R v Neil Woodley

On 16 January 2025 in the Crown Court at Bristol, the appellant Neil Anthony Woodley was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment for the manslaughter of Luke Wasley. He was also sentenced to 16 months' imprisonment for possession of a bladed article, namely a knife, in a public place, that sentence to be served concurrently. He appeals against sentence with the leave of the single judge.

This is a tragic case. Luke Wasley was just 20 years old when he lost his life. The judge in his sentencing remarks described the effect of Luke's death on his mother and father and on his brother and his aunt. Nothing that we can say or do can possibly ease the grief suffered by them. As the judge emphasised, the sentence that is passed is not in any way intended to be a measure of the value of Luke's life.

We turn then to the facts of this case. The appellant Neil Woodley was 49 at the time of these events. He was a long term user of drugs. During the evening of 13 June 2023 he was walking along a street in Coleford. Three men, Curt Aston, Jack Edmonds and Luke Wasley saw him. They followed him along Staunton Road. Jack Edmonds began verbally to harass the appellant. He can be seen on tCCTV throwing a punch at the appellant.

The appellant had a knife in his pocket. He said he was carrying that knife in self-defence in case someone unconnected with these events, who was involved in drug dealing, attacked him. During this first incident the appellant produced the knife in an attempt to ward off Edmonds. Verbal threats were made and the three men left. They went to the home of the girlfriend of one of the three men.

Later that evening the three men left that address and they made their way back along Staunton Road. They came across the appellant at the junction with Albert Road and they chased him down that road into the Oakfields area. They hit him. They threw a wheelie-bin at him, hitting him with it. One of them knocked a mobile phone out of his hand. A chain was pulled from his neck. The attack on the appellant was unprovoked.

The appellant then drew the knife from his pocket. He stabbed Luke Wasley twice, once to his arm and once to his torso. The knife entered just below the rib cage, catching the edge of the spleen and then passing through the stomach, damaging an artery and a vein and cutting into the left kidney. The wound caused significant internal bleeding and it was this wound that caused the death of Luke Wasley.

The appellant pleaded guilty to the offence of possession of a bladed article (the knife) in a public place. He did not plead guilty to the charge of murder or manslaughter. There was a trial on those charges and also on the charge of violent disorder against Mr Edmonds and Mr Aston. At the trial the judge directed an acquittal of Mr Edmonds and Mr Aston as there was no case to answer. The appellant's counsel applied for the jury to be discharged. The judge granted that application and ordered a retrial of the appellant alone.

Before the second trial the appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter. There was a detailed basis of plea. The prosecution accepted that plea and offered no evidence on the charge of murder. It was on that basis therefore that the appellant came to be sentenced for the offences of manslaughter and possession of a bladed article in a public place.

As we have said, the appellant was 49 years old at the time of the offence. He had four previous convictions for seven offences, including burglary, theft, a public order offence and offences under the Bail Act 1976. The last of these convictions was in 2007. Those convictions, as the judge accepted, were not relevant to the offences for which the appellant was to be sentenced and the judge attached no weight to the previous convictions.

There was a pre-sentence report. There were also reports by others including a report from Dr Church, a consultant forensic psychiatrist, and reports by Dr Lyle, a consultant and chartered clinical psychologist. The gist of these reports, so far as relevant to this appeal, is that the appellant did have a number of mental health conditions, the most relevant being ADHD and that the appellant's intellectual functioning was at a low level.

The judge began with a consideration of the Sentencing Council Guidelines for Manslaughter which require the court to establish the level of the offender's culpability. There are four categories for culpability and the guidelines should be read carefully and in their entirety. One category, Category A, applies in cases of very high culpability. It is not suggested that the case here falls within Category A. The second category is cases of high culpability, Category B. There the starting point is 12 years' custody with a sentencing range of eight to 16 years' custody. The third category is medium culpability, Category C. The starting point for Category C is six years' custody with a range of three to nine years’ custody. The fourth category is described as lower culpability, Category D, with a starting point of two years' custody and a range of one to four years' custody.

The judge considered that the appellant's culpability fell between Categories B and C. It would fall within B because death was caused in the course of an unlawful act, here the assault with a knife which carried a high risk of death or grievous bodily harm, and that risk was or ought to have been obvious to the offender. The judge considered that what prevented this offence from falling squarely into Category B were the matters referred to in the basis of plea, in particular, the fact that the appellant was the subject of an unprovoked attack by three men. Those matters caused the judge to consider that culpability fell into the top end of the sentencing range for Category C, which would be nine years' imprisonment, and that was in fact equivalent to the bottom of the sentencing range for Category B. The judge rejected the submissions of the appellant that the case fell within Category D because death was done in the course of an unlawful act, which was done to defend himself but which did not in law amount to a defence.

The judge then considered aggravating factors. He did not take into account the fact that a weapon (the knife) had been used because he had already factored that into assessing culpability. He considered that there were no relevant previous convictions and he gave that no weight. He did have regard to the fact that the offence had been committed under the influence of drugs and considered that was an aggravating factor. The appellant had, it seems, taken skunk cannabis that day.

In terms of the mitigation the judge considered that the fact that the appellant had no relevant previous convictions and had expressed remorse carried little weight. He considered the medical evidence and the appellant's mental health and the relevant Sentencing Council Guidelines carefully. He accepted that the appellant's low intellectual functioning and what Dr Church described as "a degree of ADHD" impaired the appellant's ability to exercise judgment and make rational choices under stress. The judge accepted the inference that that had contributed in some way to his decision to use the knife and to that extent he accepted that it was a mitigating factor. That would justify a downward adjustment in the sentence. However, the use of drugs by the appellant on the day of the offence would also have had a similar effect, as Dr Church said in his report. That was an aggravating factor which would have justified an upward adjustment in the sentence. The judge considered that those factors balanced themselves out. In the circumstances, therefore the judge considered that a sentence of nine years' imprisonment for manslaughter was appropriate. He declined to make any reduction for the guilty plea, having considered the relevant sentencing guidelines. This plea was entered after the first trial had concluded, with the acquittal of the other defendants Edmonds and Aston, and the acceptance of the appellant's application for the jury to be discharged which meant there had to be a retrial.

In relation to the offence of carrying a bladed article in a public place, the judge considered that that was a Category 1A offence within the relevant Sentencing Council Guidelines. The starting point was 18 months’ custody (with a sentencing range of between one year and two years’ six months’ custody). The judge said there were no mitigating considerations. He considered that the aggravating factors had already been taken into account when deciding the sentence for manslaughter. He reduced the sentence for the offence of possession of a bladed article offence from the starting point of 18 months by 10% because of the guilty plea in relation to that offence. That resulted in a sentence of 16 months. He ordered that that sentence be served concurrently with the sentence for manslaughter, rather than consecutively, and the total sentence therefore was one of nine years' imprisonment.

In her written and oral submissions on behalf of the appellant, Miss Brimelow KC advances the five grounds of appeal for which she has permission to advance and also seeks leave to argue a sixth ground, namely that the judge should have given credit for the guilty plea.

Ground one was that the judge erred in his assessment of culpability. Ms Brimelow submitted that the judge erred in rejecting Category D as being available because of the use of the knife, whereas on a proper analysis she submitted that this offence did fall squarely within Category D. She submitted that the facts here on the evidence and the basis of plea could hardly have been closer to self-defence and therefore the judge was wrong to put it into Category C or at the top end of Category C, and it should have been Category D. That has a much lower starting point of course of two years' custody.

Secondly, Miss Brimelow submitted that the judge erred in regarding the fact that the appellant committed the offence whilst under the influence of drugs as an aggravating factor because the appellant was an addict and the use of drugs was involuntary.

Thirdly, she submitted that the judge erred by either rejecting or not reflecting the mitigation in this case. That included the fact that the appellant had been attacked by a group and that in her written submissions indicated a sentence at the lower end the Category C range.

Fourthly, she submitted that there was inadequate reflection of the appellant's mental health disorders in the sentence. She submitted that under the guidelines there were two questions: was it an impairment and was the impairment or disorder connected with the use of the knife. She submitted here the judge should have found that there was such an impairment and that was a mitigating factor which should have been taken into account. Alternatively, those factors should be seen as some further element of personal mitigation because of the appellant's vulnerability.

Fifthly, she seeks leave to argue that the judge erred by not making any reduction for the guilty plea when that guilty plea had been made four months ahead of the trial and saved witnesses and the family of the victim having to return to court. She submitted that the judge erred and should have given at least 10 per cent credit for that. She further submitted that the guidelines did not deal specifically with the question of a retrial.

Finally, in relation to the sentence for possession of a bladed article Miss Brimelow submitted that the judge erred in not adjusting the sentence downwards from the starting point to reflect what she submitted was considerable and strong mitigation and the sentence did not reflect the basis of plea.

We start with the first ground appeal. In our judgment the Sentencing Council Guidelines in the present case were not correctly applied. It is important to read the Sentencing Council Guidelines for manslaughter carefully as those guidelines differ from the structure adopted in relation to guidelines for other offences.

The guidelines require at step one the determination of the category of the offence. That depends upon the offender's culpability. The guidelines say this:

Category A encompasses cases of very high culpability. That category does not apply here. Category B encompasses cases of high culpability. That includes cases where "death was caused in the course of an unlawful act which carried a high risk of death or grievous bodily harm which was or ought to have been obvious to the offender".

There were clearly factors here which could put this offending into that high culpability category. The unlawful act was using a knife to stab someone. It was obvious that that carried a risk of killing or causing really serious bodily harm to someone.

Category D is lower culpability. That includes situations where death was caused in the course of an unlawful act “which was in defence of self or others (where not amounting to a defence)." The judge here considered that, in the circumstances of this case, it would not be right to place the offence within that category. As he said, he was satisfied that the appellant's “use of a knife in response to the attack takes this case entirely outside the lower culpability category”.

That then raises the question of Category C. That deals with cases falling between high and lower culpability. Category C applies where death is caused in the course of an unlawful act but, in the circumstances, the offence fell between Category D lower culpability and the Category B high culpability. Applying that approach, it would indicate that this case fell between Category B (because death was caused by an unlawful act which carried a risk of death or grievous bodily harm which was or ought to have been obvious to the offender) and Category D (defending oneself or another and that defence not amounting to a defence in law). In other words, the conduct here was not as culpable as high level Category B because of the element of the unprovoked attack by the three men. But it was more culpable than Category D (defence of self) involving as it did carrying a knife around and then drawing it and using it to stab someone.

In those circumstances, it was not correct to say that the culpability fell between Categories B and C. It fell in Category C, medium culpability, precisely because it fell between Category B (high culpability) and Category D (lower culpability). In those circumstances the starting point would be six years' imprisonment, not the nine years' imprisonment that the judge took.

We would add, as the judge rightly said, that it would not be correct to treat the use of a weapon as an aggravating factor as that would justify an upward adjustment from the starting point because the use of a weapon has already been factored into the assessment of culpability in deciding which category applies.

Ground 1 of the grounds of appeal therefore succeeds. The starting point before consideration of other aggravating and mitigating factors should have been six years' imprisonment not nine years' imprisonment for this offence of manslaughter.

We turn then to the other grounds of appeal. In relation to ground 2, we do not consider that the judge erred by treating the fact that the appellant committed the offence under the influence of drugs as an aggravating factor. The judge was right. It was an aggravating factor. So far as ground 4 is concerned, the judge did accept that the applicant's mental health conditions (the low functioning and ADHD) would have impaired his ability to make rational judgments that night. He expressly found the medical conditions were ones listed in Annex A to the guideline. He accepted the argument that the use of the knife was in some way to be attributed to the mental health conditions as a mitigating factor that night which justified a downward adjustment and reduction in the sentence. However, given the medical evidence, the judge was entitled to conclude that the use of the drugs was an aggravating factor and that too contributed to the fact that he took the decision to use the knife that evening. That would have justified an upward adjustment in the sentence to reflect that aggravating factor. The judge was entitled to conclude that the one adjustment was cancelled out by the other adjustment when working out the appropriate sentence. We do not accept that the judge erred by not making some further element of reduction because of some element of personal mitigation for vulnerability. We would therefore dismiss grounds 2 and 4.

We turn to ground 3. Contrary to what is submitted, the judge did, in fact, take into account the fact that the appellant was the subject of an unprovoked attack by three men. That is why he said he did not consider it fell squarely within Category B and we have dealt with that matter when we considered the categorisation.

The judge considered remorse and the fact that there was no relevant previous convictions but he decided to give them little weight. Normally we would not have intervened in relation to that assessment. As, however, we are going to be reduce the sentence to reflect the error in categorisation and the use of nine year’ rather than the six years’ custody as the starting point, it is open to us in the course of the consideration of this appeal to look at those matters again. We do consider that in the particular circumstances of this case the absence of relevant previous convictions and the clear remorse that Mr Woodley has shown from the very evening when he killed Mr Wasley justify a small reduction, somewhere in the region of around six months in the sentence. We would allow the appeal on ground 3 to that limited extent.

Standing back from the details therefore, we consider that on the particular circumstances of this case a sentence in the region of five-and-a-half years' imprisonment would have been the appropriate sentence. That reflects the fact that this was an offence of manslaughter, involving the stabbing and killing of a young man, but that it occurred in the context of an unprovoked attack by three men. The appellant had carried a knife with him and then drew the knife and stabbed a man twice and killed him. Having regard to the aggravating and mitigating factors, a sentence in the region of five-and-a-half years' imprisonment would be appropriate.

Finally, in relation to this sentence we do not consider that the judge erred in not making a reduction for the plea of guilty. The appellant did not plead guilty to manslaughter before or indeed at the first trial. He did plead guilty before the retrial. Section 73 of the Sentencing Act 2020 provides that when determining the sentence for an offender who has pleaded guilty the court must take into account the stage in the proceedings at which the intention to plead guilty is indicated and the circumstances. The Sentencing Council Guidelines on Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea provides that the maximum reduction for a plea after the first stage of proceedings is one-quarter. But it then goes on to say that the reduction should be decreased to a maximum of one-tenth where the plea is made on the first day of trial. The reduction should be reduced further, even to zero, if the guilty plea is entered during the trial. The judge here was not required, whether under the Sentencing Act or the relevant Sentencing Council Guidelines to reduce the sentence for a guilty plea in the circumstances of this case. We reject the submission of Miss Brimelow that there must be at least 10 per cent credit. That, with respect, fails to have regard to the terms of the relevant guideline. It fails to recognise that much of the benefit of the guilty plea was lost in this case because the family had to endure the first trial and witnesses had to give evidence on the first occasion and the investigations had long been completed. We recognise that some judges might have given a small reduction, far less than 10 per cent, because at least as a result of the guilty plea before the second trial the witnesses did not have to give evidence at the second trial and the family at least were spared that terrible ordeal. However, we do not consider that the judge erred in any way in the circumstances of this by not making a reduction because of the guilty plea entered after the first trial and before the start of the second trial. We would refuse leave to argue this ground.

We turn to the sentence for the possession of the bladed article. We do not consider that a sentence of 16 months' imprisonment was manifestly excessive. The judge did not make any reduction for mitigating features, but in the scheme of things a sentence of 16 months' imprisonment for a person who arms himself with a knife and carries that in a public place is appropriate. The risks of carrying a knife in those circumstances appears only too tragically when one bears in mind that the carrying of the knife led to its use and the death of a 20-year-old man.

For those reasons we allow the appeal. We quash the sentence of nine years' imprisonment for manslaughter and substitute a sentence of five-and-a-half years' imprisonment. The sentence of 16 months' imprisonment for possession of a bladed article to be served concurrently is unaltered.