R v Robbie Cook

This is a renewed application for leave to appeal. On 23 October 2024, the applicant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Lewes to three counts of causing death by dangerous driving, contrary to section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and to a further count of doing an act tending and intended to pervert the course of justice. Those guilty pleas were entered at the pre-trial and preparation hearing. On 22 November 2024, the applicant was sentenced by HHJ Laing KC to a total sentence of 18 years' imprisonment. He was also disqualified from driving for 14 years and ordered to take an extended retest and the victim surcharge was imposed.

The facts were as follows. On 13 February 2023, shortly after 10.30 pm, the applicant was driving a Range Rover motor vehicle at high speed through the residential streets in Eastbourne in pursuit of a Berlingo motor vehicle driven by Jonathan Day (then aged 32) who had two passengers in his car, namely Jon Miller and Daniel Davies. Jonathan Day was unfamiliar with the roads in Eastbourne. As a result of that pursuit and the applicant's dangerous driving Jonathan Day lost control of his motor vehicle. The car left the road and hit a tree and all three occupants of that car suffered catastrophic injuries and died at the scene.

There was evidence that the applicant's stepson, Harvey Murphy, had anticipated being supplied with a significant quantity of drugs from at least one of the men in the Berlingo. The evidence showed that the intention had been to supply Murphy with bogus drugs, and the sentencing judge found that it was likely that Murphy had paid a substantial amount of money for what turned out to be false drugs. No drugs were ever recovered.

The applicant accepted that he had been selling drugs with Murphy. The call logs and CCTV footage showed the Berlingo motor vehicle appeared to be leaving the area but after there was a call to one of the occupants the car drove back to the area where the initial deal had taken place. The applicant then arrived in the Range Rover two minutes later, the Berlingo then drove away with the applicant in pursuit and then, as we have explained, came off the road and hit a tree with fatal consequences.

After the crash, the applicant got out of his car and went over to the vehicle where he could hear the fatally injured occupants moaning. The CCTV which we have watched shows that for a period of 3 minutes or so he is at the scene of the crash. He did not summon any help at all. Rather, the applicant went back to his car, turned off the headlights and used his phone as a torch to search around the vehicle, no doubt looking for drugs or money. The applicant then got back in his car and drove away. After that he destroyed his phone. He asked another person to report the crash and the emergency services were only notified of the collision 1 hour after it had happened. All the occupants of the Berlingo car died at the scene.

The applicant has 17 convictions for 40 offences stretching over a period until October 2021, some of which relate to other offences concerning motor vehicles but the sentencing judge paid little attention to or placed little weight on that earlier offending.

The sentencing judge was sure that the applicant drove his car in pursuit of the men in the Berlingo after he had discovered that false drugs may have been supplied. The Berlingo came back to the place where the initial drug deal had taken place and when the applicant returned to that area in his Range Rover the pursuit immediately began. The applicant did not dispute that this was a category 1 offence under the Sentencing Guideline and that there were other aggravating features, namely that other road users had been put at risk and that he had pleaded guilty to perverting the course of justice, and that he failed to summon any help immediately and that three people had been killed.

The sentencing judge had regard to the references she was provided with in relation to the applicant and his personal circumstances in mitigation. In concluding her sentencing remarks she said this:

The applicant seeks leave to appeal on the ground that the sentence is manifestly excessive. In support of this Mr Israel, on behalf of the applicant, says that the starting point of 24 years is too high. Mr Israel also says that insufficient regard was made to mitigating factors, in particular the actions of the deceased. There is no dispute that under the sentencing guidelines this was a category A offence within a category range of 8 to 18 years' custody. The judge referred to that categorisation in her sentencing remarks and having identified the aggravating and mitigating features identified a notional sentence of 24 years before applying the discount for guilty plea to which the applicant was entitled of 25 per cent.

Before us today Mr Israel, for the applicant, has made oral submissions and in particular has submitted that the sentencing judge failed to take into account Mr Day's driving and in particular the speed at which Mr Day was driving and the toxicology evidence. Mr Israel submits that Mr Day was partly at least responsible for what happened in the events resulting in his death. Mr Israel submits that there is very little to recommend Mr Day's behaviour and that the sentencing court ignored altogether the culpability of Mr Day.

We disagree. The reason Mr Day was driving so fast was because the applicant was driving very fast extremely close to the rear of his vehicle. This was on a road with which Mr Day was unfamiliar and the applicant was in a bigger and much more powerful car. The applicant gave Mr Day no opportunity to stop and the reason he was driving so fast behind him was because he was trying to enforce a drug debt and he wanted his money back. The submission that Mr Day was in some way responsible for what happened is, in our view, misconceived on the facts of this case. We do not consider that this is a point which is arguable.

In his written grounds Mr Israel has argued that aside from the fact there were multiple victims, which he accepted is the most serious of all, and that the applicant disposed of his mobile phone the following day, there were no other aggravating factors identified. This is wrong. The judge was very careful in her sentencing remarks to identify all the relevant aggravating features which also included putting other road users at risk and the applicant's failure to summon any medical help. Rather, he looked after his own interests and searched the crashed vehicle for drugs or money. On top of that the applicant's offending was further aggravated by the fact that this was a pursuit which arose in the context of a drug deal. In addition to that, the judge paid regard to all the mitigation advanced by the applicant and gave very little weight, if any, to his previous convictions.

The last point we should mention is that Mr Israel also submitted that the judge failed to take into account the fact that the applicant did contact the emergency services. The judge found there was no mitigation in this and we agree. The applicant's only thought was for himself at the scene. He had his mobile phone with him but for 3 minutes he used it as a torch and failed to call the emergency services. If he had done so at that time, Mr Israel conceded that some of those in the car may have survived. Again, there is nothing in this point and we note that although the emergency services were contacted, that was some time afterwards.

In her sentencing remarks the judge was careful to have regard to all the aggravating and mitigating features and having done so, this was plainly a case where she was entitled to go outside the category range in identifying the sentences before applying the discount for guilty plea. Further, in our view, if the applicant's actions had resulted in one death, we consider that before a discount for guilty plea, the appropriate sentence would have been at least 16 years. Here there were three deaths.

We have considered carefully all the papers in this and listened to all that has been said by Mr Israel today. The sentence passed by HHJ Laing KC cannot be faulted in anyway. We do not consider it is arguable that the sentence passed was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. The application is dismissed.