R v Tasham Mahmood

This case arises from the tragic and needless death of Carol Andrew which was caused by the dangerous driving of the respondent offender on 21 July 2021 when she was walking her dog and trying to cross a road where the speed limit was 30 mph but he was driving at over 60 mph and was unable to stop in time.

We have read the moving statement of her son Robert Andrew who writes on behalf of the entire family. He says that their mum died just a few weeks before her 70th birthday for which the family had been making plans. He tells the court that no sentence will bring back their mum. They always expected that one day they would have to plan a funeral for their mum, but never this early. Nothing we say can give sufficient comfort to the family but we do offer our sincere sympathy.

The respondent offender was born on 13 September 1991 and was aged 29 at the date of the offence. On 24 January 2025 in the Crown Court at Leeds he, now aged 33, pleaded guilty on re-arraignment to an offence of causing death by dangerous driving, contrary to section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. On 25 April 2025 he was sentenced by His Honour Judge Mairs to a sentence of four years' imprisonment. A statutory surcharge order was imposed. The offender was disqualified from driving until an extended retest was passed. He was disqualified from driving for a period of seven years, made up of five years plus a two year extension under section 35A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.

His Majesty's Solicitor General now applies to this court for leave to refer that sentence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 ("the 1988 Act") on the ground that it was unduly lenient.

The facts can be taken for present purposes from the Final Reference on behalf of the Solicitor General. In summary, on 21 July 2021 the offender deliberately drove his Seat Leon motor vehicle dangerously for approximately seven minutes over a distance of just under five miles. His driving was persistent and prolonged, and included driving in excess of the speed limit, carrying out dangerous manoeuvres, using right-turn lanes, overtaking seven separate vehicles, undertaking another vehicle and driving through three separate sets of red traffic lights, before driving at 64 mph in a residential 30 mph speed limit, such that it was too late for him to avoid a fatal collision with a pedestrian crossing the road with her dog. The pedestrian sustained fatal injuries and was pronounced dead at the scene.

Like the sentencing judge we have viewed the CCTV footage which includes footage from the dash cam located in the offender's vehicle which makes it clear the appalling nature of the offender's driving over a sustained period of time and in accordance with the brief summary we have already given. This culminated at 19:49 with the fatal collision with the deceased.

For periods of time the offender had driven at 84 mph in a 50 mph zone, at 67 mph in a 30 mph zone and finally, as we have said, well above 60 mph in a 30 mph zone. The offender drove dangerously and without regard to the safety of other road users. He performed dangerous manoeuvres.

The fatal collision was captured on a nearby CCTV camera. After the offender had struck the deceased he stopped his vehicle a short distance down White Lee Road. Members of the public immediately came to the scene and numerous calls were made to the emergency services which included a call from the offender. Members of the public immediately commenced emergency life-saving treatment, including CPR, before the arrival of the emergency services. Paramedics and a doctor from the local air ambulance attended but despite their very best efforts Carol Andrew was pronounced dead at 20:17 hours. She had sustained multiple injuries, including massive chest injuries.

While members of the public were trying to administer emergency life-saving treatment, the offender removed the dash cam from his car and threw it inside the vehicle of a passing motorist who had stopped because of the collision and whom the offender recognised. Mr Hashmi told police that when he stopped he noticed the driver who looked to be in a panic and who said that his brother was not well. Mr Hashmi walked towards the collision site to see if there was anything he could do and when he returned to his car he found a dash cam on the front passenger seat. The offender told him that he had thrown the dash cam there and handed him the memory card from the dash cam. Mr Hashmi also told the police that he left the scene of the collision before the emergency services as he panicked because of what the offender had given him and did not want to get involved. However, he later returned to the scene of the collision and handed the dash cam and the memory card to the police.

The offender was arrested at the scene and conveyed to Huddersfield Police Station where his detention was authorised. He was interviewed on 22 July 2021. The offender submitted a prepared statement accepting that he was the driver of the Seat Leon at the time of the collision but answered no comment to all other questions. He was released pending further enquiries.

On 20 December 22 he re-attended the police station and was interviewed. During the interview he said that on the day of the collision he received a telephone call from his wife. She told him that his brother had fainted and collapsed and was not breathing and he needed to get home urgently. His brother died later that day. Thereafter he answered no comment to all questions asked of him.

An investigation was conducted by a forensic collision investigator, Mr Crispin, who explained that CCTV and dash camera footage showed Carol Andrew crossing the road from the offender's offside and stepping into the road from behind a parked car, although she had waited for approximately 19 seconds before starting to walk across White Lee Road. This would have hindered the offender from clearly seeing her waiting on the verge before crossing or whilst initially crossing the road. In any event, the deceased was captured on CCTV appearing to look in the direction of the offender's vehicle before stepping into the road. Just before she reached the middle of the road she appeared to look again towards his vehicle and then to hurry up or jog across the carriageway. Tyre screeching can then be heard indicative of an emergency anti-lock braking system, but the offender struck the deceased. At the onset of the emergency braking, the offender's vehicle was approximately 19.2 metres away from the point of impact. This meant that the overall stopping distance fell within a range of between 66 to 81 metres. Had the offender been driving within the speed limit of 30 mph he would have stopped the vehicle within 20 to 27 metres, meaning that he would have been able to stop and avoid the collision.

At the date of offence the maximum sentence for causing death by dangerous driving was 14 years' imprisonment. The maximum was increased by section 86 of the Police, Crime and Sentencing Act 2022 to life imprisonment but this did not come into force until 26 June 2022.

The Sentencing Council issued a definitive guideline regarding causing death by dangerous driving which applies to any offender sentenced on or after 1 July 2023, this is regardless of the date of the offence. As this court explained in R v Freeth [2023] EWCA Crim 1754 at [22], in a judgment given by William Davis LJ, the definitive guideline applies to offences committed prior to the increase in the maximum sentence. This is clear from the opening paragraphs of the guideline itself. There is nothing anywhere in the guideline which indicates that the starting point and the relevant factors relating to culpability apply differently to cases where the maximum sentence was 14 years' imprisonment as opposed to cases where the maximum is life imprisonment. The court said that the sentencing judge must apply the guideline irrespective of whatever the statutory maximum sentence might have been "subject to not exceeding the relevant statutory maximum."

In R v Ahmed [2023] EWCA Crim 1537 at [30] this court, again in a judgment given by William Davis LJ, explained that the only legitimate expectation an offender can have is of being sentenced by reference to the guideline applicable at the date when he is sentenced. Accordingly, application of the guideline introduced with effect from 1 July 2023 is in accordance with the law, as clearly stated in the Sentencing Act 2020 or the Sentencing Code.

Having regard to that guideline, it is clear that a case which falls within Category A will attract a starting point of 12 years' custody with a category range of eight to 18 years' custody. As will become apparent, in the present case the Solicitor General submits that on the judge's own findings this was clearly a case where there were a number of Category A factors and the case should have been treated as falling squarely within Category A.

As we have mentioned, the offender was aged 29 at the date of the offence. He lived with his wife and daughter. The offender suffers from an hereditary condition which causes muscle weakness in his body. Since the instant offence he has been diagnosed with depression, anxiety and borderline PTSD. He experiences flashbacks of the incident and struggles to be a passenger in a car. He disclosed experiencing suicidal thoughts shortly after the incident but not now. He has access to treatment via his GP in the form of medication. He has not accessed any secondary mental health services. He has suffered a number of bereavements which significantly affected his emotional wellbeing.

The judge had notes for sentence from both the prosecution and the defence. The judge had, as we have read, a pre-sentence report. The offender told the Probation Service that while he was at a petrol station on the way to Leeds City Centre he had received a call from his wife, who was clearly distressed, saying that his brother had collapsed and they needed him to get home. The offender admitted he had panicked and turned back to drive home. While driving along White Lee Road the offender states that he did not see the deceased on the road in advance. When he did see her he said he tried to swerve but was unable to turn the vehicle. He admitted he did remove the dash cam before he released the severity of the collision and while he was still acting in panic. He admitted that he was not thinking about the speed at which he was driving and his thoughts were preoccupied with worry about his brother. The offender was highly remorseful of his actions and the immense harm he had caused to the deceased and her family and expressed a desire to apologise to them. The offender's previous conviction, when looked at against the instant offence, could be indicative of a pattern of reckless behaviour when driving. The instant offence constituted an escalation in seriousness. That earlier conviction for dangerous driving was in 2012 and related to an offence in June 2011.

The offender did not disclose any adverse childhood experiences. He told the author of the pre-sentence report that he had taken time off work in February 2024 because of health issues. He has since set up his own accountancy firm with a friend but has not been involved in the business recently due to health issues and the sentencing hearing. He plans to fully commit to the business on release from prison.

Assessment tools utilised by the Probation Service placed the offender in a group of offenders with a low likelihood of reconviction in the next two years and a medium risk of harm to the public, including serious physical injury. The risk is likely to be greatest when the offender has access to a vehicle and engages in reckless or dangerous driving or poor decision making.

As we have mentioned, we have also read the moving victim personal statement from Mr Robert Andrew who describes the effects on the entire family of the loss of the beloved Carol Andrew.

In passing sentence, the judge said that by law he had to follow the sentencing guideline issued by the Sentencing Council. The offence pre-dated the increase in maximum sentence so whilst he had to apply the categorisation in the guideline, he had to recognise that difference. The judge said the reasons why the respondent had taken the deliberate decision to ignore the rules of the road and demonstrate a disregard for the safety of others might afford him mitigation but it did not alter the fact that he had made such a deliberate decision. Further, this was a prolonged and persistent course of deliberate driving. There were obviously dangerous manoeuvres and the speed was significantly in excess of relevant speed limits. These, the judge said, are all Category A features. The judge observed that what had happened on White Lee Road was the overwhelmingly likely conclusion to a course of driving that lasted some seven to eight minutes. The respondent had repeatedly failed to show any regard for the safety of other drivers and pedestrians alike. Furthermore, the judge observed that there are aggravating features. The respondent had tried to hide evidence, although this was unsuccessful, not because of anything he had done or any change of heart on his part. Further, the respondent had a previous conviction for dangerous driving, although, as the judge put it, he tempered that by recognising that it was some time ago. The judge also recognised that there was the aggravating feature that the deceased was a vulnerable road user as a pedestrian.

The judge also recognised there was mitigation available to the respondent, in particular bearing in mind his brother's death and that had been followed by other bereavements which had been acute and painful. Having considered Dr Todd's report, the judge observed that this was not a case that engaged the mental health guideline in relation to sentencing. This could not affect the respondent's culpability at the time but the judge bore it in mind and the effect that the death had had upon the respondent. The judge also accepted what was said about the respondent's own health and the reports he had read in relation to Bell’s Palsy.

The judge rightly observed that the credit to be given for the guilty plea could not be as high as 25 per cent because that is reserved for pleas at the plea and trial preparation hearing. Here the plea was tendered 12 months after that date. The judge said that it was only a couple of months before trial, whereas in fact it was a matter of about 10 days since the trial date had been set for 3 February 2025. The judge also accepted the respondent had expressed remorse, both in his interview and in the pre-sentence report. As we have said, the judge imposed a sentence of four years' imprisonment having said that at trial the sentence would have been one of five years' imprisonment. The judge also imposed the other orders, including the disqualification period to which we have referred.

On behalf of the Solicitor General, Miss Oakley observes that it is unfortunate that the judge did not express his starting point for the appropriate increase for the aggravating features or the discount afforded for mitigation. Nevertheless, she submits that his sentencing remarks make it clear that the offender's culpability fell within Category A. The judge expressly said that the offender's driving involved a deliberate decision by him to drive in the manner he did and that whilst his anxiety and desire to get home was understandable, his driving was not. The judge expressly said that the driving was prolonged and persistent, that it involved dangerous manoeuvres, that the offender drove at grossly excessive speed and that he repeatedly failed to show any regard for the safety of other drivers and pedestrians. Accordingly, the starting point in the definitive guideline is 12 years' custody.

Further, Miss Oakley submits that the judge had identified a number of aggravating features that must have increased the starting point to somewhere in the region of 13 years if not more. These included the offender's previous conviction for dangerous driving, albeit tempered by the fact that it was some time ago, the fact that the deceased was a vulnerable road user and that the offender had attempted to hide the dash cam upon which the majority of the evidence in the case was based. The judge said that having balanced all these factors the appropriate sentence after trial would have been five years' imprisonment.

The judge had correctly rejected submissions made for the defence that none of the factors in Category A applied and that the judge had to assess the offender's culpability at the point of the collision disregarding his driving immediately before then. Plainly there were multiple factors within Category A and any suggestion that the judge should have disregarded the offender's driving immediately before the collision were simply wrong. In that regard Miss Oakley submits the judge was correct.

Furthermore, defence counsel had submitted that cases falling in Category A should be reserved for particularly egregious examples of dangerous driving but that was wrong in principle: see R v Freeth, citing Brown [2018] EWCA Crim 1774. Accordingly, Miss Oakley submits that the real question in this case boils down to this: whether the mitigating factors could have reduced a sentence in the region of 13 years after trial to five years. The Solicitor General acknowledges that the offender has experienced significant bereavements including the loss of his brother and his daughter. It was also rightly accepted by the prosecution that the judge was able to take into account the fact that the offender was suffering from medical conditions himself by way of mitigation. But nevertheless, Miss Oakley reminds this court that any medication would be available within the prison estate. Further, the judge accepted that the offender expressed remorse and that his absence while serving a sentence of imprisonment would bite hard upon his family and his daughter.

No criticism is made by Miss Oakley of the credit of 20 per cent for the plea of guilty, although she acknowledges that not all judges would have given such a large discount for a plea entered only 10 days before trial. But she acknowledges that this fell within the judge's legitimate exercise of discretion. This is also acknowledged to be a case where the judge was entitled not to impose an extended sentence of imprisonment on the ground of dangerousness. Nevertheless, in all the circumstances Miss Oakley submits that the sentence did not fall within the range that was properly available to the judge and therefore was unduly lenient.

On behalf of the respondent, Miss Chapman submits, first, that the judge settled on the correct starting point; secondly, he correctly identified and balanced the aggravating and mitigating features; thirdly, he justly settled on the correct sentence which reflected his informed assessment of all features of the case. This has the consequence, Miss Chapman submits, that while the sentence could be said to be lenient, it was not unduly so.

Miss Chapman submits that although the judge identified Category A features, he did not in terms state that he had placed the case into Category A. One analysis of the sentencing remarks is either that the case straddled the culpability categories or that the case did not really fit into one of the categories. She submits that the judge made a downward adjustment to reflect the lower maximum sentence at the time when the offence was committed and that he was entitled to do so in accordance with the approach of this court in Ahmed.

Turning to mitigation, Miss Chapman submits that the respondent had an unusual and upsetting reason for taking the decision to drive in the way that he did. It was accepted the driving was entirely motivated by a desire to get home to his dying brother. Further, the offender had not consumed alcohol or drugs. Thirdly, he had expressed remorse. Fourthly, he had suffered other bereavements himself. Fifthly, he has physical health difficulties and there were character references which reflected well upon him. Finally she points out that the offender had a stable life with attached parental responsibilities.

The principles which govern applications for leave under section 36 of the 1988 Act are well established. They can be found summarised for example in Attorney General's Reference (Egan) [2022] EWCA Crim 1751, [2023] 2 Cr.App.R (S) 16 at [3] to [6] where this court cited the seminal decision of this court in Attorney General's Reference (No 4 of 1989) [1990] 90 Cr.App.R 366 and the judgment of this court in Attorney General's Reference No 132 of 2001 (Bryn Dorian Johnson) [2002] EWCA Crim 1418, [2003] 1 Cr.App.R 41 in particular at [24] in a judgment given by Potter LJ.

The principles to be applied can be summarised as follows:

In our judgment the sentence in the present case was unduly lenient having regard to those principles. The relevant category in the definitive guideline was Category A. That meant that there was a starting point of 12 years' custody with a category range of eight to 18 years. We note that even if the offence could have been regarded as falling in Category B, or at the cusp between the two categories, the starting point for a Category B case is six years' custody, with a category range of four to nine years. It is therefore with respect difficult to see how the judge could reasonably arrive at a notional sentence after trial of five years' imprisonment.

There were undoubtedly strong mitigating features in this case, in particular the circumstances in which the respondent found himself, feeling that he had to get to his brother as quickly as possible however misguided that was. But there were also aggravating features, including a relevant previous conviction and the fact that the respondent had tried to conceal evidence in the shape of the dash cam footage.

In all the circumstances, we have reached the conclusion that the minimum sentence that would have had to be imposed had there been a trial is eight years' imprisonment. After a 20 per cent deduction for the guilty plea, that would result in a sentence of six years four months' imprisonment.

We need to address the issue of disqualification from driving. Disqualification until an offender passes an extended driving test is obligatory: see section 36 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. Disqualification from driving for a period of not less than two years in the absence of special reasons is also obligatory: see section 34(4) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.

The judge imposed a discretionary disqualification period of five years and added the two years which was half of the custodial sentence which he was then imposing. That was in accordance with the approach which is required of sentencing courts as set out by this court in R v Needham [2016] EWCA Crim 455, [2016] 2 Cr.App.R (S) 26.

Since we have increased the custodial sentence in this case, the disqualification period needs to be adjusted upwards. The five year disqualification period imposed by the judge will remain as it was, but there has to be an uplift to that equivalent to half of the custodial sentence now imposed by the court. The custodial sentence of six years four months is 76 months' custody. Half of that accordingly is 38 months. When that is added to the five-year disqualification period imposed by the judge, that is eight years and two months.

For the reasons we have given, this application by the Solicitor General for leave under section 36 of the 1988 Act is granted. We quash the sentence of imprisonment that was imposed by the court below and substitute a sentence of six years four months' imprisonment. We impose the other orders to which we have made reference. In particular we increase the period of disqualification from driving to eight years and two months.