 2024. She moved in to live with the offender in his house, following which controlling and manipulative behaviour towards her began and escalated in intensity. He discouraged her from seeing friends or going out. There were arguments during which he would demand that she did housework. There were repeated events involving significant violence by him against her. He hit her, pinched her, slapped her and bit her. On two specific occasions he strangled her. On each of those occasions the strangulation was sufficiently severe such that she vomited immediately after she was released from it. He made threats to assault her and her family. At one point he threatened to blow up her parents' house.

He was eventually arrested on 28 June 2025 and released on police bail, with conditions not to contact the victim. He did so. He sent threatening messages which we shall set out below.

The relationship began to deteriorate significantly during the autumn, such that by Christmas of 2024 the impact upon the victim had become perceptible to others. In particular, her mother noticed the changes in her behaviour caused by the way the offender was dealing with her.

It is relevant to the nature of the relationship, as the victim perceived it to be, that when she was injured by the offender she took the precaution of photographing those injuries. This happened as early as 21 July 2024. An argument had taken place when they were out in the car. When they got out of the car, the offender slapped her on her bottom, leaving a visible mark. She challenged him about it. He laughed and said that he thought it was funny. She obviously did not because, as we have said, she took a photograph of it so that there would be a record and evidence of what he had done to her. She did this notwithstanding the fact that this episode occurred early in the course of the relationship and at a time when it was at its happiest.

The next particular event that we should record occurred on 21 December 2024. This involved the offender biting the victim on her arm. She then sat on the floor, hoping that he would leave her alone, but he pulled her by the hair and dragged her across the floor. She thought that he dragged her by her hair for approximately six steps. This caused a carpet burn.

Over the New Year of that year there was an event which the victim particularly recalled. She was out with friends. The offender telephoned her and told her not to bother returning home and said that he was going to throw out her belongings. She said that this was one among may incidents of that kind.

Returning to the catalogue of violence, the next event which warrants a detailed description occurred on 10 February 2025. This event included the first of the two acts of intentional strangulation, which became count 2 on the indictment. They both took place in bed. He reached across and placed his right hand on her throat, strangling her. She saw that he was angry at the time. She next remembered everything going black as she lost consciousness from being unable to breathe. When she recovered her consciousness, she coughed forcefully and then vomited. She asked him if she had passed out. He replied, "I didn't think you were going to wake up".

Later that day, the offender dragged the victim once again by the hair and punched her to the side of her head. This caused an injury to the side of her eye, which was again photographed. She described him as being angry at the time when that happened.

Before continuing with the catalogue of violent events, it is worth observing at this stage that that act of strangulation was in itself an extremely serious offence. It had caused the victim to lose consciousness. The offender was aware of that and expressed the view that he had thought that she would not wake up. That means that if he had not been aware of the grave danger to life caused by an act of strangulation before he did that to her on 10 February, he certainly was aware of it from that time on. Even on that day he was not dissuaded from further violence because he went on to perpetrate the dragging and punching we have already described.

Moving on to 28 March 2025, there was a further episode when he pinched the victim severely for approximately five or six seconds. When she told him that it hurt, he responded with a smirk.

Three days later, he approached her and bit her on the left arm without any warning. She cried (not for the first time during this relationship). He responded: "It doesn't hurt. You are just a fanny".

Five days later, he forcefully slapped her cheek. She said that this stung and felt hot for several hours.

One week after that, on 12 April 2025, he pinched her breast. She had told him to stop while he had been touching her breast, and this was his response. He said that she was his, which made her body his. She had tried to push his hands away, and that is when he pinched her.

Three days after that he pinched her again, and six days after that he did it yet again. This time she told him to get off her. She tried to leave the room, but he slapped her on the back of the arm. Later on that day, he sent voice notes to her on Snapchat, threatening to assault her and her sister, and to blow up her parents' house.

On 3 May 2025, a further very serious episode occurred. The offender approached her from behind and placed her in a headlock. He lifted her a few centimetres off the ground. His elbow was pressed against her neck, preventing her from breathing. This is the incident which became count 3. She felt that he was using all his force on her. She was hitting him with her arms to get him off. After a time he dropped her to the floor. She began to cough and again vomited. He kicked her and told her to clean up the mess.

The trigger for the involvement of the police occurred on 23 June 2025, when a neighbour heard the offender shout, "You bitch!", and then heard a female voice (the victim) say, "I'm just getting dressed, leave me alone", and then "Get off!" After that she heard some thumping sounds and decided to call the police.

As a result of that, the police spoke to the victim on 26 June. The offender was arrested on 28 June. He was interviewed and answered "No comment" to all the questions he was asked. He was released on police bail, with conditions which included a condition not to contact the victim.

On 17 July, he sent a voice note to her, and five more on 6 August 2025. The notes sent in August included the following:

As a result of this behaviour, the offender was arrested again on 8 August. He was interviewed under caution again. This time he produced a prepared statement in which he claimed that the victim had tried to contact him. He said that she was abusive and deliberately provocative. He agreed that he had sent these voice notes, but claimed that there was no intent behind them. He said that he struggled with his mental health and had allowed himself to be affected by the victim's messages. That is an attitude towards his offending which was later further to be evidenced by observations that he made about it to the author of the pre-sentence report. He was inclined to blame the victim for the offences he had committed against her.

It is necessary now to say a little about how these criminal proceedings developed, because an issue arises about the extent of the credit for the guilty plea which the offender was afforded. He was charged on 9 August 2025 with 15 separate offences. These were designed, as analysis demonstrates, to capture all of the conduct which we have described in some detail above. They included a number of allegations which were not later proceeded with as specific counts on an indictment, but were included in the course of conduct which is count 1, coercive and controlling behaviour. At that hearing it appears that no indication of any guilty pleas was given to the court. There is no Better Case Management Form which records what actually happened in the magistrates' court, which means that the judge and this court are required to rely, as we do, upon the account given to us by Mr Jenkins, who appeared later for the offender in the Crown Court and who has appeared before us in response to this application. Mr Jenkins tells us that a colleague of his attended to represent the offender before the magistrates' court on that Saturday morning; that the court was busy; that it was clear to his colleague that the offender would be admitting some of the 15 charges which he faced, but that he would not be admitting all of them. Accordingly, no indication of plea was tendered at that stage, and it was decided that there would be an early conference between the offender and Mr Jenkins.

That early conference did take place. The offender had, surprisingly, been granted bail by the magistrates. But there was a successful prosecution appeal against that decision, which resulted in him remaining in custody until the point of sentence. The conference, therefore, took place in those circumstances. But it was possible to arrange a constructive discussion.

The original indictment was uploaded by the prosecution on 4 September, which then contained six counts. This was, as we understand it, a different way of seeking to capture all of the criminal conduct set out above.

Soon after that, Mr Jenkins made an entry on the Crown Court Digital Case System sidebar indicating that he had instructions, that he had liaised with the prosecution, and that satisfactory pleas to an amended indictment were expected at the plea and trial preparation hearing, which was fixed for 8 September. That amended indictment contained the three counts we have already described. Leave was given for the amendment and an arraignment took place at the PTPH. The offender entered guilty pleas to all three counts which how appeared, and it was made clear that the offender accepted that full facts alleged by the prosecution and that no basis of plea would be relied upon. Sentence was adjourned to 30 September and a pre-sentence report was ordered.

It was in those circumstances that the case came before Judge Lawrie for sentence, with the result we have already described.

The offender has one previous conviction for two offences, neither of which is of any relevance to the way in which he ought to have been dealt with for this case. There is, however, a caution dating back to 31 May 2021, when he was 18 years old, for an offence of criminal damage. The judge was informed – and it has been confirmed before us – that this caution (which was a conditional caution) arose as a result of an offence committed by the offender against a former partner. It was, therefore, a previous incident of domestic abuse.

The pre-sentence report contained an explanation by the offender of his reason for not pleading guilty in the magistrates' court. He said that he had had insufficient time to process the charges internally and to consult with his barrister. He admitted, he said, that he had been violent towards the victim, but denied being controlling. He subsequently clarified that Mr Jenkins had seen him and advised him to plead guilty. He accepted that advice and did so.

We have already said something about the pre-sentence report. It contains worrying observations by the offender which tend to minimise the extent of his criminality and which seek to place blame upon his victim for what he did to her.

In relation to the second incident of strangulation, the offender claimed to have acted in self-defence. He said that when he returned home after being out with friends, he had been threatened with a kitchen knife. He disarmed her and, having done that, he said, put her in a headlock to prevent her from attacking him. He denied using enough pressure to disrupt her breathing, and he said that it ended when he pushed her to the floor and told her to sort herself out. That is an example of the worrying observations to which we have referred in summary.

The pre-sentence report concluded that the offender poses a high risk of serious harm to the victim and that this risk extends to any potential future partner. It also sets out material which constitutes significant mitigation. It is clear that the offender had a traumatic upbringing which included being placed into local authority care and then being moved into temporary foster care before being placed into supported accommodation. He had lived with his parents, but when they separated his mother's behaviour towards him was distressing, which had the consequences we have described.

There is also a reference in the pre-sentence report to anxiety and depression.

There was a personal statement by the victim, dated 18 August 2025. The judge had read that and described its powerful impact. We agree with him. She explained that the consequences of this relationship have been serious for her. She felt degraded and had lost her confidence. She has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and depressive mood disorder. She has been prescribed medication and is awaiting psychological therapy. In July 2025, she took an overdose intended to end her life. She is now anxious and worried about her future.

The judge was aware of the relevant sentencing powers and the relevant sentencing guidelines. There is an offence specific guideline published by the Sentencing Council for both of the offences on the indictment – controlling and coercive behaviour and strangulation. There are also overarching guidelines which required consideration. The Domestic Abuse Overarching Guideline indicates that the domestic context of the offending is an aggravating factor. The Guideline for Reduction in Sentence for Guilty Plea, the Guideline for Imposition and the Totality Guideline are all engaged.

The prosecution submitted that the offence of coercive and controlling behaviour was a category A1 offence, because the conduct was persistent over a prolonged period and was intended to maximise fear or distress. Harm was at category 1, because there was fear of violence on many occasions. Although Mr Jenkins had made written submissions contesting this, realistically at the hearing before the judge he accepted that that was an optimistic endeavour. Category A1 involves a starting point of two years and six months' custody, with a range of one to four years.

The offence of strangulation was also, said the prosecution, a culpability A offence because on each of the two occasions the strangulation was sustained. The prosecution submitted that the harm caused by the strangulation was such that for each offence it should be placed in category 2. Mr Jenkins took a similar approach to these submissions as he had to the first set of submissions. The starting point for a category 2A offence is two years and six months' custody, with a range of one year and six months up to three years and six months.

There were aggravating and mitigating factors to be taken into account in identifying the sentence within the category range, having first identified the starting point. The starting point, as the judge clearly determined, was two and a half years' custody in respect of each of the three counts.

The most significant individual aggravating factor, in addition to the seriousness of the offences themselves was the conduct of the offender after he had been released on police bail. Those deeply unpleasant threats sent to the victim in July and August significantly aggravated the offending in count 1. In terms of the harm caused by that offence, we should record that they occurred after the suicide attempt.

So far as mitigation is concerned, as we have indicated, the offender is young (22). He has a relatively limited criminal history. He had a difficult upbringing and he suffers from some learning difficulties. By the time of his sentence he was expressing the view that he regretted his behaviour and was motivated to address his issues. The offender's personal circumstances were essentially the reason why the judge decided not to impose a custodial sentence.

In the course of counsel's submissions and again in the short sentencing remarks in which he explained his sentence, the judge had observed that applying the guideline to each of the two offences for which there are guidelines would inevitably produce a custodial sentence of more than two years, which could not be suspended. He therefore decided that, because he wanted to rehabilitate the offender, who was young and capable of rehabilitation, he would impose the community orders upon which he ultimately decided. During the course of the discussions the judge indicated that an appropriate level of credit for the plea of guilty was 30 per cent, although in the result, given the choice of sentence that the judge settled on, that was an academic matter as far as he was concerned. This was designed to give some weight to the circumstances in the magistrates' court on the Saturday morning, which we have described above. It also gave some weight to the conduct of counsel for the offender and counsel who prosecuted in resolving the case in the course of constructive and early discussions prior to the PTPH.

The judge said that the alternative to the course he took which would result from a strict application of the guidelines would have been a sentence of three and a half years' custody after credit for a guilty plea. That means that before credit of 30 per cent, a sentence in the region of five years' custody would have been that which would have been imposed by the judge following a trial.

The Solicitor General submits that the offending here was simply too serious to enable anything other than an immediate custodial sentence to be passed and that the judge's sentence was simply outside the range of sentences available to him.

In response, Mr Jenkins has repeated the submissions he made to the judge and has further developed submissions based upon what can be learned from what occurred as a result of the judicial oversight direction.

The unpaid work has not been started, and the rehabilitation activity requirement days are in their early state because the offender has had an operation in the meantime which has prevented him from doing all that he would have wished to do. However, the judicial oversight has taken place to the extent that there has been a single hearing at which the judge made detailed enquiries into the progress being made by the offender. He recorded those events in full on the Digital Case System. We have had regard to what he said. He concluded that the offender's progress was "excellent". Although on a reference of this kind this court is concerned to review the sentence on the basis of the material which was available to the judge, it is reasonable to take into account that judicial oversight hearing, because it provides some support for the proposition that that requirement, when imposed by the judge as part of his sentence, was part of a rehabilitative package which was judged by him at that time to have prospects of success. The early oversight hearing would suggest that that judgment was an accurate one.

We understand and applaud the approach of a sentencing judge who seeks to avoid immediate imprisonment and to achieve rehabilitation in the case of a young offender with a very limited criminal history. We understand precisely why the judge acted as he did.

However, in contradistinction from that approach in this case, we are entirely satisfied that the offender's offending was simply far too serious to allow such a course. The guidelines are very clear that a single offence – any one of these three counts – would have involved a starting point of two and a half years' custody. Taken together, all three counts must inevitably have involved, in our judgment, a sentence significantly in excess of that. This was repeated, violent and dangerous offending by a young man against a woman who was in effect defenceless against him. It has had consequences for her which may be long-lasting and disastrous. We must hope that that is not the case; but the offender has created the risk that it is.

The categorisation which gives rise to that result for each of these offences is, in our judgment, that which was contended for by the prosecution. Count 1 is an A1 offence of coercive and controlling behaviour. Counts 2 and 3 are A2 offences of strangulation. A category A offence of strangulation involves persistent strangulation which entails a risk of death. On one of these two occasions this young woman actually did lose consciousness. On both occasions she was sufficiently affected by the strangulation that she vomited when it ceased. To add to that, the catalogue of less serious but nevertheless deeply distressing violent incidents and the controlling environment in which they occurred makes our conclusion which we have already expressed inevitable, in our judgment.

There must therefore be an immediate custodial sentence in this case. That sentence should take account of the mitigating factors which led the judge, in our judgment in error, to impose the sentence that he did. The offender is young and his criminal record is limited. He has had difficulties in his upbringing, and we hope that there is a real prospect of rehabilitation for him so that life will hold the prospect of a constructive future.

For all of those reasons we consider that it is possible to impose a sentence which is somewhat lower than the judge appears to have had in mind had he found such a sentence to be inevitable. We consider that in respect of each of these three counts a sentence which starts at four years' custody would be appropriate.

We turn to the question of credit for the guilty plea. We have given an account of the difficult situation which confronted the offender and his legal adviser in the magistrates' court. We have also observed that we are somewhat in the dark about what actually happened there because nobody was able to find the time to prepare a Better Case Management Form. The existence of such a form is very important to a Crown Court Judge who has to decide what level of credit is appropriate to someone who pleads guilty. It is also important to this court if considering an appeal or reference against any sentence passed in which the question of credit for a guilty plea arises. We therefore regret the absence of the form in this case. It may be that the judge, who is Resident Judge for Gloucester Crown Court, will be in a position to discuss the content of this judgment with the relevant magistrates' court in an endeavour to improve performance in this respect.

Doing the best we can in those rather unsatisfactory circumstances, we can see the force of the argument advanced by the Solicitor General that the credit of 30 per cent is too great, as assessed by the judge, and that no more than 25 per cent should be allowed, having regard to the guideline.

Notwithstanding the force of that submission, we do not intend to interfere with the judge's assessment of the position as a matter of our discretion. We will therefore give somewhat more credit for these guilty pleas than the guideline would strictly mandate. We consider that against the sentences of four years' imprisonment, which we have indicated would otherwise have been appropriate, a discount of approximately 30 per cent should be made, reducing those sentences to sentences of 34 months' imprisonment in respect of each of the three counts.

We therefore quash the orders made by the judge in relation to the sentences imposed for those three counts and substitute for each of them those concurrent terms of 34 months' imprisonment. The other orders made by the judge are unaffected by this and will stand.

The offender is not present. He must surrender to Compass House Custody Suite, Edison Close, Waterwells Business Park, Quedgeley, Gloucester GL2 2AE by 2.30 pm today. That sentence will start from when he surrenders to custody.