R v Alfie Clive Rhodes

With the leave of the single judge the appellant appeals against a total sentence of 4 years 4 months, imposed in respect of the following offences: (1) being concerned in the supply of a controlled drug, Class A (4 years 4 months); (2) being concerned in the supply of a controlled drug, Class B (4 years 4 months, concurrent); (3) and (4) possessing a controlled drug of Class A, with intent (4 years and 4 months, both concurrent); (5) possessing a controlled drug, Class B (4 months concurrent); (6) acquiring criminal property (4 months concurrent).

The appellant pleaded guilty to these offences on 11 November 2024; he was sentenced on 26 November 2024.

On 24 September 2024, the police arrested another man for being in possession of Class A drugs; when his ‘phone was downloaded there were messages to a number ending in 7888, which was the appellant's number.

As police inquiries were ongoing, on 9 October 2024, plain-clothed officers in an unmarked police vehicle saw the appellant riding an electric bike along Bath Road and took the opportunity to detain him. The appellant was searched and his mobile phone was seized along with £90 in cash; no drugs were found but he was arrested for being concerned in the supply of Class A drugs.

The appellant was taken to the police station and, on a further search, officers found 15 wraps of Class A drugs in his underpants, 5 of heroin and 10 of cocaine. The appellant's home address was also searched and the officers found drugs paraphernalia, such as clingfilm and electronic scales, and a small quantity of cannabis.

When the ‘phone relating to the male arrested in September was analysed, messages were found which showed the appellant controlling that man in relation to drugs. The drugs expert concluded that the messages represented conversations between the two, keeping stock of their drugs; the user of the ‘phone 7888 (the appellant) was organising and controlling the other man and making him conduct a stock check of the drugs he had left so the appellant could keep track of what had been sold and what was left.

In interview the appellant made no admissions save that he accepted that the Class B drugs found at his home address belonged to him.

The appellant was 21 when convicted and sentenced. He had one previous conviction for two possession offences (Class A and Class B), for which he received an 18-month conditional discharge on 14 August 2024. As the current offences meant the appellant was in breach of his conditional discharge, he also fell to be sentenced for that.

No pre-sentence report was obtained because none was necessary: a custodial sentence was inevitable and the sentencing judge was provided with all the information required from the appellant's counsel.

No issue is taken with the judge's categorisation of this offending as falling within category 3 (street dealing) under the guidelines; the judge further assessed the appellant as having a significant role, with something of a management function, being motivated by financial or other advantage, and with some awareness of the scale of the operation. That gave a starting point of 4½ years with a range of 3½ to 7 years.

Taking the first four counts as the lead offences, the judge determined the appropriate sentence after a contested trial for the global criminality involved would have been 66 months (5½ years). Allowing a 25 per cent discount for credit for plea, the judge reduced that term to 52 months (4 years 4 months), to run concurrently on each of those counts; he imposed further concurrent sentences of 4 months for counts 5 and 6, with a further, also concurrent, sentence of 4 months for the breach of the conditional discharge.

Contending that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, the appellant says that the judge gave too little regard or weight to the circumstances of the offences and his personal mitigation. In particular, emphasis is placed on the appellant's youth and his lack of maturity, the fact that he had only one previous conviction for possession, and the fact that he had been a drug user for some time and had built up debts with his supplier, which had led him to get involved in this criminal enterprise to try to pay off his debts. The appellant points to the fact that he had become homeless, and had moved from Kent to London but, while on remand, had reflected on his position and was making positive steps to rehabilitate himself and had expressed remorse for committing these offences.

In granting leave, the single judge considered it arguable that an increase from the starting point of 54 months to 66 months was manifestly excessive in the circumstances of this case, in particular given the appellant's age. He also noted that the reduction for plea had only been 14 months, whereas 25 per cent credit should have led to a reduction of 16½ months.

In our judgment, little issue can really be taken with the categorisation of this offence. We also note that it is apparent that the judge had some regard to totality, identifying the first four counts as lead offences and, to represent the global criminality involved, passing concurrent sentences on each, together with lesser concurrent sentences on the remaining counts and for the breach of the earlier conditional discharge (which might have warranted a consecutive sentence).

That said, this was a case where the offending in issue had taken place over a relatively short period; effectively over a matter of weeks. Moreover, although the appellant played a significant role, as the judge acknowledged, he was by no means towards the upper end of the enterprise: as was explained by way of mitigation, the appellant was a drug user, who had got into debt with his supplier and had taken on this role in the operation as a means of paying off his debts. That by no means excused the appellant's offending but it placed it in context. Accepting that the judge was not required to set out the precise mathematical calculations involved at each stage, the sentencing remarks suggest that, notwithstanding some reduction for the appellant's personal mitigation, he adopted a nominal starting term that was more than 12 months above the guideline starting point.

Allowing that the judge was sentencing the appellant on a number of counts, and was entitled to apply an uplift to reflect the totality of the offending, we are unable to see how the circumstances of this case warranted an increase of over a year from the guideline starting point. That, we are clear, would be manifestly excessive given the totality of the offending involved. Even allowing that the breach of the earlier conditional discharge aggravated the seriousness of the current offences, we cannot see a proper basis for the elevation of the sentence to a point somewhere above 66 months (again assuming – as the sentencing remarks suggest – some reduction for mitigation).

In our judgement, the judge was correct to recognise that there were mitigating features in this case that needed to be taken into account. The appellant was young and immature; his descent into this criminal enterprise was the subject of some explanation from his mother, and this had plainly been a difficult period in his life; he had only one previous conviction for possession (albeit that was close in time to the current offending), and there was some evidence of remorse, reflection and an attempt to change course. We consider that the mitigating features of this case balanced out the aggravating factors identified by the judge and, had this matter gone to trial, ought to have resulted in a sentence of the guideline starting point of 4½ years. Applying a 25 per cent reduction by way of credit for plea, that would give a sentence of 40 months.

For the reasons identified, we therefore allow the appellant's appeal and quash the sentences of 4 years 4 months on each of counts 1 to 4, substituting on each count a sentence of 40 months (3 years 4 months), each to run concurrent to each other and to the sentences imposed on counts 5 and 6 and in respect of the breach of the conditional discharge.