R v Sona Godlova

On 18 July 2025, in the Crown Court at Cambridge, the appellant, Sona Godlova (aged 19) was sentenced by His Honour Judge Enright for a number of offences. She was sentenced to 24 weeks' detention in a young offender institution for each of two offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. No separate penalty was imposed in respect of five offences of assault on an emergency worker. In respect of an earlier incident no separate penalty was imposed for an offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm or an offence of affray.

The appellant now appeals against sentence with the leave of the single judge.

The facts may be stated shortly. On 23 August 2024, at about 5 pm, police were called to an address in Peterborough. Present at the address were the appellant's mother and her stepfather. The appellant was at the address and had shut herself in the upstairs bathroom. She had been refusing to leave and her behaviour had become increasingly erratic. One police officer tried, but failed, to persuade her to leave the bathroom. Eventually, access was gained. Another policeman tried to hold the appellant to move her. However, the appellant started to smash her head on the shower glass and then she headbutted the door frame. She was manoeuvred to the floor, but she headbutted the floor. Two more officers came to try to assist. The appellant resisted the officers and tried to harm herself. Her mother also came to help, but the appellant (as it was put) latched on to her arm with her teeth. That was the first count of assault. The appellant kicked one of the police officers on the legs and she headbutted another police officer. Her behaviour was described as alternately calm and hysterical. She was placed into a police van. She headbutted the walls of the van and when removed from the police van, she kicked another police officer to her legs.

The following day, at the police station, she grabbed two more officers. There was a fight and the appellant had to be restrained. She was manoeuvred to the ground, during which she bit the arm of one of the police officers. That was the second offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The kicks and the grabbing of the police officers comprised the offences of assaulting an emergency worker, for which no separate penalty was imposed.

The other offences related to an incident which occurred about eight months earlier, when a group of people beat up two or three males. The appellant joined in by kicking one of the victims whilst he was unconscious on the ground. No separate penalty was imposed for those offences.

The appellant was born in July 2006. She was aged just 18 at the time of the two offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and was aged 19 when she was sentenced. She had one previous conviction of being drunk and disorderly and assault on an emergency worker, which occurred in May 2024. No separate penalty was imposed for those offences, but she was ordered to pay £50 compensation.

There was a pre-sentence report in which the harm to the emergency workers was acknowledged. They had endured aggressive and violent behaviour. The author's assessment was that the motivation for her actions was the appellant's negative attitude to police and the perception that she was acting in self defence. The author of the report said that it was her assessment that the appellant's actions were "an impulsive response to a perceived threat, leading to her resistance and aggression during the altercation". The author said that the appellant exhibited "significant difficulties with anger management and tempter control". Having carried out an assessment, the author of the report considered that the appellant's immaturity was a likely factor contributing to the risk of causing serious harm and re-offending and that there was a need for intervention to promote maturity. The author assessed the circumstances of the offence and considered the impact on the appellant if she were to be subjected to a custodial sentence. It was noted that incarceration would make her existing mental health challenges worse, especially given her chaotic lifestyle and her anxiety. It was considered that a custodial sentence might not address the root causes of the offending. The author proposed the imposition of a 24 month suspended sentence, with a requirement to complete 40 days of rehabilitation activity and to complete an unpaid work requirement with a specified number of hours.

We have had the benefit of an updated report from the young offender institution where the appellant is being detained. Sadly, there has been no provision of mental health support. Many people need help sometimes. The appellant needs some help. It is unfortunate that she has not been able to receive it in the place where she is being detained. The report says that the appellant has not had any negative or positive behaviour warnings or adjudications. She is working on the wing. She is complying with the regime, and no concerns have been raised about her behaviour in the young offender institution. The judge did not have that report available to him, but we bear it in mind in considering this appeal.

The judge considered that he should focus on the two offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, although he said that he did not wish to minimise the assaults on the emergency workers. He also noted that the earlier set of offences involved a lesser role and would, in his judgment, have led to a non-custodial sentence.

One of the offences of assault related to the biting of the appellant's mother. The mother did not support the prosecution. The police officer who was bitten did not make a victim impact statement. The judge characterised each of the offences of assault as culpability B and harm level 2 under the relevant Sentencing Council guidelines for assault. That was accepted by counsel for the appellant at the hearing before the judge. The starting point was 36 weeks' custody, with a range from a high level community order to one year and six months' custody. The judge considered the fact that the appellant had been on police bail at the time of the offences was an aggravating factor. He considered that that would have justified an upward adjustment to the sentence, to make it 40 weeks' custody.

The judge took account of the appellant's mitigation, which he described as her youth and her troubled background. He considered that that justified a downward adjustment, which took the sentence back to 36 weeks' custody. The appellant had pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity, and so she was entitled to a one third reduction, which took the sentence to 24 weeks' custody for each offence, to be served concurrently.

The judge considered whether he could suspend the sentence. He said this:

In helpful and focused written and oral submissions on behalf of the appellant, Miss Rogers advanced two ground of appeal. The first is that the judge did not properly take into account the appellant's personal mitigating features, which included her immaturity, the lack of recent offending, her deprived background and her mental health difficulties. Miss Rogers relied upon the liaison and diversion report and the pre-sentence report to which we have referred. Miss Rogers confirmed that whilst the accommodation which the appellant had available at the time of sentence had been lost, other accommodation would be available today if this appeal were to be allowed.

The second ground is that the judge had failed to take the appellant's mitigation into account when deciding not to suspend the sentence. Miss Rogers submitted that the combination of the judge's acceptance of a realistic prospect of rehabilitation and the appellant's personal mitigation led to a situation where it could not be said that the only appropriate punishment was immediate custody.

We consider grounds 1 and 12 together. We announced, prior to giving judgment, that the appellant's sentence would be suspended as we did not want to keep her waiting to hear the result. In reaching that conclusion, we bear in mind the relevant Sentencing Council guidelines. They include, but are not limited to, the guideline dealing with offenders with mental disorders, developmental disorders, or neurological impairments. That indicates that the sentencing judge should assess culpability and then consider whether the disorder meant that the offender's culpability was reduced.

We also bear in mind the guideline on the imposition of community and custodial sentences. In relation to whether a sentence can be suspended, the guidelines indicate that two of the factors where suspension is not appropriate include the risk that the offender presents to the public, the fact that appropriate punishment can be achieved in custody, and a third, a history of poor compliance with court orders. No risk has been assessed in this case and there has been no failure to comply with court orders.

The factors indicating that suspension is appropriate include; first, a realistic prospect of rehabilitation; second, strong personal mitigation; and third (not relevant in this case), custody might result in significant harm to others.

In all the circumstances of this case, therefore, we consider that the judge erred in imposing a sentence of immediate detention in a young offender institution. We consider that the judge has not properly assessed certain factors in the appellant's case. First, the judge accepted that there was a realistic prospect of rehabilitation. Secondly, however, the judge did not factor into the equation the appellant's strong personal mitigation. She was aged just 18 at the time of the two offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. Her culpability was reduced as her mental health conditions had affected her actions that afternoon at the time of the offences and the following day, as explained in the psychiatric report. Those were strong factors, together with the prospect of rehabilitation, which pointed towards suspending the sentence, and so allowing the appellant's underlying problems to be addressed in the community, whilst also imposing a degree of punishment in the community.

We do not consider that the judge was correct to conclude that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate custody in the circumstances of this case. We recognise that the offences were serious, but they do need to be assessed in context. First, as we have said, the appellant's culpability – her responsibility for her actions – was reduced because she had a number of mental health difficulties which affected her actions at the time. That matter significantly affects the question of whether custody was the only appropriate punishment. That factor, however, does not feature in the judge's analysis.

Secondly, the appellant had only one previous conviction from a time when she was 17 years of age and which had not led to the imposition of any penalty.

Thirdly, although the appellant acted wrongly and should not have done what she did, she acted impulsively in refusing to leave her mother's home. The assault on the police officers was carried out in the context of lashing out and trying to prevent herself from being taken out of the house when they were trying to remove her.

Given all the circumstances, we do not consider that the judge was right to say here that punishment could only appropriately be achieved by immediate custody. Punishment in the community would have been appropriate, ideally with the structured intervention of community health services to address the appellant's underlying problems which had led her to offend.

In all the circumstances, therefore, we consider that the judge did err in imposing a sentence of immediate detention in a young offender institution. We consider that the sentence of 24 weeks' detention should have been suspended for 24 months.

We would normally have imposed an unpaid work requirement, but in view of the fact that the appellant has already served three weeks of her sentence in custody, we consider that she has already experienced a degree of punishment for her actions on that day, and that it would not be right or fair to impose an unpaid work requirement.

We do impose a requirement that the appellant completes 40 days of rehabilitation activity.

Accordingly, and to that extent, the appeal is allowed.