R v Peter Adrian Dilenardo & Anor

The Applicants are Peter Dilenardo, who is also known as Adrian Dilenardo (“the First Applicant”) and Nicola Dilenardo (“the Second Applicant”). Pursuant to sections 65 and 85 of the Proceeds of Crime Act, they seek leave to appeal an order of the Crown Court at Leeds dated 24 October 2025 appointing a receiver over the property known as 5 St Chads Grove Headingly, for the purposes of enforcing a confiscation order made against the First Applicant on 9 September 2021, as varied on 25 October 2021.

The order of 24 October 2025 was made pursuant to section 50 of the Proceeds of Crime Act. It requires the First Applicant and all those in possession of the properties to deliver up vacant possession on or before two months from the date of the Order.

The Applicants also seek leave, pursuant to section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, to introduce fresh evidence. Other fresh evidence has also been introduced which we will consider in due course.

Prosecution counsel (Mr Holsgrove) attends by direction of the court. The First Applicant sought permission to appear by CVP yesterday afternoon, an application we refused on the basis it was late and accompanied by insufficient medical evidence to justify his position. Neither Applicant has appeared before us this morning. The matter was listed for 10 am and this particular matter has commenced at 11.35 am. Prosecution counsel has explained to us that a member of his team has travelled from Yorkshire this morning which is where the Applicants reside and there have been no reported travel difficulties so accordingly, we decided to continue with the hearing. However, in order to ensure equality of arms we decided not to hear from prosecution counsel and to rely instead on the detailed written submissions from the Applicants and Prosecution Counsel, save that we asked prosecution counsel to identify the new material produced by the Applicants after the skeleton arguments. We also offered him the opportunity to make submissions on any of the new material. Counsel provided the assistance sought with scrupulous fairness taking care to make sure we were aware of the new material without straying into submissions.

There is a protracted and lengthy history to this case which may be conveniently summarised as follows.

The First Applicant was an independent financial adviser authorised by the Financial Conduct Authority to give advice to clients relating to products regulated by them. He was authorised from 1 December 2000 until 2014 but continued to advise clients after his authorisation ended.

On 13 August 2015, a without notice restraint order was made against him pursuant to section 41 of the Proceeds of Crime Act prohibiting him from dealing with any realisable property held by him. The assets restrained included 5 St Chads Grove which is the focus of the order before us.

On 30 May 2019 in the Crown Court at Leeds following a nine-week trial, the First Applicant was convicted of a number of counts of:

The First Applicant's conduct included overcharging clients; continuing to give financial advice when he was no longer authorised to do so; manipulating financial products to generate commission for himself; repeatedly moving clients' money to generate commission; and the use of documents with forged/altered signatures and dates.

On 4 June 2019, he was sentenced to a total sentence of 10 years and 3 months' imprisonment and disqualified under section 1 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 for 9 years.

Confiscation proceedings commenced in December 2020.

On 9 September 2021, the Crown Court made a confiscation order pursuant to section 6 of the Proceeds of Crime Act. The order was subsequently varied on 25 October 2021. The Defendant was considered to have benefited to the extent of £1,197,552 as a result of his criminal lifestyle. The amount available to be realised was identified as £514,163 and was stated to be payable as compensation to the victims of the First Applicant's fraudulent conduct. The available assets identified in the schedule included approximately seventeen properties, one of which was 5 St Chads Grove.

The order was made by consent between all the parties including the Second Applicant.

Payment was to be made within 3 months, or a sentence of 5 years' imprisonment would be imposed in default. Time for payment was later extended for another 3 months until 9 March 2022.

The First Applicant sought to appeal his convictions, the sentence and the confiscation order. Leave was refused by the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, on 28 March 2023: R v Peter Adrian Dilenardo [2023] EWCA Crim 517.

The First Applicant was imprisoned in default of payment in September 2023.

By 3 December 2024, the outstanding balance of the confiscation order was £51,880.31, with accrued interest of £40,923.49 giving a total outstanding amount of £92,803.

In March 2025, the CPS applied for an enforcement receiver in relation to 5 St Chads Grove.

Witness statements from Emma Tucker, a financial investigator with the Asset Confiscation Enforcement Team at the Yorkshire and Humber Regional Economic Crime Unit, explain the unsuccessful attempts made by the POCA Enforcement Team to realise the assets and the reason for seeking an enforcement receiver for 5 St Chads Grove. She also explains the following:

The hearing of the Crown's application under section 50 of the Proceeds of Crime Act took place on 24 October 2025 in the Crown Court at Leeds in front of His Honour Judge Clark. The First Applicant was represented by Counsel although he has subsequently raised complaints about the quality of that representation which we will consider in due course.

The judge explained his position with respect to the Second Applicant at the hearing in his ruling on the application. The Second Applicant had written to the Court explaining that she needed more time to instruct lawyers. However, she did not have an interest in the property and had had more than the 5 days' notice required by the Criminal Procedure Rules and in reality, much longer. Her position had been addressed in written submissions. Moreover, if she is a tenant of the property (which the judge was inclined to doubt) then her interests will be protected by the receivership.

The judge considered an application on behalf of the First Applicant to adjourn the proceedings to await the outcome of a complaint by the First Applicant to the Financial Ombudsman in relation to a mortgage company with mortgages on some of the properties in his name and the company’s utilisation of Right to Consolidate clauses. The judge refused the application on the basis a representative of the mortgage company had made clear that the proceeds of sale would be used to discharge the outstanding amount on the confiscation order.

The judge detailed the information in papers considered in coming to his decision as follows:

The judge noted that the procedure for an application set out in the Criminal Procedure Rules 33.56 had been complied with.

The judge directed himself to section 50 of the Proceeds of Crime Act. He referred to Millington and Sutherland Williams on the Act and said that there is no ‘defence’ as such to an application under section 50, rather that a defendant is reliant on the exercise of a court's discretion — a point, he observed, that Counsel for the First Applicant had accepted at a previous hearing.

The judge then set out the reasons for the exercise of his discretion to make the order sought. The history of proceedings indicated that the First Applicant would not voluntarily satisfy the order. The Applicant should not be given any further opportunity to realise the assets himself. The procedure for an application under section 50 of the Proceeds of Crime Act had been complied with. The First Applicant was estopped from arguing that a property is not realisable property as to which there was and is no challenge. The First Applicant was not in a position to satisfy the order voluntarily as he had no other assets and if he did, then all that would happen is the realisable amount would be reviewed and increased given the difference between that and the benefit figure.

The judge assessed the position of the Second Applicant. She was a party to the confiscation hearing in 2021 and knew what the order contained. The order was agreed, and nothing had altered and the hearing before him was not an appeal of the confiscation order. It could not be argued that the determination under section 10A of the Proceeds of Crime Act agreed at the original hearing was incorrect. There was no evidence to support the suggestion that the Second Applicant had a deposit and mortgage offer for the property. Nonetheless if the offer was genuine, the receiver would consider it. The protracted proceedings and the First Applicant's imprisonment in default of payment all lent support to granting the application.

The following provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act are of particular relevance. Section 50 provides that:

The Applicants appeal on similar grounds, advancing fourteen grounds of appeal as follows:

In subsequent skeleton arguments and emails to the Court, the First Applicant has raised other CPS failings and misrepresentations and submits he did not have a fair hearing in the Crown Court. He has provided fresh evidence. We have considered the skeleton argument, the emails, the fresh evidence and the legal authorities provided.

It is appropriate to set this appeal in its context. A confiscation order was made in October 2021. It identified the benefit to the Applicant from his criminal lifestyle of approximately £1.1 million of which only half (approximately £500,000) was considered to be realisable. The court directed the £500,000 to be paid as compensation to the victims of the First Applicant's fraudulent conduct. The order is accompanied by a schedule of realisable assets which includes at least 17 properties. Payment was required within 3 months; subsequently extended by another 3 months to March 2022.

The First Applicant appealed against conviction, sentence and the confiscation order. His appeals were dismissed by the Court of Appeal in 2023.

The confiscation order required the First Applicant to pay the money specified. It was open to him to satisfy the order voluntarily. He chose not to do so. The witness statement of Ms Fuller explains the lengthy and protracted attempts by the POCA enforcement team to realise the assets, which culminated in the Applicant being imprisoned in default of payment in September 2024.

The CPS applied for an order under section 50 of the Proceeds of Crime Act, 3 years after the deadline for payment, with £52,000 of the order remaining outstanding. Together with interest of approximately £40,000, the outstanding amount rises to £92,000 as at December 2024.

Section 50 of the Proceeds of Crime Act empowers the Crown Court to appoint receivers for the purposes of enforcing a confiscation order. Section 50 sets down conditions for its application: a confiscation order must have been made and not satisfied and is not subject to appeal.

The conditions are satisfied in the present case. There is no dispute that a confiscation order has been made. It remains unsatisfied to the extent already specified. The First Applicant's appeal against conviction, sentence and the confiscation order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal in 2023.

After the CPS applied for an order under section 50, the Applicant applied to vary the confiscation order under section 23 of the Proceeds of Crime Act. This is not however an appeal. Any such application cannot be used to go behind a finding made at the confiscation hearing or embodied in the confiscation order as to the amount of the defendant’s realisable assets. Such a finding can only be challenged by way of an appeal against the confiscation order: see Gokal v Serious Fraud Office [2001] EWCA Civ 368, per Keene LJ at (17) and (24) (in the context of the predecessor regime under section 83 of the Criminal Justice Act).

In addition, after the CPS's application under section 50, the First Applicant applied to the Criminal Cases Review Commission. This cannot however act to stay an application under this section: See R v Soneji[2006] EWCA Crim 1125 at (10) where the court said in the context of a petition to the European Court of Human Rights that the obligation to pay a confiscation order within a specified period remains in force from the date it was imposed. The clock does not stop running whilst an appeal is pending, save by judicial authorisation.

Accordingly, the conditions for the exercise of discretion by the court under section 50 are satisfied. Nonetheless the court is not bound to appoint a receiver even where the conditions in section 50(1) have been met. The remedy is a discretionary one. The court must exercise its discretion judicially and in accordance with the provisions of section 69 of the Proceeds of Crime Act.

The Applicants challenge the judge's exercise of discretion on a number of grounds which we consider according to the broad categories to which they relate, as follows.

The First Applicant submits that his legal representation ‘collapsed at a critical stage’ which created an inequality of arms. The judge was wrong, he submits, to consider he had meaningful representation. However, as he concedes, he was represented by Counsel at the hearing on 24 October 2025. The First Applicant complains about the quality of his representation, but the Crown Court judgment expresses no concerns in this regard, and the judge was well placed to make that assessment.

There is moreover a pattern of behaviour on the part of the Applicant in this regard. The judge refers in his ruling to repeated switches in legal teams. The ruling of the Court of Appeal in 2023 which refused the First Applicant permission to appeal against conviction, sentence and the confiscation order refers to the First Applicant's criticism of his legal team and to the three different firms of solicitors who represented him at trial at public expense. The Court of Appeal found no basis whatsoever to support the Applicant’s criticism of their conduct.

The First Applicant submits that the hearing in the Crown Court was unfair. There is no evidential basis for this assertion. The judge was satisfied that the CPS had complied with the procedure in Crim PR 33.05 which sets out the process for applying for an order. It is apparent that the judge adopted a considered and fair approach to the hearing. He considered the applications to adjourn and gave reasons for refusing them. He explained that he had read the responses and documents submitted by Counsel for the Applicant; he had read the documentation provided by the Crown and dealt with the evidence given in a letter and by way of a statement from a representative of the mortgage company; he heard submissions from Counsel for the First Applicant and read the letter and documents provided by the Second Applicant.

The First Applicant submits that the hearing in the Crown Court was procedurally unfair because evidence about his health and probation conditions were not before the judge due to the negligence or professional misconduct of his advisers. The judge cannot be criticised for not considering evidence which was not before him. We treat the evidence as fresh evidence and consider it de bene esse in due course.

The Applicants submit that the section 50order amounts to an ultra vires attempt to confiscate the belongings of the Second Applicant, in particular in relation to her improvements to the property.

The judge carefully considered the interest of the Second Applicant, concluding as follows:

Support for the judge's approach in this regard is to be found in section 10A of the Proceeds of Crime Act which precludes the re-litigation of the extent of a defendant's interest in a property once the determination under section 10A is made. Section 10A determinations were made with the consent of the Second Applicant in the substantive confiscation proceedings. The property was held absolutely by the First Applicant. The Second Applicant's arguments seeking renovation costs were heard but not accepted.

The Applicants complain about the inconsistent application of the lender's right to consolidate and submit that the judge was wrong to treat any sale proceeds as belonging to the First Applicant when it belongs to the lender.

The First Applicant also submits that the order is premature given his complaint to the Financial Ombudsman about the exercise of the right of consolidation by the mortgage company with the benefit of mortgages over his buy-to-let portfolio of properties.

We find the First Applicant's argument hard to follow given the clear statement to the court by the representative from the mortgage company, accompanied by a statement of truth, that the mortgage company will waive the right to consolidate so as to enable the outstanding amount owing on the confiscation order to be used to satisfy the confiscation order, as well as the costs of the receiver and sale costs. In doing so the mortgage company (Topaz Mortgages) has put the interests of the victims over and above its own interests. Whether or not the mortgage company chooses to do the same in relation to other properties is not a matter for this Court or relevant to the enforcement order before us.

For the same reasons we do not accept the submission that there will be double recovery in that the First Applicant will still owe £52,000 to the mortgage company. That is not the effect of the statement from the mortgage company representative. The prosecution has confirmed in writing that the mortgage representative has confirmed the point to the First Applicant. There has therefore been no false assumption of the available amount.

We have been shown a recent provisional decision by the Financial Ombudsman in this regard which has been published after the ruling in the Crown Court which we have considered de bene esse as we explain in due course. We say simply at this point that we do not consider it to be material to the issues before us in that it addresses the service provided by the mortgage company. The author of the letter refers to the complaint evolving and now extending to the mortgage company not applying its Right to Consolidate clause consistently, but the author continues by stating that he cannot comment because this is not part of the original complaint.

The Applicants submit that the judge did not perform the proportionality analysis required by Article 1 Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. We do not accept this submission.

A Defendant is entitled to his Convention rights, in particular to a fair trial under Article 6 on the European Convention on Human Rights and is only to be deprived of assets in accordance with Article 1 Protocol 1. It is however also the case that the overall aim of the Proceeds of Crime Act is to recover assets acquired through criminal activity, both because it is wrong for criminals to retain the proceeds of crime and in order to show that crime does not pay. Practicality involves ensuring that, so far as is consistent with the wording of the statute and other legal principles, the recovery process, both in terms of any hearing and in terms of physically locating and confiscating the assets in question, is as simple, as predictable, and as effective as possible (R v Ahmad [2014] UKSC 36).

The judge understood that the order was not to be imposed automatically once the conditions in section 50 were satisfied and that he was required to exercise his discretion judicially and in accordance with section 64 of the Proceeds of Crime Act. He considered whether there was any prospect of the First Applicant satisfying the order voluntarily but concluded, unsurprisingly, that there was not in circumstances where the First Applicant had been committed to prison in default of payment and has not apparently changed his stance on release from prison.

The judge considered whether there was any alternative way of dealing with matters but concluded that there was not. He observed that the First Applicant did not produce a witness statement setting out any realistic proposals to discharge the outstanding amount.

The judge considered the interests of the Second Applicant concluding that her interests will be protected by the receivership process in the event she is considered to be a tenant as to which he expressed doubt. We share the judge's scepticism. The witness statement of Ms Fuller explains that the tenancy agreement commenced 18 months after the making of the confiscation order. It is not executed as a deed; it is expressed to be for monthly rent below the market value. Ms Fuller suggests it is a disingenuous attempt by the Applicants to prevent the marketing of the property at its full value before going on to explain that many alternative housing options were open to the Second Applicant after the sale of the marital home. Options included renovating and living in a property she owned in her sole name. The Second Applicant incurred expenditure on the property after September 2021 in the knowledge that the property belonged to the First Applicant and that no allowance would be made for her expenditure.

What matters in an Article 1 Protocol 1 assessment is not whether the judge has made specific reference to the European Convention on Human Rights or the requisite proportionality assessment but whether the outcome is proportionate. We have no doubt that it is.

The objective of the receivership order is to realise the outstanding assets due under the confiscation order which will be used to compensate the victims of the First Applicant's fraud. The confiscation order itself was made by court order pursuant to the legislative regime of the Proceeds of Crime Act. It was confirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeal. It is now 3.5 years since the deadline for satisfaction of the order, and the First Applicant has shown himself willing to go to prison to avoid payment. There is ample evidence before this Court of strenuous efforts to avoid satisfying the order. The appointment of a receiver reflects the legislative steer in section 69 of the Proceeds of Crime Act that the power under section 50 should be exercised with a view to the value of realisable property being made available for satisfying any compensation order. There is no evidence before this Court that any alternative proposal will lead to the outstanding being paid to the victims of the frauds not least because the mortgage company in question has come to a specific agreement with the CPS to divert sufficient funds from the sale proceeds of St Chad’s Grove to discharge the outstanding amount owed to the victims of the fraud.

The First Applicant makes a number of complaints that the CPS have acted irrationally, inconsistently or in a procedurally unfair manner, as for example in securing equity from one property whilst failing to secure it from other properties. He submits that had the CPS, acted competently, the entire POCA balance would have been satisfied without any need to sell 5 St Chads Grove. This submission ignores the reality that the confiscation order issued in 2021 is an order to the First Applicant requiring him to pay the money due. He has failed to satisfy the order voluntarily and has shown determined persistence in not doing so, culminating in imprisonment. In the circumstances the CPS have utilised section 50 as a practical attempt to obtain the outstanding amount on the confiscation order. The prosecution has explained why the house at St Chad’s Grove is the focus of the order.

The Applicants submits that the hearing in the Crown Court was procedurally unfair because evidence about the First Applicant’s health and probation conditions were not before the judge due to the negligence or professional misconduct of his adviser.

We have already commented on the pattern of behaviour by the First Applicant in criticising his legal advisers and already explained that the judge cannot be criticised for not considering material which was not before him.

Nonetheless we consider this evidence de bene esse as fresh evidence pursuant to section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act, along with other evidence generated by the Applicants after the hearing in the Crown Court. We have come to the following assessment of the material.

The material in relation to the exercise of the Right to Consolidate clause does not afford a ground of appeal in light of the clear statement to the Crown Court by the representative of the mortgage company that the outstanding amount on the confiscation order will be diverted from the proceeds of sale to satisfy the order.

The July 2025 letter from the Leeds Wellbeing Service is simply confirmation that the First Applicant has been placed on the waiting list for Eye Movement Desensitisation Therapy. It does not give any details of the reasons why and it is not said that the First Applicant cannot continue to access the service in the event he moves house.

The probation office letter refers to the disruption of the confiscation of the First Applicant’s home, but the First Applicant has shown himself willing to leave his home for prison in order to avoid compensating the victims of his fraudulent conduct. In any event we have recently been shown an ISA statement indicating funds of £40,000 available to the Second Applicant which could be used to rent another property.

We have already addressed our assessment of the recent provisional finding of the Financial Ombudsman as not relevant to the matters before us.

The First Applicant has produced emails suggesting that Law of Property Act receivers have been appointed in respect of 23 The Village Street and that this will produce the outstanding money for the confiscation order more quickly than the sale of 5 St Chads Grove. This is however conjecture on his part, and we are told that the CPS understanding is that the property is in negative equity.

Evidence of complaints about legal representation reflect a continuing pattern of conduct by the First Applicant since his trial in 2021.

Accordingly, we decline to receive the evidence put before the Court by the Applicants on the basis it does not appear to us to afford any ground for allowing the appeal (section 23 of the Criminal Evidence Act).

For the reasons given leave to appeal is refused.

Although not present in Court, the Applicants submitted in the following written applications which fall to be considered consequentially upon our decision to refuse leave.

The Second Applicant applies for an extension of time for compliance with the order (so as to vacate the property) until 30 April 2026. The Second Applicant has produced evidence of an offer to buy an alternative property and correspondence with mortgage advisers.

We refuse the application to extend time on the basis that the property has been restrained since 2015 and included within the confiscation order as a realisable asset since October 2021. The CPS have explained that the Second Applicant had other accommodation options available to her after the marital home had been sold but chose to move into this particular property despite being aware of its status as a realisable asset.

This Court may only certify a point of law of general importance if that point was involved in a decision on an appeal for which leave had been given. As a matter of statutory interpretation this court has no power to certify a point of law which was involved in a decision refusing leave to appeal (R v Hussain, Fiaz [2023] EWCA Crim 1100). Accordingly, the application for certification on a point of law is refused. The application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court is refused.