R v Mandeep Gurmukh

The victims of the applicant's offences were a boy then aged eight, whom we will call "X", and a girl then aged six, whom we will call "Y". We order that no matter relating to X or Y may, while they are aged under 18, be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify them as a person concerned in the proceedings. This includes, in particular, their name, their address, the identity of any school or other educational establishment attended by them, the identity of any place of work and any still or moving images of them.

The applicant renews her application for leave to appeal against a dog destruction order made on 14 March 2025 in the Crown Court at Stafford following the applicant's guilty pleas entered on 24 July 2023 to two counts of being the owner of a dog which caused injury while dangerously out of control, contrary to section 3(1) and (4) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, for which she was sentenced on 5 July 2024.

The offences were committed on 26 March 2022 when X and Y and their mother (whom we will call "Z") were in the garden of the applicant's home. The applicant's dog, an XL bully-type dog called Ace, attacked and bit X, Y and Z. The photographs of X's injuries are particularly gruesome. He sustained a puncture wound to his left hand, which damaged the tendons, and a significant injury to his cheek, which required six or seven hours of surgery. His face was very swollen after surgery, with one eye pulled down, which may have needed further surgery in the future to correct. Y sustained a bite mark to the top of her arm, with a V-shaped wound which was flapping. This required surgery to wash out and close. X and Y were left with scars, including scarring to X's face which has had a profound effect on his life. Y and Z have also been greatly affected by the incident.

There was a hearing on 28 February 2025 in which two expert witnesses gave evidence, Miss D'Sa, instructed by the Crown, and Mr Turner, instructed by the applicant. The recorder produced a long and careful written judgment in which he set out the background facts, correctly set out the applicable law, summarised the factual and expert evidence which he had read and heard and set out his analysis and conclusions. The recorder was obliged to make a destruction order unless he was satisfied that Ace would not constitute a danger to public safety. The burden of proof on this issue was on the applicant and the standard of proof was the balance of probabilities.

In paragraph 94 of his judgment, the recorder said as follows:

The proposed grounds of appeal are set out fully and at some length, but they amount to an assertion that the recorder was not entitled on the evidence before him to conclude that the applicant had not discharged the burden of proving on the balance of probabilities that Ace would not constitute a danger to public safety. On that basis, it is submitted that the recorder should have made a conditional destruction order rather than a destruction order.

Only yesterday the applicant made an application for permission to rely on fresh evidence, namely a report from Mr Turner which was first sent to the court on 17 October 2025, commenting on what is known as the "Dunbar bite scale", to which Miss D'Sa referred in her evidence, and its application in this case. That is evidence which could have been addressed at the hearing and, in any event, it has no bearing on the applicant's application. The photographs of the injuries inflicted on X speak for themselves.

Also sent to the court on 17 October 2025 was an application for disclosure of the communications between the officer in the case and Miss D'Sa before she produced her report of 8 August 2024 in which she set out the change in her opinion. The fact of that change in opinion and the reasons for it were explored at the hearing. The disclosure application sent to the court is no reason for delaying the consideration of the renewed application for leave to appeal.

The court has also received further submissions on behalf of the applicant, which amount in effect to a skeleton argument which we have carefully considered.

In refusing leave to appeal, the single judge said as follows:

We do not propose to address in this judgment all of the many points which were made in the grounds of appeal, the skeleton argument and the submissions made to us today, although we have, of course, considered them all carefully. To take a few examples, the fact that the recorder said that the decision was 'difficult' did not mean that his decision was one which he is not entitled to reach. The fact that Miss D'Sa had changed her mind during the course of the case did not mean that the recorder was precluded from relying on the evidence which she gave before him. It was submitted today that the recorder was wrong not to impose conditions under a conditional destruction order, but the recorder carefully considered the conditions which had been proposed. Contrary to the grounds of appeal, the recorder did not speculate. The recorder was required to make an assessment as to the future.

In all the circumstances, our firm conclusion is that this is a case where the applicant simply disagrees with the assessment which was made by the recorder after correctly identifying the issue which he had to decide and after carefully considering all of the evidence which had been placed before him. In our judgment, the proposed appeal is unarguable. We refuse leave to appeal.