R v DCB

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence. Under those provisions where a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall, during that person's lifetime, be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act. Given the relationship of the applicant to certain of the complainants, he will be referred to in listing and in the headnote of this judgment by randomly generated letters "DCB" to prevent any possibility of jigsaw identification of the complainants. The complainants will also be anonymised in this judgment.

On 12 August 2022 in the Crown Court at Wolverhampton the applicant pleaded guilty to a single count of robbery. He accepted an offence of failure to surrender. On 15 August 2022 in the Crown Court at Birmingham the applicant was convicted after a trial of four counts of sexual activity with a child, counts 4, 5, 6 and 8, and one count of rape, count 7 (Trial 1). He was acquitted of assault by penetration, count 1, and two further counts of sexual activity with a child, counts 2 and 3.

On 13 January 2023 in the Crown Court at Birmingham the applicant was convicted after a trial of one count of assault of a child under 13 by penetration, count 2, one count of rape of a child under 13, count 3, one count of sexual assault of a child under 13, count 4 and one count of rape, count 6 (Trial 2). He was acquitted of two further counts of sexual assault of a child under 13, counts 1 and 5.

On 31 January 2023 in the Crown Court at Birmingham the applicant was sentenced on all matters as follows:

In relation to Trial 1, the applicant seeks an extension of time of 240 days for leave to appeal conviction and for bail and a representation order following refusal by the single judge. In relation to Trial 2, the applicant seeks an extension a time of 89 days for leave to appeal conviction and for bail and a representation order following refusal by the single judge. In respect of all offences the applicant renews his application for an extension of time of 80 days for leave to appeal against sentence and for bail and a representation order following refusal by the single judge.

The facts are fully set out in the CAO summary. It is unnecessary to repeat all the details here.

Taking the matters shortly, Trial 1 concerned A, a 15-year-old who met the applicant through a friend. There was initially some sexual activity in a park on 22 February 2020, which A said she had consented to, and then on 24 February the applicant persuaded A to stay home from school. He was aged 20 at the time. He came over to A's house and the remaining offences occurred there. They included vaginal rape. A subsequently complained to a friend. She was spoken to by police on 21 June 2020 and gave an ABE interview on 23 June.

The applicant was interviewed about A's allegations on 8 July. He said he had gone to her house, but nothing had happened. He gave a similar account in his first defence statement but later provided an amended defence statement in which he accepted that there had been sexual activity, saying that it was consensual and that he believed A to be aged 16.

At trial he gave evidence and in cross-examination was pointed specifically to a text message where A had spoken of being five years younger than him. He said it had not sounded any alarm bells for him at the time.

The issue for the jury was whether the sexual activity happened as A alleged and if it did then in relation to counts 4, 5, 6 and 8 (sexual activity with a child) did the applicant reasonably believe that A was at least 16 years old? In relation to count 7 (rape) the jury had to decide whether the complainant consented and, if not, whether the applicant honestly and reasonably believed that she had consented.

Trial 2 concerned events that began when the applicant was aged 13. The complainants B and C were both family members. B was aged 10, C aged 5 when the offending began. In both cases the applicant began by touching them, moving on to digital penetration and, in the case of C, rape. The first occasion of rape was when C was aged between 10 and 12 and the applicant was aged between 18 and 20. The second charge of rape related to an occasion in early 2022 when C was 14 and the applicant was aged 22.

The applicant was arrested on 19 July 2022, he denied all allegations. The issue for the jury at Trial 2 was whether the sexual acts had happened as B and C alleged. At Trial 2 the judge permitted the jury to be told about the applicant's convictions at Trial 1.

The robbery occurred on 7 April 2022. The applicant was one of three males, one of whom (not the applicant) was carrying a hammer. They threatened the shop staff, smashed several glass cabinets and seized a number of phones before running off. The staff chased them and managed to catch the applicant, detaining him until the police arrived.

At sentence the judge had victim personal statements from A, B and C. We have read them. The judge commended their bravery in coming to court to give evidence of what the applicant had done to them.

There was a pre-sentence report dealing with the robbery and the sexual offending from Trial 1 and a further pre-sentence report following Trial 2. The prosecution and defence both provided sentencing notes. We have seen all of this material.

The judge concluded that the applicant was dangerous, posing a significant risk of serious harm to younger women and girls. This was supported by the conclusions of the authors of the pre-sentence reports who spoke of the applicant's predatory behaviour, expressing the view that he posed a high risk of further serious sexual offending, and a high risk of serious harm to adolescent girls and young women. The judge said that there would be a single global extended sentence for the sexual offending, consecutive to a determinate sentence for the robbery. The custodial element of the extended sentence, given the number of offences, would go outside the guidelines. He went on to pass the sentences which we have detailed above.

The applicant has given these reasons for the delay in making these applications: he says that he was going through a stressful time and was even thinking of giving up on everything. When his case first started it did not hit him properly until he was sentenced when it finally hit him his life was over and there was nothing he could do about it. His solicitor and barrister never listened to him and withheld information from him. His solicitor did the minimum he could do to help the applicant and told him there was no point in appealing since there were no grounds. However, upon speaking to another solicitor the applicant was made aware that he did have grounds, especially since the prosecution kept evidence hidden and his trial solicitor had not even listened to him or heard what he had to say. The applicant was told to make sure he had all information ready, which he has now done, and that has contributed to the lateness of his applications.

The applicant submits that his solicitor did not allow him to view evidence from the unused material which they deemed irrelevant, in particular text messages from complainant A showing that she had lied to get back at him for breaking her heart and that would have helped the applicant's case. The applicant submits that his lawyer and the prosecution were too friendly. He says his lawyer would just follow anything the prosecution said. His lawyer did not have his back or his interests at heart.

In further grounds the applicant said that his first solicitor, Mr Tonks, would meet up with the prosecution officer DC Harris to discuss the case and would not meet with the applicant. Because they were so friendly the applicant asked for another lawyer. His new solicitor Mr Qureshi was very dismissive and would not listen to anything the applicant had to say. Whenever the applicant asked about the unused material, which his solicitor deemed as unimportant, his solicitor would get aggressive and would tell him to focus on the information he had been given. It was as though Mr Qureshi just wanted the case to be over, to do the minimum work possible. He would avoid the applicant any time he called the office and take two weeks just to respond to a letter.

The unused material contained a proof of messages sent after the alleged rape saying how the alleged victim loved the applicant and that she only did this because she hated being second best. She had wanted to have sex, and the applicant avoided it and rejected her and left her because he had a girlfriend at the time. At the time because he had already blocked her, he did not see the messages.

In a further letter received by the Criminal Appeal Office on 19 September 2024 after the single judge's decision, the applicant repeated that he believes there are messages to be found in the unused material showing A calling him after he had allegedly raped her which would help to prove his innocence.

In relation to Trial 2 the applicant says that the judge wrongly allowed the prosecution to adduce evidence of the applicant's bad character, namely his previous convictions from Trial 1. Further, the applicant repeats the point that he made in relation to Trial 1, namely that his lawyer and the prosecutor were too friendly, he would just follow anything the prosecutor said, his lawyer did not have his back or his interests at heart in that trial also.

As to sentence, the applicant submits that he was on bail from June 2020 with extensive bail conditions which required him to sign on four times a week and which led to him losing many jobs and that this should have been treated as mitigation. The judge asked two different probation officers to write a report which led to them being biased by contacting the prosecution. When this happened, the judge found the applicant to be dangerous and gave a higher sentence. This was the applicant's first custodial sentence, and he had never been on the police radar for anything like this before.

Given the complaints made about his representatives at both trials, the applicant was asked to, and did, waive privilege in respect of his trial solicitors and counsel. They have each provided detailed responses to the applicant's criticisms. Those responses were before the single judge. We have read them carefully as well. We have also read the Crown's response in its Respondent's Notice.

The single judge rejected the applicant's applications for (in each case lengthy) extensions of time, pointing out that the long delays in advancing criticisms of his representatives impacted the credibility of the complaints and that the oblique reference to the opinion of an unnamed solicitor lacked any substance. We agree. However, like the single judge we have nevertheless considered each of the points raised by the applicant to determine whether any of them raises an arguable case that the convictions are unsafe or the sentence manifestly excessive.

In relation to the convictions from Trial 1, the single judge said this:

Moving to the grounds given for challenging the outcome of Trial 2, the single judge said this:

We move to consider the applicant's challenge to his sentence. As to that, the single judge said this:

Once more, we agree with the conclusions of the single judge and for the reasons which he gives. Given the seriousness of the offending and its context, particularly in relation to younger female family members, a finding of dangerousness was inevitable. The overall sentence for this collection of very serious offending was not remotely excessive. It follows that these applications must all be refused.