R v Keaton Muldoon

This is the hearing of an application by his Majesty's Attorney General for leave to refer a sentence which the Attorney General believes to be unduly lenient. The respondent is Keaton Muldoon. He is aged 24 years having been born in November 2001. He was prosecuted for offences of murder of Alana Armstrong and the attempted murder of Jordan Newton-Kay. The prosecution case was that on 26 November 2024 he had deliberately driven his Land Rover Discovery into the e-motorbike which was being driven by Mr Newton-Kay and on which Ms Armstrong was a passenger.

Mr Muldoon had pleaded guilty at the start of that trial on 20 May 2025 to causing death by dangerous driving and causing serious injury by dangerous driving and those counts had been added to the indictment on the first day and he had pleaded guilty on that day. He pleaded guilty earlier to the offence of driving whilst disqualified at the pre-trial preliminary hearing.

On 19 June 2025 he was acquitted of the offences of murder and attempted murder. On 22 August 2025, he was sentenced for those offences for which he pleaded guilty as follows. On count 2, causing death by dangerous driving, he was sentenced to 5 years and 3 months' imprisonment. On count 5, which was causing serious injury by dangerous driving, he was sentenced to 27 months' imprisonment concurrent and on count 6, driving whilst disqualified he was sentenced to 1 month's imprisonment concurrent. So this gave an overall sentence of 5 years and 3 months' imprisonment. On count 2, he was also disqualified from driving for a total period of 12 years and 6 months. That comprised a discretionary period of 10 years and an extension period of 2 years and 6 months pursuant to section 35A of the Road Traffick Act 1988. On count 5 he was disqualified for 5 years concurrent and on count 6, 12 months' disqualification concurrent.

At the relevant time Mr Newton-Kay was aged 23 years and Ms Armstrong was aged 25 years. They were riding what was described in the evidence as an e-motorbike or sometimes referred to as an e-bike for short. They were not legal to ride on the roads and they were not designed for two people. On the evening of 26 November 2024 they were on one e-motorbike and James Gilbert was riding another e-motorbike. Shortly before 8 o'clock, so when it was dark, their journey took them along a rural road called Sampson's Lane. While riding along that lane Mr Newton-Kay noticed Mr Muldoon's Land Rover Discovery 3 parked in a lay-by by a hedgerow. He alerted James Gilbert who was in front of him. They decided to have a closer look and returned shining their headlights into the Land Rover because the vehicle was in darkness. It appears from the evidence given at the trial that the reason why Mr Muldoon was parked in a lay-by related to a drug deal between Mr Muldoon and his passenger.

Mr Muldoon's reaction to the lights looking into the car was to drive his Land Rover out of the lay-by. Mr Newton-Kay and Mr Gilbert rode their e-motorbikes back onto Sampson's Lane and made off in their original direction. Mr Muldoon followed them in his Land Rover Discovery. The judge found that he was irritated by what had happened and decided he would teach them a lesson by chasing them in his bigger vehicle and by frightening them. Ms Armstrong was riding pillion behind Mr Newton-Kay.

Mr Muldoon's pursuit of the e-motorbikes was just over 1 mile and lasted 2 minutes and 20 seconds. The pursuit was down dark, windy, narrow roads, which were not in the best condition. Mr Muldoon drove his car close to the e-motorbike being driven by Mr Newton-Kay and the judge found that that was at a not inconsiderable speed for the prevailing conditions in order to frighten them. He then carried out a dangerous undertaking manoeuvre where it was unsafe to do so, it seems that he was undertaking on what had become a passing place that had been created by other road users pulling over on the narrow road. That, the judge found, had caused Mr Newton-Kay to lose control of the e-motorbike and the fatal accident then occurred when Ms Armstrong fell to the road.

The average speed of the e-motorbikes and the Land Rover was 29 mph but from the beginning of Batley Lane to the point of the undertaking the average speed was 25.41 mph. When Mr Newton-Kay and Mr Gilbert exited the lay-by they both drove along Sampson's Lane to Batley Lane. Ms Armstrong sustained fatal injuries in the accident and she was pronounced dead at the scene. The evidence showed that there had been a single impact with her unprotected back making contact with the road surface when Mr Newton-Kay had lost control of the e-motorcycle he was driving. Mr Newton-Kay sustained life-changing injuries including the loss of his right leg. Skin, soft tissue and muscle had been torn away from the calf below the knee exposing grossly displaced fractures of the tibia and fibula. An amputation cutting 15 centimetres above the right knee was performed on 2 December 2024. That was also the day that Mr Muldoon was arrested and interviewed. He answered "no comment" to all questions and he set a number of false trails in comments made to the police suggesting that other relatives might have been involved.

There were victim personal statements from Jordan Newton-Kay, Kerry Hall who was Ms Armstrong's mother, and Elaine Newton who was Mr Newton-Kay's mother. There was a psychiatric report carried out on Mr Muldoon which showed that he had an emotional unstable personality disorder which was a disorder within the Mental Health Act 1983. The judge rejected submissions that that reduced his culpability.

The judge made the following findings of fact. First, that the jury could not be sure that Mr Muldoon had deliberately rammed the e-motorcycle that Mr Newton-Kay was riding on and on which Ms Armstrong was the pillion passenger. Secondly, that Mr Muldoon's reaction to the light shining into his vehicle was to start up his vehicle. Thirdly, as a consequence Mr Muldoon's starting up his vehicle, the e-motorbikes had headed off but Mr Muldoon had followed them. Fourthly, Mr Muldoon could have turned around or left in the opposite direction but he chose not to. Fifthly the reason Mr Muldoon had followed the motorcycles was because he was irritated about what had happened and he would teach whoever they were a lesson by chasing them in a bigger vehicle and frightening them.

The judge held that there was no real evidence that when Mr Muldoon left the lay-by he intended to hurt anybody. Mr Muldoon's pursuit of the e-motorbikes was just over one mile and lasted 2 minutes 20 seconds before ending tragically in Batley Lane.

The judge found that on more than one occasion Mr Muldoon had deliberately got as close to whichever e-motorcycle was closest to him in order to frighten them. The judge said it was inevitable that what Mr Muldoon was doing was not only dangerous but carried a very real and inevitable risk of either a collision with one or other of the e-motorcycles or causing one or other of the e-motorcycles to lose control, leading to potentially tragic consequences. The judge, so far as is material, also found that Mr Muldoon drove at a not inconsiderable speed for the prevailing conditions, causing the e-motorcycle to lose control. The judge was satisfied that Mr Muldoon did not make contact with the e-bike of Mr Newton-Kay but that Mr Muldoon performed an undertaking manoeuvre on a narrow country lane, in darkness where it was plainly unsafe to do so and the manoeuvre was clearly a dangerous one.

The judge found that he could be sure that Mr Muldoon left the scene knowing that there had been a collision in which one person had been seriously injured, but that once Mr Muldoon became aware that something had occurred he attempted to avoid capture by disposing of the Land Rover Discovery, which he had agreed to sell before this incident, and seeking to persuade his passenger to dispose of evidence. He made a deliberate choice to try and implicate his uncle as the driver of the Land Rover Discovery to try to avoid detection.

The judge considered whether there was a mechanical defect on the e-motorbike. The judge heard some 4 weeks' evidence and there was expert evidence and he said that even if any defect in relation to the bearings on the e-motorbike had been any type of contributory factor, there was always an inevitable risk of a collision should the e-motorcycle suffer any kind of failure, whether mechanically or as a result of rider error. That was a risk Mr Muldoon took.

The judge then addressed whether this was a category A culpability offending or category B culpability offending for the purposes of the causing death by dangerous driving category. There are three culpability categories A, B and C. That is because the harm will always be the same, namely the death of an individual. Culpability A factors, so as far as is material, include: “deliberate decision to ignore the rules of the road and disregard for the risk of danger to others”; a “prolonged, persistent and deliberate course of dangerous driving”; and an “obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre”. It is relevant to note that culpability C is a standard of driving just over the threshold for dangerous driving and culpability B includes, so far as is relevant, a factor “driving at a speed that it is inappropriate for the prevailing road or weather conditions” and also applies where the offender's culpability falls between A and C.

The judge said that:

That is because in these offence specific guidelines for culpability A category, the starting point is 12 years with a category range of 8 to 18 years, culpability B has a starting point of 6 years with a category range of 4 to 9 years and category C has a starting point of 3 years with a category range of 2 to 5 years. The judge rejected submissions that Mr Muldoon's culpability had in any sense been reduced by his mental health disorder.

Doing a reverse calculation on the sentencing remarks to work out how the judge had got to his final sentence of 5 years and 3 months' imprisonment, it seems that the judge took the starting point of 6 years, as indeed he indicated he would, he must have gone up to about 9 years to take account of the seriously aggravating matters and to reflect the other offending, namely that in relation to Mr Newton-Kay, and then reduced that sentence from about 9 years to 7 years to take account of mitigating factors (and there were relevant mitigating factors which it is not necessary to repeat), before discounting 25 per cent for the guilty plea to give the sentence of 5 years 3 months. We should recall that there was a slip rule hearing which was dealing with the amount of time that should take place before the extended retest was imposed.

It is submitted on behalf of the Attorney General that, first, the judge erred in placing Mr Muldoon’s culpability in category B in light of the factual findings that he had made to determine the appropriate sentence. Properly analysed there was: “a deliberate decision to ignore the rules of the road and disregard for the risk of dangers to others”; there was a “prolonged, persistent and deliberate course of dangerous driving”; and there was an “obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre”; which were all culpability A factors. Secondly, it was submitted that the judge identified a number of aggravating factors that should increase the seriousness of the offending and result in an upward adjustment, and thirdly, it was submitted that although there were mitigating factors that reduced the seriousness of the offence, they could not serve to reduce the sentence below the category A range. In oral submissions it was noted that although the judge was the trial judge, and this Court had no basis for interfering with the findings of fact made by the trial judge, it was on the trial judge's own findings of fact that there were those three culpability A factors. This meant that the starting point should have been one of 12 years.

It was submitted on behalf of Mr Muldoon that: the prosecution case of murder was not accepted by the jury; it was apparent that attempts had been made by prosecution witnesses to overstate their evidence; the judge had to make his findings in light of the jury's verdict and to determine what he could be sure about. The elements of dangerous driving found proved by the judge were small elements within the period and distance, and that an obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre on a country lane in darkness was not the judge's finding. The judge could not exclude the catastrophic failure of the e-bike because of a locking of the wheels because of the failure of a bearing. It was submitted that the judge had taken a proper evaluation of the evidence which he had heard over a substantial period of time to make the finding of culpability category B.

The principles to be applied to references can be summarised as follows. The judge at first instance is particularly well placed to assess the weight to be given to competing factors. This court should find that sentences were unduly lenient only where the sentence outside the range of sentences which the judge at first instance might consider appropriate. Leave to refer a sentence should only be granted in cases which are not borderline. Section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 is designed to deal with cases where judges have fallen into gross error. In addition, we note that an appellate court should not interfere with findings of fact made by a trial unless those findings are without factual foundation, internally inconsistent, inconsistent with incontrovertible facts, or otherwise irrational.

In our judgment, this is a case where the judge was faced with a very difficult sentencing exercise. That is because it was apparent that not all of the prosecution case had been accepted by the jury, and indeed substantial parts must have been rejected when Mr Muldoon was acquitted of both murder and attempted murder. The judge had made careful findings of fact which included findings in relation to exactly what occurred at a time when the judge had to rely only on the witness evidence of those who had survived this tragic incident. Although there was some CCTV evidence which we have seen, that essentially showed only headlights at various stages along the journey. There was expert assistance which the judge took into account in finding the calculations of speed and he also made findings to the appropriate standard of proof.

In our judgment, the judge's advantages in relation to the findings of fact also carry over into the proper assessment of the culpability. Category culpability C is for a standard of driving that was just over the threshold for dangerous driving. The judge considered, notwithstanding submissions that had been made on behalf of Mr Muldoon, that that was not an appropriate category for the offending. The judge had also had the advantage of submissions from the prosecution at the time about whether there was “prolonged, persistent and deliberate course of dangerous driving” and an “obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre” as culpability category A factors. The judge did not accept those submissions on the facts that he had found, and stated:

In those circumstances the judge was entitled, on the material and submissions that were before him, to place this into category B.

That leaves only the submission, made to this court but not made to the judge below, that there was a category A culpability factor being a “deliberate decision to ignore the rules of the road and disregard the risk of danger to others”. Ms Oakley made the point that Mr Muldoon had driven behind the e-motorbikes for a period over the 2.2 miles, and at times had got very close in relation to the e-motorbikes. We appreciate why, on a literal reading of this culpability factor, the submission is made. Indeed in any case where a driver makes a deliberate decision to exceed the speed limit, even by a small amount, it might be contended to be “a deliberate decision to ignore the rules of the road and disregard the risk of danger to others”. It is apparent, however, that more is required and cases where this culpability A factor have been proved include: racing; deliberately driving on the wrong side of the road; and reversing for a substantial period on a main road. Each case will depend on its own facts, and in our judgment the judge’s findings about speed (about 25 mph), proximity of the car to the e-motorbikes, and the final manoeuvre, do not suggest a deliberate decision to ignore the rules of the road and disregard the risk of danger to others. We accept that the Attorney General is not bound by how the case was put at trial by prosecuting counsel, but it might be noted that trial counsel did not suggest this driving could be described as a deliberate decision to ignore the rules of the road and disregard the risk of danger to others.

Overall this was a careful finding about categorisation made by a judge, who had heard evidence over a period of four weeks, who had rejected both culpability category C and culpability category A, and was sure that it was culpability category B. In our judgment, it is not for this Court, on the materials before us, even with the benefit of the findings of fact that we have, to interfere with that considered assessment.

For all those reasons, we will refuse to grant leave for the Reference and we will refuse the Reference. We should thank both Ms Oakley and Mr Langdale very much for their helpful submissions.