R v Joshua Blachford

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall, during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act. For the avoidance of any doubt, we do not waive or lift the prohibition. In the course of this judgment we shall refer to the victim throughout as "V".

His Majesty Solicitor General applies for leave to refer a sentence which she regards as unduly lenient. The sentence was imposed on 12 August 2025 by HHJ Rowland in the Southampton Crown Court. The offender had previously pleaded guilty at the PTPH to an offence of rape. HHJ Rowland imposed a sentence of 3 years and 9 months' imprisonment after allowing a 25 per cent reduction from 5 years on account of the offender's guilty plea. We give leave.

The offender was the assistant manager at a restaurant in Hampshire. As part of his role he organised the work rota. V also worked at the restaurant. She started working at the restaurant in September 2023, working on Tuesdays and Saturdays. The offender and victim (V) were friends and occasionally engaged in casual sexual intercourse, the first occasion being in October 2023. From the start V was clear with the offender that they would be no more than friends and she did not want a proper relationship. When V told the offender she was using dating applications he was upset. The parties last had consensual sexual intercourse about a week before the commission of the offence with which we are concerned.

On 13 February 2024, the offender asked V if she wanted to see him on 18 February. She replied that she could not do so as she was going on a date. Messages between them indicate that he knew that she was dating other people. On the evening of 17 February 2024, the offender and V were working together at the Lounge. V considered that the offender had not been pleasant to her during the evening, making sarcastic comments and being short with her. The offender and V were closing up at the end of the shift. The offender went into a room at the back where staff kept belongings. He asked V if V was coming. She believed that this was to collect her personal items and then leave to go home.

When V got into the room the offender pushed her up against one of the walls and tried to kiss her twice. She said "no" twice. She moved her head away and told him "no". The offender put his hand down over her clothing and rubbed V's vulva. She thought he was trying to rub her clitoris with his hand and pushed his hand away. V tried to move the offender's hand away. He began to take her clothes off. He removed one shoulder of her jumpsuit and then the next which left her feeling trapped unable to move her arms. He pulled it lower past her waist and then it was left hanging at her ankles. She was just in her underwear. V was unclear how but she was turned so that she was facing the wall. The offender removed V's underwear and at some stage he took his trousers and pants off. He then penetrated V's vagina with his penis. The offender continued until he ejaculated in V's vagina. The rape lasted a few minutes. The offender left the room whereupon V put her clothes back on.

The offender was due to be driving V home that night. The parties collected their belongings and walked to his car. V describes her body language as being "quite cold". The offender asked what was wrong, she replied: "I'm really disappointed that just happened". On the journey the offender tried to talk to V as she was being cold but she told him to drive her home. The journey was about 10 minutes. He told her not to feel "disappointed". She told him she did.

The offender messaged her after he had dropped her off saying: "Goodnight" and apologising for his conduct. She replied that he should not have had sex with her. He said that he knew and he hated himself for doing so. He admitted that what had happened was a huge error and apologised to V. The parties continued to message with the offender expressing regret and remorse for what had happened until 28 February 2024, when V asked the offender to stop contacting her. Asked by the police how she felt V said:

Both parties confided in a mutual friend about what had happened. The offender was upset and admitted that he had sexually assaulted V. V reported matters to the police on 1 March 2024. The offender was arrested the same day and interviewed. He provided a partial comment interview in which he denied raping V. He said that they had been in a sexual relationship from mid-October to December. He described it as "friends with benefits". He said they had discussed they were getting too serious and so they agreed to ease back on seeing each other. After Christmas they went back to seeing one another two to three times a week. He said that the casual relationship continued up to the date of the alleged offence. He described them as "close friends": "We would go to each other with problems or support each other." As for the day of the rape, he claimed they had kissed during the day. After closing at work he claimed they hugged, they kissed and embraced. The victim kissed him passionately and this led to mutual sexual touching. He removed the bodysuit she was wearing before they had consensual sexual intercourse. He described how sexually excited she was. He confirmed that he ejaculated. He denied the victim had said "no" and stated that there had been no expressions by her that she did not want to have sex. The offender confirmed he gave her a lift home stating that she hugged him goodbye. He stated the messages that had been sent after he had dropped her home had been taken out of context. Asked about subsequent text conversations he said he could not remember the content of them.

When V's account was put to him he denied being horrible to her during the day. He said her account of what happened in the staff room was inaccurate and denied that she had said "no" or protested. Following a break in the interview to allow him to discuss the messages with his solicitors, he said that the messages expressing disappointment related to him kissing her in the car and she may have been taken aback for that. She may have also disappointed that they had sex at work. When further messages from him were put, he initially remained silent. He then said he thought his apologies were in relation to making her feel uncomfortable about what had happened on the Saturday. He was apologising that he had continued after he had kissed her and he told her what his feelings for her were. When challenged over the messages, he admitted that the victim had said "no" to the first kiss. He accepted that looking at the messages and the description it appeared she was not consenting.

At his first appearance before the Southampton Magistrates the offender gave no indication of plea. He was remanded on conditional bail and the case was sent to the Crown Court for trial. It was first listed in the Crown Court on 16 June 2025 for PTPH. An indication was given a few days before and the offender entered a guilty plea on that occasion. The plea was entered on a basis which was as follows:

V was 26 at the time of the offence. She made a long and detailed victim personal statement in which she eloquently explained the impact that being raped had had on her. It is the primary evidence of the severity of the psychological harm that she has suffered. The key points are:

The offender was 28 at the time of the offence and is now 29. There were seven character references from those who knew him well, all of whom attested to his exemplary good character, and that his criminal offending was completely out of character:

The court had available a pre-sentence report which, as with all the other materials available to him, it is plain that the judge had read. The pre-sentence report offered a number of possible insights into the offender's motivation, while accepting as at least a possibility that the offender's behaviour may have reflected a belief that doing what he did initiated some consensual sexual interaction between him and V. The writer of the report "encountered nothing disingenuous in interviewing the offender".

Before receiving V's victim impact statement, the Crown had provided a Sentencing Note in which it submitted that the offence appeared to be category 3 harm with culpability B. Ejaculation was identified as an aggravating feature, and the prosecution submitted that the offence occurred in a domestic conduct and was therefore more serious, because they had been in an on-off intimate relationship so that V was entitled to trust the offender. In the light of V's victim impact statement the prosecution changed its position, contending that the case was in category 2 for harm because the harm was "severe psychological harm."

The prosecution referred the judge to relevant authority, and to an extract from Rook & Ward on Sexual Offences (Sixth Edition) referring to "severe" meaning "more than significant" and that, in making the assessment whether harm qualifies as "severe", the judge must keep in mind that the levels of sentence set out in the guidelines already take into account the psychological harm that is inherent in the offence.

The defence did not accept that the case fell within category 2B and contended for category 3B as had originally been the Crown's position.

It was essentially common ground that the following aggravating and mitigating features applied. The offence was aggravated by having occurred in the context of a quasi-relationship and the fact of ejaculation. In mitigation, the offender was able to rely upon his lack of previous convictions, his positive good character, his remorse, the absence of any further offending and his plea of guilty at the PTPH. The offender also referred to conditions in custody and the case of Ali.

The judge's sentencing remarks were concise but made plain that he had taken into account all of the material with which he had been provided. He referred expressly to the Rape and Domestic Abuse Guidelines, noting that the prosecution had referred to the nature of the pre-existing relationship which has been described to us as "friends with benefits", which we take to be a reference to the existence of occasional and casual intimacy but the absence of a relationship of commitment on either side.

On categorisation, the judge said that he had considered the submissions on both sides, the comment in the guideline relating to severe psychological harm, the passage in Rook & Ward to which we have referred above and in particular to the decision in Ul Nazir [2015] EWCA Crim 1604 and so he placed the categorisation "between 2 and 3B."

After referring to the agreed aggravating features, he turned to the offender's mitigation and the testimonials:

The Solicitor-General's primary submission is that the case fell squarely within category 2B having regard to the level of psychological harm suffered by V. On that basis, the judge should have taken the guideline starting point at 8 years. In the Solicitor General's submission, that starting point should have been adjusted upwards significantly on account of the aggravating features. Specifically the applicability of the Domestic Abuse Guideline and the fact of ejaculation. The aggravating features should have been taken as substantially outweighing the offender's mitigation. A sentence of 60 months before reduction by 25 per cent on account of his plea was unduly lenient and should be adjusted by this Court.

Mr Lloyd, who also represented the offender in the court below, submits that the sentence passed was not unduly lenient and is justifiable in the light of all the evidence including in particular the basis of plea, the genuine and obvious remorse and the scope for judicial mercy in the case of a person of otherwise exemplary good character. He submits that the judge was entitled to place the case between categories 2 and 3B because the harm, though serious, was not such as compelled the judge to place the case in category 2B. To the contrary, he submits that the judge could have placed it within category 3B with a starting point of 5 years. Over and above the "routine" allowance of 25 per cent for a plea at or about the time of the PTPH, Mr Lloyd urges on us, as he urged on the judge below, that the court should recognise it to be rare for defendants in the offender's position to plead guilty as he did and that this offender's remorse was immediate and profound.

The sentencing exercise facing the judge was extremely difficult and finely balanced. On the one hand, he had to bear in mind the short and long-term impact of the offence on V. On the other, he had to recognise that the offence was completely out of character, and that the impact of a substantial sentence of imprisonment would have a severe and lasting effect on this relatively young offender, while always bearing in mind the cautionary restatement that the more serious the offending of this type, the less weight will generally be placed on good character as a mitigating feature.

Equally, this Reference cannot be decided by mechanistic application of the guidelines. The judge described the case as "between categories 2 and 3B", thereby indicating that it fell short of being a straightforward category 2B case. In our judgment, that was an assessment that he was entitled, just, to make, having due regard for V's evidence about the impact of the offence upon her. It is an assessment that does not lend itself easily to creating a midway figure in lieu of the starting points in the guideline for categories 2B and 3B. Furthermore, there is no "gap" between the two categories as the category range for category 3B goes up to 7 years which is also the bottom point of the category range for category 2B. What the judge's finding does imply is that, if one were to start with the starting point for category 3B, there would have to be some upward adjustment to reflect V's evidence about the impact on her. For the same reasons, if one were to start with the starting point for category 2B there would have to be some downward adjustment.

Although the Domestic Abuse Guideline is engaged, we do not find it compelling as a significantly aggravating feature given the nature of the relationship that we have described above. Ejaculation was and was recognised to be a further aggravating feature that had to be taken into account; but it is to be remembered that what caused the prosecution to contend for category 2B was not the fact of ejaculation but V's evidence about the psychological harm she had suffered.

In our judgment, before taking into account the offender's mitigation, a notional sentence of about 7 years would have been the least sentence that could reasonably have been imposed. We make it clear that a greater sentence could reasonably have been contemplated at that stage but we are concerned with a Reference and must therefore concentrate on the lowest sentence that could reasonably have been imposed. Adopting that same approach, because we are concerned with a Reference, the question is whether a reduction from 7 years to 5 years could reasonably be effected on account on the offender's personal mitigation.

We have summarised the mitigation above and it is plain that the judge was materially influenced by it. In our judgment, a notional reduction of 2 years was at the outer limits of what could reasonably be given for the offender's personal mitigation on the facts of this particular case. Once again, we make it clear that a lesser reduction could have been given but we are concerned to identify the lowest overall sentence that could reasonably be imposed.

Viewed overall, we are in no doubt that this was a lenient sentence. Arguably it was not merely verging on the unduly lenient but was properly to be described as unduly lenient. For that reason we have given leave. But it was also a merciful sentence by a judge who was striving to balance all of the varied objectives of sentencing policy. In our judgment, the final sentence of 45 months after reduction for the offender's guilty plea was too low but not so low that this Court should intervene.

Accordingly, we dismiss the Reference.