R v Danial Arshad

On 26 June 2024 in the Crown Court at Preston, the Appellant pleaded guilty to causing serious injury by careless driving, contrary to s.2C Road Traffic Act 1988 and driving under the influence of drugs, contrary to s.5A(1) of the same Act. On 7 October 2024, he was given a suspended sentence order that was 10 months and 3 months’ imprisonment for those offences respectively, to be served concurrently, suspended for 24 months, with an order that he complete 300 hours of unpaid work and a 15-day rehabilitation and activity requirement. Finally, he was disqualified from driving for 3 years and ordered to undertake an extended re-test before his driving licence could be returned.

With the leave of the Single Judge, the Appellant seeks only to challenge the period of disqualification. Pursuant to s.34 Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, in absence of special reasons, disqualification from driving for a period of not less than 12 months is mandatory for various offences including causing serious injury by careless driving and driving under the influence of drugs.

The injured person in the case was Nicholas Cooper. At the time of the offence, Mr Cooper was a full-time professional cyclist and had been since the age of 18, riding internationally and competing in European competitions. On 31 August 2023, he was riding his bike on the way to a training session. The Appellant was driving his vehicle in the opposite direction and came to a traffic-light controlled crossroads. At the lights, the Appellant was positioned behind a stationary vehicle which, after the lights had turned green, had stalled on two occasions. The complainant, who was coming from the opposite direction, had crossed the junction while the lights were green. At that moment the Appellant decided to overtake the stalled vehicle, making a sudden manoeuvre onto the wrong side of the road and putting his vehicle directly into the path of the complainant as he cycled through the junction. The complainant collided with the Appellant’s vehicle. He was thrown some 20ft into the air ultimately landing on the concrete road. The incident was all captured on CCTV.

As a result of the collision the police attended, and a roadside drug test was undertaken. The Appellant tested positive for cannabis. He was arrested on suspicion of drug driving and taken to a police station. Whilst there a blood test was taken and the reading was found to be 3.06, the legal limit being 2.

The complainant sustained fractures to the C1 posterior arch and the base of a C2 fracture, fractures at C2 and C3, first fractures at T4, sternal fractures, rib fractures of both the first and forth ribs, transverse factors bilaterally and soft issue injuries to his right shoulder which required considerable immobilisation within hospital. There was an initial period in hospital where the complainant was placed on bedrest and not allowed to move at all.

The Appellant had no previous convictions. He pleaded guilty at the PTPH. At the sentencing hearing the judge had a pre-sentence report, a victim impact statement from Mr Cooper, several character references for the Appellant and a Sentencing Note from the defence. The Sentencing Note was short and concentrated perhaps understandably on the issue of whether an immediate custodial sentence was necessary. It did not address the issue of disqualification or its length.

As to the sentencing guidelines the prosecution suggested that the careless driving count fell into culpability A, based on the Appellant’s deliberate and impatient decision to pull onto the wrong side of the road without having sight of any traffic or being aware at all of any of the prevailing traffic conditions. The prosecution submitted that the Appellant’s driving fell just below the threshold of dangerous driving. As a result of the severity of the injuries caused to Mr Cooper the prosecution submitted the harm fell into category 1. In terms of aggravating features, the prosecution relied upon the Appellant being over the prescribed limit for drugs and that Mr Cooper was a vulnerable road user, being a cyclist. It was conceded by the defence that therefore the Appellant fell to be sentenced on category 1A on the Sentencing Guidelines.

The pre-sentence report recorded the Appellant’s extreme remorse for what he had done and the injuries that had been caused to Mr Cooper. The author of the report assessed that expression of remorse as being completely genuine.

In his remarks, when sentencing, the judge said that he had found the sentencing exercise to be difficult. Agreeing that the case was in category 1A on the guidelines the judge nevertheless observed:

“… notwithstanding that you were under the influence of the drug cannabis, notwithstanding your impatience to get around the car ahead, it was at the end of the day a momentary error of judgement, and I have to factor that of course into the sentencing exercise.”

The judge accepted that the Appellant had a strong personal mitigation and noted the character references that had been provided. The judge also, exceptionally, was persuaded to allow the Appellant a one-third credit for his guilty plea even though it had been given at the PTPH.

Again, perfectly understandably, the judge’s focus in his sentencing remarks was on whether an immediate custodial sentence should be imposed or whether he could pass a suspended sentence order. The judge said it was a finely balanced decision, but he concluded that, largely due to the Appellant’s strong personal mitigation and the prospects of rehabilitation, that he could suspend the sentence of imprisonment. He therefore imposed the sentence that we have set out earlier. In terms of disqualification the judge simply imposed a period of 3 years with an extended re-test. The judge did not explain how he had reached the figure of 3 years. The imposition of the extended re-test was, as the judge noted, discretionary.

Mr Moran, for the Appellant, has argued today that the 3-year disqualification was manifestly excessive. He submits that although there is a punitive element to a disqualification the main purpose of disqualification is forward looking and preventative rather than backward looking: R -v Crew [2009] EWCA Crim 2851 [16]. He argues that the imposition of the extended re-test is a further element of public protection which means that the public protection element of a period of disqualification is of lesser importance.

We are unpersuaded that the 3-year disqualification imposed in this case was manifestly excessive. The imposition of a period of disqualification in road traffic offences serves several aims, only one of which is protection of the public from the harm of further offending by the immediate defendant. Disqualification is also intended as both punishment and deterrent. It must be recognised that the period of disqualification is an important element of the overall punishment for the offence and that its punitive effect is part of its function (see R -v- Acton [2018] EWCA Crim 2410 [20]). As the Sentencing Council Guidelines made clear:

“Disqualification is part of the sentence. Accordingly, when setting the discretionary element of the disqualification the court must have regard to the purposes of sentencing in section 57 of the Sentencing Code, which include the punishment of offenders, the reduction of crime, the reform and rehabilitation of offenders and the protection of the public when dealing with the length of any disqualification.”

Nevertheless, the guidance continues:

“In assessing the length of any disqualification sentencers should not disqualify for a period that is longer than necessary and should bear in mind the need for rehabilitation (by considering the effects of disqualification on employment or employment prospects).”

We accept that the risk of the Appellant re-offending is low and his prospects of rehabilitation therefore correspondingly high. We also recognise that the requirement that the Appellant undertake an extended re-test before his licence to drive is returned is a further protection of the public. But as we have identified, these are factors not the only ones to be considered when determining the period of disqualification. This was a very serious case of causing serious injury by careless driving. The period of disqualification reflects elements of punishment and deterrence. Having regard to the seriousness of the offence we reject the contention that a period of disqualification of 3 years was manifestly excessive.

The judge pronounced an order for the statutory surcharge which was calculated administratively at £187. However, on the court’s record it appears to have been recorded for both offences and therefore as two separate orders. This court takes the opportunity to direct that this error be corrected. Save in that respect the appeal is dismissed.