R v Omar Mechita

On 28 November 2024, the appellant, Omar Mechita (then aged 33) was sentenced for a series of drugs and money laundering offences. He was sentenced to three years and two months' imprisonment for possession of a controlled drug of Class A drug (cocaine) with intent to supply to others. That sentence was ordered to run consecutively to a sentence that the appellant was already serving for conspiracy to murder. He was also sentenced to two years' imprisonment for possession of a Class B drug (ketamine), again with intent to supply, and to four months' imprisonment for possession of a Class B drug (cannabis) with intent to supply. He was also sentenced to one year's imprisonment for possession of counterfeit currency; to one year's imprisonment for possession of criminal property; and to four months' imprisonment for another offence of possession of criminal property. All of those sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with the sentence for the possession of cocaine with intent to supply. The appellant now appeals against sentence by leave of the single judge.

The facts may be stated shortly. Police officers were searching for the appellant in connection with the offence of conspiracy to murder. That was a drugs-related shooting offence which had been committed in 2019. The appellant had avoided arrest since that time. On 3 August 2022, he was seen to leave a property in West London. That property was searched. Police officers recovered 341 grams of cocaine (with a purity of 88 per cent), just over one kilogram of ketamine, and 18.8 grams of cannabis. They also found counterfeit currency with an attributed value of £32,640, genuine sterling to the value of £20,590, and euros to the value of £1,080. Multiple phones and SIM cards were found, along with drugs paraphernalia such as packing material, glass vials with labels, plastic boxes and bags.

The appellant had been sentenced in December 2022 to 20 years' imprisonment for the offence of conspiracy to murder. He was not sentenced for the drugs and other offences at that time. There was a delay in the proceedings for those offences. He was ultimately sentenced for those offences in November 2024. At that time he was aged 33, and his only previous conviction was for the conspiracy to murder. The judge did not consider that a pre-sentence report was necessary. Nor do we consider that a report is necessary.

The judge took the offence of possession of cocaine with intent to supply as the lead offence. The appellant had argued that his role was a significant role. The prosecution placed it at the top end of significant, largely it seems because they did not have telephone evidence available to show precisely what the appellant was doing.

In his sentencing remarks, the judge noted that there had been "much discussion and submissions" on whether the appellant occupied a leading or a significant role for the purposes of the Sentencing Council guidelines. The judge said that it was right to say that there were features which indicated a significant role but that, taking a step back and comparing the features of a "significant" and a "leading" role, he took the view that the appellant had performed a "leading" role. He took that view because the appellant had bought drugs on a commercial scale. He considered that that was the case because of the quantity of drugs – one kilo of ketamine and one third of a kilo of cocaine – and because of the purity of the cocaine (88 per cent). He found that the appellant must have had close links to the original source of the drugs, because in the normal course of events drugs start off at their purest, but become diluted before they are sold on the street. He considered that the appellant had also expected substantial financial advantage from the sale. The appellant had bought at one price and had sold at another. He noted that the appellant had been in possession of £20,590 which had not been explained. He took the money as reflective of the scale of the operation. For all those reasons the judge concluded that the appellant had performed a "leading" role.

A category 3 offence involved 150 grams of cocaine, for which the starting point would be eight years and six months' imprisonment. For category 2, the indicative amount was one kilogram, for which the starting point would be 11 years' imprisonment. The judge took the term of nine and a half years – that is a point between the starting points for categories 2 and 3 – to reflect the amount of the drug. He reduced that by one third to reflect the delay in sentencing and also the other mitigation. The resulting sentence was one of six years and two months' imprisonment. He then reduced that further by one third to reflect the appellant's guilty plea, which resulted in a sentence for that offence of three years and two months' imprisonment. The judge did not treat the previous conviction for conspiracy to murder as an aggravating feature, although he said that he could have done so. He ordered that the sentence for the cocaine offence be served consecutively to the earlier sentence for the conspiracy to murder.

The judge took a similar approach for the other offences. The ketamine offence was a category 2 offence, given the quantity, and for an offender performing a "leading" role the starting point was six years' imprisonment. The judge again reduced that to reflect the delay and the mitigation, and then by one third to reflect the guilty plea. That resulted in the sentence of two years' imprisonment. He took a similar approach in relation to the cannabis offence. He took a starting point of one year's imprisonment, but reduced it in a similar way, resulting in a sentence of four months' imprisonment.

For the offences of possession of criminal property, the judge took a starting point of three years' imprisonment, which he reduced ultimately to a sentence of one year's imprisonment for the possession of the £20,590 sterling. He took one year's imprisonment as the starting point for the offence involving the euros, which he reduced ultimately to four months' imprisonment. He took a starting point of three years' imprisonment for the possession of the counterfeit currency, which he reduced in a similar way to reflect the mitigation and the guilty plea, resulting in a sentence of one year's imprisonment. All of those sentences were ordered to run concurrently with the sentence for the cocaine offence.

Miss Chinner, who appears on behalf of the appellant, submitted that the starting points of nine years and six months' imprisonment for the cocaine offence and six years' imprisonment for the ketamine offence were too high. She submitted that there was no evidence that the appellant had performed a "leading" role, as opposed to a "significant" role. There was no direct evidence of directing or organising buying or selling on a commercial scale. There were no text messages or ledgers. There was no evidence of links to the original source, other than the purity of the drug. Nor was it known at what purity drugs would be sold on the street. She submitted that although the appellant was in possession of significant sums of money, that did not demonstrate that the gain would be substantial, rather than significant. She drew attention to the circumstances in which the appellant, who was then of course on the run, was living as indicating that the amount of money was significant, but not substantial.

In relation to the money laundering offences, Miss Chinner submitted that the level of harm from the drug dealing had already been factored into the category for the drug offences and should not have been used to increase the starting point for the money laundering offences. She submitted that there were no other factors indicating high culpability.

We deal first with the offence of possession of cocaine with intent to supply. There are a number of factors identified in the relevant Sentencing Council guidelines which indicate what amounts to a "leading" role. These include the following three, among others: directing or organising buying and selling on a commercial scale; close links to the original source; and expectations of substantial financial advantage. In our judgment, the judge was entitled to conclude on the facts of this case that the appellant had performed a leading role. The judge was entitled to have regard to the quantity of cocaine and to its purity, together with the other evidence of packaging, as indicating selling on a commercial scale. That was reinforced by the amount of money in the appellant's possession and, indeed, the amount of other drugs (the one kilo of ketamine in particular) in his possession, all of which was indicative of supply on a commercial scale. The judge was also entitled to infer a close link to the original source, given the purity of the cocaine. He was entitled to find that the amount of drugs involved, and their purity, gave rise to an expectation of substantial financial gain.

In those circumstances, given the quantity of cocaine, the judge was entitled to adjust the starting point for a category 3 offence upwards, and to increase it from eight and a half years to nine and a half years' imprisonment. Thereafter, he gave a substantial reduction for the delay and for the other personal mitigation, and the maximum reduction for the guilty pleas. In our judgment, the sentence of three years and two months' imprisonment was not manifestly excessive. In any event, even if the categorisation had been as a significant rather than a leading role, we do not consider that the sentence imposed would, on the facts of this case, be manifestly excessive. If the supply of cocaine were to be considered alone, the starting point for a significant role for a category 3 offence would be four years and six months' imprisonment, with an indicative amount of 150 grams. As the appellant was in possession of 340 grams, there would have needed to be an upward adjustment to somewhere in the region of six years' imprisonment. That would have been reduced by one third to reflect the mitigation, resulting in a sentence of four years' imprisonment. There would then be a reduction of one third to reflect the guilty plea, resulting in a sentence for the cocaine offence of two years and eight months.

However, as the sentences for the cocaine offence and the other offences were to be made concurrent, the sentence for the cocaine offence would have had to have been adjusted at some stage to reflect the overall offending. That would have involved an upward adjustment, before reducing the sentence for the guilty plea. That would still have resulted, inevitably, in a sentence in the region of three years and two months' imprisonment. A sentence at that level, given the fact of the overall offending in this case, would have been amply justified. In all the circumstances, therefore, however analysed, a sentence of three years and two months' imprisonment is not manifestly excessive. Nor do we consider that the sentence for possession with intent to supply ketamine was manifestly excessive.

Further, in relation to the possession of criminal property (the £20,590), we consider that the judge was entitled to regard the appellant as demonstrating high culpability. Given the amount of money involved, it was a category 5 offence within the relevant Sentencing Council guidelines, with a starting point of three years' imprisonment. The judge then reduced that to reflect the personal mitigation and made a further reduction to reflect the guilty plea. For that reason the resulting sentence is not manifestly excessive.

Finally, we do not consider that there was any breach of the principle of totality by reason of the fact that the appellant was sentenced at different times for the conspiracy to murder and for the drugs and other offences. The drugs and other offences were different in kind and committed at different times from the conspiracy offence. As a matter of principle, a consecutive sentence was appropriate. The judge did not treat the earlier conviction as an aggravating factor, as he could have done. He made a substantial reduction for the delay in bringing these offences to trial.

In all the circumstances, the total period of imprisonment for all the offending that the appellant had committed is not disproportionate. It is just, proportionate and merited. Accordingly, this appeal against sentence is dismissed.