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R v Damien Sartip-Zadeh & Ors

Neutral Citation Number [2025] EWCA Crim 1250

R v Damien Sartip-Zadeh & Ors

Neutral Citation Number [2025] EWCA Crim 1250

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT LEEDS

HHJ BELCHER T20207499

CASE NOS 202301759/B4. 202301760/B4. 202301768/B4, 202301827/B4 & 202302115/B4

NCN: [2025] EWCA Crim 1250

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand

London

WC2A 2LL

Friday, 5 September 2025

Before:

LORD JUSTICE COULSON

MRS JUSTICE MAY DBE

REX

V

DAMIEN SARTIP-ZADEH

DALE SARTIP-ZADEH

DIANE SARTIP-ZADEH

__________

Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,

Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London, WC2A 1JE 

Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

_________

The applicants all appeared in person

_________

J U D G M E N T

MRS JUSTICE MAY:

Introduction

1.

There are before us five applications which have been listed together. They are made by three members of the same family, two of whom seek to renew their applications for extensions of time and leave to appeal in relation to (a) conviction and (b) sentence after refusal by the single judge. The third applicant seeks an extension of time and leave to appeal against her conviction, also after such refusal.

2.

On 5 April 2023 in the Crown Court at Leeds before Her Honour Judge Belcher, the first applicant, Damien Sartip-Zadeh was convicted unanimously of two counts of fraudulent trading (counts 1 and 2), one count of engaging in aggressive commercial practice (count 3) and one count of concealing, converting and transferring criminal property (count 4).

3.

On the same day the second applicant, Dale Sartip-Zadeh, brother of the first applicant, was convicted unanimously of counts 1, 2 and 4. He had earlier been found not guilty on count 3 on the direction of the judge following her ruling that there was no case to answer. Also that day, the third applicant, Diane Sartip-Zadeh, mother of the two brothers, was convicted unanimously of count 4.

4.

Since the applicants all share the same surname, we shall, without intending any disrespect, refer to them in this judgment by their first names.

5.

On 15 May 2023 the trial judge sentenced the applicants as follows. Damien received a total sentence of nine years and six months' imprisonment, comprising eight years and six months on counts 1 and 2, and six months on count 3, all to run concurrently, with a consecutive sentence of 12 months on count 4. Dale was sentenced to a total of eight years' imprisonment, comprising a sentence of seven years on counts 1 and 2 running concurrently with each other, with a consecutive sentence of 12 months on count 4. Both Damien and Dale were disqualified from acting as directors for a period of 10 years. Diane was made subject to a suspended sentence order of two years' imprisonment suspended for two years with requirements.

6.

Another co-accused, the brothers' father Mahmud Sartip-Zadeh was convicted on count 1 and sentenced to a suspended sentence order of two years' imprisonment suspended for two years. His application for leave to appeal conviction was also refused by the single judge and has not been renewed.

The facts

7.

Detailed facts are set out extensively in the Criminal Appeal Office note. It is unnecessary to repeat them all here. In short, between 2013 and 2016 Damien and Dale set up and operated a website advertising and charging people for arranging to obtain a European Health Insurance card. In fact, such a card was available for no charge from the NHS. Trading standards got involved, warning letters were sent and eventually the website was shut down, whereupon the brothers started up again with a new website engaging in precisely the same activity. They operated that website from 2018 to 2019.

8.

Count 1 related to their operation of the first website and count 2 to the second. When some of the victims tried to cancel, they were refused. If they persisted, they would be met with a threat of legal action and costs if they tried to charge a claim back from their credit card company. That formed the basis of count 3. Count 4 related to the funnelling of proceeds through the brothers' and the mother's bank accounts. The value of the fraudulent trading (being the total loss to customers) amounted to a total of £2,664,264 split between £1,446,538 on count 1 and £1,217,726 on count 2.

Applications for extension of time and leave to appeal conviction and sentence

9.

Each of the applicants is representing themself on these applications. We appreciate that it cannot be easy addressing this court as a litigant in person. We are grateful to each of them for the submissions they made to us today.

10.

We read all the papers very closely before the hearing, in particular the memorandum to the judges that each applicant recently produced. We made it plain at the outset that we could not consider points raised which had not already been raised in the grounds of appeal. It is not open to us to consider any new matters. We are bound only to look at what is raised in each applicant's grounds. So, for example, the extensive assertions of judicial bullying made in Damien's memo was not raised in his grounds of appeal at all, nor in anyone else's grounds of appeal. We are not entitled to consider it on this appeal. Another point not raised in the grounds of appeal relates to a confidential email sent during the course of trial from Miss Breen-Lawton KC to a Head of Chambers elsewhere. It has been referred to by all applicants today, relying heavily on it to bolster their complaints about Mr Furlong (Dale's counsel at trial) even where complaints about him never featured in their grounds of appeal. We refer here to Damien's grounds of appeal. Miss Breen-Lawton expressed surprise that her confidential letter had been shared but as it had she dealt with it and provided an explanation which satisfies us that it has no further material bearing on the points raised either as to Mr Furlong's conduct or as to Dale's reasons for not giving evidence during trial.

11.

As a preliminary point, we make it clear that as the extensions of time sought are relatively short and as the applicants are representing themselves, we have examined the substantive grounds of appeal to see if there is merit in them on the basis that if we were persuaded to grant leave for any appeal to be heard, then we would also grant the extension of time sought in order for that to happen. We now turn to the individual applications.

Damien

A.

Conviction

12.

Damien challenges his conviction on essentially two grounds. First, he says that he was prejudiced at trial by the absence of potentially helpful evidence from the server referred to as KM/1. KM/1 could not be accessed having been locked and encrypted by the actions of a police examiner with the 100-character password required to unlock and decrypt the data recorded inside the server and nowhere else, according to the brothers.

13.

Second, Damien says that his brother and co-defendant Dale's conduct in dispensing with his leading counsel, causing junior counsel to withdraw also, together with Dale's decision not to give evidence, prejudiced the conduct of his (Damien's) case, denying him the opportunity to defend himself fairly.

B. Sentence

14.

As to sentence, Damien argues that the total sentence was manifestly excessive. He says that the judge failed to take account of the submissions made by counsel on his behalf. She took insufficient account of his personal mitigation, omitting to recognise delay as mitigation or the fact that the authorities had failed to put a stop to his offending many years before. He points to the fact that the number of customers who complained was very small compared to the numbers who paid to use the website. He says that the judge should have imposed concurrent sentences and that she failed to have regard to totality.

15.

The prosecution have responded to both sets of grounds in a Respondent's Notice which we have read.

Dale

A.

Conviction

16.

Dale's written grounds of appeal are considerably longer. In essence the points he makes are these: His counsel, Mr Furlong misconducted his case by making an offer to the prosecution without seeking his consent, he did not present evidence in the way he should have done or examine witnesses as instructed, he was late to court each day so there was no time to give him instructions and contrary to instructions he presented a blurred image of Damien's house to the jury. He announced that Dale would not be giving evidence when no final decision had been made, and it is said he refused to work with Damien's counsel.

17.

Dale says his junior counsel, Miss Birch, resigned without notice at a point when she was heavily pregnant and there had been no discussion about her pregnancy prior to that. Miss Birch is criticised for appearing on CVP without her papers (having wrongly left them behind in court). It is said that she was not proactive in court in the conduct of his defence. When counsel left, Dale says there was no time given to him to instruct fresh counsel. He says he could have been acquitted if he had given evidence and that he did not get a fair trial overall. He disagrees with the judge's directions given to the jury on counts 1 and 2. He makes the same KM/1 server argument as his brother Damien.

B. Sentence

18.

Turning to sentence, Dale argues that his sentence was excessive. He says that the judge failed to take account of any mitigation, particularly his previous good character. He says that his role in the offending was not high but was medium culpability in the guideline. The sentences should have been concurrent not consecutive, no account was taken of delay and the judge failed to consider the small number of complaints against the total number of customers.

19.

In view of the criticisms Dale makes of his counsel, particularly in relation to conviction, he was asked to and did waive privilege. His counsel have provided detailed responses which we have read closely. The prosecution have responded to both sets of grounds by way of a detailed Respondent's Notice dealing with each of the points raised.

Diane

A.

Conviction

20.

In lengthy and rather confusing grounds of appeal prepared by counsel against conviction, the following points appear: There were errors of law including the failure to appoint an intermediary to assist Diane at trial. This unfairly impacted her defence. There were insufficient measures put in place to assist her during the long trial process which had a negative impact on her health, particularly towards the end of trial. The judge unfairly rejected applications made by Diane's counsel for adjournments, for severance, for disallowing the admitting into evidence of her police interview and appropriate special measures applications to assist Diane in participating in the trial. Like Damien, she complains that the conduct of Dale's defence prejudiced her own. Lastly, she says that her application of no case to answer should have been allowed as there was insufficient evidence upon which to convict her of money laundering. Delay is also mentioned.

21.

Again, the prosecution have responded in a Respondent's Notice addressing each of the points raised in Diane's grounds.

Decisions on these applications

Damien

22.

In refusing leave to appeal conviction, the single judge said this:

"3.

The server ground:

A.

In her 31 January 2023 ruling, the judge considered the prejudice arising from the loss of data caused by the encryption of the server KM1. There was a live issue as to whether you really were unable to assist the prosecution in accessing such data given the inherent implausibility of your case that the 100-character password was only saved on that server; an approach that the IT experts agreed made no sense and put you and your business at substantial risk of losing the data in any number of circumstances, including a power outage.

B.

The judge was right to conclude that a fair trial remained possible and that the prejudice caused by the loss of the data could be properly accommodated by the trial process. You were able to explore and present evidence about the inadequacies in the manner in which the server was seized.

C.

Further, the judge properly directed the jury to consider the question of prejudice in her legal directions. She directed the jury that if they were sure that the defendants had deliberately withheld the password that would have allowed the server to be decrypted and accessed then they might properly conclude that any prejudice was their own responsibility and not something to be taken into account in their favour. Conversely, she directed the jury that if they were not sure that the defendants had deliberately withheld the password, they should the possible prejudice into account in the defendants' favour. Such directions were impeccable and fair.

4.

Dale's defence: It was a matter for Dale to decide whether to retain or dispense with counsel, and whether to give evidence in his own defence or not. Further, it was for Dale and his then counsel to determine how they should best defend Dale. The fact that Dale's case was not run as you would wish does not give rise to an arguable ground of appeal."

23.

We agree with the single judge and cannot improve upon his reasons for dismissing the grounds. There is no merit in the appeal against conviction. We refuse the extension of time and refuse the application.

24.

In refusing leave to appeal against sentence, the single said this:

"You rightly accept that you were the driving force behind these frauds and that your culpability was high. The judge was right to identify that the appropriate starting point indicated by the Sentencing Council for each offence of fraudulent trading (taking the analogous offence of fraud by false representation for which there are guidelines) was 7 years' imprisonment with a category range of 5-8 years.

It was a serious aggravating feature of your case that, after suspending operations between 2016 and 2018 while Camden investigated your first business and despite the clear warning then issued to you, you then established and operated a second fraudulent business offering the same services between July 2018 and September 2019. You seek to blame Trading Standards for not 'nipping your criminality in the bud'; but you alone were responsible for your actions and the earlier investigations and warnings are aggravating and not mitigating features of your case. While consecutive terms would have been appropriate, the judge properly took account of the principle of totality in passing concurrent sentences on counts 1 and 2. In fixing the appropriate sentence for those frauds at 8½ years' imprisonment, she treated your conviction on count 3 as a further aggravating feature.

The Guideline for the money laundering offence on the basis of a value of £300,000 was 5 years' imprisonment with a category range of 3-6 years. The judge properly took account of the principle of totality in passing a much-reduced sentence of 12 months' imprisonment on that count but ordering that it should run consecutively to the sentence of 8½ years imposed on counts 1 and 2.

The judge's total sentence of 9½ years' imprisonment was not manifestly excessive and properly took into account your overall criminality, the delay in your case and the relevant personal mitigation available to you."

25.

Like the single judge, and for the reasons he gave, we cannot find that the total sentence passed for this offending taken together was excessive. The sums of money were very high and the period over which they were acquired through the websites was long. The second website was restarted in flagrant disregard of extensive warnings given in respect of the first. We refuse the extension of time and refuse the application for leave to appeal.

Dale

26.

In refusing Dale's application for leave to appeal conviction, the single judge said this:

"It was your decision to sack Mr Furlong. It must have been obvious that Ms Birch might not have been able to take over your defence given her advanced state of pregnancy, the overrunning of the trial, and the known fact that for some time she had not been well enough to attend court. Further, it was your considered decision, against advice and after being given substantial time to consider your position, not to give evidence. You cannot now complain about the difficulties that these decisions caused your defence of this case or invite the appeal court to speculate as to what might have been had you given evidence.

Your criticisms of Mr Furlong's conduct have in any event been answered by both Mr Furlong and Ms Birch (in whom you appear to have confidence) in their joint response for the appeal court, and by the further observations of the Crown.

It is not arguable that the judge's second direction was either wrong in law or unfair. It properly related to counts 1 and 2 as charged."

27.

We agree and have nothing to add. The extension of time is refused and the application for leave to appeal against conviction is refused.

28.

Refusing leave to appeal sentence the single judge gave the following reasons:

"It is not clear to me that your appeal against sentence (as opposed to your appeal against conviction) is out of time. If that is wrong and you seek to renew this application for leave to appeal then you will also need to seek an extension of time from the full court.

Before the judge and in your initial grounds of appeal you rightly accepted that your culpability was high. There is no merit in your belated attempt to suggest otherwise. The judge was right to identify that the appropriate starting point indicated by the Sentencing Council for each offence of fraudulent trading (taking the analogous offence of fraud by false representation for which there are guidelines) was 7 years' imprisonment with a category range of 5-8 years.

It was a serious aggravating feature of your case that, after suspending operations between 2016 and 2018 while Camden investigated your first business and despite the clear warning then issued to you, you then established and operated a second fraudulent business offering the same services between July 2018 and September 2019. You seek to blame trading standards for not 'nipping your criminality in the bud'; but you alone were responsible for your actions and the earlier investigations and warnings are aggravating and not mitigating features of your case. While consecutive terms would have been appropriate, the judge properly took account of the principle of totality and appropriately distinguished between your own role and that of your brother in passing concurrent sentences on counts 1 and 2 of 7 years' imprisonment.

The Guideline for the money laundering offence on the basis of a value of £300,000 was 5 years' imprisonment with a category range of 3-6 years. The judge properly took account of the principle of totality in passing a much reduced sentence of 12 months' imprisonment on that count but ordering that it should run consecutively to the sentence of 7 years imposed on counts 1 and 2.

The judge's total sentence of 8 years' imprisonment was not manifestly excessive and properly took into account your overall criminality, the delay in your case and the relevant personal mitigation available to you."

29.

Again, we take the same view as the single judge and cannot improve upon his reasoning. If an extension of time is required, we refuse it and in any event we refuse the application for leave to appeal against sentence.

Diane

30.

Having remarked on the rather rambling and unfocused grounds settled by counsel, the single judge went on to note that insufficient reasons had been given for the extension of time sought. He nevertheless addressed the merits of the grounds, saying this:

"The intermediary ground: This is hopeless. The expert evidence was that you were fit to stand trial. The recommendation for an intermediary was based on the expert's flawed understanding of the intermediary's role. There was no expert evidence that you needed help with communication, but rather proper breaks (which the judge accommodated) and clear explanations as to the charges that you faced (which was a matter for your lawyers and not for an intermediary). Furthermore, no intermediary had been identified or provided a report identifying any communication difficulties with which he/she might assist. On the evidence before her, the judge rightly rejected the applications to adjourn this second trial or to sever the indictment in week 5.

The alleged inadequacy of breaks: You wholly fail to articulate how the judge's careful case management of this trial was insufficient. Without identifying a number of occasions when it is argued that the judge should have afforded a break that was requested by your counsel and precisely how the judge's refusal of such additional breaks prevented your fair trial, this ground is hopeless.

The alleged failure to hear the whole application: This ground goes nowhere without particulars as to which applications the judge decided without hearing full argument; the gist (and evidential basis) for the argument that she did not hear; identification of the relevant ruling; analysis as to how the argument that she did not hear should have caused the judge to rule differently; and analysis as to how such decision renders your conviction unsafe. I do not accept your assertion that the ground is strengthened by the judge's failure on occasions to ask the prosecution to respond. Any judge is absolutely entitled to dismiss a bad application without calling for adversarial argument in response to the application. Doing so particularly when confronted with repeated bad applications and while a jury is waiting, can indeed be good practice and proper case management.

Bias: The judge's rejection of a number of applications goes nowhere near to establishing bias. While advocates should be fearless in alleging bias, or the appearance of bias, in those rare cases whether that is appropriate, it is wholly improper to insinuate bias without proper foundation or to fail to explain the basis for making such a serious allegation against a judge.

No case to answer: You have not provided me with a copy of the judge's ruling on this issue and accordingly it is not possible to conclude that there is any arguable appeal. From all of the other papers that I have read concerning your own and your family's appeals, I am not presently persuaded that there is any merit in this ground.

The conduct of Dale's case: You assert that events at trial concerning the conduct of your son's defence prejudiced your own defence, but you identify no evidence whatever to support such assertion. In particular, you do not identify any specific respect in which you were unable to participate effectively in proceedings by reason of the conduct of your son's defence.

Delay: You make an offhand reference to delay but did not argue that the prosecution was an abuse of process. Such argument was taken by your sons and rightly rejected in the judge's ruling on 31st January 2023."

31.

Having reviewed all of the papers to us, submitted with these grounds, which included a transcript of the judge's ruling of no case to answer, we agree with the single judge's assessment of the merits. In particular we have now considered the judge's ruling of no case and are satisfied that there is no merit in the suggestion that there is an arguable appeal arising from her dismissal of it. We agree with the single judge's assessment and with his reasons for refusing leave. The application for an extension of time is refused and Diane's application for leave to appeal against conviction is refused.

32.

That deals with all of the applications before us today.

LORD JUSTICE COULSON: In summary we consider that the convictions in this case are entirely safe, and the sentences are neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle. So, for the reasons given by my Lady, all these renewed applications are therefore refused.

Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof.

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