George Webb & Anor v R

The appellants appeal by leave of the single judge against their conviction by the jury on count 1 of an indictment which alleged:-

Count 1

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE

HOLDING A PERSON IN SLAVERY OR SERVITUDE, contrary to section 1(1)(a) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE

GEORGE ASHLEY WEBB and SARAH SOMERSET-HOW between the 1st day of January 2016 and the 6th day of September 2020 held Thomas Somerset-How in slavery or servitude and the circumstances were such that they knew or ought to have known that he was held in slavery or servitude.

The single judge also referred applications for leave to appeal against sentence by both appellants to the full court, and we will deal with those in this judgment.

The appellants were also convicted by the jury of other offences arising out of the same facts as count 1, but there is no appeal against those convictions. The applications for leave to appeal against sentence contend that the sentence of 11 years’ imprisonment on count 1 was manifestly excessive and, separately, that the total sentences in each case of 9 years’ imprisonment in respect of the other offences was also manifestly excessive. That total term of 9 years was ordered to run concurrently with the term of 11 years making the sentence 11 years in total. Its length becomes highly material if the conviction on count 1 is quashed.

Verdicts were returned on 12 May 2023 and sentencing took place on 14 July 2023.

The offences and sentences were as follows:-

Webb was acquitted of ill treatment by a care worker (Counts 2 and 4). Somerset-How was acquitted of ill treatment by a care worker (Counts 3 and 5), and fraud by abuse of position (Count 13) and theft (Count 14). Webb was acquitted, on the direction of the Trial Judge, of Counts 13 & 14 following a successful submission of No Case to Answer.

The grounds of appeal are put on this way on behalf of Webb:-

“The essence of the submission is that:

(i)

there was no evidence that Thomas Somerset-How (“TSH”) was held in slavery or servitude, and/or

(ii)

that the Learned Judge wrongly directed the Jury in relation to slavery or servitude, and/or

(iii)

that Count 1 should have been split (between slavery or servitude) into 2 Counts (duplicity).

In essence the central question for this Appeal what is meant by “slavery” and “servitude” when no work or function is performed by the individual kept in slavery/servitude.”

For the appellant Somerset-How the grounds are formulated differently, but come to the same thing, except that it is not suggested that Count 1 alleged two offences in one count and is therefore bad for duplicity. They say that:-

“a)

The application to dismiss count 1 should have succeeded,

b)

The submission of no case to answer on count 1 should have succeeded,

c)

The judge’s directions to the jury regarding count 1 were flawed. “

It is necessary to set out sections 1 and 3 of the 2015 Act.

Section 1 is in these terms:-

(1)

A person commits an offence if—

(a)

the person holds another person in slavery or servitude and the circumstances are such that the person knows or ought to know that the other person is held in slavery or servitude, or

(b)

the person requires another person to perform forced or compulsory labour and the circumstances are such that the person knows or ought to know that the other person is being required to perform forced or compulsory labour.

(2)

In subsection (1) the references to holding a person in slavery or servitude or requiring a person to perform forced or compulsory labour are to be construed in accordance with Article 4 of the Human Rights Convention.

(3)

In determining whether a person is being held in slavery or servitude or required to perform forced or compulsory labour, regard may be had to all the circumstances.

(4)

For example, regard may be had—

(a)

to any of the person's personal circumstances (such as the person being a child, the person's family relationships, and any mental or physical illness) which may make the person more vulnerable than other persons;

(b)

to any work or services provided by the person, including work or services provided in circumstances which constitute exploitation within section 3(3) to (6).

(5)

The consent of a person (whether an adult or a child) to any of the acts alleged to constitute holding the person in slavery or servitude, or requiring the person to perform forced or compulsory labour, does not preclude a determination that the person is being held in slavery or servitude, or required to perform forced or compulsory labour.

Section 3 says:-

Meaning of exploitation

(1)

For the purposes of section 2 a person is exploited only if one or more of the following subsections apply in relation to the person.

Slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour

(2)

The person is the victim of behaviour—

(a)

which involves the commission of an offence under section 1, or

(b)

which would involve the commission of an offence under that section if it took place in England and Wales.

Sexual exploitation

[not material in this case]

Removal of organs etc

[not material in this case]

Securing services etc by force, threats or deception

(5)

The person is subjected to force, threats or deception designed to induce him or her—

(a)

to provide services of any kind,

(b)

to provide another person with benefits of any kind, or

(c)

to enable another person to acquire benefits of any kind.

Securing services etc from children and vulnerable persons

(6)

Another person uses or attempts to use the person for a purpose within paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of subsection (5), having chosen him or her for that purpose on the grounds that—

(a)

he or she is a child, is mentally or physically ill or disabled, or has a family relationship with a particular person, and

(b)

an adult, or a person without the illness, disability, or family relationship, would be likely to refuse to be used for that purpose.

As will be apparent from the Grounds, there was an application to dismiss Count 1, and a submission at the close of the prosecution case that there was insufficient evidence of either slavery or servitude to go to the jury, and, following those submissions having been rejected, there was argument about how the jury should be directed. There was also a submission, which was resisted by the Crown, that Count 1 should be separated into two counts to avoid duplicity. The judge was referred to such authority as there is on these issues.

All of the submissions raised the same points and these are points of law. The application to dismiss was heard by HHJ Melville KC, and HHJ Ashworth dealt with the trial. The judges gave reasoned decisions at each stage which have been of considerable assistance to us in analysing the case but it is not necessary to set them out in this judgment because the question for us is whether the results were right in law. We will have to analyse the directions given to the jury, which followed from Judge Ashworth’s reasoning on the submission of no case and which he explained in a further ruling after the jury had retired. We do not have to assess the soundness of his reasoning but to decide whether the directions were right in law.

It will become apparent that we have criticisms of the directions to the jury. Before setting those conclusions out below, we would like to acknowledge the care which Judge Ashworth took in considering and deciding complex questions of law in the absence of very much guidance from previously decided cases. The 2015 Act is not an easy provision to apply, and was probably not drafted with the facts of this case in mind. It is not surprising that in these circumstances a Court of Appeal, with three judges and more time to reflect, may come to different conclusions from a trial judge.

The appellant Somerset-How and TSH married in 2012. TSH suffers from cerebral palsy and needs substantial physical care and assistance. Until 2013 it was agreed to have been a happy marriage. In 2013 his health began to deteriorate further, his eyesight worsened, and he could no longer care for himself.

The prosecution’s case was that both of the appellants actively coerced and controlled TSH. Together they separated him from his family and made him report that Webb was doing a good job to the carer’s agency and the Social Services. Their case was that TSH was held in servitude or slavery. Whilst he had not provided work for the appellants he had been coerced into enabling Webb to keep his job and his income when he was failing lamentably in his duties as a carer, and behaving in abusive way to TSH over a long period of time. TSH eventually provided a home to both of the appellants and further resources to Somerset-How. This had enabled them to use his money to fund their lifestyle. The prosecution case was that it was because the victim was enslaved that they could continue to enjoy this way of life. Had he been free to decide for himself who his carer would be, he would have dispensed with Webb’s services. The appellants, unknown to TSH, were having an affair and their coercion of him prevented him from discovering this and enabled it to continue under his roof.

Both appellants denied that there was any mistreatment of TSH at all, and consequently no condition of slavery or servitude arose. They denied that TSH was coerced into providing them with employment for Webb, housing, or money to both. There were very important issues of fact which the jury had to resolve. Their mixed verdicts show that they resolved most of them, but not quite all, against the appellants.

We will summarise the evidence of TSH in a little detail and the rest of the evidence much more briefly. He said that he had been happily married. He had used a wheelchair but was fairly independent until 2013 when issues with his leg caused his mobility to suffer, and then his sight deteriorated. He had hip surgery and had a medical bed to recover. His wife, the appellant, began to suffer from depression. She slept on the sofa, but he had thought that their marriage remained good. In 2015 the social services met with him and his wife to review his care. They remained fairly happy, although he gave evidence of a conversation which had upset him at Christmas of that year. There had been no conversation about separating before the arrival of Webb. To bond with his carers, he often adopted their interests. His previous carer Ryan planned structured activities. At the end of 2015 he had surgery on his hand and wrist. There was mention of light sensitivity and ultraviolet shields. Charts monitored his urine for infection and his bowel movements were on occasion sudden.

Webb became his carer from January or perhaps March 2016. He worked weekdays only and did not live in the property. At first it worked well. TSH and the appellants did things together. He did exercises morning and evening. But the appellants started to stay up together, and his evidence was that after 6 weeks or so, things deteriorated. Webb started coming in late which had not been too much of an issue until he got so late that TSH missed getting to his day centre at noon.

He began to get unhelpful responses from Webb especially when he needed assistance with the lavatory and he began to feel he was not being treated with care. It had become a chore. Webb self-medicated and sometimes he could not rouse him. It got to the stage where he would trouble his wife when she got home from work, and she was displeased if he needed her to help him use the lavatory.

By April or May, Webb had stopped getting him up and out of bed. He stopped texting Webb generally because of the hostile responses. Despite seeing his mother in May and nursing and social service reviews he had not complained. He said that he did not feel able to.

They had stopped going out. They would not walk the dog daily. He would be left for hours without hearing from or seeing Webb. There would be weeks when he had not got up at all unless he was desperate to use the lavatory. He was left for up to 12 hours with a urine bottle and Tupperware on weekdays and weekends. Eventually, Webb was staying at the address. TSH did get to go out very occasionally but for 95% of the time over the four-year period he did not. There was a period of five weeks where he said he did not get a shower although he had said in his statement that he would get a shower once a week.

On one occasion he had a bad bowel accident and needed a shower whereupon Webb said that he was horrible and disgusting. He said that he did not get paid enough ‘to do this.’ He then held the shower to his mouth, and he held his nose and called him “scummy”. TSH told his wife, but nothing was done. She said that they had no other choice.

He brushed his teeth occasionally and had not seen a dentist for a year. Webb got angry and defensive quickly and he had not thought that he could really speak to him. He would shout and walk away. He was in charge. TSH would text his wife asking for her help when she got home from work. She always said that Webb had them over a barrel and that she was keeping a log which he never saw. This was to record evidence of poor behaviour and performance by Webb so they could get rid of him, but actually she had no intention of allowing that to happen.

Webb started to work full time and 7 days a week. He had just started staying longer. The feedback to the social services had not all been from TSH. His wife had given some of it. When he had said that he was very pleased in the February and April 2017 reviews, he had felt under duress. He had not been able to express the problems he was having. All of his communications were monitored. His wife never directly threatened him, but invitations tailed off and people never managed to come in. In May 2017, Webb became directly employed for financial reasons. His living conditions deteriorated, and the curtains were closed.

At one point his sister had hand delivered a letter asking if she was no longer welcome at his house. His wife read it to him and told him that she did not want him “blubbing” about things. She was there if he made telephone calls. She told his family not to turn up. He had thought that his wife would deal with the situations until he realised that it was going to be the way it was and so he shut down. He would be taken out for a couple of hours every few months. On one occasion his sister came to visit and wanted to “sort it out” but he asked her not to. He was mentally broken. He was showered and “spruced up” when they expected company (and this was supported by one series of text messages on the point). The incident in count 12 (Actual Bodily Harm) occurred when both appellants were there. Webb got angry and threw something which hit him in the mouth. It split his lip. He was later told that it had been a football boot. He denied that it had been accidental contact with a broom whilst Webb was cleaning the floor

TSH’s sister Kate described a distance developing between him and the rest of his family. She attended his home in December 2018. By then, no one from the family had seen him for 2 years. She arrived unattended and parked away from the house. She brought a Christmas hamper and when Webb answered the door, she introduced herself. He was reluctant to let her in. The house was squalid. It was dark, there were piles of clothes and it smelt of tobacco and cannabis. Webb went to make a telephone call to his co-accused, and she walked to her brother’s bedroom. She found him confused and disorientated and not wearing his glasses. There was detritus everywhere. He smelled awfully. He smelt of urine. He could not tell her the last time he had been washed. He was thin, he had long nails, greasy hair and facial hair. She asked him if he wanted her to take him away. He told her no and that he was ok. She did not feel that she could force him. Webb was aggressive and said “you need to get home now. I’m not happy”. She was polite to him because she was scared that he may hurt TSH . She denied that he had offered drinks or that there had been any chatting. She took photographs which were produced.

TSH’s mother said that there had been an exchange of words when she had called to his home and found that he was still in bed at 3 o’clock. Webb had been aggressive and rude and thought he would be sacked. Webb had stood in the doorway, and when she bent over to speak to TSH said that he was all right. In December 2018 her daughter Kate spoke to her after her visit and gave her the description of the event she later gave to the jury. They had not done anything because TSH declined the offer of help and had insisted that he was ok. She had met with the appellant Somerset-How in a coffee shop and offered to tidy and clean the house. She also offered financial assistance.

TSH’s father said that from February 2017 things had changed, and they had no longer been welcome at his address. They would drop by or call, but it was always inconvenient, and they were told to make appointments that never happened. His wife had continued to invite TSH and his wife to lunch, and they came a couple of times during which he had greasy hair and not his usual clothing. She talked continuously or used her phone. Then they stopped coming. When they drove past the bungalow the blinds were always down. Following Kate’s visit in December 2018 he had seen the photographs and had been shocked. However, TSH insisted he was ok, and he felt whatever their view they had to accept what he said. They had paid an unscheduled visit to on his birthday in March 2020. The appellant Somerset-How opened the door by 6 inches and saw who it was. She said, ‘Wait a minute. Just let me see if it’s convenient.’ Two or three minutes later, she said it was not convenient. They passed over his present and she said that they would drop by later that afternoon but did not. Although he had met other carers, he never met Webb.

Things came to a head when Gina Zeelie made contact with TSH by videocall during the pandemic. She had not seen him for a long time and was shocked by what he said and what she saw. He had lost a great deal of weight and was unkempt. The social services were informed and they arranged for TSH to be removed from his home. The police then became involved. He was medically examined and the doctor found him to be pale and that he had a vitamin D deficiency. She thought he had not been outside for some time. He was very underweight.

A great many text messages were obtained by the enquiry and put into evidence. They included particularly aggressive messages to TSH or messages indicating that the appellants were manipulating him to say the right things at reviews or to his family, or to get him to avoid family visits. They also produced messages between the appellants regarding their affair and attitude to TSH. Messages of this kind started fairly early on. Other messages showed that Webb was unhappy when TSH ’s family turned up at the address. Webb had messaged “Back off Ronnie. You’re just a job. I’ll be looking for a new one”. The appellant Somerset-How had messaged on 24 August 2018 “I’m thinking of leaving Tom here while the fight is on”. Text messages on 19 November 2018 showed that the appellants were using cannabis. On December 18 (coinciding with Kate Somerset-Holmes account of her visit) Webb messaged saying “Tom’s sisters came. I offered them tea or coffee. We spoke about music. I panicked, because I thought they might be a bit like Tom’s mum. It was the only time the house was in a mess.” Somerset-How responded “I didn’t know anything about them coming. I’ll fucking kill them. How dare they?” and later “I’ve gone mad down the phone, OK?”. In January 2019 texts were exchanged between the appellants such as “His fucking family is just turning up”. “I’ve made out he’s with you” to which she replied “Good. Fucking cunts” He threatened to leave and then “They need to text me before. I’ve also told ET to give my number to them but again ignored.” Somerset-How replied “I totally agree with you. I’ve had a slagging match with Tom about it. I’ve told him to sort his family out.” To which Webb responded, “He hasn’t got the balls” and she responded “I’m as shocked by you by her turning up. If dickhead won’t give them your number, then I will. But I don’t want them thinking they can text and then turn up. They need to respect the rules here. They’re playing me and you up against each other. It’s not a game they’re going to win. I only made up with his family over Christmas so they wouldn’t want to come round. Cunts. It should be dickhead that takes this shit for today.” Further messages in 2019 and 2020 including that TSH was “singing to their tune”, “remember we just use him” and that Somerset-How had wanted to strike TSH.

Messages between TSH and his wife were produced including one in which he said, “I want out of here” and on another occasion “either leave or get me out then...This isn’t fair. You keep saying it’ll get better, but it won’t, so choose”. There were text conversations when she complained that he was not putting Ben off well enough and one where TSH said “How many times have you said I’ve been ill, and I haven’t? Every decision is yours ...... It’ll never change. You and him, have your plans and I barely feature except as an inconvenient chore to be dealt with.” To which the appellant responded “No, then your family will want me out of the house. No fucking way, because your family think they call the shots. Well, hot news for them. They don’t”. On 16 January 2020 there was a conversation about the dentist and TSH said that he was sorry that he had an accident, and Somerset-How responding “Tough luck. I’m not dealing with it.” Other messages instructed TSH not to “poop”. Following the assault, which became Count 12, TSH and Somerset-How exchanged messages “Guess I’m not worthy like you said. you don’t let me get help from anyone, because your fragile egos wouldn’t handle it, plus one or both of you would beat the shit out of me if I did.”. Her reply was “I would never beat the shit out of you. How fucking dare you say that? How dare you?”. It continued “Well, my face got split. But what consequences were there? None. You might as well have thrown a punch. Why do you think I asked you to kill me, for fun? It’s the only way I get out.” Her response was “It was your lip, not your face. It was a small cut. Don’t go lying about it or over-dramatizing things”.

There were messages which showed that the appellants discussed a “five-year plan” in which they would save money to set up a music business and then leave TSH. To achieve that they needed to be able to maintain Webb’s income as his carer and to live in his home.

The prosecution summarised the evidence by saying that TSH was effectively imprisoned for a period of 2½ years, confined to his bed, having lost all ‘autonomy’ such that the only ‘decision’ he could take for himself was to limit his consumption of food and drink in the hope that he would not soil the bed before one of the appellants would empty the bottle he used to urinate in or help him on to the lavatory. This was evidence of slavery. By enslaving him they were able to enjoy the use of his home and income.

The judge dealt, at different stages, with the same submissions which are before us. These were, in summary:-

The judge rejected the first of these submissions, but did accede to the alternative suggestion that the jury should receive what is called a Brown direction. This is so called because of the case of R v Brown (Kevin) (1983) 79 Cr App R 115 which involved an allegation that Brown had obtained property by two different deceptions. It was held that the jury should have been directed that if they were not unanimous that Brown had used both deceptions, they should at least all agree which one he used.

The judge appreciated that in ordinary language TSH was not providing any service for the appellants and he was certainly not working for them. However, he relied upon section 3 to say that it was enough to amount to servitude if the conduct of TSH had produced a benefit for the appellants and they had coerced him to do that. This meant that there was evidence of servitude.

The judge considered the authorities and identified a definition of “slavery” which he later gave to the jury in his legal directions. He held that there was sufficient evidence on which they could properly conclude that the appellants had enslaved TSH according to that definition. He therefore concluded that there was evidence both of servitude and slavery, and that is why he decided to give a Brown direction.

The legal directions about the definitions of slavery and servitude in relation to count 1 were as follows:-

COUNT 1

15)

On Count 1, the Defendants are jointly charged with holding Thomas Somerset-How in slavery or servitude.

16)

A person is guilty if:

a)

they hold another person in slavery or servitude, and

b)

the circumstances are such that the Defendant knows, or ought to know that the other person is held in slavery or servitude.

Definition of slavery

17)

The definition is provided by the 1927 Slavery Convention:

” The status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.”

18)

This definition clearly met the evil of slavery of that era – the buying and selling of human beings. This is not an archaic concept. The European Court of Human Rights has noted that although slavery was officially abolished more than 150 years ago, “domestic slavery” persists in Europe and concerns thousands of people, the majority of whom are women.

19)

In the modern world exploitation can and does take place in many different forms. Perhaps the most obvious is that where one human being is treated by another as an object under his or her control for a sexual purpose.

20)

In this case, a more helpful formulation of the definition is that the essence of slavery is:

“Treating someone as belonging to oneself by exercising some power over that person as one might over an animal or object.”

Definition of “servitude”

21)

Servitude means;

“One person’s obligation to provide services to another, an obligation that is imposed by the use of coercion.”

22)

To that definition are added two further requirements:

a)

The victim must have lost the ability to decide where they will live, and

b)

They must have no prospect of changing their condition.

23)

The concepts of slavery and servitude are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Servitude is linked with the concept of slavery and a person can at the same time be subjugated to slavery and servitude. The common denominator is that the victim is subject to a degree of enforced control exercised by another.

Consent

24)

The consent of the complainant does not preclude a determination that the complainant is being held in slavery or servitude.

Definition of services

25)

There is no definition of services. When the 1927 convention was set down, there was no concept of state provision of carers wages for the disabled in place. Services at that time clearly referred to labour, farming, housework, or other types of physical activity. However, the law adapts to the changes brought by time and an increased recognition of the need to protect the rights of the vulnerable such as those with physical disabilities.

26)

Whether or not Thomas Somerset How did provide services to the 2 Defendants is a matter of fact for you to decide, having heard the arguments of the parties, and considered all of the evidence.

The prosecution case.

27)

The prosecution ask you to consider that the services provided by Thomas Somerset How are:

a)

The continued employment of Webb,

b)

The provision of a home to Sarah Somerset Howl (enabling the two Defendants amongst other things to continue an affair), and

c)

The use of his money to fund their lifestyle.

28)

They say that it was because he was enslaved that they could continue to enjoy the situation – in short, the slavery enabled the servitude.

The Defence case.

29)

Each Defendant denies that there was any mistreatment of Thomas Somerset How at all, and consequently condition of slavery or servitude arose.

30)

They deny that Thomas Somerset How was coerced into providing themwith:

a)

employment for George Webb,

b)

housing, or

c)

money.

31)

In any event, they both challenge that any of these things can amount to “services”.

Factors to be considered:

32)

You may have regard to all the circumstances in the case when determining if Count 1 is made out. The Modern Slavery Act provides two examples of some circumstances that may be relevant in this case.

33)

The first of these relates to any of Thomas Somerset How’s personal circumstances such as his family relationships, and his physical condition which may make him more vulnerable than other persons.

34)

The second set of circumstances relates to any services provided by him, including consideration as to

a)

whether he was subjected to force, threats or deception designed to –

i)

induce him to provide services of any kind,

ii)

induce him to provide either or both Defendants with benefits of any kind, or

iii)

enable one or both Defendants to acquire benefits of any kind, and or

b)

Whether either or both of the Defendants used or attempted to use Thomas Somerset-How to,

i)

provide services of any kind,

ii)

provide either or both Defendants with benefits of any kind, or

iii)

to enable one or both Defendants to acquire benefits of any kind.

(1)

having chosen him for that purpose on the grounds that he is physically disabled, or has a family relationship with a particular person, and

(2)

a person without the disability, or family relationship, would be likely to refuse to be used for that purpose.

How to approach the fact that the charge alleges holding the complainant in slavery OR servitude

35)

Count 1 relates to one set of circumstances – the living conditions of Thomas Somerset How. The prosecution will have proved their case in relation to Count 1 if they make you sure that those conditions satisfy the definition of slavery, or the definition of servitude, or both.

36)

However, to find a Defendant guilty, you must all be sure that those conditions amount to slavery, and/or all besure they amount to servitude. It would not be sufficient for some of you to be sure about one (slavery) and some about the other (servitude).

The joint nature of the charge

37)

On Count 1 both Defendants are jointly charged with the offence. However, that does not mean that you must find both Defendants guilty or both Defendants not guilty, your verdicts can differ in that you could find one Defendant guilty and the other one not guilty.

38)

The prosecution’s case is that both Defendants are actively involved in coercing and controlling the complainant. The prosecution say that the Defendants worked together to separate him from his family and to keep him telling the carers agency and the social workers that he was alright, and that George was doing a good job.

39)

You must examine the case of each Defendant separately to see if the prosecution have made you sure that each Defendant:

a)

Held Thomas Somerset How in slavery and/or in servitude, and

b)

Knew or should have known that that was what they were doing.

The time period covered by Count 1

40)

The Count is framed to cover the entire period that George Webb was the carer. You do not have to be made sure that the complainant was held in a state of slavery or servitude for that entire period, and indeed the evidence or Thomas Somerset How, if you accept it, is that care that was initially good tailed off to chronic neglect, ill-treatment, and abuse.

41)

However, these are serious charges and are not intended to cover a one-off event or a condition that only lasts for a period of a few days or weeks. It is a matter of fact for you to determine the period of time over which you are sure Thomas Somerset How was held in slavery or servitude, if that is your finding. Once you have done so, providing that period of time is more than a few days or weeks, it is a matter for you if you think the period of time is long enough to justify a finding that he was “held” in slavery or servitude.

These directions reflect the judge’s view of the law which led him to reject the submissions of no case to answer and it not necessary to consider that ruling separately from the accuracy and sufficiency of those directions. If the directions are substantially correct, then there was a case to answer. If not, that will undermine the safety of the convictions on count 1 and it will not serve any purpose to consider separately the position as it stood at the close of the prosecution case.

The duplicity issue also has consequences for the directions. It will be noted that the Brown direction is at paragraphs 35 and 36 of the directions.

Reformulating the issues with these thoughts in mind, we consider that we have to decide:-

Section 1 of the 2015 Act replaced section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Sub-sections (1) and (2) are in substantially the same terms as sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 71 of the 2009 Act. Sub-sections (3)-(5) are new. The 2015 Act also increased the maximum penalty to life imprisonment from 14 years. This illustrates that section 1 of the 2015 is intended to create a very serious criminal offence. Holding a person in slavery or servitude or requiring a person to perform forced or compulsory labour is serious criminal conduct.

The most detailed analysis of the language used in section 1 in a previous decision of this court is found in R v. K [2011] EWCA Crim 1691. This was an appeal against a conviction for trafficking a person into the United Kingdom for exploitation, contrary to section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (treatment of claimants etc.) Act 2004. Like the 2009 and 2015 Acts, the 2004 Act was intended to employ the domestic criminal law in support of the vindication of Convention rights guaranteed by Article 4 of the European Convention. The mechanism was somewhat different, however. The 2004 Act defined one of the ways in which exploitation could occur in these terms

(4)

For the purposes of this section a person is exploited if (and only if)–

(a)

he is the victim of behaviour that contravenes Article 4 of the Human Rights Convention (slavery and forced labour),

The word “slavery” only appears in parenthesis to remind the reader what Article 4 is about. The prosecution is required to prove that the behaviour contravenes Article 4 if this is the variety of exploitation alleged. Perhaps because the language of Article 4 is not drafted in the same way as a United Kingdom penal statute, Parliament in 2009 and again in 2015 decided that the conduct penalised should be described in the Act rather than by incorporation of Article 4. That conduct is holding a person in slavery or servitude or requiring a person to perform forced or compulsory labour. Article 4 is brought in as an aid to construction of those words by section 1(2) of the 2015 Act. They are to be construed “in accordance with” Article 4.

Article 4 of the Convention

Article 4 – Prohibition of slavery and forced labour

1 No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.

2 No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.

3 For the purpose of this article the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall not include:

a any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed according to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during conditional release from such detention;

b any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory military service;

c any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the community;

d any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations.

It is not possible to construe “slavery or servitude” in accordance with Article 4 itself because it does not define these terms. The court in K therefore considered Siliadin v France (2006) 43 EHRR 16 which did seek to define these terms. “Slavery”, it said at [122], is “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised”, a definition which appears in the 1927 Slavery Convention. The court held that the conduct in that case did not amount to slavery, saying:-

“122.

It notes that this definition corresponds to the ‘classic’ meaning of slavery as it was practised for centuries. Although the applicant was, in the instant case, clearly deprived of her personal autonomy, the evidence does not suggest that she was held in slavery in the proper sense, in other words that Mr and Mrs B exercised a genuine right of legal ownership over her, thus reducing her to the status of an ‘object’.”

At this point it may be helpful to record that Mr Bryan’s submission on behalf of Webb is that “slavery” in the 2015 Act involves the deprivation of personal autonomy and the judge’s direction fails to make that clear. He and Ms Upton both then submit that the evidence fell short of proving deprivation of autonomy as opposed to a restriction of it. In other words, the jury was not directed that they had to decide whether TSH had been deprived of his personal autonomy, and if they had been they would have been driven to conclude that he had not. If Siliadin is right, even if they had made that finding it would not have been sufficient to constitute slavery.

“Servitude”, the court in Siliadin said at [124], is an obligation to provide services which is imposed by the use of coercion. The passage setting out the findings of the court on whether or not the victim had been held in servitude is as follows [the paragraph numbers are accurately taken from the text]:-

“123.

With regard to the concept of “servitude”, it “prohibits a particularly serious form of denial of freedom”. It includes,

“in addition to the obligation to provide certain services to another (…) the obligation on the ‘serf’ to live on the other's property and the impossibility of changing his status”.

123.

In this connection, in examining a complaint under this paragraph of Art.4 , the Commission paid particular attention to the Convention on the Abolition of Slavery.

124.

It follows in the light of the case law on this issue that for Convention purposes “servitude” means an obligation to provide one's services that is imposed by the use of coercion, and is to be linked with the concept of “slavery” described above.

125.

Furthermore, under the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, each of the states parties to the Convention must take all practicable and necessary legislative and other measures to bring about the complete abolition or abandonment of the following institutions and practices:

“(d)

Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of 18 years, is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour”.

126.

In addition to the fact that the applicant was required to perform forced labour, the Court notes that that this labour lasted almost 15 hours a day, 7 days per week.

126.

Brought to France by a relative of her father's, she had not chosen to work for Mr and Mrs B.

126.

As a minor, she had no resources and was vulnerable and isolated, and had no means of subsistence other than in the home of Mr and Mrs B, where she shared the children's bedroom as no other accommodation had been provided. She was entirely at Mr and Mrs B's mercy, since her papers had been confiscated and she had been promised that her immigration status would be regularised, which had never occurred.

127.

In addition, the applicant, who was afraid of being arrested by the police, was not in any event permitted to leave the house, except to take the children to their classes and various activities. Thus, she had no freedom of movement and no free time.

128.

As she had not been sent to school, despite the promises made to her father, the applicant could not hope that her situation would improve and was completely dependent on Mr and Mrs B.

129.

In those circumstances, the Court concludes that the applicant, a minor at the relevant time, was held in servitude within the meaning of Art.4 of the Convention.”

These definitions are adopted in the law of England and Wales in K at [19]. That court was construing Article 4 directly as we have explained, whereas we are construing a criminal statute which contains terms which are to be construed in accordance with Article 4. Section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides:-

2.

— Interpretation of Convention rights.

(1)

A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into account any—

(a)

judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights,

Section 3 of the 1998 Act says:-

3.

— Interpretation of legislation.

(1)

So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.

We are, therefore, required by section 1(2) to construe section 1(1) of the 2015 Act “in accordance” with Article 4. In deciding what Article 4 means we must take account of Siliadin but are not bound by it. By section 3 of the 1998 Act we must give effect to section 1(1) in a way which is “compatible with” Article 4.

K is a domestic decision of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division of England and Wales. As we have recorded, it incorporates, at [19] the definitions in Siliadin.

“The prohibition of slavery and servitude in Article 4(1) is absolute. So too is the prohibition on “forced or compulsory labour” in Article 4(2) . It has been said that the prohibition of slavery, servitude and forced labour “enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic society” (see MacDonald's “Immigration Law and Practice”, 8th edition, paragraph 8.57). In Siliadin v France (Application 73316/01) [2005] 20 B.H.R.C. 654 , ECtHR, the European Court of Human Rights held that Article 4 imposes positive obligations on the State to protect individuals, particularly children and other vulnerable people, including by means of penalisation and effective prosecution of acts contrary to Article 4 . Slavery is the status of a person over whom powers attached to the right of ownership are exercised. Servitude is an obligation to provide one's services that is imposed by the use of coercion. Forced or compulsory labour is work performed involuntarily and under the threat of a penalty.”

At [23] in K the court cited Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia [2010] ECHR 22 as a restatement of the definition of slavery in Siliadin, and pointed out that the court there held that there was servitude and forced and compulsory labour, but that the treatment had fallen short of slavery. Forced or compulsory labour required some physical or mental constraint and some overriding of the person’s will:-

23.

In Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia [2010] ECHR 22 , the European Court of Human Rights noted (in paragraph 272 of its judgment) that Article 4 makes no mention of trafficking, proscribing only “slavery”, “servitude” and “forced and compulsory labour”. The court referred to its decision in Siliadin, observing (in paragraph 279 of its judgment) that in that case it had concluded that the treatment suffered by the appellant amounted to servitude and forced and compulsory labour, although it fell short of slavery. In paragraph 276 of its judgment in Rantsev the court said this:

“In Siliadin , considering the scope of “slavery” under Article 4 , the Court referred to the classic definition of slavery contained in the 1926 Slavery Convention, which required the exercise of a genuine right of ownership and reduction of the status of the individual concerned to an “object” [paragraph 122 of the judgment in Siliadin ]. With regard to the concept of “servitude”, the Court has held that what is prohibited is a “particularly serious form of denial of freedom” (see Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium, Commission’s report of 9 July 1980 …). The concept of “servitude” entails an obligation, under coercion, to provide one’s services, and is linked with the concept of “slavery” (see Seguin v France … 7 March 2000 ; and Siliadin … [paragraph 124]. For “forced or compulsory labour” to arise, the Court has held that there must be some physical or mental constraint, as well as some overriding of the person’s will (Van der Mussele v Belgium, 23 November 1983 , …; Siliadin , …, [paragraph 117].”

At [24], the court in K quoted with approval, a textbook which said:-

“9.17.

…“Slavery” involves being in the legal ownership of another – a concept which is sometimes referred to as “chattel slavery”. It has been suggested that this concept has evolved to encompass various other forms of slavery which are also based on the “exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership.” In practice, issues concerning slavery have not arisen under the Convention because legally sanctioned slavery does not exist in any of the states which are parties to it.

9.18.

“Servitude” also embraces the totality of the status or condition of a person. However, it is distinguishable from slavery in that servitude does not involve ownership, but concerns less extensive forms of restraint. For Convention purposes “servitude” means an obligation to provide one's services that is imposed by the use of coercion.

9.19.

Servitude can be differentiated from forced labour. In the Van Droogenbroeck case, the Commission stated that:

“In addition to the obligation to provide another with certain services the concept of servitude includes the obligation on the part of the ‘serf’ to live on another's property and the impossibility of changing his condition.””

This led the court in K to conclude at [24]:-

“In descending order of gravity, therefore, “slavery” stands at the top of the hierarchy, “servitude” in the middle, and “forced or compulsory labour” at the bottom.”

The court then turned to consider the judge’s directions and the submissions of the parties before the passage headed “Discussion and Conclusion” at [37]ff. This passage includes these paragraphs:-

“39.

We have concluded that the judge's summing-up did not reflect with sufficient clarity the core elements of Article 4of the Human Rights Convention – namely “slavery”, “servitude” and “forced or compulsory labour” – which are integral to the offence provided for in section 4 of the 2004 Act. Those core elements are crisply defined in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Siliadin. As we have noted (in paragraph 24 above), they form a hierarchy of denial of personal autonomy. The essence of the concept of “slavery” is treating someone as belonging to oneself, by exercising some power over that person as one might over an animal or an object (see paragraph 122 of the court's judgment in Siliadin). The essence of the concept of “servitude” is one person's obligation to provide services to another, an obligation imposed by the use of coercion (paragraphs 123 and 124 of the court's judgment in Siliadin). The essence of the concept of “forced or compulsory labour” is work exacted under the menace of a penalty and performed against the will of the person concerned, a concept which brought to mind the idea of either physical or mental constraint, the essential character of the work or service involved being work or service for which the person had not offered himself voluntarily (see paragraph 117 of the court's judgment in Siliadin)).

40.

These concepts are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A person can at the same time be subjected to “slavery or servitude” and to “forced or compulsory labour”. The common denominator is that the victim is subject to a degree of enforced control.

41.

Nor should the concepts be seen as archaic. To dismiss “slavery” as being merely reminiscent of an era remote from contemporary life in the United Kingdom is wrong. In the modern world exploitation can and does take place, in many different forms. Perhaps the most obvious is that in which one human being is treated by another as an object under his or her control for a sexual purpose. But “slavery or servitude” and “forced labour” are not confined to exploitation of that sort. One person may exploit another in many different ways. Sexual exploitation is one, domestic servitude, such as was found in Siliadin, another.”

We were referred to the Guide on Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights, published by the court itself and updated to August 2025. This refers to Siliadin and sets out the definitions to be derived from it.

Finally, in this review of authority, we refer to R v Rooney and others [2019] EWCA Crim 681. This was a case which included an allegation of conspiracy to require a person to perform forced orcompulsory labour, contrary to section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which was later replaced by section 1 of the 2015 Act as we have said. It was, therefore, not directly concerned with the definition of slavery. The passage in Rantsev cited in K was cited and relied upon.

The judge decided that because of section 1(4)(b) of the 2015 Act, the reference to “benefits” in section 3(5) and (6) meant that exploitation for the purposes of “securing services” could constitute servitude.

The relevant provisions are set out in full at [9] and [10] above, but are repeated here for ease of reference.

Section 1(3) and (4) provide as follows:-

Section 3(1) provides that “for the purposes of section 2 a person is exploited only if one or more of the following subsections apply in relation to the person”, and the list of those sub-sections includes (5) and (6) which say:-

Securing services etc by force, threats or deception

(5)

The person is subjected to force, threats or deception designed to induce him or her—

(a)

to provide services of any kind,

(b)

to provide another person with benefits of any kind, or

(c)

to enable another person to acquire benefits of any kind.

Securing services etc from children and vulnerable persons

(6)

Another person uses or attempts to use the person for a purpose within paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of subsection (5), having chosen him or her for that purpose on the grounds that—

(a)

he or she is a child, is mentally or physically ill or disabled, or has a family relationship with a particular person, and

(b)

an adult, or a person without the illness, disability, or family relationship, would be likely to refuse to be used for that purpose.

In this case the factual allegations made by the prosecution did not change whether the legal result of those allegations was said to amount to slavery on the one hand, or servitude on the other. This was not a case where the prosecution alleged that an offence may have been committed in two different ways. It was a case, so far as relevant to this argument, where the question was whether either the word “slavery” or the word “servitude” or both or neither could properly be applied to describe in law what the appellants had done in fact.

We have to consider section 1(1)(a) in this case, which is committed where a person holds another in slavery or servitude. Very similar considerations will apply to section1(1)(b) which is committed where a person requires another to perform “forced or compulsory labour”. In each sub-section the conduct criminalised is described in two ways, linked by the disjunctive “or”.

The rule that only one offence should be charged in any count of an indictment (the rule against duplicity) was discussed by the House of Lords in DPP vMerriman [1973] AC 584. Lord Diplock at 607C said that the rule:-

“…..has always been applied in a practical, rather than in a strictly analytical, way for the purpose of determining what constituted one offence. Where a number of acts of a similar nature committed by one or more defendants were connected with one another, in the time and place of their commission or by their common purpose, in such a way that they could fairly be regarded as forming part of the same transaction or criminal enterprise, it was the practice, as early as the eighteenth century, to charge them in a single count of an indictment. Where such a count was laid against more than one defendant, the jury could find each of them guilty of one offence only: but a failure by the prosecution to prove the allegation, formerly expressly stated in the indictment but now only implicit in their joinder in the same count, that the unlawful acts of each were done jointly in aid of one another, did not render the indictment ex post facto had or invalidate the jury's verdict against those found guilty.”

In R v Grout [2011] EWCA Crim 299; [2011] 1 Cr App R 38, the court considered a count which alleged causing or inciting sexual activity with a child contrary to section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. At [32] the court said:-

“32.

The fact that s.8 of the SOA creates two, if not four, separate offences means that a count charging a defendant must be drawn with particular care. In the present case we have to say that count 1 was not so drawn and that is what gives rise to the difficulties which have led us to conclude that this conviction is unsafe. On any view count 1 alleges at least four different offences. These are: (1) intentionally causing H to engage in sexual activity in taking part in a webcam conversation when the defendant asked H to show her bra; (2) intentionally inciting H to engage in sexual activity in taking part in a webcam conversation when the defendant asked H to show her bra; (3) intentionally causing H to engage in sexual activity in taking part in a webcam conversation and asking her to take off clothing; and (4) intentionally inciting H to engage in sexual activity in taking part in a webcam conversation and asking her to take off clothing. It might be thought that the count also contains allegations of: (a) intentionally causing; and (b) intentionally inciting H to engage in “sexual activity” in the form of a webcam conversation in the circumstances alleged. Technically speaking, the count was bad because it contained within it allegations regarding a multiplicity of offences, which depended on proof of different facts and different actions, and a different state of mind by the defendant (an intention to cause and an intention to incite) for each allegation. More importantly and practically, this jumble of offences in one count created difficulties for both judge and jury.”

At [36] the court said:-

“36.

…….two out of the four parts of it should not [have gone] before the jury, viz. those alleging that the appellant had intentionally caused or had intentionally incited H to engage in “sexual activity” by taking off clothing. Those allegations, should have been withdrawn on the simple ground that there was insufficient evidence on which a jury, properly directed, could convict of those offences. Moreover, it is clear that the offence of “intentionally inciting” H to show her bra was itself duplication, because the evidence was that she had actually shown her bra strap, so that the offence of “intentionally causing” H to do so was sufficient to cover those facts.

37 We have concluded that this failure in itself makes the conviction unsafe because the jury were asked to consider, within the one count, two possible offences which they should not have been asked to consider. We do not know on what basis the jury did, in fact, convict the appellant.”

The Brown direction came about in this case because defence counsel asked for it after the rejection of their argument that the allegation of holding in slavery should appear in a separate count from the allegation of holding in servitude. The prosecution agreed, according to Mr Cavin KC, because they felt that it was necessary to make progress with the case and to bring fruitless argument to an end.

The circumstances in which such a direction should be given have been considered in a number of cases. It is enough to refer to Brown itself, to R v Mitchell [1994] Crim LR 66, and to R v Chilvers [2021] EWCA Crim 1311. Those circumstances are very limited. Chilvers involved an allegation of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship, contrary to s.76(1) and (11) of the Serious Crime Act 2015. There are relevant parallels between the nature of that offence and the offence or offences created by section 1(1)(a) of the 2015 Act. Indeed, an allegation of controlling or coercive behaviour against the appellant Somerset-How would appear to describe what happened quite well. Webb might have been indicted as a secondary party, or under the Serious Crime Act 2007 or perhaps a charge of conspiracy may have been preferred. It is perhaps worth noting that the court in Chilvers did not say that two counts were required because the statute, in criminalising “controlling or coercive behaviour” created two offences. The case proceeded on the basis that the statute created one offence which might be committed by behaviour of two different but very similar types. It concerned itself with whether a Brown direction should have been given and decide that it should not. The indictment had given nine particulars of behaviour by the appellant which were alleged to have resulted in controlling or coercive behaviour. At [63] and [64], following an extensive and careful review of authority, the court identified the “comparatively rare” circumstances in which such a direction should be given. Fulford VP said:-

“It is confined to those cases when, first, there is an appreciable danger that, when the jury in decidingwhether they are agreed on the matter that constitutes the relevant ingredient ofthe offence, some may convict having found a particular matter proved asconstituting the ingredient whilst others may find a wholly different matter ordifferent matters proved as constituting the ingredient. Therefore, when the factualbasis of the crime charged (e.g. as set out in the particulars) are, in reality,individually coterminous with an essential element or ingredient of the offence,then it appears it is necessary for a Brown direction to be given (see Kennedy LJin Giannetto at [58] above). Examples of this situation, as already described, areto be found in Brown, Smith, Mitchell, Boreman, Carr and D. This, it is to beemphasised, does not require each juror to follow the same route through theevidence to reach the decision that a particular ingredient is made out. Secondly,a Brown direction should be given when two distinct events or incidents are alleged,either of which constitutes the ingredient of the offence charged (see Smith at [53]and Boreman at [60]). Thirdly, a Brown direction should be given when twodifferent means of committing the offence may give rise to different defences (see Carr at [61] above).” [underlining added]

The decision in the case is at [71]:-

71 In our judgment, the present case is at considerable distance from the circumstances of Brown, Smith, Mitchell, Boreman, Carr and D. The actus reus of the offence in count 1 was the defendant’s repeated engagement in behaviour towards Magdalena Lesicka that was controlling or coercive. The nine particulars were simply examples of how that coercive behaviour was manifested, to assist the jury in understanding the nature of the case the defendant had to meet. The individual particulars were not each suggested to be coterminous with the actus reus. There was no realistic danger, therefore, that the jury might not have appreciated that they must all be agreed on the particular ingredient (viz the actus reus) on which they relied to found their verdict of guilty on count 1, and might return a verdict of guilty on the basis that some of them found one actus reus and others found another actus reus proved, with the result that they were not unanimous as to the ingredients which established the charge. The jury’s task was to evaluate the entirety of the behaviour in question and decide whether it was controlling or coercive in the light of all the evidence. It was not necessary for the jury to be agreed as to the parts of the evidence which led them to the conclusion that the actus reus of the offence had been made out. We stress this was not a case when two or more distinct events or incidents were alleged, either or any of which constituted the actus reus of the offence. Instead, it involved an assessment by the jury of the cumulative impact of the undoubtedly diverse evidence of controlling and coercive behaviour. There were not two or more different means of committing the offence which may have given rise to different defences, since the defence of the defendant was that the entirety of the allegations against him were simply untrue.

72 To summarise, therefore, the jury did not have to be unanimous as to which particular kind or kinds of controlling or coercive behaviour they were satisfied had been established. The relevant ingredient of the offence—the actus reus—was the defendant’s repeated engagement in behaviour towards Magdalena Lesicka that was controlling or coercive. That finding would have been sufficient. Simply because particulars of the offence in count 1 had been provided did not mean that those particulars were individually an essential ingredient of the offence. Instead, they did no more than indicate the nature of the case the prosecution sought to prove and they were a summary of the kinds of principal overt acts upon which the Crown relied.

The first of the six questions identified at [42] above is whether the judge was right to leave it open to the jury to convict if they were not satisfied that the prosecution had established slavery but were sure that they had established servitude. The directions, including the Brown direction, leave open the possibility that this was the basis of conviction. In a case where the victim provided no work or services for the appellants is that, in law, a proper basis for conviction?

This involves an analysis of the nature of the offence creating provision which will also feature in answering others of the questions which we address.

The judge’s definition of “servitude” in his paragraphs 21-23 and 25-26 is drawn directly from the definition given by the European Court in Saladin and the Court of Appeal in K. We consider that we should not depart from K in this respect and that we should take account of Saladin as required by section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 which is to the same effect. This means that servitude must involve the provision of work or services under coercion, with the additional requirements found in the passages from Siliadin and K quoted at [48] and [53] above which the judge included in his directions at his paragraph 22.

The difficulty with this approach in this case is that TSH never did provide any services or do any work for either appellant. Therefore, paragraph 26 of the judge’s directions was a misdirection. There was no basis, on this definition, on which the case could be left to the jury on the basis that it was open to them to find that TSH had been held in servitude.

This is made clear beyond argument when we approach the basis of the judge’s approach. The relevant provisions are set out at [61] and [62] above. They were new in the 2015 and had not appeared in the 2004 or 2009 Acts, but in Rooney the court held that they were intended to clarify but not to change the law. Section 3 primarily governs the circumstances which give rise to a finding that a person is exploited for the purposes of section 2 of the Act (the modern equivalent of the provision considered in K). Section 3(5) and (6) both deal with circumstances in which the securing of services from a person can constitute exploitation, and additionally with the circumstances in which causing that person to provide a benefit or to enable another person to acquire a benefit can amount to exploitation. This led the judge to conclude that the provision of a benefit or the enabling of another person to acquire a benefit is a form of work or services for the purposes of the definition of servitude which he had explained to the jury. Section 3(3)-(6) are carried into the interpretation of section 1 by section 1(4)(b) which only applies them to the provision of work or services in the circumstances described in those provisions of section 3. That is the only respect in which section 3, including the references to benefits, is applied to the interpretation and application of section 1. It is true that section 1(3) enables the court to “have regard to all the circumstances of the case” and that the two matters identified in section 3(4) are expressly described as “examples” of such circumstances. However, the 3(4)(b) example limits the relevance of the types of exploitation described in section 3(5) and (6) to cases where work or services are being provided would make no sense if section 1(3) permits a significant change to the definition of the word “servitude” so that they apply to cases where no work is being done or services provided.

This is a penal statute and it is an important principle of statutory construction that, as far as the wording allows, there should be no doubt about what conduct is penalised and what is not. That is a further reason for rejecting the approach of the judge.

For these reasons we consider that the judge was in error in leaving the case to the jury on the basis that they could find that TSH was held in servitude.

Further, the relationship between the judge’s definition of servitude in paragraphs 25 and 26 of his directions and the directions he later gives about the relevance of benefits flowing to the appellants as a consequence of their treatment of TSH is not made clear. He reminds the jury that it is the appellants’ case that these benefits cannot amount to “services” at his paragraph 31, but gives no clear guidance about the law which the jury should apply in resolving that question. He sets out the effect of section 3(5) and (6) in his paragraph 34 but does not explain how that is relevant. The result is a direction which, in addition to being based on a misinterpretation of the statute is unclear.

We agree with the court in K that the two ways of committing an offence under section 1(1)(a) of the 2015 are not mutually exclusive, see [40] set out at [56] above. We would suggest that just as the expression “forced or compulsory labour” involves the use of two expressions whose meaning is very close to each other, so “slavery” and “servitude” do not mean that same thing, but the conditions they describe are so similar that in many cases both words will be apt to describe the condition to which the victim was reduced by the conduct of the perpetrator. That qualifies the conclusion in the same case that there is a hierarchy, in descending order of seriousness, from holding in slavery, through holding in servitude to requiring the performance of forced or compulsory labour. We would prefer to describe section 1(1)(a) as creating one offence involving conduct of a kind which involves slavery or servitude which are closely related concepts. Both will usually involve the domination of a person to induce them to provide work or services, and to constitute servitude, as we have held, that element must be present. We are about to consider the definition of slavery to show what additional conduct the inclusion of that word might capture. There is no purpose to be achieved by interpreting this statutory provision so that it creates two offences where the distinction between the different ingredients is so fine and where in very many cases both will be present. In our judgment it should be approached in the same way as the offence of “controlling or coercive behaviour”, namely one offence which may be committed in two very similar and often indistinguishable ways.

This involves a different approach from that which the court in Grout took to the offences created by section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. We are not required to consider whether that decision was correct or not, but we consider that it should not be applied by analogy to section 1(1) of the 2015 Act, just as it has not been applied to the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship, contrary to s.76(1) and (11) of the Serious Crime Act 2015.

We do not agree with the judge that a Brown direction was required and in this respect we follow Chilvers. Brown directions are, rightly, very rare. If the jury agreed that TSH was held in slavery or servitude then the offence was made out. Of course, on the facts of this unusual case, as we have held, there was no evidence of servitude and the only word the jury should have been considering was “slavery”. This could have been addressed by deleting the word “servitude” from the Indictment or directing the jury that the word was irrelevant in this case because TSH did not work for or provide services to the appellants. Proof that a person was coerced to provide work or services is a classic element of proving offences under section 1 of the 2015 Act, including slavery. Where that is not the case, then particular care has to be taken to define “slavery” to show how it can exist without this element. We will turn to that definition shortly.

Given the way that the judge approached this case it is possible that the jury may have been unsure that there was slavery in this case, but sure that there was servitude and convicted on that basis. This renders the conviction unsafe because there was no evidence of servitude here. This was one of those cases where there is a palpable difference between slavery and servitude because the domination of TSH was not done so that he would provide work or services. Further, the judge’s direction to the jury about servitude was unclear and makes it impossible to know whether they approached the question of servitude properly. The answer which results from our consideration of questions 1 and 2, therefore, is that the jury may have convicted on a basis for which there was no evidence because of a misdirection.

The third and fourth questions we pose at [42] above require us to address the definition of slavery and the evidence in this case.

The judge’s definition is at his paragraphs 17-20. This is firmly based on K as we have sought to demonstrate. The judge’s paragraph 20 is drawn directly from paragraph [39] of K:-

“Treating someone as belonging to oneself by exercising some power over that person as one might over an animal or object”

There is a significant problem in adopting the “classic” definition of slavery, sometimes called “chattel slavery”, and using it as a basis for the definition of criminal conduct imported by the use of the word slavery in section 1(1)(a) of the 2015 Act. In Siliadin the decision of the court was that the victim was not enslaved “in the proper sense, in other words that Mr and Mrs B exercised a genuine right of legal ownership over her, thus reducing her to the status of an ‘object’”, see paragraph [122] of the judgment at our [48] above. Siliadin had defined slavery as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised”. The problem with this is that there is no “right of ownership” of a human person to which any “powers” might be attached. It has been clear for a very long time that in this jurisdiction it is not possible in law to own another person and to acquire any rights over them by ownership. The same is true in France and throughout the nations which are signatories to the European Convention. The approach to the definition of slavery of the court in Siliadin is therefore difficult to reconcile with the prohibition on slavery in section 1 of the 2015 Act.

The word “slavery” also appears in section 45 of the 2015 Act which creates a defence to victims of slavery who commit offences through compulsion in the sense there defined. This judgment does not require any detailed analysis of that provision, but it is clear that that defence does not only apply to those who were owned by another person who exercised powers attaching to the right of ownership over them. The definition of slavery in section 45 certainly goes beyond the “classic definition” of “slavery proper”, which is an indicator that it also does in section 1 of the same Act.

The “classic definition” of slavery may continue to have validity. It appears in international instruments which are intended to outlaw slavery and the slave trade in parts of the world where such things may still occur. In addition to the Slavery Convention 1927 relied upon in Siliadin, it appears in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery Adopted by a Conference of Plenipotentiaries convened by Economic and Social Council resolution 608(XXI) of 30 April 1956 and done at Geneva on 7 September 1956, Entry into force: 30 April 1957, in accordance with article 13. It is set out in the Guide on Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights mentioned at [57] above.

The Siliadin definition, whatever its problems, is therefore widespread. The Australian Criminal Code has this definition of slavery (and also defines servitude as we have done):-

“For the purposes of this Division, slavery is the condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised, including where such a condition results from a debt or contract made by the person.”

It is, nevertheless, obvious that the meaning of slavery in a modern act of Parliament which creates an offence which can be committed in the United Kingdom cannot be premised on the existence of a legal status which does not exist here. We are concerned to define slavery in that statute for the purposes of the criminal jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales.

That statement of the obvious has led to attempts to find language which extends the definition of slavery to circumstances which have some of the characteristics of ownership, even if ownership itself cannot exist. The decision making sections of K [39]-[41], as opposed to the definition sections at [19]-[24], therefore contain such language. As we have explained the court there was concerned to interpret and apply Article 4 directly, whereas our task is to interpret and apply the 2015 Act “in accordance with Article 4” and in a way which is “compatible with” it. The difference in these exercises may be conducive to the use of more concrete language, rather than expressions such as “treating someone as belonging to oneself by exercising some power over that person as one might over an animal object”. This is the expression from K which found its way into the judge’s directions.

This is not to say that purporting to buy and sell a person, and passing them round from one abuser to another, would not constitute holding that person in slavery. On the contrary it clearly might. It is rather to ensure that the definition of slavery is wider than that and not limited to cases where a status of legal ownership is created by coercion.

We consider that the essence of slavery is the domination of another person’s life so that they are deprived of any real personal autonomy. They are deprived of important freedoms by the coercion and controlling behaviour of another person. This may involve a form of imprisonment, forced work, demands for sexual and other “services”, or forced compliance with demands for obedience. They may have no freedom to decide where to live, or with whom. In this case, TSH was denied the freedom to choose who would provide intimate personal care for him, the purpose of which was to preserve as much personal autonomy as possible, given the constraints of his physical disability. He could not decide when to go to the lavatory, when to go out of the house or whether to see his family. He reached the stage, according to the messages, when he wanted to die because it was his only escape from these miserable and squalid conditions. Counsel for the appellants have pointed to some things which he was able to do, and the resolution of the question of whether the restrictions imposed by the behaviour of the appellants amounted to a sufficient removal of his freedom was an issue for the jury to resolve on the evidence.

Much criminal conduct has the effect of restricting the freedom of the victim. The obvious cases are false imprisonment, kidnap, controlling and coercive behaviour, but this consideration is not limited to offences where it amounts to an ingredient of the offence. We consider that the judge was right to direct the jury as he did in his paragraphs 40 and 41, particularly paragraph 41. Slavery is a status and not a condition which lasts only for a short time. The same is true of servitude. The direction that it should last for more than a period of a few days or weeks was intended to deal with the facts of this case and we can conceive of cases where slavery was established in a period of weeks, but the judge’s directions that the jury should decide whether the period of time was long enough to justify a finding that he was “held” in slavery or servitude is accurate, clear and helpful.

It seems likely that the two requirements of servitude identified in the judge’s directions at his paragraph 22 will equally be requirements of slavery in most cases. They were not, however, repeated by the judge as indicators of slavery and this direction related only to servitude. These were (with some words added by us to the second):-

In our judgment the best way to direct a jury about the meaning of slavery is to produce a legal direction which is tailored to the facts of the case, rather as our paragraph [92] begins with a general statement of principle but then brings it to the facts of TSH’s life during the period of the slavery. It will always be helpful to identify the conduct of the defendant which is said to amount to holding the person in slavery, and to direct the jury that they must decide whether that conduct had the effect of reducing the person’s personal autonomy to such an extent and for such a period that it amounted to holding them in slavery.

The way in which a question may be framed for the jury may benefit from consideration by the authors of the Crown Court Compendium. We have two formulations of the general principle to offer for consideration, but repeat that it will be necessary in all cases to tailor this to the facts of the case:-

The judge’s directions were based on authority and in many respects sound, but we do not consider that paragraph 20 of his directions was adequate. He is not to be criticised for that, because he used words extracted from a decision of this court. He also followed the modern practice of distributing his directions in draft and seeking the assistance of counsel about them. He did that in a careful and thorough way. The problem with his definition of slavery is that it draws the jury’s attention to how one might treat an “animal or object”, rather than focussing on the effect of the conduct of the appellant’s personal autonomy and freedom. The earlier reference to the Slavery Convention of 1927 did not assist because it dealt with the concept of powers attaching to a right of ownership, rather than what was done to TSH and its effect on him. This was apt to confuse.

The offence is committed when a person holds another in slavery. Slavery is a change in the status of the victim from being free to exercise choice to being subject in all important matters to the will of another. The direction must of course identify the conduct which is said to have brought about that change (“the holding”) but must also clearly direct the jury that slavery concerns the condition of the victim and the impact of the conduct on it. The judge’s direction failed to make that clear.

We do consider that there was evidence on which a jury properly directed could have concluded that TSH was held in slavery by these appellants, but we do not think that it was so overwhelming that the conviction is safe notwithstanding the problem which arose in relation to the judge wrongly leaving it open to them to find that TSH was held in servitude. In other words, the evidence was not such as to drive us to the conclusion that the jury must inevitably have concluded that TSH was held in slavery given the findings which they reached on the facts.

The flaws in the direction given to the jury about the definition of slavery also lead to the conclusion that these convictions are not safe. This conclusion is not dependent on our decision about the safety of any conviction based on servitude but leads independently to the same result.

It follows that the convictions on count 1 will, in due course, be quashed.

We will deal with the fifth question, duplicity, quite quickly in view of its relative unimportance given the conclusion we have reached. We have cited DPP v Merriman and Grout above at [65]-[67]. We have concluded at [80] above that section1(1)(a) of the 2015 Act creates a single offence which could be committed in different ways. On that analysis no question of duplicity arises. Even if it did, the rule is based on pragmatism and it does not follow that a technical breach will always render a conviction unsafe. In Grout the court did not simply identify a technical breach and quash the conviction. They took that step because the one count had charged four offences and there was no evidence to support two of the allegations. The court said:-

“We have concluded that this failure in itself makes the conviction unsafe because the jury were asked to consider, within the one count, two possible offences which they should not have been asked to consider. We do not know on what basis the jury did, in fact, convict the appellant.”

In this case the duplicity argument adds nothing of substance to the decision we have already taken about the decision to leave it open to the jury to convict on the basis that the conduct of the appellants did not amount to holding TSH in slavery but did amount to holding him in servitude. It would not, without that substantial problem, justify quashing the conviction on its own and we say no more about it.

For the reasons we have given the convictions on count 1 will, in due course, be quashed.

This means that the sentence of 11 years imposed on count 1 falls away and (subject to what may happen at any retrial) we consider these applications in relation to the sentences which remain, namely in Webb’s case three consecutive terms of 3 years imprisonment and a concurrent term of 12 months, and in Somerset-How’s case three consecutive terms of 3 years imprisonment. When the conviction on count 1 is quashed, they will each therefore serving sentences totalling 9 years.

The important point to record is that the factual basis of count 1 and the factual bases of the other offences in respect of which there were convictions are the same. The three offences of ill treatment by a care worker contrary to section 20 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 of which Webb was convicted and the three offences of aiding and abetting ill treatment by a care worker contrary to the same provision of which Somerset-How was convicted reflect exactly the same conduct which was said to have amounted to holding TSH in slavery. These counts reflected the criminality of the appellants without any need to engage in the complexities of the 2015 Act. As we have observed at [69] above a charge of controlling and coercive behaviour may also have been suitable. The difference which count 1 made is that it attracts a different guideline with a higher maximum penalty. It is hard to see how there could have been convictions on count 1 and acquittals on the ill treatment by a care worker offences, so even without count 1 there would have been the power which was exercised in this case to reflect the overall criminality of the case by imposing consecutive terms for those offences.

The question for us is whether those sentences of 9 years are manifestly excessive. They are clearly not wrong in principle.

As we have explained in setting out the facts above, this was cruel and neglectful behaviour of a powerless and defenceless man in his own home. He depended on care for his most intimate functions and if he was let down, as he was, he was left in filthy squalor until someone deigned to clean up. This happened because the appellants had a five-year plan which required them to pretend to care for him so that they could live in his house and Webb could earn an income for pretending to provide care. The five-year plan developed because the appellants were having an affair in the same house, although TSH was not aware of this until he saw the messages which the police had extracted which passed between the two appellants.

TSH was abused and threatened and caused to live an isolated life from which he could see no escape but death.

This is a substantial sentence for offenders of good character, but it was imposed by a judge who had heard the trial and had a depth of insight into the conduct and motivation of the appellants.

We mentioned above that the conduct caused serious weight loss and under-nourishment. The latest victim personal statement confirms the lasting impact of it.

“Physically this case has caused me health troubles. It has affected my digestive system, my appetite is not where it should be. This is because I had gotten used to one box of food. I feel like they have done a decade’s worth of damage to my body. Cerebral palsy if you don’t keep up with everything you need to it attacks in a much more severe way. They have let the disease attack me and have caused life altering physical and psychological damage.

Psychologically this will never go away. I will never be able to form a proper relationship again. Mentally and emotionally, I cannot get to the stage where I need to be to form a meaningful and fair long term romantic relationship. What I mean by fair is that they can give me love but I cannot ever give it back to them. I can feel a connection artificially and I can synthesise it, but it is not a true connection as I am always waiting for somebody to drop me and tell me I am not what they want. I felt this way before Sarah but after Sarah this has crystalised that feeling and made it permanent. I will never be able to get past what has happened to me. This situation never ends for me and I will continue to live my life tainted from what they have done to me.”

We have carefully reflected on this case and come to the conclusion that it is not arguable that the sentences imposed by the judge were manifestly excessive. It is clear that Webb took the leading role in the conduct and he was the one paid to provide care while actually doing the opposite. He was also convicted of a relatively minor offence of violence against TSH. We have asked ourselves whether the sentence on Sarah Somerset-How should have been less than that on Webb. We think not. Her betrayal of her husband was quite shocking and the offences were committed very cynically for their joint benefit.

For these reasons, we dismiss the application for leave to appeal against sentence against the sentences imposed in respect of the convictions which survive.

Following the handing down of the judgment which appears above on 19 November 2025 the prosecution applied for a order under section 7 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 that both appellants should be retried on count 1. Section 7 is in these terms:-

7 Power to order retrial.

(1)

Where the Court of Appeal allow an appeal against conviction and it appears to the Court that the interests of justice so require, they may order the appellant to be retried.

For the reasons given at [106] in our judgment, count 1 added nothing to the factual basis of sentence in this case. The appellants have been sentenced in each case to terms of 9 years’ imprisonment for their grave criminal conduct. The whole of that conduct was described in the three counts against each appellant described in that paragraph. The judge correctly used consecutive sentences to reflect the totality of the offending. We have dismissed the applications for leave to appeal against those sentences.

The prosecution submit that count 1 did add materially to the seriousness of the case because it resulted in a sentence on each appellant of 11 years. The early release provisions for that sentence mean that they will serve 2/3 of it (88 months) before they are released. They submit that the sentences on the other counts will qualify for release at 40% of the term. 40% of 9 years is 42 months. The difference in outcome is partly the result of decisions made by Parliament about the availability of early release in different classes of offence, but it is not only that. The offence charged in count 1, holding a person in slavery, may be committed by the same conduct as one or more offences of ill treatment by a care worker contrary to section 20 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, but it requires proof of an additional consequence of that conduct for the victim. The ill-treatment must be shown to have deprived the victim of personal autonomy, or personal freedom, to such an extent that their condition has become that of a slave. We have suggested at [94] above that in most cases of slavery it is likely that this condition will include the loss of the ability to decide where to live and also that it is likely that the person enslaved will see no prospect of changing that condition. There is, in principle, a difference between offences of holding in slavery and ill-treatment.

However, that difference in principle does not necessarily lead to a different outcome in the circumstances of this case. The gravity of the consequences for the victim of an offence of ill-treatment by a care worker is a highly significant determinant of sentence for that offence. The sentences of nine years were clearly intended to reflect the culpability of the appellants and the harm they did to their victim. In rejecting the application for leave to appeal against those terms we held that this was so. We did not consider whether the additional two years was justified because of the conviction on count 1. On the particular facts of this case, it could be said that the same level of culpability and harm was present in the ill-treatment offences on the one hand and the slavery offence on the other.

Offences contrary to section 1 of the 2015 Act carry a maximum life imprisonment and are listed in Part 1 of Schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Parliament decided that release at the two thirds point was appropriate for those sentenced to seven years or more for such offences. Because of a crisis in prison capacity, Parliament decided that in many other cases people who would formerly have been required to serve half their sentences before release may now be released at the 40% point.

We venture to suggest that, apart from the difference which arises from these early release provisions, it could not sensibly suggested that there should be a retrial in this case, where the appellants have been convicted of and sentenced for all the wrong doing alleged against them. This is not a case where the judge decided that the appellants should be treated as dangerous offenders against whom the public required protection. Therefore, the difference in release provisions appears to us of more a matter of government policy than sentencing principle and is of limited if any weight when considering whether it is in the interests of justice to order a re-trial.

We have also considered the strength of the evidence of the offence of holding in slavery. We have found that there was a case to answer in that regard, see [99], but we have also held that the evidence was not overwhelming. On a proper direction, the jury would have to consider the case based on slavery and not servitude. They would have to decide that the conduct of the appellants was such as to deprive TSH of all important freedoms in his life (in short summary). That is an evaluative exercise and it is conceivable that different juries may come to different conclusions about it.

Finally, we consider that it is relevant that the prosecution has had a full opportunity to present its case on count 1, and that the reason this issue arises now is that the judge made two errors which they failed to correct.  First, the judge allowed the case to go to the jury on the basis that TSH was held in servitude when he was not, and secondly the direction about slavery was not adequate to explain what had to be proved if the case was to succeed on that basis.  If the prosecution chooses to indict an offence in novel circumstances where the law is not widely understood, they bear a significant burden in assisting a trial judge to avoid error.  In this case, there was a lengthy exchange between the judge and prosecuting counsel on 28 April 2023 when the judge was troubled about the definition of servitude and asked for help about the importance of whether or not TSH was providing services. On 4 May 2023 the prosecution provided written submissions resisting a suggestion that count 1 might be split into two counts, one alleging servitude and the other slavery. On 8 May the judge distributed draft directions of law and a discussion document which explained how he had reached the conclusions he had. This resulted in discussions in which all parties had the opportunity to make submissions about the law and the legal directions which should be given. Where a judge falls into error, having sought help from the prosecution about how he should direct a jury, it should not simply be assumed that in all cases the prosecution will be allowed to try again.

We consider that in the particular circumstances of this case the interests of justice do not require a retrial, and we shall not order one. The appellants benefit from the generous early release provisions now in force and have avoided the more stringent early release provisions which would have applied to a sentence for count 1. They have nevertheless been convicted of very serious criminal offending and have received a substantial term of imprisonment for it.

Accordingly the reporting restriction ordered on 19 November 2025 pursuant to section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 is discharged. This judgment may now be reported in full.