R v Jacqueline Mulenga Mwila

One of the victims of the applicant's offending is a child. We order that no matter relating to him may, while he is aged under 18, be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify him as a person concerned in the proceedings. This includes, in particular: his name, his address, the identity of any school or other educational establishment attended by him, the identity of any place of work and any still or moving image of him. To protect his identity, we will refer to him as M and we will refer to his late mother as N and to her partner as O.

The single judge has referred to the full court the applicant's applications for an extension of the time for applying for and, if the extension of time is granted, leave to appeal against the sentence imposed on her on 4 October 2024 in the Crown Court at Caernarfon for three offences to which she had pleaded guilty.

The applicant was sentenced to 7 years and 4 months' imprisonment for an offence of causing death by dangerous driving, contrary to section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The victim of that offence was N. The applicant was sentenced to 16 months' imprisonment for an offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving, contrary to section 1A of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The victim of that offence was O. The applicant was also sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment for a further offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving. The victim of that offence was M. All three sentences were concurrent.

The defendant indicated a guilty plea to the offence of causing death by dangerous driving in the magistrates' court. She also pleaded guilty in the magistrates' court to the offence of causing serious injury to M by dangerous driving, but she did not plead guilty to the other offence until the plea and trial preparation hearing in the Crown Court. That is because it was not clear when the case was in the magistrates' court whether O's injuries amounted to serious injuries.

We are told that the reason for the delay in commencing this appeal was the need to secure funding for the applicant's representation. In those circumstances, we have considered the merits of the proposed appeal.

On 3 April 2023 the applicant was driving along a busy road, the A487, in the direction of Caernarfon when she collided with a car being driven by N, a 28-year-old woman. The passengers in that car were N's partner, O, and her 4-year-old son, M. At the point where the collision happened, and for some distance before that, double white lines separated the lane for traffic travelling towards Caernarfon from the two lanes of traffic travelling in the opposite direction, which was towards Bangor. The applicant had had ample opportunity to observe both the double white lines and the hatch markings which preceded them, but she was driving on the wrong side of the double white lines, in one of the lanes for traffic travelling in the opposite direction. Moreover, the speed limit on that stretch of road was 60 mph, but the applicant was driving initially at 65 mph and then, five seconds before the collision, she accelerated to 69 mph. She did not apply her brakes until one second before the collision.

N was killed by the collision. Her death was virtually instantaneous. M had multiple injuries and fractures. These included an injury to his brain, multiple areas of bleeding within his brain, swelling to the tissue of his neck, fractures to the bones of his neck and to the bones of his lower spine, rib fractures, lung contusions, fluid between the lining of the lungs and the lungs themselves, a laceration to his liver, a duodenal perforation and fractures to the bone of his right forearm. His bowel was abnormally adhered together, there were holes in his bowel and his gall bladder was distended. His treatment for these injuries will continue for years. O sustained fractures to two of the bones in his hand. There was also injury to blood vessels around the front aspect of the upper and middle regions of his right lung, resulting in an accumulation of blood and fluid within the lung tissue and the collapse of his left lung. The hand injury has resulted in a permanent reduction in function of the hand. O was off work for a year. Another driver, Malcolm Williams, was also injured in the collision. He had pain in the right side of his chest and he was bleeding from his head.

There were victim personal statements from O, from N's parents and from M's father. These all spoke of the terrible and continuing loss they have suffered. For instance, M and his younger brother will have to grow up without their mother. We fully endorse the remarks which the judge addressed to N's friends and family.

The applicant was 51 when she was sentenced. The pre-sentence report disclosed that she showed great remorse, but also that she denied that she was overtaking at the time of the collision, whereas the judge was sure that the applicant had been performing an overtaking manoeuvre at the time of the collision.

The applicant had a variety of health conditions. She had also experienced physical, emotional and sexual abuse in her native Zambia between the ages of 11 and 21 and she had been subject to abusive relationships, first with her husband and then with another man who went on to murder another woman. A letter from Dr Nilufa Ahmed, a psychologist, said that the applicant had post-traumatic stress and that the collision had triggered dormant traumas concerning her childhood and her abuse. Dr Ahmed's opinion was that, given the interconnection of her physical and mental health, a custodial sentence would have a significantly adverse impact on the applicant's emotional, mental and physical health.

A letter from the applicant emphasised her remorse. Fourteen character references spoke to her many positive qualities. She was rightly described by her counsel as a conscientious, hard-working member of her local community and society more widely, giving all of her time through charitable endeavours to helping other people.

It was possible that the applicant's imprisonment would lead to her adult son losing his home. The applicant's niece and nephew in Zambia would also lose the financial support which the applicant had been providing to them.

It was accepted that the applicant's culpability was such as to place the offence of causing death by dangerous driving in category A in the relevant sentencing guideline, with a starting point of 12 years' custody and a range from 8 to 18 years. However, the judge accepted that there was only one factor placing the offence in that category, namely that this was an obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre. The offence of causing serious injury to M by dangerous driving fell within category 1A in the relevant sentencing guideline, with a starting point of 4 years' custody and a range of 3 to 5 years. The offence against O fell within category 2A, with a starting point of 3 years and a range of 2 to 4 years. Because he imposed concurrent sentences, the judge had to treat the injuries caused to M, O and Mr Williams as aggravating factors in relation to the offence of causing death by dangerous driving.

In 2006 the applicant had been sentenced for three offences relating to benefit fraud, but the judge made clear that he did not treat those convictions as an aggravating factor. Indeed, he treated the absence of relevant or recent convictions as a mitigating factor, together with the applicant's good driving record and her genuine remorse.

The judge said that he reduced the sentence for the offence of causing death by dangerous driving from the starting point of 12 years to 11 years by reason of the fact that there was only one category A factor in this case. He increased that sentence to 13 years by reason of the aggravating factors, but reduced it back to 11 years by reason of the mitigating factors.

We observe that the judge was not obliged to attribute specific figures to individual factors which were taken into account in the sentencing exercise: see R v Hallam [2025] 4 WLR 33 at [26(iii)] and R v Ratcliffe [2024] EWCA Crim 498; [2025] 1 Cr App R (S) 45 at [81]. The question for us is whether the sentence which the judge imposed was manifestly excessive, regardless of how he arrived at it. The judge reduced all three sentences by one-third by reason of the applicant's guilty pleas. But for that reduction, the sentences which he imposed would have been 11 years, 3 years and 2 years' imprisonment respectively.

We were referred to the case of R v Ahmed [2023] EWCA Crim 1537, but we have not found it helpful to compare the judge's sentencing exercise in this case with a case decided on very different facts, where, for instance, no one was injured except the man who was killed.

The sole ground of appeal is that the sentence was manifestly excessive because the judge erred in assessing culpability and the appropriate downward adjustment within the category range. It is submitted that the offence of causing death by dangerous driving ought to have been placed at or towards the bottom of the range for a category A offence, given that there was only one category A factor.

We accept that, in the circumstances of this case, the fact that there was only one category A factor was a consideration which called for a reduction in the sentence, but we have not found it helpful to attribute a specific figure to that factor in isolation. Instead, we have considered it together with the aggravating and mitigating factors. It is particularly significant that, since he was imposing concurrent sentences, the judge was, in effect, imposing a total sentence for all three offences, including not only the offence of causing death by dangerous driving, for which the starting point was 12 years' imprisonment, but also two offences which in themselves merited sentences, before the reduction for the applicant's guilty pleas, of 3 years and 2 years respectively. Viewed in that light, we do not consider that it is arguable that the sentence of 7 years and 4 months' imprisonment was manifestly excessive. We refuse leave to appeal and, since it would serve no purpose, we refuse the extension of time.