R v Jordan Davis

On 11 June 2025, in the Crown Court at Croydon, having pleaded guilty at an earlier hearing, the appellant, who was then aged 31, was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for one offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving. He was disqualified from driving for three and a half yeas.

He now appeals against the custodial sentence with the leave of the single judge.

On the afternoon of 27 October 2024, Moshood Lawal was driving a goods vehicle along Stafford Road in Croydon. The appellant, who was driving a white transit van, was travelling in the same direction. His 6 year old daughter was in the front passenger seat.

While events are captured on CCTV and dashcam footage, the precise circumstances of what initially occurred are not captured. However, it can best be described as a road rage incident. Mr Lawal believed that the appellant had cut him up and hit his vehicle. There was an exchange of words before both men got out of their vehicles. The appellant approached Mr Lawal in an aggressive manner. He responded by shoving the appellant forcefully. While not wholly one sided, the pushing and shoving came more from Mr Lawal. The appellant was said to have shouted words to the effect that he would stab Mr Lawal. As he walked back to his vehicle, the appellant said, "Pull over at the next traffic lights and see what I do to you". Mr Lawal drove off again. The appellant tailed him, not maintaining a safe distance. Mr Lawal pulled over and there was a further exchange of words, with Mr Lawal saying, "Go for it", referencing the appellant's earlier threat. Mr Lawal then returned to his vehicle. As he did so, the appellant revved his engine and drove directly at Mr Lawal at speed, striking him and his vehicle. The appellant then drove away from the scene.

That crucial part of the incident is clearly captured on CCTV footage which we have watched. It was shocking, as demonstrated by the reactions of passers by.

Mr Lawal suffered a large laceration to his left arm and soft tissue damage. He underwent surgical closure of the wound the following day. He also sustained injury to his ankle, which caused difficulty with walking and which required him to sleep downstairs for three weeks. He experienced symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder and was prescribed sleeping pills.

In a Victim Personal Statement prepared some six weeks after the offence, Mr Lawal described a significant ongoing impact on all aspects of daily life.

The appellant had six previous convictions for ten offences. The last was in 2018. In 2017 he was sentenced to a community order in relation to assaulting two police officers and using a vehicle while uninsured. The assaults had occurred in the context of the police conducting a vehicle stop when the appellant was driving.

The judge had character references from the appellant's partner and sister, which emphasised that he was a family man and that his absence from the family while he was on remand had had a significant impact on his family, including his young children. There was no pre-sentence report.

We have had the benefit of a prison report which confirms that the appellant's conduct in prison has been good. He is apparently now on home detention curfew.

Having viewed the CCTV footage, the judge found that the appellant had driven directly at Mr Lawal and had veered to do so. He noted that the appellant had not been driving fast before that, but had clearly accelerated in Mr Lawal's direction.

With reference to the sentencing guidelines, the judge found that the case fell into culpability category A. The appellant had made a deliberate choice to ignore the rules of the road. He was not, as he had suggested, trying to get away from Mr Lawal. It was, the judge found, a highly dangerous manoeuvre. Although short-lived and a split second decision, it was an appalling piece of driving.

There was no issue about the categorisation of harm, which fell into the lower category 2 bracket. Having placed the offence in category A2, which gives a starting point of three years' custody, and a range of two to four years, the judge identified a number of aggravating factors, namely: the appellant's previous convictions, the fact that he failed to stop after striking Mr Lawal, the presence of a child in his vehicle, and that he was driving a goods vehicle. Those factors were to be balanced against the personal mitigation.

The judge took account of the character references, the impact on the appellant's family and business, and the fact that he had made good progress in custody. The judge concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigation. He therefore concluded that the appropriate sentence after trial would have been 43 months' imprisonment. He allowed 15 per cent credit for the guilty plea, arriving at the final sentence of 36 months' imprisonment.

By his grounds of appeal, the appellant contends that the judge took too high a starting point under the guidelines; although it is accepted that the judge was entitled to place the offence into category A2, it is argued that there were mitigating circumstances which required a significant downward adjustment. Secondly, the appellant contends that he was afforded inadequate credit for his guilty plea.

In his well focused oral submissions, Mr Brewer has contended that there were three factors that ought to have led the judge to conclude that a downwards rather than an upwards adjustment was required from the starting point. First, he relies on the incident not being prolonged or sustained, and not demonstrating deliberate endangerment. Secondly, he says that the context of this offence was important, namely that the appellant was responding to aggression from Mr Lawal. Thirdly, he relies upon the personal mitigation, all of which was clearly set out to the judge and is identified in the papers before us, including the character references which we have read.

In short, Mr Brewer contends that the balance struck by the judge between those aggravating and mitigating factors was wrong and there ought to have been a downward adjustment. Further, he suggests that it may be that there was a degree of double counting in relation to the feature of the vehicle being a goods vehicle, which he suggests the judge perhaps took into account both in the categorisation of the offence and in treating it as a further aggravating factor.

In relation to the argument about credit for the guilty plea, the plea and trial preparation hearing took place in November 2024. At that time the offence with which we are concerned was not on the indictment. Instead, the appellant was charged with an offence of wounding with intent and an offence of dangerous driving. He entered not guilty pleas to both of those offences. The offence with which we are concerned was not added to the indictment until later. Mr Brewer tells us that there had been a late change of representation, following which the plea was offered on 23 April 2025, albeit that arrangements could not be made for the appellant actually to enter the plea until 30 April 2025. Mr Brewer accepts that any one of the features upon which he relies may not have been sufficient to justify greater credit than the appellant was in fact allowed. But taking the late amendment of the indictment, the earlier offer to enter a plea to the new charge and the late change of representation together, Mr Brewer contends that the judge ought to have afforded more than the 15 per cent that he in fact did.

We take first the arguments in relation to the sentencing guidelines. The judge was undoubtedly right to place the offence into category A2 as is realistically conceded. It is said by Mr Brewer that this was a momentary offence committed in response to a stressful and provocative situation of escalating aggression from Mr Lawal. It is submitted that the prosecution conceded that this was not a deliberate or reckless attempt to collide with or to endanger Mr Lawal, but we have seen nothing to confirm that such a concession was in fact made. We do acknowledge that in accepting the guilty plea to the charge of causing serious injury by dangerous driving, rather than pursuing the charge of wounding with intent, the prosecution can be taken to have accepted that the appellant did not deliberately drive into collision with Mr Lawal. There was no basis of plea, and the judge said that the appellant had pleaded guilty on a full facts basis. In any event, the clear CCTV evidence leaves no room for doubt about what occurred. It is wrong to say that at the moment he drove at Mr Lawal, the appellant was responding to escalating aggression from Mr Lawal. Whatever the rights and wrongs of what had gone before, Mr Lawal was close to his own vehicle with the door open when the appellant drove directly at the vehicle door. Striking the door was inevitable and was what did in fact occur, which obviously endangered Mr Lawal.

Further, the suggestion that the offence was partly borne out of a desire to remove his daughter from a dangerously escalating dispute cannot be maintained on the evidence before the judge and this court. It is quite clear from the CCTV footage that the appellant followed Mr Lawal, closely on his tail. In our judgment, the judge's findings of fact are unimpeachable. Indeed, they were the only findings reasonably open to him on the basis of the CCTV evidence. Far from trying to remove his daughter from danger, the appellant deliberately drove in a manner that placed her in real danger, since she was in the seat closer to the impact. No doubt he did not intend her harm, but in his anger he failed to think sufficiently of her. Her presence was, as the judge identified, a very significant aggravating factor.

In our judgment, the judge's weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors was faultless. We are entirely satisfied that the sentence of 43 months' imprisonment, which the judge identified as appropriate after trial, was well within the range available to him.

As for the credit for the guilty plea, it is contended that the appellant pleaded guilty to the offence for which he was sentenced at the first opportunity and that credit of only 15 per cent was insufficient. While it is right that the appellant was initially charged with wounding with intent and with dangerous driving, and not with the offence with which we are now concerned, the appellant maintained not guilty pleas in relation to both the initial charges, so that the matter proceeded to trial on both charges. The appellant had make it clear that he denied all criminality and had put forward a positive defence. The count to which the appellant pleaded guilty was added at a later stage, and the appellant pleaded guilty to that offence. In our view, the appellant might have had a somewhat stronger argument on credit had he pleaded guilty to the less serious offence of dangerous driving at an earlier stage. He did not do so. Rather, he maintained that he was not guilty of dangerous driving. That was an essential element of the offence for which he was eventually sentenced. In those circumstances, the appellant is not entitled to credit on the basis that he pleaded at the first opportunity.

We have considered all the points advanced on the appellant's behalf by Mr Brewer but conclude that the credit allowed by the judge, which was in reality a little over 15 per cent, was entirely appropriate, given the stage at which the appellant was prepared to acknowledge his criminality.

It follows that we reject both grounds of appeal. The sentence of three years' imprisonment was entirely appropriate. It was certainly not manifestly excessive.

This appeal is accordingly dismissed.

That leaves us with an outstanding issue about the disqualification. This is a point that was picked up by the Court of Appeal Office. It did not form part of the appellant's appeal. The record and no doubt documents that the appellant will have had show that he is subject to an extended re-test. There is no complaint about the length of the disqualification, which was clearly dealt with at the time. Unless counsel want to seek to persuade us otherwise, that is the end of the matter. There is no evidence before us to show that that was not the judge's sentence. We therefore do not propose to correct the record in any way.

In relation to the summary only offences, we are minded not to take any action. The prosecution have not made any application before coming today. They will have to consider whether they need to take action in the magistrates' court. Clearly, if it had been dealt with properly, no separate penalty would have been imposed on both of those charges. The prosecution will have to work out what they want to do about them.