R v Richard Mills

This is an appeal against sentence brought by leave of the single judge.

The anonymity provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply. There must be no reporting of the case which is likely to lead to the identification of the victims of the offences. This prohibition applies for the lifetime of the victims, unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act.

On 7 February 2025, in the Crown Court at Liverpool, the appellant, who is now 42 years of age, was sentenced by His Honour Judge Swinnerton to a total of 18 months' imprisonment for two offences of sexual assault, contrary to section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, committed against two different women several years apart. On count 2, the sentence was six months' imprisonment. On count 4, the sentence was 12 months' imprisonment, which was ordered to run consecutively. The appellant had been convicted of the offences on 20 December 2024 after a trial. There were other counts on which the appellant had been acquitted by the jury.

The grounds of appeal, in short, are that the judge misapplied the relevant Sentencing Council guideline, failed to give sufficient credit for the appellant's personal mitigation, and failed to have sufficient regard to the principle of totality, with the overall result that the sentence was manifestly excessive.

The appellant was a serving police officer with the Greater Manchester Police at the time of these offences. He had joined the force in 2006.The first complaint, "X", had been a police officer since 2000. The appellant first met her in 2012, when they were both working on the Public Protection Investigation Unit based at Oldham. They were both of the rank of constable at that stage. Part of the background to count 1 is that when she and the appellant were both working in the same team or in the same office, the appellant's conversation with X would sometimes include inappropriate sexual innuendo.

The offence charged in count 2 took place in early 2015. X was asked to make a welfare check on a colleague who was on sick leave at home. The colleague lived in Rochdale. The appellant said that he had some enquiries to make in that area and suggested that he and X should travel to Rochdale together by car. X drove. Her habit when driving was to rest her left hand on the gear stick. During the journey that appellant's conversation became sexualised. He said that he was not "getting it" because his wife was pregnant. X felt uneasy but did not engage with the conversation. At some point the appellant took X's hand, lifted it from the gear stick and placed it on his crotch, over his trousers. She could feel that his penis was erect. She moved her hand straightaway and said, "Fuck off, Rick", and carried on driving to the colleague's house. She told the colleague what had just happened, whose advice was that she must report it.

X did tell others about what had happened at the time, but she was ambivalent about pursuing any formal complaint. In September 2016 she made it clear that she would not support any investigation into the appellant's misconduct. At his disciplinary interview in 2017 the appellant denied the allegation. Because X did not assist the investigation, there was no evidence to support an allegation of gross misconduct, so there was no formal misconduct hearing. However, at a conduct meeting, the appellant was given a verbal warning as to his future behaviour.

The appellant was subsequently transferred from the Public Protection Unit to work at Nexus House in Manchester – one of the Force's headquarters buildings. The second complainant, "Y", had begun her career with Greater Manchester Police in a civilian capacity in 2017, when she was aged 19. She had always wanted to be a police officer. In due course, after the offence in question, she achieved that ambition. She did well in her civilian supervisory role. By the time of the offence in count 4, when she was still aged only 21, she was leading a team of around five other civilian staff.

The appellant had been Y's supervisor and mentor. When she achieved promotion, she and the appellant were at the same level of seniority in the sense that they were both supervisors.

In November 2019, the appellant and Y went together to a leadership and management course in Sheffield run by the College of Policing. Because Y could not drive at the time, the appellant offered her a lift. The journey there was uneventful. However, at the conference the appellant and Y sat at the same table at the back of the room. After lunch, as the conference continued, the appellant complained to Y that he was bored. He then whispered to her that she looked "really nice", that he was turned on, and that he felt "horny". He told her that his penis was hard. He then took her hand by the wrist and pushed it onto his crotch so that her hand was on his penis through his trousers. She could feel that he had an erection. Initially she froze. Her hand was on his penis for five to ten seconds. She then moved it away. She felt unable to do or to say anything.

On the drive home, the appellant engaged in further sexualised conversation in the course of which he said, "I'm giving you a lift back. What's in it for me?" The sexual implication was clear.

Each of the complainants provided a victim personal statement. Both women had been badly affected psychologically and emotionally. X had since had difficulty accepting and dealing with trust in the workplace and with colleagues. She had undergone counselling and therapy. She said that she struggled now to trust male partners and was constantly second guessing their motives. She had come to dislike her career as a police officer and had been left with a sense of guilt and embarrassment that she had not pursued the complaint further at the time

Although Y had always wanted to be a police officer she said that she now felt unable to progress her career because her anxiety always takes over at the prospect. She has noticed a change in her own personality. She snaps at the smallest thing, and she finds herself re-living the incident in broken sleep at night. She feels sad all the time.

The appellant had no previous convictions. There were impressive character references from his wife and from close family friends to whom the behaviour in these offences seemed totally out of character.

The author of the pre-sentence report noted that the appellant still denied the offences, although he acknowledged that for some time his behaviour at work had been inappropriate. The view of the author was that the appellant had demonstrated no insight into the impact of his behaviour. As it was put in the report, despite the warning he had received in the past, he had not been able to censor his attitudes and actions.

In his sentencing remarks, the judge set out in some detail the circumstances of the offences and his factual findings. He noted in relation to count 2 that, although the allegation was not pursued to a formal misconduct hearing, the appellant had received a verbal warning as to his future behaviour and should have learnt his lesson from that.

In relation to count 4, the judge observed that the appellant had been supervising Y as her mentor prior to her promotion. Although by the time of the offence she and the appellant were ostensibly on the same level as supervisors, the judge took the view that there was an imbalance of power between them. He said:

In relation to the circumstances of the offence and Y's feeling unable to say anything when the assault took place because they were in the conference room, the judge said:

The judge referred to the victim personal statements which, he said, painted a picture of two professional police women who have had their mental health, their careers and their lives blighted by what the appellant had done to them.

The judge noted the evidence at trial that there had been a culture among police officers of not reporting each other – a culture of which, he said, the appellant was part. The judge observed that the public were rightly concerned about the behaviour of police officers because they had powers that other members of society did not have. Their role in upholding the law meant that they were frequently in contact with vulnerable people, which is why, the judge said, the public are concerned about the behaviour of police officers. The judge continued:

The judge turned to the Sentencing Council guideline for sexual assault. He found that although the complainants had suffered serious psychological harm, it could not be said to be severe psychological harm, a category 1 factor. The serious psychological harm they had suffered was, nevertheless, an aggravating feature of the case. As there were no other category 2 factors, it was category 3 harm.

In terms of culpability, it was level B, because none of the level A factors was present.

The judge took into account as a mitigating factor the appellant's good character. He noted that, although the offences had taken place five and ten years ago, part of the reason for the delay was the culture which had enabled and emboldened that appellant to do the things he did.

The judge regarded the location of the offences as an aggravating factor. The assault in count 2 took place in a police car, where X was unable to move away because she was driving. It took place when the appellant was at work. The offence in count 4 was aggravated by the appellant's failure to heed the warnings he had received previously and by the fact that he took advantage of the culture of not reporting the misbehaviour of other officers. He had also taken advantage of Y's relatively junior position and her junior years.

Applying the guideline, the judge considered that although on the face of it these were category 3B offences, the aggravating features he identified justified an upward adjustment to category 2B. Count 4, he said, was the more serious offence. The starting point under the guideline for a category 2B offence is 12 months' imprisonment, with a range of up to two years' custody. Here there were two victims. The judge indicated that he took into account totality in arriving at his overall sentence. The sentence on count 2 would be six months' imprisonment; and on count 4, a consecutive term of 12 months' imprisonment.

The judge considered whether the sentence could be suspended. He carefully identified and balanced the factors for and against suspension, as required by the relevant Sentencing Council guideline. He took the view that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate custody. There has been no challenge to that conclusion.

We are grateful to Mr Hunter Gray for his written and oral submissions, and to Mr Dudley for his submissions too, both in the respondent's notice and orally. Mr Gray submits that the judge was wrong to elevate the offences to category 2B under the guideline, when in fact they fell squarely within category 3B, where the starting point was a high level community order and the range up to six months' custody. He submits that there was substantial mitigation in the appellant's good character, the loss of his job, the passage of time since the offences were committed, and the impact of the sentence on the appellant's family. Mr Gray submits that none of the category 2 harm factors was present, as the judge had acknowledged. He submits that the judge was wrong to treat as an aggravating factor in count 2 the location of the offence being in a car. He drew out attention to the drop-down expansion expansion of this factor in the guideline which in some ways, it might be said, supports that as a general proposition.

Mr Gray accepts that the judge was entitled to impose a higher sentence on count 4, but not to the extent of moving up from category 3B to category 2B. He submits that in passing a sentence substantially above the guideline range for category 3B, the judge failed to allow sufficient credit for the appellant's mitigation and, in addition, failed sufficiently to reflect the principle of totality.

In his written and oral submissions, Mr Dudley contends that on a proper application of the guidelines, the judge was fully entitled to move out of category 3B, in particular because of the finding of serious psychological harm which the judge had made.

We have considered carefully all of these submissions. We bear very much in mind that the judge had presided over the trial and was best placed to assess the harm caused by these offences and the appellant's culpability.

There is, as we reminded Mr Gray in the course of submissions, an important part of the guideline which he had not set out in his grounds of appeal. At step 2 of the guideline, beneath the table setting out starting points and ranges, there is the following important paragraph:

Here, we are quite satisfied that there was a highly significant "other relevant factor" not included in the guideline, namely the fact that the appellant was a serving police officer and committed these offences whilst at work and, technically at least, whilst on duty. The offences were committed against fellow police officers. Furthermore, as the judge correctly emphasised in his sentencing remarks, quite apart from the harm suffered by the complainants, there was additional harm in the undermining of the public's trust and faith in the police force.

The wording of the paragraph in the guideline which we have just quoted makes it clear that an increase beyond the category range otherwise indicated may be appropriate by reason of a combination of aggravating or other relevant factors. The judge was, in our view, entitled to find that the location and circumstances in which the sexual assault in count 2 was committed aggravated that offence. The assault took place in a police car whilst the complainant was actually driving. In the event she made clear what she thought of the appellant’s conduct and it seems not to have impaired her driving, but the shock and surprise of being assaulted in that way could easily have had serious consequences for road safety.

The judge was fully entitled to conclude, in relation to count 4, that there was an imbalance of power between the appellant and the complainant. He was much older. He had been Y's supervisor and mentor. She was inexperienced and in her first professional job. The judge was entitled to treat as an aggravating factor the way in which the appellant, as the judge found, took advantage of the likely reluctance of his intended victims to report the sexual offences he was about to commit. He himself was an experienced police officer who had worked in public protection and the investigation of sexual offences.

The judge was entitled to treat as an aggravating factor the serious psychological harm both complainants had suffered, and the impact of the appellant's offending on their professional and personal lives. As this court made clear in R v Chall [2019] EWCA Crim 865; [2019] 2 Cr App R (S) 44, at [26], a sentencer may move upwards from the guideline starting point to reflect the fact that the psychological harm suffered, although short of "severe" (the level required for category 1) is significantly greater than would generally be seen in the offence in question.

Applying the guideline, we think this combination of aggravating and other factors entitled the judge to move outside the range for category 3B in respect of count 4, which he rightly judged to be the more serious of the offences. However, we do not think that it was appropriate to move out of category 3B in respect of count 2. The sentence imposed on count 2 was six months' imprisonment – the very top of the range for category 3B. There should have been some reduction for personal mitigation.

We note that in his sentencing remarks the judge referred to only two mitigating factors: the appellant's good character and the passage of time. The value of the latter as a mitigating factor was diluted because the delay was caused, in part, the judge considered, by the culture of non-reporting, of which the appellant had taken advantage.

However, there was additional personal mitigation to which the judge referred only briefly and in the different context of balancing the guideline factors for and against suspension. Although the appellant brought these consequences on himself, the fact is that there will be very serious financial and social consequences for the appellant and his family. Inevitably, he has now been dismissed from the Force for gross misconduct. Whether or not his police pension will be in peril remains to be seen, but it is certainly a possibility. His wife, perhaps surprisingly, also lost her job as a result (it seems) of the publicity surrounding the appellant's offending. There was a likelihood that the family home would have to be sold, but Mr Gray tells us this morning that that may no longer be the case. It was a question of whether, on the depleted family finances, they could afford to maintain that home.

We do think that the personal mitigation should have been more strongly reflected in the overall sentence and that the principle of totality also called for further adjustment. We are persuaded that the total sentence of 18 months' imprisonment was manifestly excessive. We therefore allow the appeal.

We think that the appropriate total sentence of immediate imprisonment should have been 13 months, rather than 18 months. To achieve that, we quash the sentence of six months' imprisonment on count 2 and substitute a sentence of four months' imprisonment. On count 4, we quash the sentence of 12 months' imprisonment and substitute a sentence of nine months' imprisonment. The sentences will continue to run consecutively, as before.

To that extent the appeal is allowed.

There is one further technical matter which has been drawn to our attention. The victim surcharge order is recorded in the sum of £156, when in fact it should have been £100. We simply direct that the record be amended accordingly.