R v Adrian John Jellicoe

On 11 March 2025, in the Crown Court at Liverpool, the appellant (then aged 49) was sentenced following his earlier conviction of two offences of sexual activity with a child, contrary to s.9(1) Sexual Offences Act 2003. On Count 1 the sentence was 3 years' imprisonment; on Count 2, 18 months' imprisonment concurrent. With the leave of the single judge, the appellant contends that the overall sentence of three years' imprisonment was manifestly excessive.

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to these offences. Under those provisions, where a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of the offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act.

The appellant was in a position of trust towards the complainant, a young girl aged 12, and her two younger half-siblings.

On 7 June 2023, just before the complainant's 13^th birthday, the appellant sexually assaulted her by rubbing her vagina (Count 1) and rubbing himself up against her while lying in her bed (Count 2). A few days before the offence, the complainant had told her aunt that the appellant would get into her bed in the morning and hug her. This made her extremely uncomfortable. The appellant was sentenced on the basis that the rubbing of her vagina had been over her pyjama trousers. The complainant was so distressed by what had occurred that she packed a bag which she took to school, intending to run away. Later that day she disclosed what had happened to a safeguarding officer at her school and the police were contacted. When police attended the family address they found a number of CCTV cameras situated around the property, including in the bedroom which the complainant shared with her younger half-sister.

The appellant had no previous conviction, but had been cautioned in 2001 for handling stolen goods. He was treated as of effective good character in the context of this offending.

The complainant's victim personal statement vividly portrayed the lasting distress which the offending had caused her. She did not sleep well, often staying awake for hours overwhelmed with her thoughts. She did not feel safe in her own bed. She had developed real trust issues and could not confide in people. At this stage when she was starting to form friendships and closeness with those of the opposite sex, she had rushed into a relationship with a boy and this had scared her. The abuse had messed with her head so that she was going deliberately faster than she should. She had feelings of complete worthlessness and had at one point harmed herself by cutting. Her school work had suffered and she had been nervous for months, pending completion of the investigation and the trial. She struggled with not seeing her siblings and with the break-up of the family unit.

The pre-sentence report recorded that the appellant continued to deny any inappropriate touching and suggested that her younger half-sister may have been responsible in some way. He showed little understanding of the impact on the complainant. The author describes the offences, occurring within the family home as a significant breach of trust, and that this had been preceded by grooming behaviour over a period of time when the appellant got into the complainant's bed. The appellant was assessed as posing a high risk of harm to children through the commission of further specified offences. The report recommended imprisonment as necessary to protect the public, specifically pubescent females with whom the appellant might have prolonged contact. Further, the duration of the sentence would need to be sufficiently adequate to facilitate necessary interventions aimed at rehabilitation and risk reduction.

The Judge, who had conducted the trial, concluded that he could not reach the sure conclusion that the appellant had rubbed against the complainant's naked vagina, as opposed to over clothing. She had been wearing pyjama pants and also probably knickers.

Accordingly, and by reference to the sentencing guideline, the Judge concluded that the lead offence (Count 1) fell within category 3. As to culpability, this was category A because of the features of abuse of trust; grooming behaviour; and the significant disparity in age. However, as to the latter, the Judge observed that this reflected the offence itself and that he must avoid double-counting. This produced a starting point of 6 months' imprisonment and a category range of a high level community order to 3 years' imprisonment.

The Judge duly referred to and took account of the pre-sentence report and the victim personal statement of the complainant.

As to aggravating factors, the Judge identified the severe psychological harm suffered by the complainant; the location of the offending in her bed; the time of the offending, namely the morning; and the fact that it involved two offences. Contrary to the evidence given by the appellant, the Judge accepted the evidence of a witness called on his behalf that the CCTV camera in the complainant's bedroom was pointing towards her bed. The Judge observed that the aggravating factors might make it appropriate to move outside the category range.

As to mitigating factors, the Judge took account of the appellant's effective good character and noted the difficulties in his childhood which were characterised by absent parents and poverty.

The Judge concluded that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by an immediate custodial sentence. In light of the mitigating features the judge stated that he had "made a slight reduction in my starting point for your sentence". The Judge concluded that the least sentence he could impose for the lead offence (Count 1) was three years' imprisonment. On count 2, he imposed a concurrent term of 18 months' imprisonment. This reflected that the offence was part of the same incident as Count 1. He also imposed a Sexual Harm Prevention Order.

In his submissions on behalf of the appellant, Mr Paul Becker contends that the Judge stated that, having regard to the aggravating factors, it was appropriate to depart from the sentencing guidelines and to take a starting point outside the range. He then submits that the Judge took that course, but did not identify either the starting point outside the range or the reduction therefrom in respect of the mitigating factor of effective good character.

Mr Becker submits that the Judge had no reason to depart from the maximum figure in the category range. Further, there had been double-counting of the supposed aggravating factors, which were already embraced withing culpability category A. In any event there was overlap between at least some of the culpability factors. Whilst accepting that there was a clear need to increase the sentence from the guideline starting point of 6 months' imprisonment, there was no basis to elevate the starting point to a figure in excess of 3 years' imprisonment or to reach an ultimate sentence of 3 years. All in all, the sentence was manifestly excessive.

This is another appeal where misuse of the phrase "starting point" has resulted in confusion. The only true starting point is the sentence identified in the relevant sentencing guideline for the relevant category of the offence. The relevant guideline then states in a case of particular gravity, reflected by multiple features of culpability or harm, that it may be appropriate to make an upward adjustment from the starting point before taking account of the aggravating and mitigating features.

In our judgment, the Judge correctly placed the lead offence in category 3A; stated that the guideline starting point was 6 months' imprisonment; did not make any upward adjustment before considering the aggravating and mitigating factors; and then turned to the aggravating and mitigating factors.

Towards the end of the sentencing exercise, the Judge referred to making a reduction in his "starting point" for the mitigating factors. That was not a reference to the guideline starting point, but evidently meant the figure he had reached, having taken account of the aggravating factors, but before taking account of the mitigating factors.

True it is that the Judge had previously stated that it might be necessary to go outside the guideline category range. However he did not do so in respect of his ultimate sentence. Having taken the correct guideline starting point and then taken account of the aggravating and mitigating factors, the Judge identified the appropriate sentence as 3 years' imprisonment, i.e. at the top of, and not beyond, the guideline category range.

The true and interlinked questions in this appeal are therefore not about the starting point, but whether the Judge erred in the weight which he gave to the aggravating and mitigating factors in his overall assessment and/or in his decision to impose a sentence at the top of the category range.

This was very serious offending committed in breach of trust and following grooming behaviour; and it has resulted in the complainant suffering serious psychological harm, both directly from the offending and from the consequent break-up of the family unit. We accept that there were significant aggravating factors. However, we also accept that there were elements of overlap in respect of some of the factors of culpability. There was also some, albeit limited, mitigation.

Standing back and considering the sentence overall, we are persuaded that there was no sufficient reason to impose a sentence at the top of the category range. The term of imprisonment should not have exceeded 2 years. The offending plainly called for immediate imprisonment. We therefore reduce the sentence to one of 2 years' imprisonment. The appeal is allowed to that extent.