R v Maurice Jones

On 14 June 2024, in the Crown Court at Winchester, after a jury trial, the appellant (aged 25) was convicted of the following offences: murder (count 1) and having an article with a blade or point (count 2). On 18 July 2024, the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment on count 1 with a minimum term of 30 years, less the 329 days he had spent on remand; a concurrent four-year term was imposed on count 2.

With the leave of the single judge, the appellant appeals against his sentence on count 1 on two grounds: (1) the increase to the minimum term was overly aggravated to reflect the presence of a child and the appellant's previous convictions; (2) the imposition of a 30-year minimum term was manifestly excessive. The appellant does not seek to renew his application for leave in respect of any other grounds.

To respect the privacy of the deceased’s child, we will refer to the victim in this case as "the deceased" and to the child's mother by the initials "SH"; in so doing, we mean no disrespect.

The deceased, who was 20, had a young son (then aged 16 months) whom he co-parented with his former partner, SH (the child's mother); although they were no longer in a relationship, both still lived in Salisbury, approximately half a mile apart.

The appellant, who had been living in the Midlands, had started an on-line relationship with SH in July 2023, and had arrived in Salisbury, to move in with her, some 12 days before the killing. Messages on the appellant's ‘phone indicated he was unhappy with the prominent role the deceased continued to play in SH's life, and he was determined to change this, displaying open hostility towards the deceased. Although not a source of tension by August 2023, SH had informed the appellant that her relationship with the deceased had had problems, and that he had previously assaulted her.

On the morning of Tuesday 22 August 2023, the deceased had been due to take his son back to SH's flat when he had received a message from her, asking if he could keep the child another night. This request was not well received, and led to an argument between them, conducted by ‘phone messaging. The appellant, having taken SH's ‘phone, joined in the argument, exchanging further messages with the deceased. The exchange ended with the deceased telling the appellant to inform SH that he would be arriving in 10 minutes with their son. The deceased then left his home, pushing the child in his stroller.

The appellant, having armed himself with a large, 21-cm kitchen knife, left SH's flat. A friend of the appellant, Mr Moores, who was present at the time, could see the appellant was angry and unsuccessfully tried to stop him leaving. In the street a witness noticed the appellant striding purposefully, with Mr Moores alongside, and SH running behind him saying, "don't let him do it, stop him". Various aspects of this journey and what happened thereafter were caught on CCTV and dashcam footage.

When the group met with the deceased, who was travelling in the other direction, SH took the child as the deceased moved nearer the appellant; Mr Moores, meanwhile, could be heard saying to the appellant, "leave man, you're going to get arrested". CCTV footage showed movements from the appellant consistent with taking a knife from his pocket. The appellant then stabbed the deceased at least eight times, including a fatal stab to the lower left side of his back with sufficient force to penetrate his back muscles, to cut across and through a rib, and to penetrate the left lower lobe of his left lung and into his heart. Given their location, and the track caused by the knife, at least some of the injuries (including the fatal one) were caused when the deceased had his back to the appellant. Although the attack itself was not captured on camera, the stabbing was witnessed by a number of people and CCTV audio was available. On the audio recording, SH could be heard calling out that the child could see what was happening, and SH's screams and the deceased's shouts can be heard.

After the stabbing, the appellant left the scene and discarded the knife. He was arrested 80 minutes later, shoeless and having changed his clothes; he later agreed he had thrown the trousers and shoes worn during the attack away, saying his shoes had had blood on them. During his fourth interview, the appellant provided a short statement in which he admitted to causing the injuries leading to the deceased's death, saying he had lost control after the first stabbing and that he was remorseful and never intended to kill. He went on to say that he had wanted to teach the deceased a lesson due to the way he had treated him and SH but had blacked out and did not expect it to elevate so far.

After a trial before a jury, the appellant was convicted of murder and of having a bladed article.

In sentencing the appellant for murder, the judge was bound to impose a life term; in then determining the minimum term, it was common ground that, given the appellant had taken a knife to the scene, this must be at least 25 years (Sentencing Act 2020 schedule 21 paragraph 4(2)(a) and (b)).

The judge accepted there was some, limited, mitigation arising from the appellant's age (he had just turned 25) and mental health issues, notably evidence of low intelligence. He considered, however, that the appellant's previous conviction for assault constituted a relevant aggravating feature. While accepting it related to far less serious offending, the judge saw a parallel with that earlier assault, which occurred in 2021, when the appellant attacked his then partner when she was holding a young child, during which he had kicked the infant's head. As for the present offence, the appellant had known that the deceased would be with his 16-month-old son at the time of the altercation, and, as the audio recording of the incident made apparent, the child saw his father being stabbed and would have heard his mother's screams and his father shouting; the judge considered this was “an extreme aggravating feature” of the offence, warranting a substantial increase so as to result in a minimum term of 30 years.

By the first ground of appeal, it is contended that the judge overly aggravated the minimum term in relation to the presence of a child and the appellant's previous convictions. The second ground makes the more general objection that the 30-year minimum term was manifestly excessive.

Accepting that the appellant's previous conviction had relevance, in demonstrating that he struggled to maintain his temper, and, consequently, engaged in violence in a domestic context, the appellant says that significantly less serious offending should carry little weight as an aggravating feature of the current offence. As for the presence of the deceased's child, although that was an inherently aggravating factor, it is pointed out that the boy had been left with his mother as the deceased made his way towards the appellant, thus distinguishing this from a case where an infant was being held by, or was in the immediate care of, a person who was then murdered. Furthermore, given the child's young age, it was unclear how much he had seen, heard or understood.

Allowing that schedule 21 of the 2020 Act provides guidelines, not tramlines, the appellant contends that the various starting points and sentencing gaps between them provide direction for the court when considering the seriousness of an offence as a whole, taking into account any aggravating and mitigating features. This was not a case that engaged any of the criteria specified under schedule 21 paragraph 3(2) (where the appropriate starting point, in determining the minimum term, would be 30 years), and, when further taking into account the appellant's personal mitigation, the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.

For the prosecution it was submitted that the judge was entitled to see the seriousness of the offending as significantly aggravated by reason of the appellant's previous conviction and the (known) presence of his son; these matters warranted a substantial and significant upward revision to the starting point. It is further observed that schedule 21 provides starting points, not an end point; the judge permissibly saw the presence of the deceased's child as a factor of "extreme aggravation" and any ultimate equivalence with a higher starting point under the schedule merely reflected that.

The judge did not obtain a pre-sentence report in this case but it is not suggested that this would have assisted him, and, although we have had regard to the provisions of section 33 of the Sentencing Act, we similarly consider it unnecessary for us to obtain a report.

In considering the points raised on this appeal, we first observe that this was a particularly brutal killing; nothing we say detracts from that fact, or from the tragic consequences of the appellant's senseless actions. Further, although the judge acknowledged the appellant's relative youth and low level of intelligence, he was entitled to find that afforded only limited mitigation. We also agree that the judge was entitled to take into account the appellant's previous conviction, relating to the 2021 assault. While the present offence was a very significant escalation, the judge permissibly saw a pattern in the appellant's willingness to engage in violence in a domestic context, notwithstanding that his victim was with their infant child at the time. More specifically, in relation to the instant offence, the judge was entitled to have regard to the fact that the appellant had gone to meet the deceased, armed with a large knife, knowing that the deceased would be with his 16-month-old son. Although SH and the child might have been a little away from the immediate scene, it is apparent that the boy witnessed the assault on his father, while hearing the screams of his mother. There was evidence before the judge of the traumatic impact this had already had on the child, and he permissibly saw this as a significantly aggravating feature of the offence.

Acknowledging all those points, we nevertheless have to consider this sentence set within the context of the guideline starting points for the determination of minimum terms as provided by schedule 21 of the Sentencing Act 2020. Doing so, while we do not minimise any aspect of this offending, we consider it was wrong to treat it as on a par with that envisaged by paragraph 3(2) of schedule 21, such as murder involving sadistic conduct, or the murder of two or more people. Treating the aggravating features of this offence as warranting an uplift of something over five years (allowing for some reduction for mitigation) thus gave rise to a sentence that is properly to be described as manifestly excessive. In our judgment, having regard to all the circumstances, including the appellant's youth and immaturity, and doing justice to the case as a whole, the appropriate minimum term for the offence of murder should have been set at 27 years. From this must be deducted the 329 days the appellant had spent on remand, thus resulting in a minimum term of 26 years and 36 days.

The sentencing remarks below would appear to indicate that no surcharge was initially imposed in this case, albeit a surcharge of £228.00 has been recorded on the Court Extract. Although the surcharge is mandatory, its imposition is not automatic and it must be ordered by the judge (see R v Jones [2018] EWCA Crim 2994 at paragraph 15). Given our decision on this appeal, imposing the surcharge at this stage will not, however, result in the appellant being treated more severely than he was below and we will accordingly now make this order.

On count 1, we quash the minimum term of 30 years less 329 days spent on remand and instead substitute a minimum term of 26 years and 36 days. To this extent the appeal is allowed. We make no change to the sentence imposed on count 2. A victim surcharge in the sum of £228.00 is applied.