R v Christopher Cartwright

On 22 May 2024 in the Crown Court at Lincoln, the appellant was sentenced to 10 years six months' imprisonment for conspiracy to supply a class A drug, namely cocaine, having pleaded guilty to that offence at an earlier hearing. The appellant appeals against that sentence with the leave of the single judge.

The appellant's offending came to light as a result of a police operation into the organised supply of cocaine into Lincolnshire. This uncovered a conspiracy which ran between 1 June 2019 and 27 February 2020. The wider conspiracy in which the appellant played a part involved the supply of 9.5 kilograms of cocaine. The appellant, based in Leicestershire, was responsible for one of three supply lines into Lincolnshire. He pleaded guilty on the accepted basis that he supplied a total of two kilograms of cocaine in eight quarter-kilo batches. There was evidence of other intended sales which did not take place, apparently because funds were not available or because the co-conspirators sourced cocaine from other suppliers on those dates. The appellant was able to organise a supply while out of the country, relying on an associate to conduct the arrangements.

The appellant was arrested on 21 April 2020. His home address was searched and £2,000 cash was seized. In his police interview the appellant denied any involvement in the drugs conspiracy and said the £2,000 was from buying and selling cars.

The appellant, who was aged 37 at the date of sentence, had four convictions for seven offences spanning from March 2008 to May 2018. His relevant previous convictions included offences of possession of drugs and, significantly, two offences of possession of class A drugs with intent to supply, convictions dating from 2008 and 2011.

The appellant entered his guilty plea on 6 November 2020, that is some three-and-a-half years before he was sentenced. As the judge acknowledged, that delay was no fault of the appellant. He had not offended further in the intervening period and relied on character references from his partner, his former partner (who is the mother of his older children) and his employer. In a letter to the judge the appellant expressed remorse for his actions and for the impact that his offending would have on his family. He maintained that the motivation for his offending was financial pressure which he had since sought to address.

In sentencing the appellant, the judge noted that the amount of cocaine involved in the conspiracy was 9.5 kilograms which would place it into Category 1 harm within the relevant sentencing guideline. However, the judge properly noted that the amount the appellant supplied was two-kilograms. Category 1 has an indicative quantity of five kilograms and Category 2 an indicative quantity of one kilogram. The appellant's case fell between those categories. The judge found that the appellant had a leading role. In the realistic submissions that he has made to us, Mr James acknowledges that although he contended otherwise the finding by the judge is not open to challenge. The appellant directed and organised the buying and selling on a commercial basis, had substantial links to others in the chain and was expecting a substantial financial advantage.

With reference to the sentencing guideline, the judge concluded that a sentence of 12 years' imprisonment would be appropriate before weighing aggravating and mitigating factors. He then considered the aggravating factor of the appellant's previous conviction for drug trafficking offences set against the mitigation available to him. That mitigation included that the appellant was a well thought of family man, with relatively young children who would be impacted by his absence, the impact on his ex-partner and children, the remorse the appellant had shown and the actions he had taken to get his life back together, including working and staying out of trouble since his arrest. In addition, the substantial delay in the appellant's sentencing which arose through no fault of his own was identified by the judge as a significant mitigating factor.

Balancing those factors, the judge concluded that the appropriate sentence after trial would have been 14 years' imprisonment. The appellant was entitled to 25 per cent credit for his guilty plea. Via that route, which the judge clearly explained, he arrived at the eventual sentence of 10 years six months' imprisonment.

By his grounds of appeal the appellant contends that the judge gave insufficient weight to the mitigating factors and/or gave too much to the aggravating factor of the appellant's previous convictions.

Whilst acknowledging that this is not strictly an argument in relation to disparity, Mr James on behalf of the appellant seeks to draw a comparison with the sentences imposed on the co-conspirators who were sentenced at the same time as the appellant. It is argued that in the case of the three other co-defendants sentenced at that time downward adjustments were made from the sentences identified by the judge as appropriate before weighing aggravating and mitigating factors. Having started with sentences in the range of 13 to 16 years, the judge applied reductions in the region of two to two-and-a-half years for the delay and personal mitigation. It is contended that the appellant's mitigation was at least as strong as that of his co-defendants. Indeed, Mr James argues with justification that the delay had been particularly lengthy in the appellant's case. He was one of the first to enter his guilty plea but was in the group of offenders to be sentenced last. In those circumstances, it is argued on behalf of the appellant that the judge was wrong to uplift the appellant's sentence from the 12 years he identified as appropriate, having regard to culpability and harm, to one of 14 years. We are very grateful to Mr James for the very focused way in which he has presented this appeal and for his extremely helpful oral submissions to us today.

As is acknowledged on the appellant's behalf, the judge's approach to sentencing in this complex case was careful and thorough. Mr James realistically accepted that the fact that this was the appellant's third class A drugs trafficking offence significantly aggravated his position. Although the previous convictions were of some age, the last being some 13 years earlier, they demonstrated a history of dealing in class A drugs. The appellant's claim to have turned to dealing drugs because of financial pressures is to be viewed in that context. The history also had some bearing on the weight that could be given to the appellant's expression of remorse and the impact on his family. The appellant returned to supplying class A drugs in full knowledge of the likely consequences.

On any basis therefore the appellant's previous convictions did call for a substantial uplift to be applied to the sentence of 12 years' imprisonment which the judge had selected after considering the guidelines and about which no complaint is made. The uplift was thought to be offset by the appellant's mitigation. By far the most significant mitigating feature in his case was the very substantial delay between his guilty plea and his sentence for which he was not responsible in any way.

The judge concluded that notwithstanding the mitigation which he carefully detailed, the significant aggravating feature of the previous class A offences could lead to upwards adjustment from the sentence of 12 years' imprisonment which he would otherwise have imposed. The sole question for us is whether in striking the balance that he did the judge arrived at a sentence that was manifestly excessive.

We acknowledge that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating features is primarily a function of the sentencing judge and that the judge approached this case with conspicuous care. However, in the context of a difficult sentencing exercise involving multiple offenders, we consider that there is force in the argument that the final sentence for the appellant did not strike the appropriate balance. The delay in sentencing the appellant was particularly significant and should have been reflected in the eventual sentence, as indeed it was for the other offenders. If the judge made appropriate allowance for the mitigation he had identified, it follows that he must have applied an uplift in the region of at least four years for the previous convictions. That is an uplift of one-third to the sentence he otherwise identified as appropriate.

Serious as those convictions were, there had been a substantial gap in the appellant's offending and we consider that such an uplift was too great. Alternatively, it may be that despite identifying the substantial mitigation in the final calculation in the appellant's case the judge underestimated the downwards adjustment that was required. Either way we have been persuaded that a sentence of 14 years' imprisonment before credit for plea was manifestly excessive.

In our judgment, an appropriate sentence after weighing the mitigating and aggravating factors to be imposed after trial in the appellant's case was one of twelve-and-a-half years' imprisonment. Allowing credit of 25 per cent for the guilty plea and after rounding, we arrive at a sentence of nine years four months' imprisonment.

We accordingly quash the sentence of 10 years six months' imprisonment and substitute one of nine years and four months. To that extent this appeal is allowed.