R v Sukh Chamdal

On 29th July 2024, in the Crown Court at Chelmsford before Mr Recorder William Clegg KC the appellant pleaded guilty on re-arraignment to having contravened a tree preservation order (“TPO”) contrary to s. 210(1)(c) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“the 1990 Act”). The particulars of the single count were that the appellant caused or permitted the cutting down of at least 132 trees in breach of the order made by Epping Forest District Council (“the Council”). On 30th August 2024 the judge sentenced the appellant to a fine of £200,000, or in default 3 years’ imprisonment.

Mr Chamdal appeals against sentence with the leave of the single judge. The Council brought the prosecution as the local planning authority for its area and is the respondent to this appeal. We are grateful to Ms Chalkley KC who appeared for the appellant and to Ms Lambert who appeared for the respondent for their helpful written and oral submissions.

On 22 June 2023 two arborists Jan Lloyd and Matthew Watson-Thomas pleaded guilty to having contravened the TPO and were committed for sentence to the Crown Court. On 8 August 2023 they were each sentenced to a fine of £20,000.

The issues on this appeal is whether the fine imposed on the appellant was manifestly excessive because:

It is helpful to consider this appeal, and more generally sentencing for offences under s.210 of the 1990 Act, in the context of the statutory framework for dealing with trees protected by TPOs. Section 198 of the 1990 Act empowers a local planning authority to make an order for the preservation of trees or woodlands specified in the order if it appears to them to be expedient in the interests of amenity to do so.

The Town and Country Planning (Tree Preservation) (England) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012 No 605) contain detailed provisions for making and notifying landowners about a TPO. Regulation 3 and the Schedule to the Regulations prescribe the content of a TPO. It must specify the trees, group of trees or woodlands to which it relates and must indicate the position of those trees on a map annexed to the order.

When an order is made, it must be served on the owners of the land to which the order applies. They then have an opportunity to make objections. If after considering any objections the order is confirmed, the local planning authority must notify landowners of that fact, serve on them a further copy of the order if it has been modified, and in any event make the order available for inspection at the authority’s offices (regs. 5 to 8). The authority also has to keep, and make publicly available, a register of all applications for consent and the decisions taken (reg.12). The authority must additionally register a TPO as a local land charge (s.1(1)(b) of the Local Land Charges Act 1975) in the part of the Register dealing with “planning charges”. Thus, the statutory scheme provides for landowners to become aware of a TPO, either when the order is first made or when an intending purchaser of a property obtains the results of the usual local authority searches before exchange of contracts.

The 2012 Regulations also lay down the controls for the protection of trees covered by an order. No person may cut down, top, lop, uproot, or wilfully damage or destroy such a tree, or cause or permit any such activity, except with the written consent of the local planning authority (reg.13). Consent must be obtained beforehand. Regulation 14 contains a number of exceptions to that prohibition, one of which relates to work which is necessary to enable a person to implement a full or detailed (not an outline) planning permission.

A TPO is required to set out the same prohibition and exception (Art.3 of the Schedule to the Regulations).

Thus, landowners should be aware of any TPO affecting their land and are able to find out which trees are protected by the order and the controls applicable to those trees. If a landowner is uncertain about the effect of an order he can contact the local planning authority and if necessary obtain professional advice.

By s 206(1) if a tree is removed or destroyed in breach of an order, it is the duty of the owner of the land to plant another tree of appropriate size and species at the same place as soon as he can reasonably can. Section 206(3) deals with an owner’s obligation to replant trees unlawfully removed from woodland. If it appears to the local planning authority that s 206 has not been complied with, it may serve on the owner of the land a tree replacement notice under s. 207, that is a notice requiring him to plant a tree or trees of such size and species as may be specified. In default, the local planning authority may under s.209 enter the land and carry out the works required by the notice at the expense of the then owner of the land. Thus, the system of control and enforcement under the 1990 Act clearly imposes primary obligations on the owner of the land the subject of a TPO. He must not, without the prior written consent of the local planning authority, cut down a protected tree, or cause or permit that to happen. If such a tree is cut down, then he must replace it.

Section 210 creates an offence for non-compliance with a TPO. Subsection (1) provides:

“If any person, in contravention of tree preservation regulations—

(a)

cuts down, uproots or wilfully destroys a tree, or

(b)

wilfully damages, tops or lops a tree in such a manner as to be likely to destroy it,

(c)

causes or permits the carrying out of any of the activities in paragraph (a) or (b),

he shall be guilty of an offence.”

It is well-established that this is an offence of strict liability. Under s.210(1)(c) the prosecution has to prove that the trees in question were the subject of a TPO, that works prohibited by reg.13 have been carried out (e.g. the felling of a tree), that those works were caused or permitted by the defendant and that the planning authority had not given consent for those works (R v Alath Construction Limited [1990] 1 WLR 1255). It is not necessary for the prosecution to show that the defendant knew of the TPO: see Maidstone Borough Council v Mortimer [1980] 3 All ER 552 where the Divisional Court stated at p554:

“….. Parliament intended that no tree the subject of a tree preservation order should be cut down or wilfully destroyed …. without the consent of the local authority. Plainly, it is of the utmost public importance that such trees should be preserved. The risk to their continued existence in these days of extensive building operations, which encroach further and further into rural areas, is very great. It is not a difficult task for any member of the public wishing to interfere with the shape, size or continued existence of a tree to obtain from the local authority reliable information on the question whether the tree is the subject of a preservation order and, if so, to seek the authority's consent to the operation proposed. (Mrs. Twydell appears to have made a most perfunctory inquiry of the wrong department of the local authority and to have misunderstood or misinterpreted whatever it was she claims to have been told.) Thus, there can be no hardship to a member of the public in having on or near land that he owns or occupies any protected tree.”

The offence under s.210 is triable either way. The Crown Court may impose an unlimited fine, but a custodial sentence is not available.

The appellant caused or permitted the unlawful felling of at least 132 trees on land known as Debden Hall, Ripley View, Loughton, Essex between 1 and 18 March 2021. That land was the subject of a TPO containing 35 individually specified trees and an “area” order which covered the whole of the land, protecting trees which were present at the time the order was made. The order was confirmed on 24 November 2008.

On 31 August 2016 the previous landowner, Mr Capper, obtained a planning permission for the construction of a 4-bedroom house on the site subject to conditions regarding a number of trees. Mr Capper instructed a tree surgeon to carry out tree works in accordance with that permission. That work was completed by February 2017. In 2020 Mr Capper made an application to the authority for a Lawful Development Certificate that all the necessary tree work in connection with the 2016 permission had been undertaken. The Council confirmed that any such tree works were undertaken between December 2016 and February 2017. Accordingly, the position in March 2021 was that no protected trees on the land could be felled without the prior written consent of the respondent council. The 2016 planning permission did not provide an exemption for any such works and it has not been suggested that any other grant of planning permission did so.

At the time of the offence the appellant was in the process of purchasing the land. On 23 February 2021 he had exchanged contracts with Mr Capper and become the beneficial owner. There was a specific clause in the contract for sale allowing the appellant to enter the land and begin work. On 6 April 2021 completion took place and the appellant became the legal owner of the land.

On 18th March 2021 Melinda Barham, Tree and Landscape Officer for the respondent, made a visit to the site following complaints of tree felling received at the beginning of March. Mr Stimson (a Director of Maintained4U, which was engaged by the appellant as the project manager for the development of the site), Patricia Fox (Director of the landscape design company Aralia instructed by the appellant) and John Ayres (an Investigating Officer for the respondent) were also present. Mr Stimson said that he believed that the work carried out had been covered by the previous planning permission. As we have indicated, the appellant did not rely upon that last point.

Miss Barham walked the site and noted extensive fresh tree felling which she plotted and photographed. A minimum of 132 trees, each more than 20 years old, had been felled, leaving stumps generally less than one metre in diameter. The felling had taken place in the previous four to six weeks. They were distinguishable from all the darker tree stumps on site which related to trees felled in 2016. It was not possible to ascertain whether there were any more stumps under felled trees still lying on the ground.

Miss Barham estimated the area in which the felling had taken place as approximately 1.29 hectares (or 3.2 acres). That was just under a third of the entirety of the land. Miss Barham confirmed that no applications to fell trees had been made and there was nothing to indicate that the felled trees were dead or dangerous, defective or decayed in a way which could have provided an exemption from the requirement to obtain a consent for the works under the 2012 Regulations.

During a previous visit to the land on 15 March 2021 Mr Ayres had spoken to some workers who were setting up fencing. They said that the appellant was their boss, and so Mr Ayres telephoned him. At that stage the appellant said that only trees not subject to the TPO were removed and that his project manager, Mr Stimson, had been very careful to check.

On 16 November 2021 the appellant was interviewed under caution. He said that he had met Mr Capper on site, made him an offer, they shook hands, and the deal was done. The purchase price was £1.5 million. The appellant thought he had planning permission to construct the drive, and so he had asked Mr Capper if he could start preparing the site. Mr Capper had given all the papers to the appellant’s project managers, Maintained4U. The appellant had also passed on any papers from his solicitors to Maintained4U. He said he did not go to the site very much because he was very busy and left it all to the project manager. When he purchased the land his solicitor sent him a copy of the TPO, but during the conveyancing process he made no enquiries himself and left the matter in the hands of Maintained4U, whom he trusted to do everything. He was asked if there were formal papers for the construction of the driveway and said it was all done on the shake of a hand. He said that Maintained4U would be building everything up to and including the house and that he was not really interested in the site until the house was built. He concluded by saying that if he could turn the clock back, he would have been a bit more vigilant and gone through the paperwork and taken advice.

An agreed basis of plea was put before the judge as follows:

“1.

Mr Chamdal accepts that whilst he had the relevant planning permission in place there was a TPO on the land and he ought to have known what trees were or were not covered by the TPO or should have made the necessary checks. Mr Chamdal provided the relevant paperwork to his contractors; he left the detail and execution to those employed and contracted to carry it out. He relied upon their relevant experience and expertise to comply with the terms of these permissions and restrictions.

2.

Mr Chamdal accepts the felling of at least 132 trees on the land as indicted in count 1. However, the actual felling of the trees was carried out by Matthew Watson-Thomas and Jan Lloyd. They have both pleaded guilty and therefore have accepted their criminal liability.

3.

Mr Chamdal did not instruct, directly or indirectly through his project manager Mr Mike Stimson, either Mr Watson-Thomas or Mr Lloyd to fell the trees that are the subject of this prosecution. They had been instructed to clear the land of overgrown hedges, shrubs and such like, so that the land could be better maintained by Maintained4u Limited.

4.

The trees that were felled were all on private land.

5.

At the time of the unlawful cutting down of the trees, Mr Chamdal was not the legal owner of the land but was the beneficial owner of the land. He was however in the process of purchasing the land from the previous owner, Mr Capper. Mr Capper had given Mr Chamdal permission to enter on to the land and begin work.

6.

Mr Chamdal pleads guilty on the basis that under s.210(1)(c) of Act he is guilty on a “strict liability” basis of causing or permitting the trees to be cut down.

7.

This is a one-off, isolated incident. Mr Chamdal is a man of impeccable character and moral decency. He is a successful businessman and employs 100s of people nationally. He has no previous convictions for any environmental or other criminal offences.

8.

Mr Chamdal is incredibly remorseful and offers his sincere apologies for events that have led him to this point, and he thanks the council and the court for its leniency.

9.

Tree Planting Plans and Method Statement acceptable to the Council have been agreed. A draft undertaking to the Court regarding this accompanies this Basis of Plea.

10.

Mr Chamdal has paid all the Council‘s costs and legal fees to date presented to him, circa £80k so far paid. Mr Chamdal intends to pay any yet to be incurred fees in connection with this prosecution including the cost of this hearing.

11.

Mr Chamdal has made no financial gain. Mr Chamdal has spent a considerable amount on legal fees, which if he had been properly advised at the outset could have been avoided. The Prosecution are not as a consequence pursuing a confiscation order against him.”

In his sentencing remarks the judge said that, although the appellant had not pleaded guilty at an early stage, he was satisfied that he had received incompetent legal advice from counsel formerly instructed who had raised points which were said to be wholly unarguable. Had the appellant been properly advised at the outset that he had no defence in law, he would have pleaded guilty at that stage and so should have full credit for his plea.

The judge referred to the requirement in s.210(3) that in passing sentence he should have regard to any financial benefit which had occurred or appeared likely to accrue to the appellant in consequence of the offence. There was no evidence of any such benefit in this case.

The judge then said that the intended benefit of felling “at least 132 mature trees was “an amenity benefit to provide a more attractive site for what was hoped to have been the building of a truly sensational house on what was a large site of about 10 acres on the edge of Epping Forest”, in contrast to the 2016 planning permission for a 4 bedroom home. The area where the trees were felled was 1.29 ha. The land would potentially be of very considerable value if developed for a large private home, as intended. The felling of the trees “made the site potentially more valuable”, but the appellant’s motivation in buying and clearing the land was not to make a profit but to have a site for his family home. Ms. Chalkley confirmed that the appellant makes no criticism of those findings by the judge.

The judge said that the notes of previous sentencing decisions in the Crown Court to which he had been referred had not involved such a large area of land or as many trees. The felling of the trees involved the loss of their amenity value, wildlife habitat and their function as a carbon store. But the appellant’s draft undertaking to carry out a tree planting plan would provide some environmental compensation in the future.

Turning to the appellant, the judge said that he had become a very wealthy man, worth many millions, through hard work and entrepreneurial skill. He had no previous convictions and was of positive good character, as witnessed by the very large sums he had donated to charity and his philanthropic works.

When he came to weigh all the considerations in the balance, the judge described the felling of the protected trees as a serious matter which had obviously impacted adversely on the environment. He did not think it appropriate to take a figure for the value of one tree and then multiply that by the number of trees felled. Instead, he arrived at an overall figure that he considered to be “fair and just to mark the gravity of a significant breach of the law”, along with the agreed basis of plea and mitigation. The judge concluded that after a trial the fine would have been £300,000, but he reduced that by one third for the guilty plea to £200,000.

In summary Ms. Chalkley submitted to us that:

There is no Definitive Guideline for offences under s.210(1) of the 1990 Act. Both the appellant and the respondent suggested that the court should consider the Guideline for Environmental Offences, in particular the sentencing of individuals in respect of pollution offences to do with the deposit, treatment or disposal of waste or illegal discharges to air, land or water. Initially it was suggested that this could be used as a cross-check on the level of sentence, by analogy with R v Sandhu [2017] EWCA Crim 908; [2017] 4 WLR 160 at [22] and [30]. But both counsel accepted that the Guideline is dealing with offences of a different nature, where a key input to determining sentence, harm, is not comparable to breaches of a TPO. The levels of sentence for those environmental offences cannot be read across to offending under s.210(1) of the 1990 Act. The most that can be taken from the Guideline are the degrees of culpability set out at p.17 ranging from “low or no culpability”, through “negligent”, then “reckless”, to “deliberate” and the explanations given of those terms.

In these circumstances, it is necessary for a sentencing judge to consider the General Guideline: Overarching Principles and the Sentencing Act 2020. The Guideline gives similar guidance on culpability but also addresses harm, aggravating and mitigating factors.

Section 57(2) requires the court to have regard to the purposes of sentencing, which include not only the punishment of offenders but also the reduction of crime including its reduction by deterrence. Section 63 provides that when the court is considering the seriousness of an offence it must consider—

“(a)

The offender’s culpability in committing the offence, and

(b)

any harm which the offence—

(i)

caused,

(ii)

was intended to cause, or

(iii)

might foreseeably have caused.”

Sections 125 to 126 of the 2020 Act lay down principles for fixing the amount of any fine. A fine must reflect the seriousness of the offence (s.125(1)). The court must take into account the circumstances of the case including, in particular, the financial circumstances of the offender so far as they are known, or appear to the court (s.125(2)). That last principle applies whether those financial circumstances have the effect of increasing or reducing the amount of the fine (s.125(3)). Section 125(6) addresses the interrelationship between the imposition of a fine and the making of any confiscation order.

In our discussion of factors which may be relevant to culpability and harm we do not seek to be either prescriptive or comprehensive. Tree preservation orders are of different types. Some protect individual specimen trees, while others protect groups of trees or woodlands. Section 210 covers a potentially wide range of breaches from lopping a part of a tree, the significance of which may vary from case to case, to damaging a tree, or cutting down or destroying a tree. Sentencing, as ever, is fact sensitive. Not much help is likely to be gained by comparing the index offence with the circumstances and sentence in another. Usually, insufficient information is available to enable any proper comparison to be made. But even where more information is available, it is likely to reveal dissimilarities as well as similarities and make meaningful comparison difficult. Furthermore, in Sandhu this court said that the practice of providing a judge with newspaper and other reports of sentences in other cases said to be similar must stop [20]. They are not guideline cases and they are not full, authorised reports of a decision, or even a transcript. Rather, it seems to us that practitioners should focus on making sure that the court is provided with accurate, helpful and sufficient information on the circumstances of the case with which the judge has to deal.

However, there are some decisions which do assist in identifying factors which may be relevant, or an approach which may be taken, depending on the circumstances of the case.

In R v Palmer (1989) 11 Cr. App. R. (S) 407 this court considered the forerunner of s.210(3) of the 1990 Act, the requirement that the court should pay particular regard to any financial benefits which has accrued or appears likely to accrue to the defendant as a result of the commission of the offence. In Palmer the appellant had applied for consent to install a root barrier between a protected cedar tree and his home. However, before the application was determined he cut the tree down.

The court decided to take as a starting point for the fine the costs of the installation of the root barrier which the appellant had saved. That gave some indication of the financial implications of the unlawful act. The fine then had to reflect the appellant’s deliberate defiance of the TPO to serve his own personal advantage. The court gave the appellant credit for his excellent character and his co-operation with the local planning authority in relation to other trees. But a substantial fine was called for to mark the importance of the offence and to deter others from thinking that they could take similar action “without paying heavily for doing so”. The court judged that from a starting point of £1000, the appropriate fine should be £3000. It is also worth nothing that the court regarded a landowner’s statutory obligation to replace a tree which has been unlawfully removed or destroyed as a separate matter from any penalty imposed as a punishment (p.409). We agree.

By contrast, the decision in R v Razzell (1990) 12 Cr. App. R (S) 142 does not provide any assistance for deciding how to determine the appropriate level of a fine. The court simply refused a hopeless application for leave to appeal to this court. The decision was not worth citing.

In R v Davey [2013] EWCA Crim 1662; [2014] 1 Cr. App. R (S) 34 the appellant was convicted after trial of causing or permitting a protected maritime pine in his neighbour’s property to be cut down during the night, in order to improve the view from his property over Poole Harbour and the Purbeck Hills beyond [4]. The Crown Court imposed a confiscation order in the sum of £50,000 and a fine of £75,000.

The court in Davey proceeded on the basis that the confiscation order had removed the financial benefit to the appellant because it had been based on the increase in the value of his property consequent upon the removal of the tree [8] and [13]. The court rejected the submission that the fine had wrongly taken into account that financial benefit [17]. The confiscation order had not addressed the amenity benefit of the improved view which the appellant had gained. The fine properly reflected that additional factor as well as the seriously aggravating feature that the tree had belonged to the neighbour ([18-[19]). Once again, the court stated that fines for this type of offence had to include an element for deterrence [20]. The appeal against sentence was dismissed.

In R (Natural England) v Day [2014] EWCA Crim 2583; [2015] 1 Cr. App. R (S) 53 the appellant was a wealthy businessman who owned an estate of about 500 acres comprising mainly woodland. Part of the land was a site of special scientific interest (“SSSI”) designated under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. In order to operate a commercial pheasant shoot 43 trees were felled and a vehicle track constructed on bunds or banks. The appellant pleaded guilty at a preliminary hearing to strict liability offences under the 1981 Act of causing or permitting the works to be carried out without the prior consent of Natural England. The area affected was “relatively small” [35] but it was located in a sensitive part of a river gorge. Vegetation would regenerate naturally but some topographical features had been permanently changed by the works. The appellant was fined £450,000 based on a sentence of £500,000 less a credit for plea of 10% following a Newton hearing in which the appellant had been unsuccessful. He was also ordered to pay prosecution costs of about £457,000.

The specific interests which a SSSI may serve to protect will vary from one designation to another, and are likely to be different from the objectives of a TPO. Accordingly, directcomparisons with the level of sentence imposed in Day would be inappropriate. Nevertheless, Day is helpful by indicating relevant considerations and overall approach.

The judge in the Crown Court found that the appellant knew about the SSSI and its significance. He did not deliberately set out to flout the terms of the SSSI designation but had been grossly negligent. The offence had been aggravated by the strategy he had deployed in an attempt to avoid prosecution, including tactics directed against members of the public collecting evidence.

Lord Thomas LCJ, delivering the judgment of this court, agreed with the judge’s assessment of culpability, harm and that last aggravating feature ([38]-[39]). The judge had also been entitled to take into account the appellant’s wealth ([41]-[42]. He said that it was the court’s duty to impose a fine that would not only punish the offender for what he had done (in that case for commercial gain), but which would also deter others and protect the public. The protection of the environment, particularly areas such as SSSIs, is of great importance. It is also important to take into account any difficulty a regulatory body has in monitoring such areas. Deterrence is of considerable importance. The fine in that case had to be of such a size as to achieve each of those objectives [43].

Applying the approach laid down in R v Sellafield Limited [2014] EWCA Crim 49; [2014] Env. L.R. 19 to fines imposed on companies of very significant size and on individuals possessing the appellant’s scale of wealth (£300m), a fine significantly greater than £450,000 would have been amply justified for grossly negligent conduct in pursuit of commercial gain, particularly when aggravated by attempts to avoid prosecution. A fine in seven figures might not be inappropriate [46]. Accordingly, the fine of £450,000 in Day’s case should not be seen as the benchmark against which to compare less serious cases. The court also referred to the potential need for a court to make a financial circumstances order under s.124 of the 2020 Act when dealing with wealthy individuals.

We consider that in the case of offences under s.210 of the 1990 Act, a number of factors may be relevant to the court’s assessment of harm, including the number of trees affected, the type of damage caused, and the size of the area where the works were carried out. It may also be helpful for the court to be told about the approximate age of the trees affected and their amenity and arboreal value, along with any landscape or other designations of significance to the harm which s.210 is intended to avoid. Sometimes the offender’s unlawful activities may have destroyed evidence which could have addressed some of those issues and the prosecution may have to rely upon such pre-existing material as is available. This guidance is not meant to be an exhaustive checklist for use in every case. Some prosecutions will relate to less extensive works or to a lesser degree of harm. The information provided to the court should be proportionate to the matter in hand.

As for culpability, we have already referred to guidance on the differing levels which may arise in strict liability offences of this type. There may also be aggravating circumstances such as financial benefit and or other non-pecuniary advantages, including an amenity benefit or improved view, as a result of the unlawful conduct.

The appellant pleaded guilty to causing or permitting the unlawful felling of the trees. He did not rely upon the exemption for tree works carried out in order to implement a detailed planning permission. That is consistent with the evidence that the works affecting protected trees required by the 2016 permission for a 4-bedroom house had been completed by February 2017.

Instead it was confirmed to us that the works were carried out so that a driveway could be created and in order to enhance the amenity of the land for the construction of a much larger family home which had not yet been permitted. The judge was entitled to take that factor into account as increasing the fine to be imposed.

The appellant pleaded guilty on what was described as a “strict liability basis”, but the basis of plea has to be read in context. The appellant accepts that he knew about the TPO. In paragraph 1 of the basis of plea he accepted that he ought to have known what trees were or were not covered by the order and should have made the necessary checks. As a matter of common sense, that must be right, because of the large number of trees felled on land occupying more than 3 acres. That obviously raised questions for the appellant as landowner about where the trees protected by the order were located in relation to the area he wished to have cleared. It has not been suggested that the contractors went further than the instructions they were given by the appellant as to the objectives or results he wanted to be achieved.

Although it was agreed by the parties that the appellant did not deliberately defy the TPO, in our judgment it is unrealistic to describe the degree of culpability here as no more than “low or no culpability”. According to p.17 of the Guideline on Environmental Offences that term applies to “an offence committed with little or no fault”, for example where a genuine accident occurs despite proper preventative measures being in place, or where such measures were overcame by exceptional events. Instead, that culpability was no less than “negligent”.

The undertaking to plant trees is not a mitigating factor. By s.206 of the 1990 Act the appellant was under a statutory obligation to replant in any event, which could be enforced by a tree replacement notice under s.207. Furthermore, such notices generally require the planting of much younger specimens, which do not represent a like for like replacement of established or mature trees.

We do not accept Ms. Chalkley’s submission that even if there had been low or no culpability, the degree of the harm caused was of relatively little significance. The nature and degree of the harm is generally of central importance. Here a large number of trees were cut down over a substantial area of land. They were trees at least 20 years old. They had been protected by the TPO because of their amenity value when the order was made in 2008. There was no suggestion that they ceased to have amenity value. The judge was entitled to rely upon the additional contribution made by those trees to biodiversity and to carbon storage. On that last point, the country’s woodlands and trees, and the Government’s policy to increase tree coverage nationally, form a significant part of the UK’s contribution to achieving Net Zero by 2050 (see e.g. R (Smar Holdings Limited) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2025] EWCA Civ 1041 at [11]-[14]).

The judge was told that it had not been possible for a surveyor to value the land with the trees removed in order to assess any financial benefit from the offence because it was not possible for the land to be accessed safely. Ms. Chalkley said to the judge that the absence of financial benefit was the reason for no confiscation order being made in this case. It might be thought that the appellant was fortunate in that regard. At all events, this did not affect the level of the fine. On the other hand, the judge was entitled to take into account the personal benefit to the appellant that the unlawful tree felling improved the amenity of the land for his purpose of seeking to build a large family home.

The appellant did not provide information on his means and an investigation was not ordered. The appellant does not submit that the judge was not entitled to take the view that the appellant is a “very wealthy man worth many millions”. That was a relevant factor.

Taking into account all the circumstances of the case and the need to pass sentences which deter offending of this kind, we conclude that the fine imposed of £200,000 after credit for plea was not excessive, let alone manifestly excessive. The fine was proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and to the appellant’s means.

Lastly, we reject the submission that the fine involves any disparity with the fines of £20,000 imposed by the same judge on each of the two arborists. The circumstances were plainly different. They cut down 60-70 trees between them, half the number of trees in relation to which the appellant pleaded guilty. In passing sentence, the judge had regard to the modest means of the arborists, whereas the appellant’s means did not justify any reduction. Lastly the overall removal of 132 trees was for the appellant’s personal benefit, the amenity of his intended new family home. There was no disparity between the appellant and the arborists. In any event, there was ample justification for the fine imposed on the appellant.

For all these reasons the appeal against sentence is dismissed.