R v Alice Wood

This is a renewed application for an extension of time in which to apply for leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence following refusal by the single judge. The applicant also applies for leave to rely on an additional proposed ground of appeal and on fresh evidence. For the purposes of the renewed application, the applicant is now represented by Mr D'Souza on a pro bono basis. He did not appear below, and we are grateful to him for his assistance.

On 2 January 2024, following a two week trial in the Crown Court at Chester before His Honour Judge Leeming and a jury, the applicant, Alice Wood, was convicted of murder of her fiancé, Ryan Watson.

On 2 February 2024, she was sentenced by the trial judge to life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 18 years (less 616 days spent on remand), more properly expressed as a minimum term of 16 years and 114 days.

On 6 May 2022, the applicant (then aged 22) and the deceased (aged 24) attended a social function in Hanley, Stoke. They were there for over three hours. Both consumed alcohol. The event was a party held by the deceased's colleagues at the charity where he worked. He was described by witnesses as characteristically "gregarious, fun, working the room". Some guests thought that the applicant, on the other hand, appeared "cold" or "sullen", although there was other footage showing her laughing, dancing and sitting on her fiancé's knee.

The applicant drove them both back to their home at 12 Oak Street in Rhode Heath in the deceased's Fiat Punto. Oak Street is a small lane running at right angles to Sandbach Road, the A533. Adjacent to Sandbach Road is the forecourt of a Chinese takeaway restaurant with a parking area, and next to that is a small parking area leading to Oak Street itself.

The applicant and the deceased arrived home at around 11.10 pm. She parked up behind her Ford Fiesta in the small parking area leading to Oak Street. She and the deceased were arguing. The deceased got out of the Fiat Punto and ran towards a car on the forecourt of the Chinese takeaway restaurant and kicked the driver's door. The applicant's evidence was that the argument had started in the car on the way home and was due to the deceased's jealous and irrational accusations that she had been flirting with other men at the party. Once at home she discovered that she had mislaid her mobile telephone and was looking for it in the Fiat Punto. She claimed that when she returned to their house the deceased had assaulted her, so she had left the house and got into her Ford Fiesta. She said that she intended to go back to the party to look for her phone and then to go on to stay with her mother.

What happened was captured on CCTV from the nearby Chinese restaurant. We have reviewed the footage in detail. The applicant and the deceased can be seen coming and going, sometimes off camera, and moving in between and around the vehicles. The applicant's Ford Fiesta was trapped in by the Fiat Punto. At around 11.17 pm, the applicant tried unsuccessfully to reverse out in her Ford Fiesta. She got into the Fiat Punto and rolled it back by releasing the handbrake in order to make space. The deceased then approached the Fiat Punto. The applicant ran to her car and got into the driver's seat. The deceased was moving around the Ford Fiesta, and at one stage sat in his Fiat Punto. At 11.22 pm the deceased was circling the Ford Fiesta. He was receiving calls or text messages on his phone. At 11.23 pm he walked between the rear of the Ford Fiesta and the Fiat Punto.

The applicant then reversed. She missed the deceased but crashed into the Fiat Punto which was shunted backwards. She continued to reverse; she drove into a roadside bollard and a large metal bin. She then performed a series of forwards and backwards manoeuvres. The deceased was around the vehicle and at one stage was by the driver's side of the vehicle. He grabbed the wing mirror, causing it to twist around.

A neighbour stated that she was woken at about 11.30 pm by the sound of a man arguing with someone who was inside a car. Another neighbour described hearing revving engines, crashes into a bin and a bollard, and seeing the car being driven "like a game of chicken".

The applicant then struck the deceased twice with her car, on the second occasion fatally. The deceased had walked away after the collisions with the bollard and the bin.

The first strike to the deceased was when the applicant swerved left onto the pavement and collided with him, so that he fell onto the bonnet and windscreen, before falling off. He regained his footing and was not apparently seriously hurt. The applicant then reversed quickly in an arc. She braked and straightened her car. The deceased was standing in front of her, in her headlights. 3.7 seconds after the applicant had started to reverse for the last time, at 11.24 pm, the applicant drove directly at the deceased, knocking him down and running over his body. He screamed. His full body was dragged beneath the Ford Fiesta for 158.8 metres. On the CCTV footage the car can be seen driving with smoke coming out of its rear until it stopped at Keats Drive. It is then seen to be manoeuvring as if to dislodge an obstruction. At the scene the applicant asked for help, saying "I've run over my boyfriend".

The applicant's account was that she was moving the car in a panic. She was aware of the deceased in the area, but he was moving around quickly. After she reversed the car onto the road, she saw him in the takeaway car park and decided to swerve towards him whilst revving the engine in order to scare and intimidate him. She had not intended to make contact with him, she said, but realised that he had come onto her windscreen. He was on his feet again instantly. She reversed back and then pulled onto the road. Her case was that she looked behind her over her shoulder to check the road before joining it and had not seen the deceased in front of the car. Nor had she heard his screams because she had switched on the radio. Her evidence was that she felt no sensation at the point when he went under the car but did realise that the vehicle was not accelerating as normal; so she decided to drive into a cul-de-sac where she felt something pulling at the front driver's side wheel. She tried a three-point turn, but the car was difficult to manoeuvre. She got out, realised what had happened, made ineffectual efforts to lift the car off the deceased, and then went to nearby front doors for help.

Ryan Watson was pronounced dead at the scene. The postmortem examination demonstrated that the cause of death was either traumatic compressive asphyxia from being pinned and compressed under the weight of the car or, alternatively, trauma to the chest, head or neck affecting the brain, contributing to the death.

When the applicant was arrested, she made comments which included: "I deserve it" and "You should just shoot me in the head". In subsequent police interviews she declined to comment. Her defence was that the fatal collision was an accident; that she had intended only to intimidate the deceased; and that she did not see him in front of her car at the moment of impact.

Toxicology evidence was that the applicant had nearly twice the legal limit of alcohol in her breath and was 136mg/100ml in a blood back calculation, the limit being 80mg.

The prosecution's case was that the applicant murdered her fiancé; she acted unlawfully, deliberately and in temper. Having reversed into a bin and a bollard, she drove at the deceased intending to kill him or to cause him some really serious bodily harm.

The applicant's case was that the deceased's death was a tragic accident. She had hoped to scare and intimidate him, but no more. Her perception response at the time of the fatal impact was such that she was unable to do anything to avoid colliding with the deceased. She had not seen him at the front of the car shortly before he must have been pulled under it.

The central issue for the jury was whether the applicant deliberately drove into the deceased in alcohol-fuelled aggression, intending to kill or to cause him serious harm; or whether the fatal collision was accidental. The prosecution relied on the fact of two strikes; that the applicant had deliberately driven at the deceased; and that she had seen him on the windscreen seconds before she drove at him again and struck him fatally. The jury was shown multiple CCTV clips, which included: party footage from the party (showing the couple's interactions); the Chinese takeaway forecourt, including footage of the fatal incident; and footage from residential cameras at 54 and 69 Sandbach Road, showing the car dragging the deceased. The prosecution argued that the footage demonstrated deliberate targeting, swerving, acceleration and sustained dragging.

The defence argued that the footage showed chaotic manoeuvres in panic, with poor visibility and intoxication. The applicant said that she was not "blind drunk", could still form judgments, and had chosen to drive home from the social event in order to protect the deceased's licence. She admitted deliberately serving at him during strike 1 to "scare and intimidate" him, but she intended to brake before contact. She was challenged on why she had not in fact stopped short. She claimed that she did not see the deceased before strike 2 as she was looking over her shoulder for traffic. She was pressed on the four interviews in which she had declined to comment. It was suggested that her defence of accident was tailored later in an attempt to meet the prosecution's case.

On behalf of the defence, expert evidence was called on the concept of Perception Response Time ("PRT") – the time taken for a driver to perceive and react to a new, or unexpected, hazard. The defence expert, Mr Barry Seaward, was a highly experienced ex-police officer – now a collision investigator. He produced 3D reconstructions and gave evidence that PRT was relevant. 3.7 seconds between the strikes was insufficient for a reaction to a hazard and so the fatal collision could have been unavoidable. After the first strike, the car was reversed for 1.6 seconds. There was then a delay of 0.9 seconds before it moved forward for just 1.2 seconds, before it struck the deceased. Had the applicant been looking forwards from the fist strike to the second strike, she would have been able to see the deceased ahead of the car. However, if she took her eyes away from the front view, then PRT would need to be applied, and 1.2 seconds would be insufficient time for her to have reacted to the presence of the deceased.

The prosecution's forensic collision expert, PC Michael Thompson of Cheshire Police, and Mr Seaward had met before the trial. They provided a joint experts' report, dated 29 November 2023, setting out areas of disagreement. One clear dispute between the experts was the relevance of PRT. PC Thompson agreed that, taken in isolation, 1.2 seconds would not be enough to react to an unexpected hazard in the circumstances of this collision; but that would only apply if the applicant was not looking ahead after the first strike. The CCTV footage showed that the deceased remained in front of the Ford Fiesta from when it reversed back after the first collision to the time of the second collision, and although the CCTV did not capture in which direction the applicant was looking, as she was aware that she had already struck the deceased, it was likely that she was aware of the deceased's presence. In those circumstances, in PC Thompson's view, the deceased's presence could not be described as an "unexpected hazard", such that PRT was not applicable for the second collision in strike 2.

On what is a renewed application only, we can deal briefly with the proposed grounds of appeal and our analysis of them.

The applicant seeks to advance three principal grounds of appeal against conviction. Grounds 1 and 2 were rejected by the single judge. Ground 3 in the original grounds was also rejected by the single judge and has now been abandoned. We shall call the new proposed ground of appeal “Ground 3”.

Ground 1 is said by Mr D'Souza to be by far the most important of the ground, because it is said to involve an error which impacts on the merits of Ground 2 and 3. It is submitted that the trial judge erred in permitting re-examination of PC Thompson on the applicability of PRT, thereby allowing the instruction of inadmissible and misleading opinion evidence. The inadmissible and misleading opinion evidence in question undermined the defence and amounted to a personal belief on the part of PC Thompson on what was in fact a question of fact, which should have been left to the jury; it was not expert opinion at all. PC Thompson’s evidence usurped the jury's function because he expressed a view on what in Mr D'Souza's submission was “the ultimate issue”. The judge, it is submitted, went seriously wrong and the conviction for murder is said as a result to be unsafe.

Under Ground 2 it was submitted that the judge erred in rejecting a submission of no case to answer. It is said that the evidence of intent was circumstantial only and that the jury would not have been properly in a position to exclude all realistic possibilities consistent with accident; the evidence was equivocal and the judge should have acceded to the half-time defence submission.

Ground 3 involves an application to vary the proposed grounds of appeal. The applicant seeks to argue that original trial counsel failed in their duty, or made an error of judgment when omitting to lead evidence of the deceased's prior mental ill-health and an alleged propensity on his part to jump in front of vehicles.

In a written Respondent's Notice, the respondent resists the applications. The principal submissions are that this was a straightforward case which was captured on clear CCTV footage; and that attempts to elevate expert evidence or historic background material risks obscuring what was a simple but tragic case.

We deal first with the question of delay. Given the short length of the delay, namely 49 days, the fact that the applicant is not responsible for the delay and the gravity of the consequences of conviction, we grant the necessary extension of time.

We turn then to consider the proposed grounds of appeal in the light of the evidence and the trial judge's rulings. As indicated, the applicant's case rested on the assertion that the fatal collision was accidental, that she had not seen the deceased in front of her car, and that her conduct was explicable by panic, intoxication, and an intention merely to intimidate. The prosecution case was that she had deliberately used her car as a weapon, intending to kill or to cause really serious harm.

The evidence given by PC Thompson in chief was that PRT did not apply to the second strike. This was all in line both with his written report and his comments in the joint experts' written report.

However, in cross-examination he agreed that, after the first impact, the applicant had reversed and when she drove forward again it was not to exactly the same place as where the first strike had taken place and that the deceased's position had changed between the first and second strikes, as he had moved four steps into the trajectory of the car as it moved forward. He agreed that if, after the first collision, the applicant had turned away from facing forwards, even for a second, then PRT would be relevant, as the deceased's position had changed and the applicant's brain would need time to perceive him in his new position.

Unsurprisingly, leading counsel for the prosecution, Miss Ford KC, wished to ask questions in re-examination about the fuller context of the second strike – i.e. that it followed the first strike, which was just seconds earlier, and there was no question that the applicant was aware of that first strike, including of the fact that the deceased had been thrown off the bonnet of the car. Miss Ford asked in re-examination whether the fact and timing of the first impact had a bearing on the issue of PRT for the second impact. The judge interrupted to ask whether the question went to the ultimate issue for the jury. Leading counsel for the applicant, Miss Young KC, objected to the question. However, following further submissions, the judge allowed the question to be put. PC Thompson then re-affirmed his opinion that PRT did not apply in this case. He put it this way:

In his report and evidence, by contrast, Mr Seaward (the defence expert) took a different line. He emphasised that PRT was directly relevant. If the applicant had looked away while reversing and then pulled forward, she might not have had time to register the deceased's new position in front of the car. He argued that the 3.7 second window was too short for a driver to perceive, process and react to the hazard. He described the applicant's driving overall as chaotic but not necessarily homicidal, suggesting that the revving and low speed apparent from the footage were consistent with intimidation, rather than an intention to cause serious harm. In his view, the science supported the possibility that the fatal collision was an accident which occurred within the natural limits of human reaction time.

Thus, the prosecution expert framed the deceased's presence as foreseeable and the applicant's conduct as deliberate; whilst the defence expert framed it as a matter of human limitations and accident.

Fundamentally, the short point is that the jury were left to weigh these competing interpretations: PC Thompson's assertion that "this was not unexpected" against Mr Seaward's insistence that the science of perception and reaction supported the defence narrative. It is in that context that we assess the complaint about the re-examination.

We agree with the single judge that this ground is unarguable. The judge was entitled to allow re-examination to clarify with the witness, PC Thompson, despite his concessions made in cross-examination, whether his opinion remained that PRT was applicable in circumstances where the deceased had just been thrown from the bonnet seconds earlier. PC Thompson's evidence was that the deceased's presence at the time of the second strike was not unexpected. This was entirely in line with his evidence in chief and also both his written report and what he said in the experts' joint statement. His ultimate resting position can have come as a surprise to no one, including the defence.

The admissibility of expert evidence is governed by common law principles and section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The judge had a discretion to exclude evidence if its admission would have such an adverse effect upon the fairness of the proceedings that it ought not to be admitted. The principal rule of re-examination is that questions should be confined to matters arising out of cross-examination. That rule was not breached in this case. Plainly, the question in re-examination arose out of PC Thompson's evidence in cross-examination and the evidence was properly admitted. It did not trespass impermissibly on the jury's role. The jury remained the arbiters of fact, and they were directed accordingly. It was for the jury to decide what they made of the evidence as to whether or not the applicant had remained looking forward, or had indeed turned to look behind at the time of reversing. The judge also provided written directions as to how to approach the expert evidence, before the expert evidence was called, and his directions in that regard are not criticised. We do not accept the submission that there was no proper or rational basis for the jury to have rejected Mr Seaward's opinion in favour of PC Thompson's. It was for the jury to decide whether the applicant had deliberately driven at the deceased. They had the entirety of the evidence to decide that question, not just the opinion of the two experts.

The jury were also told in evidence about the relative experience of both experts and other matters that may have gone to their assessment of the weight to be given to the respective opinions. The judge's directions on drawing inferences and assessing the expert evidence were both orthodox and fair.

The applicant next contends that the judge erred in rejecting the submission of no case to answer on the count of murder. The governing principles are laid out in R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039. If the prosecution evidence, taken at its highest, is such that a reasonable jury properly directed could convict, the case must be left to the jury. Only if the evidence is tenuous or inherently weak should the judge withdraw it.

The defence submission was that the CCTV footage in and of itself is equally consistent with murder or accident and that every single action was equally consistent with the defence that the applicant had not seen the deceased at the time of the impact. Counsel for the applicant argued that unless the jury could exclude all realistic possibilities consistent with accident, proof beyond reasonable doubt could not be achieved.

The judge rejected the submission without even calling upon prosecution counsel. He observed:

We agree. The evidence here included clear CCTV footage of deliberate swerving and acceleration; the applicant's own admission in cross-examination that she drove deliberately at the deceased to scare and intimidate him; her comments on arrest; her repeated "No comment" interview; as well as the evidence confirming death by compressive asphyxia from being dragged beneath the car.

Taken together, this evidence was ample to justify leaving the count of murder to the jury. The judge was correct to reject the submission of no case to answer.

In an application to vary, the applicant now seeks to adduce a new proposed ground of appeal based on a decision by trial counsel as to the strategy to be employed in relation to certain medical evidence relating to the deceased.

It is well known, as a general rule, that all grounds of appeal that an applicant wishes to advance must be lodged with a Notice of Appeal. The filter mechanism provided by section 31 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 is a very important stage and one not to be bypassed solely on the basis that lawyers instructed post-conviction would have done or would have argued things differently from the trial lawyers. Fresh grounds advanced by fresh counsel must be "particularly cogent", and the hurdle for an applicant is high: see R v James [2018] EWCA Crim 285; [2018] 1 WLR 2749 at [38].

Mr D'Souza on behalf of the applicant submits that evidence about the deceased's mental health difficulties which had manifested themselves in a number of attempts at suicide and in particular that in August 2019 he had tried to kill himself in front of a car and was deemed the following month as being at risk of impulsive behaviour and jumping in front of traffic should have been relied on. It is suggested that it was an error of judgment by trial counsel not to seek to do so. The error damaged the applicant's case, it is suggested, because it might have materially affected the jury's view of whether the deceased himself had caused or contributed to his own death by intentionally moving into the path of the car.

The medical records provided to the court as fresh evidence confirm historic mental health difficulties, including suicidal ideation and episodes where the deceased had allegedly tried to harm himself by walking into traffic.

Miss Young has provided a full and helpful McCook response and has explained why she chose not to adduce these parts of the deceased's medical records at trial. She acknowledges that the records were "plainly a striking feature", but that she decided tactically to keep them out in order to avoid opening the door to damaging bad character evidence against the applicant. The prosecution had given notice, at least twice, of an intention to adduce, specifically, elements of bad character, including an earlier alleged incident in 2021 where the applicant was said to have driven at the deceased. Miss Young says:

A further background feature was that the applicant had made allegations in an earlier Defence Statement that the deceased was emotionally and physically abusive towards her. That was the context in which the earlier incident of aggressive driving was to be relied upon by the prosecution. We would also note that there was a second bad character application that had been served on the applicant relating to an earlier alleged incident where the applicant was said to have stabbed the deceased in the leg. There was photographic evidence to support that.

Against all of this background, and as it was, both prosecution and defence agreed that the fairest and most appropriate focus at the trial was on the events of the night in question, rather than historical matters which could result in the trial being derailed by contested evidence about the relationship of the pair more widely and the mental health histories of both protagonists.

We have considered with care the material placed before us in support of ground 3, and in particular, the extracts from the deceased's medical records and the statement of Miss Young.

The medical records do disclose that, amongst other things, in 2019 the deceased was assessed as suffering from mixed anxiety and depression, with episodes of suicidal ideation and impulsive behaviour.

In considering whether to grant leave to amend the proposed grounds of appeal to introduce ground 3, the court needs to assess whether or not under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 the fresh evidence should be admitted. The criteria include whether the evidence is capable of belief, whether it may afford a ground for allowing the appeal, and whether there is a reasonable explanation for its non-production at trial.

We accept that the medical records are capable of belief and that they may afford some support to the defence in general terms. But in the context of the events of 6 May 2022, whilst the records may be considered superficially striking, it is important to remember, as this court has stressed on many occasions, that the fresh evidence must be not only capable of belief, but also likely to have affected the safety of the conviction.

The records in question are historic. They date back to 2019. There is no evidence that the deceased was suffering from suicidal ideation or mental health difficulties at the time of the incident in May 2022. The jury had before them the clear CCTV footage of the applicant deliberately swerving towards the deceased, admissions that she intended to "scare and intimidate him", and expert evidence that his presence was not unexpected after the first collision. Against that evidential matrix, it is difficult to see how the medical records could have been more than of very limited probative value.

As to the tactical decision, Miss Young explains how she deliberately chose not to adduce these records in order to avoid the prosecution's bad character application being admitted. She discussed this matter with the applicant, who is a highly intelligent woman, who agreed with her decision and her analysis. In hindsight, Miss Young may question whether or not the decision was correct, but there is no question, as she maintains, that the decision was made in good faith and within the bounds of legitimate professional judgment.

We remind ourselves of the principles in McCook, that the court will be slow to criticise counsel's tactical decisions unless they fall outside the range of reasonable professional judgment. We are entirely satisfied that the decision here was an entirely legitimate tactical choice. It certainly cannot be characterised as negligent or incompetent. Indeed, no one seeks to suggest that it was. The applicant was advised of the risks and she agreed to the tactical course to be taken.

Standing back, the strength of the proposed fresh ground falls very far short of the cogency necessary to justify an expansion of the grounds of appeal after leave has been refused by the single judge. The decision not to seek to admit the medical records does not, even arguably, render the conviction for murder unsafe. The records were too remote to outweigh the direct evidence of the applicant's actions. Trial counsel's tactical decision was well within the range of reasonable judgment. The evidence of the applicant's previous use of a car as a weapon against the deceased could have been extremely damaging to the defence case.

The application to add the proposed ground 3 and to vary the proposed grounds of appeal is accordingly refused.

This was indeed a tragic case in which drink and anger played their parts. The deceased was a young man who lost his life because the applicant, in drink, could not control herself behind the wheel of a car and chose to use it with fatal consequences. We are satisfied that none of the proposed grounds of appeal has arguable merit. The renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction is refused.

We turn to the renewed application for leave to appeal against the sentence of life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 18 years (less time spent on remand).

The applicant's grounds are that the judge wrongly applied the statutory framework in that he erred in finding an intention to kill on the part of the applicant, rather than an intention to cause serious harm; that he erred in treating the use of a vehicle as a weapon equivalent; and that he over-weighted aggravating factors and gave insufficient weight to mitigating factors. The submission overall is that the minimum term imposed is manifestly excessive.

This court will interfere with a sentence only if it is wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. For an offence of murder, the statutory framework is contained in Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020. The court must select an appropriate starting point and then adjust for aggravating and mitigating features to arrive ultimately at a just overall minimum term. The exercise is of course fact-specific. Case law recognises that a vehicle may be used as a weapon and that short-lived premeditation can justify an upward movement from the 15 year starting point.

In clear and cogent sentencing remarks the judge expressly applied the structure set out in Schedule 21 and selected the 15-year starting point in paragraph 5, as opposed to a 25-year starting point under paragraph 4(2). He considered, but did not apply, the "weapon taken to the scene" route. He emphasised the fact-specific nature of the exercise and rightly avoided a mechanical application of Schedule 21.

In his fact finding, the judge set out the phases of driving, as set out and supported by the CCTV footage. He found the first strike to be a deliberate swerve fully off the carriageway and across the pavement towards the deceased, which the judge found to have been with the intention to cause some harm. He rejected the suggestion that the manoeuvre was designed merely to "frighten" and to stop short. The second strike, which occurred just 3.7 seconds after the first strike, with the Ford Fiesta being reversed in an arc, positioned to aim at the deceased and then driven straight at the deceased, knocking the deceased under the chassis and dragging him for 158.8 metres was, so the judge found, caused when the applicant saw the deceased and had gone on to make no mistake in her second strike. In our judgment, these were plainly conclusions of fact to which he was entitled to come.

As for intention, the judge concluded that by the time of strike 2 the applicant had intended to kill. He recognised that intention can be formed on the spur of the moment and in the heat of the moment, and he found that this short-lived but firm intention was formed after strike 1 when the deceased had regained his feet.

The judge went on to identify aggravating features, being careful to avoid double counting. The Ford Fiesta was a highly dangerous weapon or weapon equivalent; the deceased was a pedestrian, standing on the pavement, in drink, using his phone, with limited ability to evade a rapidly developing assault; and at the time of the collision the applicant was over one and a half times the legal limit through alcohol consumption. Death was the outcome, he said, of a series of intimidatory and aggressive manoeuvres culminating in two strikes, with the fatal impact being executed seconds after the first. Further, the judge found that the applicant had been aware that the deceased was trapped under her car from the vehicle's lifting and altered handling, and that the deceased had screamed initially when being dragged under the car, sustaining numerous abrasions during the 21 second journey before the applicant stopped the car.

The judge then turned to mitigation. He observed that the applicant was aged 22 at the time of offending and 24 at sentence. She had no previous convictions, great academic promise and supportive references. He recognised that after the incident the applicant had attempted (albeit futilely) to lift the vehicle, had sought help and had expressed distress. However, he found that there was no true remorse, and he maintained that these factors did not negate his earlier finding of an intention to kill. He noted the applicant's personal circumstances and her mental health history but found that they carried limited weight against the seriousness of the offending and given his factual findings. He went on to balance the relevant factors and concluded that the aggravating features decisively outweighed the mitigating features, which justified an upward adjustment from a starting point of 15 years to 18 years.

We are satisfied that the judge's finding on intention to kill was one properly open to him on the evidence. He carefully separated strike 1 from strike 2. Strike 2 involved a short, deliberate repositioning and direct acceleration into the deceased. He correctly identified that intention may be formed on the spur of the moment. The fact of a short interval, the repositioning to aim at the deceased, the deliberate forward drive, the vehicle's lift as it passed over the deceased, and the sustained drag all supported the judge's conclusion of an intention to kill at the time of the second strike. It cannot arguably be said that the judge's conclusion was perverse.

The judge, as we have indicated, did not adopt a starting point of 25 years, but rather selected a 15-year starting point and then considered an upward movement. Treating the car as a "weapon equivalent" is entirely consistent with authority and the structure of Schedule 21. Vulnerability, intoxication, repeated hostility in driving, and suffering are legitimate aggravators. The judge avoided double counting and articulated a fact specific analysis. We can identify no arguable error of principle.

The judge gave only limited weight to his finding that there had been some mental or physical suffering, and that limited finding was carefully grounded. We refer, for example, to the evidence of an audible scream; the multiple abrasions consistent with dragging; and the length of the drag period. Further, the judge's sure conclusion that the applicant had realised that the victim was under the car yet continued to drive along Sandbach Road. The critique that suffering has to be significant in order to amount to an aggravating feature was rightly dismissed. There is no such threshold in Schedule 21.

The judge expressly weighed age, good character, personal circumstances and the immediate post-impact conduct. He gave these features credit but recognised, correctly, their reduced weight in a case as this of deliberate lethal driving, using a vehicle as a weapon equivalent. He explained clearly why he did not accept the narrative of mere intimidation or accident and why he found expressions at the scene not to amount to true remorse. Again, that evaluative exercise discloses no arguable error of principle.

Starting at 15 years, the judge moved upwards to 18 years. Against the combination of aggravators, including a proved intention to kill at strike 2, intoxication, the deceased's vulnerability, the repeated hostile driving, and the degree of physical or mental health suffering, an uplift of three years can only be said to be modest and certainly well within a reasonable range. Comparable authorities support a substantial upward movement in a case such as this, involving the use of a vehicle as a weapon.

In short, the judge's approach to sentencing under Schedule 21 was orthodox, structured and reasoned. His findings of fact were carefully grounded in the evidence after a full trial, and his balancing of aggravating and mitigating features avoided double counting. The resulting minimum term of 18 years is not wrong in principle and not arguably manifestly excessive.

The renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence is accordingly refused.

We do, however, direct that the recording of the sentence be consistent with earlier guidance from this court, so that the minimum term of 18 years, less time spent on remand consisting of 616 days, is expressed as: life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 16 years and 114 days.

Mr D'Souza, it is obvious to us that you have spent a great deal of time preparing and working on this case, and you have done that in your own time and using your own endeavours. We are very grateful to you for that. You have obviously put the applicant's case as fully as it possibly could have been put. Thank you.

MR D'SOUZA: Thank you. I am very grateful.