R v Kevin Wood

On 11 April 2025, in the Crown Court at Luton, the appellant, Kevin Wood was sentenced for a number of offences on three indictments, to which he had pleaded guilty, as follows. On the first indictment, 41B21195523, he was sentenced to ten months' imprisonment for each of two offences of assaulting an emergency worker (counts 1 and 2), those sentences to be served concurrently to each other. He was also sentenced to a term of one month's imprisonment for one offence of failure to surrender to bail, to be served concurrently.

On a second indictment, 41B21369823, the appellant was sentenced to 17 months' imprisonment for an offence of burglary of a convenience store in Tring (count 1), to be served consecutively to the sentences on the first indictment. He was also sentenced to eight months and four months' imprisonment respectively for two offences of handling stolen goods (counts 4 and 5), both sentences to be served concurrently.

On a third indictment, 41B21445024, the appellant was sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment for an offence of burglary of a primary school (count 4), to be served consecutively to the earlier sentences. He was also sentenced to three months' imprisonment for an offence of assault by beating (count 2), that sentence to be served consecutively, and three months for an offence of common assault (count 8), that sentence also to be served consecutively.

On this third indictment, he was also sentenced to four and six months' imprisonment respectively for two offences of theft (counts 6 and 10), those sentences to be served concurrently. He was also sentenced to a term of four months’ imprisonment for one count of aggravated vehicle taking (count 7) to be served concurrently.

A suspended sentence was also activated with a reduced term of five months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively.

The total sentence was therefore one of 52 months' imprisonment. The appellant appeals against sentence by leave of the single judge.

The appellant was aged 46 at the time of sentencing. He has an extensive record of previous criminal convictions comprising 41 convictions for 108 offences committed between 1996 and 2024. They include offences of dishonesty, such as burglary and handling stolen goods. They also include offences against the person, such as assault or affray. The judge did not consider that a pre-sentence report was required. We do not consider that a report is necessary.

The judge's sentencing remarks are clear, concise and comprehensive. We deal first with the two offences of assaulting an emergency worker. They involved two police officers, PC Durrant and PC Edwards. They were performing their duties as police officers and were seeking to arrest the appellant. The appellant strangled PC Durrant. He carried out a prolonged and persistent attack on PC Edwards, causing multiple bruising.

The judge regarded both offences as involving culpability A in terms of the sentencing guidelines: in one case because of the strangulation and in the other case because it was a prolonged and persistent assault. He considered that the offence on PC Durrant fell into category 1 harm, as it had caused more than mere physical harm or distress. The starting point for an A1 offence was a high level community order with a range of up to 26 weeks' custody.

The judge considered that there were aggravating factors. They included the appellant's previous convictions, which themselves included assault on police constables, an escape from lawful custody and an offence of affray. The judge also took into account that there were two victims, although he said that he intended to pass concurrent, not consecutive, sentences. He also took into account that these were assaults on police officers who, in accordance with their duty, were seeking to arrest the appellant at the time that they were assaulted.

The mitigation, which applied to all the offences on the three indictments, was that the appellant had significant mental health problems. Furthermore, and to his credit, the appellant had been trying to turn his life around. He had behaved well in custody; he had obtained enhanced status in the prison; he had undertaken education; and he had obtained a job. He had, therefore, taken steps to address his offending behaviour.

Nevertheless, the judge considered that the aggravating features outweighed the mitigating features. He considered that the appropriate sentence after trial would have been 15 months' imprisonment for each offence. That would have to be reduced by 15 per cent to reflect the time at which the appellant pleaded guilty. That would reduce the sentence for each offence to 12 months' imprisonment. He further reduced each sentence by two months to reflect the principle of totality – that is to ensure that the total sentence for all the offending across the three indictments was just and proportionate.

In relation to the Tring burglary, the judge said that this was a burglary of commercial premises which took place on 20 April 2023. Culpability was level B within the relevant Sentencing Council guidelines, as the offence involved significant planning and going equipped for burglary. Harm was category 1. The starting point for a B1 offence was one year's custody, with a range from a medium level community order to two years' custody.

The judge considered that the aggravating factors, when weighed against the mitigating factors, would put the sentence at the top of the range – that is 24 months' imprisonment. He gave credit of 20 per cent for the guilty plea, which reduced it to 19 months' imprisonment. He then made a further reduction of two months to reflect totality, thereby reducing the sentence to one of 17 months' imprisonment. That sentence was ordered to run consecutively to the earlier sentences.

Finally, in relation to the third indictment there were a number of counts. Count 4 was the burglary of a primary school on 20 July 2024. The judge found that that fell within culpability B, as there was planning, previous visits having been made to the property, and a vehicle was taken to the scene. Harm was category 2, as there was moderate loss, damage and disturbance. The starting point for that offence under the guidelines was six month' custody, with a range from a high level community order to one year's custody.

The judge said there were aggravating features: this was the burglary of a primary school which had little public funding and the loss of the whiteboard that was taken would have been a substantial loss to the school and would have had an impact on those who attended the school. The appellant was also on bail at the time of the offence; and he had multiple previous convictions. The mitigation was that described previously.

The judge said that the sentence after a trial would have been 18 months' imprisonment. That was reduced by ten per cent to reflect the guilty plea, which resulted in a sentence of 16 months' imprisonment. The judge made a further reduction of two months to reflect totality, which resulted in a sentence of 14 months' imprisonment.

Count 6 on the third indictment was an offence of theft. The appellant had got into a vehicle which was delivering parcels. The van was marked with the well-known name of Amazon. The appellant reversed the vehicle at speed and hit a parked car. He then drove off. The van was eventually located, but 22 parcels had been stolen from it.

The judge said that culpability was level B within the relevant guidelines, due to the planning, as the appellant had targeted delivery vans. The harm was category 3, as the value of the parcels was in excess of £500. The starting point under the guidelines is a high level community order, with a range from a low level community order to 36 weeks' custody. The aggravating features included: the previous convictions and the fact that the offence was committed whilst the appellant was on bail. The mitigating features were those described earlier.

The judge said that the appropriate sentence after trial would have been one of 18 weeks' imprisonment. He reduced that by 10 per cent to reflect the guilty plea, which resulted in a sentence of four months' imprisonment. That sentence was ordered to be served consecutively.

Count 2 of the third indictment was an assault by beating of Mr Shir Mohammed, who was carrying out a delivery of food at about 4.30 pm on 26 June 2024. The appellant asked Mr Mohammed through an open car window for a cigarette, and Mr Mohammed gave him a cigarette. The appellant then started to punch Mr Mohammed through the open car window. A scuffle ensued before the appellant ran off.

The judge found that this offences was culpability level A in terms of the Sentencing Council guidelines because of the persistent and prolonged nature of the attack. Harm was category 1, because more than minor injury was caused. The starting point under the guidelines was a high level community order, with a range from a low level community order up to 26 weeks' custody. The aggravating features included the fact that the appellant was on bail at the time and had previous convictions. The mitigation was as described previously.

The judge said that a sentence above the starting point was needed, given the aggravating features and the ferocity of the attack. The sentence after a trial would have been 18 weeks' imprisonment. There would be a ten per cent reduction to reflect the time at which the appellant pleaded guilty which reduced the sentence to four months' imprisonment. The judge then made a further reduction to three months' imprisonment to reflect the principle of totality.

Count 8 on the third indictment related to an offence of common assault against Laura Kirk. Miss Kirk heard a knock at her door at about 8 pm on 31 May 2024. She saw the appellant, whom she knew, holding a hammer and swinging it around. She was scared. She believed that she was about to be hit with the hammer. The appellant went around the corner and returned wearing a balaclava and still swinging the hammer.

The judge said that this offence was culpability A within the guidelines, because of the threat with a weapon. The judge assessed harm as category 1, due to the very high level of distress that was caused, and the psychological harm that the victim had suffered. The aggravating features included the previous convictions, the fact that the appellant was on bail at the time, and the wearing of the balaclava which increased the fear that the victim felt. The mitigating features were those described previously. The judge said that sentence after a trial would have been about 18 weeks' imprisonment. There was a reduction of ten per cent to reflect the time at which the appellant had pleaded guilty, which reduced the sentence to four months' imprisonment. The judge then made a further reduction to three months' imprisonment to reflect the principle of totality.

It is unnecessary to describe the other offences or the reasons for the judge's sentences on those matters, as no challenge is made to those other sentences.

It is convenient to deal with the grounds of appeal in relation to each sentence on each of the three indictments in turn. Mr Horsell, who appears on behalf of the appellant today, has very helpfully provided a full written set of submissions on the various offences, for which we are grateful. In his oral submissions this morning, Mr Horsell focused on three particular matters and on the question of totality. We are grateful to him for the concise nature of his oral submissions.

We deal first with counts 1 and 2 on the first indictment, the assaults on the emergency workers. Mr Horsell accepted that count 1 in relation to PC Durrant was properly categorised as culpability A, because of the strangulation, but he submitted that it should be category 2 harm. He submitted that the harm found by the judge (the five seconds during which PC Durrant could not breathe whilst he was being strangled) was in fact a factor which had been used to place the offence into category A, and so there was an element of double counting by using it to calculate the harm. He submitted that the judge was wrong to place the offence against PC Edwards into category A culpability, as the offence was short-lived. He submitted that the sentences were above the guidelines and were manifestly excessive for these offences.

We do not accept that the judge miscategorised the offences. First, in relation to PC Durrant, the judge had to assess culpability and harm. The factor that justified category A culpability was strangulation: the appellant deliberately strangled another person. The harm is measured by the effect of that act on PC Durrant, which the judge found to be more than minor distress, and so within category 1. There was no error, and no element of double counting.

In relation to PC Edwards, the judge was entitled to conclude that the attack was persistent or prolonged, within the meaning of the guideline, and so harm was category 1. There was no miscategorisation.

In terms of sentencing, the judge was right to treat the appellant's previous convictions as an aggravating factor. Further, as is clear from the guidelines themselves, the fact that this was an assault on emergency workers when they were actually carrying out their duty of trying to arrest the appellant, is an aggravating factor. Although there were mitigating factors, the judge was entitled to conclude that these were outweighed by the aggravating factors. As the judge proposed to order the two sentences to run concurrently, he was entitled to treat the fact that there were two separate victims as a feature which justified an increase or an upwards adjustment from the starting point.

These factors would justify moving the sentence to the top – and indeed above – the guideline figure of 26 weeks' custody for one offence. However, the increase to 15 months' imprisonment for each offence was, we consider, manifestly excessive. The sentence before reduction for the guilty pleas should have been somewhere in the region of nine months' imprisonment for each offence, to be served concurrently with each other. There would have to be a reduction of 15 per cent to reflect the guilty pleas. That would have resulted in sentences in the region of about seven and a half months' imprisonment. We would also make a reduction of one and a half months for totality (slightly less than the two months that the judge gave, but the sentence is correspondingly lower). In our judgment, therefore, sentences of six months' imprisonment on each of the two counts of assault on an emergency worker (rather than the sentences of ten months' imprisonment that were imposed) were appropriate. To that extent the sentences of ten months' imprisonment for each offence are manifestly excessive. We therefore quash those sentences and substitute sentences of six months' imprisonment on each of counts 1 and 2 on indictment 41B21195523. Those sentences will be served concurrently with each other.

Next, we turn to count one on the second indictment, the burglary of the Tring convenience store. Mr Horsell submitted that the judge gave too much weight to the aggravating factors. That is evidenced, he submitted, by the fact that the sentence for the co-defendant was lower. He further submitted that the suspended sentence which the appellant was serving was for a different offence. Further, that had been activated and so, he submitted, it was wrong to treat it as an aggravating feature.

We do not accept Mr Horsell's submissions on these matters. The judge took the correct starting point of one year's custody for a category B1 offence. There was a series of aggravating features, as outlined by the judge: the offence took place at night; the appellant was on bail; the offence involved group activity; and the appellant had previous convictions. Furthermore, the appellant was in fact subject to a suspended sentence, and the commission of a further criminal offence during the operational term of a suspended sentence is an aggravating feature. It means that the appellant was continuing to commit criminal offences when he was already subject to a court order. That adds to his culpability. The activation of the suspended sentence reflects punishment for the offence in respect of which the suspended sentence was imposed. There was no element of double counting in this respect. Nor does the difference between the appellant and the co-defendant suggest that the appellant's sentence was in any way flawed. The appellant was properly sentenced on the basis of his particular facts. We would therefore dismiss the ground of appeal in relation to this count.

We turn next to the third indictment. First, Mr Horsell submitted that the sentences on counts 2 and 8 (the battery of Mr Mohammed and the assault on Miss Kirk) were manifestly excessive. He submitted that the appellant did have convictions, but not recent ones. The most recent was for the offence of affray in May 2017. Further, he submitted that the appellant was on police bail rather than court bail, and that the offences were not proceeded with.

We do not accept those submissions. We do not consider that the sentences were manifestly excessive. The appellant does have relevant convictions. That is an aggravating feature. He was in fact on bail at the time that he committed the offence. That is also an aggravating feature. The sentences are well within the range in the guidelines for these offences. We would therefore dismiss the grounds of appeal in relation to these counts.

Next, Mr Horsell submitted that the sentence on count 4 (the burglary at the primary school) was manifestly excessive. He submitted that the judge had erred in considering that the fact that it was a primary school was an aggravating factor, and in particular in treating the theft of the whiteboard as an aggravating feature, as it was in fact obsolete and was not being used. He submitted that the appellant broke into the caretaker's store, rather than into "the school proper" (as he put it). Damage to the window, he submitted, did not constitute culpability for the purposes of the guidelines. Further, he submitted that the sentence was outside the sentencing range.

So far as culpability is concerned, the judge considered that the offence involved culpability at level B, because there was planning, reconnaissance visits, and a vehicle was driven to the scene in order to remove items from the school. It was category 2 harm, because of the moderate loss and damage or disturbance. The judge was right, therefore, to place the offence within category B2 in the guidelines, with a starting point of six months' custody, and a range of up to one year's custody. We consider that the fact that the appellant had relevant previous convictions and was on bail at the time that he committed this offence were aggravating factors which outweighed the mitigating factors and would justify a sentence at the top of the sentencing range. We do not consider on the facts of this particular case that the fact that the burglary occurred at a school justified a further increase. The damage involved in the theft of the whiteboard had already been taken into account when fixing the category for harm.

In those circumstances a sentence in the region of 12 months' imprisonment after trial, not 18 months, would have been appropriate. That figure would have to be reduced by ten per cent to reflect the guilty plea. That would have resulted in a sentence in the region of 11 months' imprisonment. We would reduce that sentence, as did the judge, by two months to reflect totality, to nine months' imprisonment. In those circumstances the sentence of 14 months' imprisonment which was imposed is manifestly excessive. We therefore quash the sentence on count 4 of indictment 41B21445024 and we substitute a sentence of nine months' imprisonment, to be served consecutively to the other sentences.

Finally, Mr Horsell submitted that the sentence of four months' imprisonment on count 6 of the third indictment (theft of the parcels from the Amazon delivery van) was manifestly excessive. Mr Horsell submitted that the judge erred in categorising this offence as category 3 harm, where the goods had a value of between £500 and £1,000, as the value fell at the bottom end of the range. Further, it is submitted in writing that the judge had placed too much weight on the aggravating features.

We do not accept those submissions. The judge was entitled to form a view as to the value of the 22 parcels stolen from the delivery van. He was entitled to conclude that the value was in excess of £500 and so to place that offence in category 3, with culpability level B, as there was planning involved. The sentence the judge imposed would have been 18 weeks' imprisonment after a trial, and he reduced that by ten per cent to reflect the guilty plea. The resulting sentence is well within the guidelines for a B3 offence, which has a sentencing range of up to 36 weeks' custody.

For completeness, we do not consider that the judge failed to apply the principle of totality when sentencing. The judge expressly referred to the need to have regard to the principle of totality. He decided, rightly, which offences should be the subject of consecutive sentences and which should be served concurrently. He made appropriate reductions to the sentences in order to reflect the principle of totality.

In summary, therefore, we allow the appeal to this extent: