R v Scott Morley

This is an appeal against sentence brought with leave of the single judge.

On 27 February 2025 in the Crown Court at Leeds on the day his trial was listed, the appellant pleaded guilty to one offence of intentional strangulation and one offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. On 4 April 2025 he was sentenced to a total of three years six months' imprisonment, comprising a sentence of two years for the strangulation offence, with a consecutive sentence of 18 months for the assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The judge made a restraining order which is not challenged on this appeal; we say no more about it.

Both offences were committed against the appellant's then partner, Jade Cartmell. The appellant had been in a relationship with Miss Cartmell for over a year prior to the offences. He was living with her at her home for some months until an incident occurred in late 2023 and Miss Cartmell made a complaint to the police. The appellant had not been charged with any offence arising out of the 2023 incident at the time of these offences, but at the time he was on bail with conditions not to have any contact with Miss Cartmell or to go to her address. Ignoring those conditions he had managed to persuade her to stay with him at his mother's address.

The offences the subject of this appeal occurred in the early hours of 31 August 2024 at Miss Cartmell's own home at around 4.00 am. She and the appellant had been out drinking at a pub and then at a neighbour's house. They both went back to Miss Cartmell's home. There was probably an argument following which the appellant assaulted her in the kitchen. He punched her and pulled her to the kitchen floor. He kicked, kneed and stamped on her, principally in and around her head and back. He bent one of her fingers right back. At one stage he placed his hands around her neck and squeezed hard, causing her to struggle to breathe. At this point Miss Cartmell dropped her asthma inhaler. The appellant kicked it away and said: "I'll take your last breath". He took a bottle of milk out of the fridge and poured the milk over her mouth, nose and face whilst still gripping her throat. Then he smashed her phone screen and left the house.

Miss Cartmell called the police who attended at the scene and called an ambulance. Miss Cartmell's finger was not broken but it was strained. She sustained injuries and marks to her neck and her forehead. There are photographs of her injuries which we have seen.

The appellant was aged 40 at sentence. He had 15 convictions for 32 offences spanning the period 2002 to 2022. His earlier convictions were mainly for driving offences and criminal damage. In 2009 he was sentenced to a community order for battery. In 2016 he was sentenced to a community order for harassment and taking a vehicle without consent. In 2018 he was sentenced to a community order for battery and sending a threatening message. His most recent convictions in 2019 and 2022 were for driving offences. As appears from the sentencing remarks, his convictions for battery and the conviction for sending a threatening message were against previous partners.

The judge was in no doubt about the severity of this incident, particularly as regards the strangulation. As he said:

The judge went on to place the strangulation offence in Category A2 of the relevant guideline where there is a starting point of two-and-a-half years and a range of up to three-and-a-half years. He categorised the assault offence as B2 where there is a starting point of nine months with a range of up to 18 months. The judge identified aggravating features as follows: previous convictions for violence towards women, the fact that the appellant was on bail at the time not to contact Miss Cartmell or to go to her address, the offence was committed when he was intoxicated, in the context of a domestic relationship and in Miss Cartmell's own home, the background of violence towards her and the fact that it took place in the middle of the night. No mitigation is identified save for the discount of 10 per cent for the appellant's plea on the day of trial when Miss Cartmell had attended to give evidence. There were references from family and a friend which we have read. The judge went on to pass the consecutive sentences which we have recorded above.

Miss Parnham, who appears for the appellant on this appeal, as she did at his sentence, makes these points. First she argues that the judge erred in making the sentences for the strangulation and the ABH offences consecutive. This was a single incident, she points out, which is an example given in the totality guideline of where sentences should properly be ordered to run concurrently.

Next, she says that the judge must have taken a sentence for the assault offence outside the top of the range in the guideline or that he failed to apply the 10 per cent discount for plea in arriving at a sentence of 18 months for that offence. She submits that the judge over-aggravated the assault sentence when compared to the extent to which he had applied the same features to aggravate the strangulation offence.

Finally, Miss Parnham argues that the judge was wrong to regard the injuries to Miss Cartmell's neck as severe and that he also erred in finding that there were previous occasions of violence when there were no charges relating to any such incidents, still less any convictions. At today's hearing Miss Parnham confirmed that her client has now been charged in respect of earlier incidents of violence towards Miss Cartmell.

Strangulation incidents are very serious. As the judge rightly said, strangling causes fear for life at the time; additionally, in a domestic relationship the act is so threatening that it can operate as a weapon of control for the future. We see some force in Miss Parnham's point about the sentences running consecutively given that the two offences arose from the same incident. It may have been preferable for the judge to have treated the strangulation offence as the lead offence, as at one stage he appeared to indicate he would, passing a concurrent sentence for the assault.

Having said this, our principal task on this appeal is to determine whether the overall sentence of three-and-a-half years, reduced from four years for the appellant's plea, was excessive. In our view it was not. Miss Parnham rightly accepts that the strangulation offence was properly categorised as A2 in the Sentencing Council Guideline where there is a starting point of two-and-a-half years and a range of up to three-and-a-half years. We do not agree that the offending fell at the lower end of this category before aggravating factors are considered. The pouring of milk over Miss Cartmell's mouth and face whilst her airway was being obstructed was a particularly nasty feature of this incident, akin to water boarding. Then there were a range of weighty aggravating features to be taken into account, lifting the offending within the guideline range. As we have noted, charges in relation to previous abuse have now been brought but even leaving those to one side there were multiple factors which, taken together, significantly increased the severity of the offending: previous convictions for violence against partners, the fact that the appellant was on bail and with conditions not to see Miss Cartmell or go to her home, he was very intoxicated, she was his partner entitled to repose trust in him and he attacked her in her own home where she was entitled to feel safest. Taking the strangulation offence alone, all of these factors would properly have driven the sentence well up in the guideline range. That is before adding in a consideration of the assault offence. If the strangulation offence were to be taken as a lead with a concurrent sentence for the assault then that offence would require to be treated as a yet further aggravating matter. These points were all made by the judge, albeit briefly, in his responses to Miss Parnham at the end of the sentencing hearing, as the transcript records. Other than the appellant's plea there was no real mitigation. The references from family are important as conveying useful support for the appellant through custody and rehabilitation but they cannot serve materially to lessen the degree of severity of his behaviour towards his partner that night. A failure to consider mitigation was rightly not raised as a ground in the appellant's grounds of appeal.

For these reasons, we are not persuaded that a total sentence of three-and-a-half years for the two offences taken together was excessive and accordingly this appeal is dismissed.