R v Rosana Awan

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to these offences. Under those provisions, where a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter shall be included in any publication if it is likely to lead to their identification as a victim of the offence. This prohibition continues throughout their lifetime, unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act. In this judgment we will refer to the victim as "C".

On 17 October 2024, following a trial in the Crown Court at Leicester before His Honour Judge Mooncey and a jury, the appellant (then aged 33) was convicted of four counts of sexual activity with a child, contrary to section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (counts 1, 3, 4 and 6) and one count of causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity, contrary to section 10 of that Act (count 2). She was acquitted of a fifth count of sexual activity with a child.

On 4 December 2024, she was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment on the lead counts (counts 3 and 4), to run concurrently with each other. Concurrent sentences of four years' imprisonment were passed in respect of all the other counts. A Sexual Harm Prevention Order and a Restraining Order were also made for a period of ten years. The appellant now appeals against sentence by leave of the single judge.

All of the offending occurred between 2010 and 2013, when C was aged between 13 and 15, and, as the prosecution said, reflected hundreds of incidents over that period. Mr Wragg, who appears on behalf of the appellant today as he did in the court below, has clarified that the indictment period was for two years and 15 days.

In 2010, C, who was then aged 13, joined a cheerleading group which the appellant had founded. The appellant was then aged 19, but the offending occurred when she was 20 and continued until she was 23. The group met on evenings and weekends and sometimes travelled abroad. It was very popular and lots of young girls joined it. The appellant singled out C from the other girls in the group. She groomed her with presents and gave her a prominent role.#

Count 1 reflected multiple occasions of the appellant touching C's vagina, either whilst C was in her car before school, or after cheerleading sessions, or at homes belonging to the appellant's relatives. Count 2 reflected multiple occasions when the appellant sucked C's breasts. Both these offences occurred at least weekly, if not more. Count 3 was a charge of digital penetration of C's vagina on at least five occasions when C was aged 14. Count 4 was of oral penetration of C's vagina by the appellant's tongue on around ten occasions. The prosecution alleged that this began in 2012 on a trip overseas and continued until 2013. Count 6 was the penetration of C's vagina with a sex toy on one occasion shortly before her 16^th birthday.

The indictment period ended on C's 16^th birthday, when she reached the age of consent; but the sexual activity continued until 2018, when C turned 21. In 2019, C first reported the offending to the police.

The appellant was arrested in May 2019. She first appeared before the magistrates' court in April 2020, when she pleaded not guilty. She was pregnant on that occasion. She had recently married, and she had a baby later that year. The trial, however, was put off, largely for reasons that were no-one’s fault, but because of the aftermath of Covid and the pressures that it put on the court system. The trial was adjourned on a number of occasions and it did not take place until October 2024.

The appellant was the primary carer for her child until her conviction when the child, then aged four years and six months, was placed into the care of Social Services. The appellant's husband has remained supportive of her. We were told by Mr Wragg that the little girl is able to contact her mother daily in the mornings and the evenings, before and after school, and that she sees her at weekends.

It is accepted that the offending on counts 3 and 4 (taken as the lead offences) fell into category 1 for harm and culpability A. There was significant planning, grooming and an abuse of the trust placed in the appellant by C's parents and wider family. It was also agreed that the offending took place over a significant period of time.

In his Advice and Grounds of Appeal, Mr Wragg accepts that there was psychological harm caused to the complainant. The defence note for sentencing took issue with its characterisation by the prosecution as severe. However, the Victim Personal Statement and the pre-sentence report provide more than sufficient support for that characterisation. C began to self-harm on a regular basis in an effort to make sense of her "relationship" with the appellant, and it was only after she moved away from her home area and attended safeguarding work whilst she was at university that she recognised herself to be a victim of sexual abuse. The continuation of the sexual relationship after C reached the age of consent has to be viewed against that background. It is clear that C was a vulnerable child when she first became involved with the appellant, and that her vulnerability was being exploited for the appellant's own sexual gratification.

The starting point in the guidelines for a single offence under section 9 or section 10 is one of five years' custody, with a range of four to ten. The maximum sentence for a single offence of this type is 14 years' custody.

At the time of sentencing, the appellant was 34 years old. All of the offending had ceased some 11 years previously, and there was no evidence of any repeat offending in the intervening period. In mitigation on her behalf it was submitted that at the time of the offending she was young, she was immature for her age, and she had also been diagnosed with ADHD at the age of 7. She had since settled down and was a devoted parent to her daughter. She had ceased the cheerleading business and remained in full-time employment. There had been a significant delay in the matter coming to trial, which had had a very adverse impact on the appellant herself and on her family. The sentencing judge said that he detected some remorse, for which he could give only limited credit given that there had been a trial.

On the appellant's behalf, Mr Wragg realistically accepted that there were multiple counts which reflected multiple offences over a significant period and therefore, he said, it would be difficult to take issue with the judge moving from the starting point to the very top of the range. However, he submitted that this was not offending which justified moving outside the range. Moreover, there was considerable mitigation in the form of the appellant's age, lack of maturity and her neurological diversity. Mr Wragg said that it was unclear whether the judge had taken her ADHD into account as a mitigating factor, and submitted that, when taken in conjunction with her lack of maturity, it could be linked to her offending in that it could be connected to the obsessional risk-taking and disinhibition involved.

The judge was referred to the guideline on sentencing offenders with mental disorders, developmental disorders and neurological impairment, paragraph 14 of which states that the sentencer must state whether the culpability of the offender was reduced by any such matter and, if so, the extent of and reasons for any reduction made on that account. The judge in this particular case made no such reference. It is to be inferred, therefore, that he considered that the appellant's culpability was not reduced by reason of her neurological diversity. He did, however, clearly take account of her age.

Mr Wragg also submitted that the judge erred in principle in giving no credit for the significant delay in the case proceeding to trial, which was not the appellant's fault. The relevant guideline makes it clear that a failure to plead guilty and put the prosecution to proof could not be counted against her in this context. Moreover, during that period the appellant became so anxious about the future that she went to see a therapist. Finally, it is said that the impact of her incarceration on her young daughter was not sufficiently taken into consideration.

As the prosecution rightly identified, the period over which the offending took place and the severe psychological harm to C were aggravating factors. The appellant's relatively young age and immaturity at the time were mitigating factors. Whilst the delay in the matter coming to trial had some adverse impact on the appellant, it was recognised by the author of the pre-sentence report that it also exacerbated the anxiety and stress to the victim, who has undergone years of counselling and psychiatric input to help her to come to terms with what happened to her and to cope with it.

According to the author of the pre-sentence report, the appellant demonstrated little insight into her offending. Her offending was said to have been linked to her emotional contact with the victim. She resorted to complex planning so that she and C could have more time alone together. That is not impulsive offending. In addition, the grooming and the period over which the offences took place are inconsistent with the suggestion that her ADHD played any significant part in her offending behaviour, or mitigated her culpability. It may have made her more disinhibited, but that does not lessen her culpability for what she did.

It must also be borne in mind that, in taking counts 3 and 4 as the lead offences, the judge was reflecting the overall criminality of the conduct in his sentence on each of those counts. He sat throughout the trial and he was best placed to assess the overall criminality. He described this as a classic case of grooming; and whilst he accepted that in her own mind the appellant may have thought that she was in love with C, C was still only a child and she should not have been corrupted in this manner. Therefore, in our judgment, the judge was entitled to elevate the sentence from the starting point to one that was significantly beyond the top of the range in the guidelines and to reflect totality by passing concurrent sentences.

The real issue in this case is whether the judge afforded sufficient credit for all the personal mitigation which Mr Wragg has identified, as well as sufficient credit for the delay for which she was not responsible. We consider that, after taking into account her age, her lack of maturity, the ADHD, the delay and all the other factors relied on, a sentence of ten years' imprisonment, though undoubtedly severe, was not manifestly excessive. For those reasons, this appeal against sentence is dismissed.