R v Maria Martha Blaauw

MR JUSTICE CONSTABLE: On 11 July 2025 in the Crown Court at Isleworth, the applicant, then aged 76, was sentenced to 26 months' imprisonment on four counts of fraud. She renews her application after it was refused by the single judge.

Each of the four counts to which the applicant pleaded guilty relates to frauds perpetrated on the applicant's daughter, Feyona Mass or Feyona Mass-Basford, her erstwhile married name, stretching over a period of in excess of 12 years.

Count 3 involved the applicant operating two sets of bank accounts. Those accounts with Nat West were in her own name and those with Lloyds Bank were in the name of Feyona Mass-Basford. There was a current account, a cash ISA, a credit card and there were some personal loans. In 2008 the applicant had obtained a personal loan from Lloyds for about £5,000, and there was about £2,000 of that outstanding around four years later.

In April 2011 the Lloyds account was substantially overdrawn to around £1,500 and a statement for the current account showed that it remained substantially overdrawn the entire time between 2016 and 2020. It was, however, eventually paid off with a payment from a third party.

The ISA account was also overdrawn for the entirety of the 2016-2020 period, ending with £187 overdrawn in January 2021. In contrast to the accounts that were in the name of her daughter, the account in the applicant's name was kept in credit, usually with a balance of a few hundred pounds being transferred across from other accounts. The applicant had therefore opened accounts in her daughter's name and used them to borrow money and run up debts. The value of the fraud on this account was stated to be in the region of £5,000.

Count 4. This related to a finance company called Nemo from which the applicant had secured a loan of £35,000 to pay off various other loans which she had accumulated in Miss Mass's name, including those debts to Lloyds, the credit cards and car finance. The loan application was also made in the name of Feyona Mass-Basford, and the loan was charged against a property owned by the complainant in Roehampton Vale. For reasons that are not themselves directly relevant to the sentencing exercise, that was a property that had been transferred from the applicant to her daughter a number of years before so as to protect that property from the potential of it being used in relation to the applicant's then debts when she was facing bankruptcy.

In opening the Nemo finance account the applicant had presented a driving licence in her daughter's name and also employment pay slips that she had obtained. She consented to a charge being placed against that property with the consequence that if the loan was not paid back the loan company could recover money against the value of complainant’s property. That loan has also since been paid off by others and the charge has been removed. The value of fraud on that count was therefore £35,000.

Count 5 related to claiming job seeker's allowance from March to September 2010 in the name of her daughter. The applicant received job seeker's allowance for the year to April 2013 in the name of Miss Mass as well. This was a period during which Feyona Mass was out of the country but when she returned to the United Kingdom, Miss Mass (the daughter) found, unsurprisingly, that she could not claim job seeker's allowance in her own name. Feyona Mass obtained a job with John Lewis, but the applicant continued to claim income support in her notwithstanding the fact that was, as the applicant well knew, working.

In 2014 the Department of Work and Pensions wrote to say that Miss Mass had to pay back £4,754.54 because of the claim made during her work. Some of that has since been paid off by Miss Mass herself, and there was some £2,400 remained outstanding.

The DWP file also showed that in 2014 the applicant was making also making claims in the name of Miss Feyona Mass for payments towards housing costs, namely mortgage interest. It showed the mortgage was in arrears at that stage. The applicant was receiving payments from in 2010 and 2011. In a letter written in 2012 the DWP were told that the applicant was still travelling and only came to London occasionally, seemingly swapping the positions of Miss Mass and the applicant. It could also be seen from the applicant's bank accounts that she was receiving payments from the DWP in her own name from 2016 to 2020. The figure of fraud put on count 5 was £4,754.

Finally, count 7. That relates to DLD college, which is a fee-paying school which the applicant's other daughter (Miss Mass's sister) had been attending. Contracts for fees were put in the name of Miss Feyona Basford. By 2011 the school was owed over £4,325 and the school started to make contact to ask how this was going to be repaid. The school commenced proceedings in 2014 and obtained a charging order against the complainant’s property. That was also paid off in November 2019. The fraud figure on this count was stated to be £4,325.

The judge considered the relevant sentencing guideline for fraud. He identified that there existed factors of high culpability, namely the sophisticated nature of the offending, the significant planning and the fact that the fraudulent activity was conducted over a sustained period of time. He calculated on the basis of the figures that have been outlined above that the aggregate value of the fraud was just under £50,000. According to the sentencing guideline that is a Category 3 amount. This category has a starting point of three years within a range of 18 months to four years. The Category 3 range of loss is £20,000 to £100,000.

The judge took count 4 as the lead offence and he took what he described as a ‘starting point’ of 40 months, although of course this reflects an uplift from the (true) starting point of three years. He reduced 40 months by 10 per cent for the guilty plea. He then reduced the resulting sentence of 36 months by a further 10 months to reflect mitigation, including the age of the applicant, the absence of previous convictions and her various health conditions. The sentencing judge also took specific account of the fact that the majority of the money had been paid back.

Mr Rimmer, for whose efficient oral submissions we are grateful, argues that the sentence of 40 months prior to credit and mitigation was too high. He argued that insufficient credit was given for mitigation, although he recognises that the judge did identify the various factors of mitigation existed. He has not advanced orally (perhaps wisely) the written submission based on suggestions that the victim personal statement was materially inaccurate. The combination of these arguments results, he says, in a sentence that was manifestly excessive.

Mr Rimmer submitted that if an appropriately lower sentence had been imposed it could have been suspended, which in all the circumstances of this case and in particular the applicant's age and medical conditions would have been the appropriate course.

We do not consider that this is reasonably arguable. We echo the reasons given by the single judge when refusing permission on the papers. It is right that the actual loss in the end, because of repayments, was limited. However, the guidelines make clear that regard also has to be had to what was intended. In his oral argument Mr Rimmer identified quite fairly that one factor that could be taken into account is the whether harm caused was in fact the risk of a loss. The guideline indicates that if the harm is a risk of loss rather than an actual or intended loss it is possible for the sentencing judge when considering all the circumstances to reduce the categorisation - so in this case from Category 3 to Category 4. However, the sentencing judge on this occasion was clear, having considered with some care the victim personal statement, which we have also read, that there was, perhaps unsurprisingly, considerable personal distress and other impact to the complainant. The categorisation of the offence as falling into Category A3 in all of the circumstances of this case cannot properly be criticised. The starting point for that category therefore was 36 months and the judge was entitled to increase the sentence from that starting point to 40 months given the fact that there were a number of features of high culpability, and given that the sentence was to reflect the totality of offending. As Mr Rimmer fairly pointed out, the Achilles heel of the defence in this case is the extraordinary length of time during which this fraud was perpetrated.

Technically, the judge should have applied mitigation before considering the limited credit for a guilty plea. But this has in fact resulted in the applicant receiving a greater reduction by way of credit than she would otherwise have been entitled to.

Therefore, whilst the applicant had no previous convictions and is now 76, and there are some health issues, there can be no valid criticism of the extent to which the judge arrived at his final sentence. The 10 month reduction for mitigation was reasonable. This was particularly so in circumstances where he found, as he was entitled to, the applicant had displayed minimal, if any, remorse. Overall, a sentence of 26 months' imprisonment for the totality of the offending cannot in our judgment be said to be either manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.

Accordingly, this renewed application is refused.