R v Mark Anthony Hall

On 29 September 2025, in the Crown Court at Newcastle upon Tyne, the appellant (aged 34) was sentenced, pursuant to his plea on the day of trial, to a term of 22 months' imprisonment for the offence of violent disorder, contrary to s.2 Public Order Act 1986. With the leave of the single judge, the appellant contends that the sentence was manifestly excessive.

The violent disorder occurred on 20 November 2022 at HM Prison Northumberland. The appellant was one of eight defendants who fell to be sentenced for the offence. They were all serving prisoners; three of them, including the appellant, because they had been recalled on their licence.

The offence involved a group of prisoners approaching and surging into a cell which was occupied by a prisoner named Gimbot. CCTV captured the events outside, but not inside, the cell. Gimbot received multiple stab wounds and another prisoner in his cell (Blessing) was assaulted. After the initial surge into his cell, Gimbot got out and threw items at his attackers, causing them to retreat down the landing. Another prisoner pursued him and took him to the floor and the attackers crowded around him again. Gimbot was further assaulted before getting to his feet and throwing items, again forcing his attackers to retreat. The incident calmed down at that stage, having lasted less than 5 minutes.

The CCTV footage showed the appellant entering from the stairs and making an unsuccessful attempt to get through the crowd and into the cell. He appeared to make another effort to enter the cell minutes later, before retreating as Gimbot exited his cell. The appellant could then be seen picking up a pool ball and throwing it in Gimbot's direction. He left about a minute later.

The appellant submitted a basis of plea which was accepted by the Crown. This stated that:

The appellant had previous convictions for 7 offences committed between 2010 and November 2024. These included battery (2010); assault occasioning actual bodily harm, battery, criminal damage and affray, for which he received a total sentence of 2 years' imprisonment (2021); assault occasioning actual bodily harm, for which he received 12 weeks' imprisonment (July 2022); and battery, for which he received 8 weeks' imprisonment (November 2024). That latter offence evidently postdated the subject offence.

As to culpability, the Prosecution sentencing note distinguished the appellant from the seven other defendants. Six of these were the instigators who had together targeted Gimbot; and another had joined in the targeting. By reference to the relevant sentencing guidelines it was submitted that these fell into culpability category A. By contrast, it was submitted that the appellant's culpability was in category B because "his involvement is only really later on when he throws his pool ball, which is less targeting of an individual in the way those who all approached together did, and more participation in an incident involving serious acts of violence". It was submitted that the offending was aggravated by the use of a weapon/ throwing of missiles; commission in a custodial setting; some level of planning; and previous convictions where relevant.

The pre-sentence report observed that the appellant's participation in the offence appeared to be linked to him trying to find out what was happening, rather than being involved in any planned offence. It was noted that his previous offences of violence had a recurrent theme of domestic abuse of partners. As to future risk, the report considered the appellant to be a high risk, in particular to future partners, as well as to any other individual who attempted to intervene.

Problems with his mental health were noted, together with an apparent willingness to be referred for assessment for a Mental Health Treatment Requirement. However he did not attend such an assessment, fixed for 8 August 2025. He had two sons from previous relationships but, at the date of the report, did not have contact with them. Probation records indicated a positive work ethic in the past. He had generally been in work since leaving school, including engineering and roofing work, and valued being able to use his time constructively and to earn his own money.

The sentencing hearing on 29 September 2025 was in respect of the appellant and two of the other defendants. The Judge had previously sentenced the other five defendants.

In the course of the sentencing hearing and his subsequent sentencing remarks, the Judge made clear that he had viewed the CCTV footage and that he would sentence on the basis of the latter where it diverged from the appellant's basis of plea. In particular he observed that the CCTV footage showed him twice trying to get into the cell.

In his sentencing remarks, the Judge acknowledged that the appellant's position was "… slightly different. You had no prior knowledge of the incident. You ran to the cell. In my judgment from the CCTV you were trying to get in on two occasions but were unable to because of the crowd. You also threw a pool ball. So although you did not have a weapon in advance you had a weapon part way through the incident and used it. I accept from your basis of plea that you yourself were hit by a pool ball before that. So in your case there is a distinction to be made."

The Judge took account of the previous offending, together with the contents of the pre-sentence report. In his favour, the Judge noted the appellant’s positive work ethic, his current work with a scaffolding company, and that he now had supervised weekly contact with one of his children.

By reference to the sentencing guidelines, the Judge concluded that for each of the offenders, the offending fell within category 2A. As to culpability: "There was targeting of an individual with pre-planning, weapons had been made in advance, the way the cell was entered, this was a joint enterprise and those who joined in at the beginning or part way through were joining in a culpability A case." However, he continued: "I am not satisfied … for the reasons I have already set out that [the appellant] knew in advance and he came later with no evidence of weapons being made beforehand. So this was participating in an incident involving serious acts of violence, there was an infliction of wounds with weapons, there was the planning involved and the targeting of Mr Gimbot."

As to harm, the Judge accepted that this fell into category 2 because of the serious physical injury which was inflicted on Mr Gimbot. The injuries to Mr Blessing were not known.

Category 2A produced a starting point of 3 years' custody and a category range of 2-4 years. In the case of the two other defendants, the Judge duly took a starting point of 3 years. In one case (Miles), he reduced that to 2½ years, having regard to mitigation, before 25% credit plea, which resulted in a sentence of 23 months' imprisonment. In the other case (Steanson), the Judge likewise went down from the starting point to 2½ years, to reflect mitigation; but rounded that down to 20 months before credit for plea. This was to reflect totality, having regard to other offences for which he was being sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Steanson's total sentence was 39 months' imprisonment.

In the case of the appellant, the Judge took a "starting point" of 2½ years, rather than 3, "because of his lesser role". He reduced that to 2 years to reflect personal mitigation. With 10% credit for his plea on the day of trial, the Judge imposed a sentence of 22 months' imprisonment.

The Judge then considered whether the sentences imposed on the appellant and Miles should be suspended. He concluded that the seriousness of the offending meant that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate custodial sentences. This also reflected the sentences which he had previously imposed on the other defendants, save one (Pederson) where the factual case was different and there was "very powerful personal mitigation indeed".

On behalf of the appellant, Ms Miller, in well-presented and impressive submissions, advances three grounds of appeal, namely that (1) the Judge wrongly concluded that the appellant was part of a joint enterprise; and thereby or otherwise wrongly placed his offending in category 2A; (2) that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances; and (3) that it was wrong in principle to conclude that the offending was so serious that the sentence could not be suspended.

Ms Miller rightly takes grounds 1 and 2 together and makes the following particular points: (1) it was accepted by the Crown that the appellant did not have knowledge of the attack prior to it taking place. He was therefore not part of the group which had targeted Gimbot, nor did his actions encourage or assist the group; (2) although outside the cell in which the assault was taking place, he did not enter the cell and was not in possession of any weapon at that point; (3) although the group was positioned outside the cell, it did not prevent officers from entering the cell. As was confirmed by one of the officers, the group responded to his command to move back and he then entered the cell; (4) by his accepted basis of plea, the appellant denied attempting to enter the cell. The CCTV footage supported that account; (5) he did not use any violence until he himself was struck twice with pool balls thrown by Gimbot. In responding as he did, he did not thereby align himself with those who had been attacking Gimbot. At the time that the appellant used violence, Gimbot was throwing missiles, i.e. pool balls, indiscriminately, and the appellant was struck twice. The scene was chaotic. As stated in his basis of plea, he was attempting to protect himself. By the time of the appellant's involvement, it was no longer a targeted attack on one individual. He had joined in what was already underway. In consequence, the appropriate category was 2B; (6) the appellant threw one pool ball in the direction of Gimbot, but it did not strike him; (7) he thereafter retreated and played no further part; (8) whilst he accepted in hindsight that his conduct in throwing the pool ball went beyond what could objectively be regarded as reasonable self-defence, his actions fell just short of reasonable self-defence in the circumstances as he believed them to be.

Further, the Crown had made a distinction between the conduct of the appellant and the other defendants; and had submitted that his offending was in category 2B. Whilst that concession did not bind the Judge, it reflected the reality and should have been accepted. He could not be said to have been a party to a group carrying out a joint enterprise to target an individual. By contrast, he did participate in an incident which was persistent and sustained withing the meaning of category 2B.

In consequence, the Judge took too high a starting point for the sentence. The starting point for category 2B was 2 years' custody, with a category range of 1-3 years.

As to the aggravating factors in his case, Ms Miller accepted that the pool ball was a weapon and that the appellant had used it as a missile. However, as it had not struck anyone, care must be taken not to double count for the violent disorder which was inherent in the offence. The fact that it had taken place in a prison setting should not aggravate his offending in circumstances where he was reacting to a chaotic and violent situation in order to protect himself. As to previous convictions, these were of a different type from the subject offence.

As to mitigating factors within the guideline, account should be taken of the appellant's low level involvement and his minor/peripheral role. His personal mitigation then showed that, 3 years after this offence and before his recent imprisonment, the appellant had stable accommodation with his parents and had saved a deposit with a view to obtaining his own tenancy. He had obtained full-time employment with a scaffolding company; and had had regular weekly and unsupervised contact with his 12 year old son. He had thereby shown his commitment to rehabilitation.

Turning to ground 3, Ms Miller submits that the Judge's conclusion that the appellant was a party to a joint enterprise targeting Mr Gimbot had in consequence affected his decision not to suspend the sentence of imprisonment. In making that decision the Judge should have had regard to the limited role played by the appellant, with a limited use of violence used in excessive self-defence; the delay of almost three years before the matter was brought to court; and to the evidence of the appellant's available employment, stable accommodation and resumed regular involvement in the life of his 12 year old son. In all the circumstances, and having regard to the guidelines in that respect, the sentence of imprisonment should have been suspended.

We agree that the Judge should have placed the appellant's offending within category 2B. Having regard to the basis of plea and properly qualified by his own observation of the CCTV footage, the Judge duly accepted that the appellant had no prior knowledge of the incident; did not arrive at the scene with weapons; and had himself been hit by a pool ball before he threw such a missile himself. The Judge accepted that there was a distinction to be made with the roles of his co-accused; and referred to his conduct as "participating in an incident involving serious acts of violence". The latter wording reflects one of the identified factors in culpability category B. However the Judge also stated that the offending "for everybody" was in category 2A, because it was a joint enterprise involving the planned targeting of an individual and the obtaining of weapons in advance. Further, those who joined in part way were "joining in a culpability A case". True it is that the Judge reflected the appellant's lesser role by taking a lower "starting point" of 2½ years, but that was all in the context of a category 2A case.

As to aggravating factors, we do not accept that the appellant's previous convictions for offences of violence can be overlooked. The prison setting must also be taken into account; as must the throwing of a pool ball, including where in unreasonable self-defence. This was evidently a most dangerous and volatile incident in a prison and every individual participant added to the overall danger, both to prison staff and to prisoners.

As to mitigating factors, we consider that even in the context of culpability category B, reduction should have been given for the limits of the appellant's role. In addition, as the Judge held, there was personal mitigation which merited due weight.

In our judgment, on the very particular facts of the appellant's case and his basis of plea, the sentence before credit for plea should not have exceeded 18 months' imprisonment. With 10% credit, and necessary rounding down, this results in a sentence of 16 months' imprisonment.

However we do not accept that the Judge made any error of principle in his decision that the sentence should not be suspended. As his sentencing remarks make clear, the Judge had the relevant guideline firmly in mind; and took proper account of the approach which he had taken when sentencing the seven other defendants. We see no basis to interfere with his exercise of judgment that the seriousness of the offending required immediate custody and that this eclipsed any factors in favour of suspension.

Accordingly the appeal is allowed to the extent of reducing the term of imprisonment to 16 months.