R v Jack Poulson & Ors

We have before us nine applications by His Majesty's Solicitor General, under the provisions of section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, for leave to refer to this court sentences which she regards as unduly lenient. We also have two applications for leave to appeal against those sentences in two cases brought by the offenders Poulson and Harwood. Finally, we should record two things: first, that there was an application on behalf of the offender Corley for leave to appeal against his sentence, but that was formally abandoned by counsel on his behalf before the hearing yesterday, and we are no longer concerned to determine it. Secondly, there was a tenth application by the Solicitor General for leave to refer a sentence in this same case in respect of an offender named Harvie Aspden. In his case we gave an ex tempore judgment yesterday in which we held that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain such an application because he had not been convicted of any offence to which the unduly lenient sentence regime applies. Accordingly, we say nothing more about him.

Before turning to determine those matters which are before us, we should record and repeat the fact that all the victims in this case are entitled to lifelong anonymity under the terms of the Sexual Offences Act 1992. That means that no material may appear in any publication which may lead to their identification as victims of the offending in this case. That anonymity provision has not been waived, and there is no reason to suppose that it ever will be.

The offenders appeared on an indictment which contained a very large number of counts. The details of the counts which related to each offender, of their pleas and of the sentences which were imposed are contained in an appendix to this judgment, and we will not burden the text of what we say now by repeating all of that information. The appendix also contains details of the ages of the offenders and some other relevant material.

Each of the offenders was either convicted by the jury after a trial, or in some cases on their guilty plea, of a significant number of sexual offences against female children who were all over the age of 13 at the time when offences were committed against them. The oldest was probably 15 years of age at the time. The victim of the highest number of offences committed by the highest number of offenders was one girl, "V1".

The trial took place between October 2024 and early February 2025, in the Crown Court at Liverpool, before His Honour Judge Medland KC and a jury. The trial judge conducted a sentencing hearing which extended over two days on 28 and 29 April 2025.

The offender Corley had entered guilty pleas in October 2023. The offender Darbyshire entered guilty pleas after the trial. He had been unable to participate in it as a defendant because of a serious medical condition which had afflicted him. Otherwise, the other offenders were convicted of the offences identified in the appendix by verdicts of the jury.

This was a gang grooming case where a series of sexual offences was committed substantially in the same property against, in most cases, the same victim, V1. In totality, the offending took place over a 30 month period, although only Darbyshire was involved throughout that time. The offending against V1 all occurred in the first three months of 2018. It ended shortly after her 15^th birthday. During that period of offending, she was raped on multiple occasions by multiple offenders.

"V2" was also raped by Darbyshire. Darbyshire was one of those who raped V1 in February and March 2018. V1 was also raped by Barrett, Poulson, Harwood and Haslam. Darbyshire raped V2 when she was either 13 or 14 years of age. He committed other sexual offences against "V3", "V4" and "V5" in 2016 or thereabouts. "V6" was the subject of an offence of sexual communication with a child by Poulson. She was also a teenage female child.

The offences against V1 committed by the offenders included, in addition to those offences of rape which we have already mentioned, offences of assault by penetration and sexual activity with a child. Those offences encompassed most of the sexual offending against her, but she was also subjected to offences of causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent, inciting a child to engage in sexual activity, and making indecent images of a child.

The offences of sexual activity with a child involved sexual intercourse in circumstances which were not said to amount to rape but which were committed against a very vulnerable child who had been procured for sexual purposes and was the subject of sustained sexual exploitation. They were, therefore, very serious offences of their kind.

It is necessary to make some general observations before turning to the individual cases. First, the issue of delay arises for consideration in this case. As we have said, the offending against V1 ended in March 2018. It came to light because the offender Bainbridge-Flatters took a car belonging to the father of the offender Corey Barrett without his consent and crashed it. V1 was a passenger in the car at the time of that accident. It attracted the attention of the police. As a result of that attention, V1 began to make disclosures of what had happened to her. That was the source of the investigation which followed, with the results identified in the appendix to this judgment. That meant that a period of about seven years elapsed between the offending coming to light and the conclusion of the trial. It appears that offenders were charged in or about early 2023 and there was, therefore, a significant delay between the initial complaint and charging. It is necessary for a court in sentencing in these circumstances to determine the extent to which, if at all, such delay operates as a mitigating factor.

The first thing to say about that is that it is inevitable that an investigation of the kind which was required in this case will take a very long time. The ten offenders are, as we understand the position, not the only ones to have been investigated during the investigation to which we have referred.

Secondly, there is no doubt that a significant cause of the delay in this case was the Covid- 19 pandemic which gripped the country from about March 2020 onwards and which has had very well documented impacts upon the criminal justice system, as well as on all other aspects of the national life.

Third, the period of time which has elapsed in this case is, in part, attributable to failures by the offenders to admit their guilt when they were first interviewed. Those interviews in many cases occurred long before the offender was charged. An early admission would probably have expedited the determination of the proceedings. The precise extent to which that would have happened is impossible to say. The offenders also, in all cases but that of Corley, either maintained their denials until conviction by the jury, or, in the case of Darbyshire, entered very late guilty pleas. Offenders are, of course, entitled to deny their guilt and to stand trial. They do not receive any additional punishment if that is the course they choose. What they lose is any credit that might otherwise be available for a guilty plea, and there is also an impact on the credit or discount for any delay in the proceedings which was attributable to their pleas of not guilty. In these circumstances, we consider that although a very long time elapsed between the first complaint by V1 to the police and the sentencing exercise in April 2025, that passage of time, with the exception of the case of Corley, does not operate to reduce the appropriate sentencing. It is of course the case that events may take place during that passage of time, whether to the credit of an offender or to their discredit, which may bear upon the ultimate sentence, but the mere passage of time does not.

Next, we should make an observation about the approach of the judge to the guidelines and about the guidelines themselves. There are offence specific guidelines for all of the offences which the judge was required to consider in this case. All victims were over 13 years of age, and so the specific guidelines for offences against children under 13 provided by sections 5 to 8 inclusive of the Sexual Offences Act 2023 did not arise for consideration. The guideline for the offences of rape and assault by penetration was the guideline which applies to any offences against any victim who has passed their 13^th birthday at the time of the offence, including, of course, adults. The judge applied the appropriate guidelines.

The judge was also required to consider guidelines concerning the sentencing of young offenders, credit for guilty pleas and totality. He took into account all relevant guidelines.

In most, but not quite all, of these cases the real question was how far a sentence should be increased above that which the guideline provides for a single offence to reflect the fact that the person being sentenced was in fact guilty of multiple offending.

The guidelines offer only limited assistance in dealing with that question. The offence specific guideline will provide a starting point, a sentencing range, and a method by which that can be adapted to a sentence which fits the individual case after the balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors and the application of any credit for a guilty plea. What they do not do is to provide any guidance where the court is dealing with multiple offences. The totality guideline provides very general guidance which is designed to ensure that the result is proportionate to the totality of the criminality for which the offender is being sentenced.

There is a single exception to that general observation which appears in the guideline which applies to the offences of rape. It says:

This exception may be useful to sentencing judges as a bench mark against which other cases involving multiple offences can be measured. The expression "campaign of rape" is not a technical or defined term. Judges are required to use their experience and judgment in deciding whether the case before them requires a sentence of 20 years and above. The figure of 20 years is the bottom of the appropriate range, if the judge takes the view that it is engaged. There is no upper limit. That is no doubt by design.

Next, we should say something about the nature of the exercise in which we are engaged. The Solicitor General has sought to refer all of the sentences imposed by the judge at the conclusion of the sentencing process. The judge had presided over the trial for many weeks. He had therefore heard the victims give their evidence and the offenders give theirs. He had the opportunity, of which he obviously availed himself, to reflect carefully on each individual case and on each individual offender. His task was to impose sentences which resulted from an application of the guidelines. This would ensure that the sentencing was in line, so far as appropriate, with sentencing levels in other cases. It was also to ensure that the result of the sentencing exercise properly reflected the relative culpability of each offender and his contribution to the very serious harm that was caused. It was important that the sentences not only reflected the guidelines individually, but that they also were adjusted so as to reflect the different levels of culpability of the different offenders who had to be dealt with.

That was a complex and difficult process. It involved a very large number of different judgments and decisions, together with the application of a wealth of judicial experience and judgment. This court is not, and cannot be, in the same position as the trial judge was when he came to decide what the sentences should be. His assessment of the case and of the relative culpability of the offenders in the trial deserves, and will receive, respect from the court in this process. It seems highly unlikely that in all of those circumstances the judge could impose sentences on ten offenders for multiple offences and get every single one of them wrong. But that is the conclusion to which the Solicitor General invites this court to come.

We consider that it would have been more helpful if a greater degree of discrimination between the different cases had been expended on them at the time when the decision to refer them was made. We appreciate that such decisions have to be made at speed because of the short time limit for the lodging of applications to refer. But the history of these cases demonstrates that there is an opportunity for further reflection after that time limit has expired.

Having said all of that, we would wish to extend our gratitude to all counsel who appeared before us yesterday. The submissions that we heard were all focused and succinct. They greatly assisted us in identifying the issues that we have to decide. The credit for that goes to all of those who made those submissions, but we hope we may be forgiven for thanking in particular Mr Holt for his contribution, because in a case of this kind the majority of the burden inevitably falls on him because he, unlike anyone else, is engaged in all ten cases.

Having said that by way of introduction, we now turn to the facts of the case and of the individual offenders.

There is no purpose in burdening this judgment by an extensive account of the detail of the offending which took place. Neither is there any purpose in setting out in detail everything which was before the judge by way of pre-sentence reports, prison reports, references and other matters concerning the personal circumstances of the individual offenders. The judge clearly had all of that detailed material in mind, and so do we. Two days have been set aside for the hearing, in addition to the time we have been able to make available for pre-reading. That has permitted a careful reflection on the detail of these cases. It is unnecessary to prove that has taken place by reciting all the material in the judgment. We have had regard to everything. We therefore will, in view of our conclusions, address the cases individually and their outcomes quite briefly.

By way of a summary of the nature of the case, we will quote what the judge said at the start of his sentencing remarks when he sentenced the first group of offenders on the first day of the sentencing hearing, 28 April 2025. He said:

The judge then turned to address the first offender to be sentenced by him, Darbyshire. He said that V1 was sexually groomed by him from when she was about 13. He continued:

Although those observations were addressed to Darbyshire for obvious reasons, they have resonance in the case of all of these offenders, with the possible exception of Elliot Turner whose offending was committed away from the premises, 12 Vicarage Road West.

Like the judge, we will start with the offender Darbyshire. In summary, he was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for two offences of rape against V1, and a further offence of rape against V2. There were also 12 offences of sexual activity with a child, three of inciting a child to engage in sexual activity, and one of making indecent images of a child. This last offence occurred when he made a video recording of an occasion when he together with Barrett raped V1 when she was 14 years old. That was a significant aggravating feature of that offence, as well as an offence in its own right, although of course double counting should be avoided.

The offences were also aggravated by the fact that Darbyshire began the process of ruining V1's life. He plied her with drugs and seduced her cynically for his own pleasure, as the judge in his memorable language recorded.

The rape counts against Darbyshire were counts 5, 7 and 54. They were dealt with as the lead offences, with concurrent terms imposed on all other counts. Sentences on these three counts were therefore to be increased so that they properly reflected the totality of the offending. He was aged 20 or 21 at the date of the offending.

The judge assessed a sentence totalling 19 years for those three counts on that basis. He then reduced that term by ten months to reflect the serious brain haemorrhage from which Darbyshire suffered after the investigation began. That brain haemorrhage was a significant factor to be taken into account in assessing the sentence because it was a very serious medical condition which has continuing and probably lifelong effects. It was also the reason why Darbyshire did not participate in the trial. That enabled him to take stock of his chances in the light of the verdicts in that trial and to enter guilty pleas before a trial of him on his own could take place.

Just as it is important not to double count matters to the discredit of an offender, it is also important not to double count matter which might reduce their sentence. There was a reduction in sentence to take account of the brain haemorrhage, and this is also relevant to the time at which the guilty pleas were entered.

In the result, the judge allowed a further discount for those guilty pleas which we in the region of 16 per cent – that is significantly in excess of the ten per cent which would usually be the maximum level of credit for a person entering guilty pleas after the conclusion of a trial in which he had been intended to be a defendant.

The issue in his case, therefore, is whether that total sentence of 19 years' imprisonment, before those two discounts, adequately reflected the totality of Darbyshire's offending.

In our judgment, this is the single case before us where we ought to give leave and to increase the sentence. Darbyshire was significantly more culpable than any of the other offenders, having committed 19 offences against five victims, two of whom he raped. He is a predatory sexual offender who targets child victims, albeit ones who are not under the age of 13. The fact that they were only just past their 13^th birthday is in his case a highly material factor in assessing their vulnerability for the purposes of the guideline. The persistent and entrenched nature of his behaviour in targeting not just one 13 or 14 year old child, but five, is also a highly material factor.

Those factors, taken together, are particularly potent in Darbyshire's case because of his leading role in seducing his victims, in making them available to his depraved behaviour and in the case of V1, to that of many, many others. These considerations, in our judgment, should have been marked by an increase in the starting point for a single 1A offence of rape of 15 years' imprisonment by more than four years before making any discount for personal mitigation and guilty plea.

We consider that the sentences for counts 5, 7 and 54 (rape) should be quashed, and concurrent sentence of 18 years and six months' imprisonment imposed in their place. We arrive at that result by increasing the sentence, before any specific discounts, to 22 years on each of those counts, and then reducing it to take account of the serious health condition of the offender and the guilty pleas.

We do not criticise the approach to these questions which the judge took, but since we are increasing Darbyshire's sentence for other reasons, we will apply our own discounts at this stage. Those three sentences of 22 years' imprisonment are reduced by one year for the health condition. We will then apply a discount which is a little in excess of ten per cent for the late guilty pleas. This produces the sentence of 18 years and six months' imprisonment.

In all the other cases we decline to increase the sentences. In the cases of Poulson, Haslam, Turner and Fitzgerald, we consider that the position is arguable and we give leave, but we dismiss the References.

In the cases of Barrett, Harwood, Corley and Bainbridge-Flatters, we refuse leave.

Given these outcomes, it is only necessary to explain our conclusions in these cases quite briefly.

Barrett was 17 years of age when he committed six offences against V1. These were five offences of rape (counts 7, 14, 16, 17 and 36) and one of assault by penetration. The "den of iniquity" or "hovel" which the judge described was his father's house. That is a point which has been prayed in aid on his behalf, that it was his home which was a place from which he also had no real escape. He did not go there solely for the purpose of sexual gratification. It was his father's home. It is also relevant in his case to observe, as did the judge, the lamentable failure of his father to provide any parental support. That is relevant because a significant feature of his case is that he was 17 years old at the time of the offending.

The judge took a sentence of 20 years to reflect the totality of the offending on the assumption that he was sentencing not a 17 year old, but an adult of full maturity. He then applied a discount of 40 per cent to reflect Barrett's age and level of maturity. He arrived, in the result, at a total term of 12 years' imprisonment. There was no discount for a guilty plea in his case. The issue for us, therefore, is whether that discount was unduly lenient.

In our judgment, the level of discount follows the guideline in respect of the sentencing of young offenders. As such, it is not open to the criticism which is levelled at it. The judge took a sentence, before making that discount, of 20 years, having regard to the number of rape offences and finding that it placed this case into the campaign of rape category that we have already mentioned. Having done that, and applied a discount for the youth of the offender derived from the relevant guideline, in our judgment it is not sensibly possible to describe Barrett's sentence as unduly lenient.

Poulson was also convicted after a trial. All of his offending, except for the offence of sexual communication with a child (against V6), was committed against V1 in 2018, when he was 25 years old (ten years older than his victim). In his case there were two offences of rape, one of assault by penetration, and eight other serious (but less serious) sexual offences listed in the appendix. His was a determined campaign of sexual offending against a vulnerable child.

The judge identified two of the rape offences as category 1A offences, with a starting point of 15 years' imprisonment, which he increased to 17 years to reflect the totality of the offending, after making such adjustment as was appropriate for such limited mitigation as could be identified in Poulson's case.

The issue for us, therefore, is whether that increase was enough or whether we are driven to review the sentence and increase it. It is, we hope, clear from what we have already said that his appeal against that sentence is simply unarguable and we accordingly refuse leave.

In our judgment, the Solicitor General's submissions in the case of Poulson do not persuade us that we should interfere with the judge's sentence, as we are asked to do. The judge did not place this catalogue of offending, serious though it was, into the campaign of rape category, and therefore chose a sentence which was less than 20 years, having decided that the gravity of the offending placed it in a somewhat lower category.

Having embarked upon that exercise and arrived at a sentence of 17 years' imprisonment, we consider that the judge was in the right area, although his sentence could, without objection, have been higher. We consider that the difference between the sentence which this court might have imposed and that which the judge selected is not sufficiently great to warrant the description "unduly lenient". Accordingly, in Poulson's case, although we grant leave, we dismiss the Reference.

Harwood was convicted after a trial. He was aged 18 when he committed three offences against V1 on different days shortly before, and on or about, her 15^th birthday. There was one offence of rape, one of attempted rape, and one of sexual activity with a child. The rape was treated as a category 2A offence. The judge said:

Category 2A involves a starting point of ten years' imprisonment, and a range of nine to 13 years. In the case of Harwood, the judge took into account particular problems in his "cognition", which he held might have increased Harwood's tendency to behave impulsively.

The sentence at which the judge arrived was ten years' imprisonment. The judge said that if Harwood had not been only 18 at the time of the offending, but had been a mature adult of normal capability, the sentence would have been 12 years' imprisonment. The judge made a reduction on those grounds from that sentence of 12 years to ten years.

The question for us is whether an increase in the starting point from ten to 12 years, before making that discount, was adequate to reflect the totality of the offending. The answer, in our judgment, is that this clearly was within the range of reasonable options available to the judge. It follows that we refuse leave to refer Harwood's sentence.

Harwood also applies for leave to appeal against his sentence. It follows from what we have just said that that application is entirely without merit and is refused.

Haslam was convicted of seven offences against V1, including three of rape, one of assault by penetration and three of sexual activity with a child. He was aged 29 and she was 15. The difference in ages was marked in his case. He has some previous convictions and was also engaged during the indictment period in selling drugs to other co-defendants. He was jointly charged with Poulson and Barrett in the rape charged in count 36. Counts 39 and 40 were two offences of rape on the same occasion, when Barrett and Fitzgerald also committed serious offences against V1. The judge said:

The judge treated Haslam's case as being similar in gravity to that of Poulson, but observed that his offending was "less prolific". This meant that the uplift applied to the starting point of 15 years for a category 1A rape in his case was 12 months, rather than two years. The issue in his case also, therefore, is whether that increase was enough, or whether we are driven to review the sentence and increase it.

In Haslam's case, as in the case of Poulson, we consider that the resulting sentence imposed by the judge could properly be described as lenient, and we therefore give leave to the Solicitor General to refer it to this court. However, for the same reasons as we gave in the case of Poulson, we consider that the sentence should not be described as unduly lenient and we would not in any event increase it. For those reasons the Reference is dismissed.

In the case of Turner, he was engaged in a markedly less extensive way than the offenders with whom we have already dealt. He fell to be dealt with for two offences of sexual activity with a child. These were two offences committed on the same occasion, not in Vicarage Road West, but in Turner's own home. Darbyshire was present on this occasion, which involves the consideration of offending committed with others as a relevant feature.

Turner was 19 years old at the time of the offending and the victim was 15. This meant that the disparity in their ages was rather less marked than in the cases of other offenders. She was thoroughly intoxicated through drink and drugs, but the offences were not charged as rape.

The category of Turner's offences for guideline purposes, it is agreed, was 1A, which involves a starting point of five years' imprisonment, and a range of four to ten years.

In sentencing Turner to a total term of two years' custody, without any credit for any guilty plea, the judge observed:

There was argument before us about what this observation by the judge meant. There were factors in the relevant guideline which were sufficient to place the case into culpability A. In a sense, Turner acted together with others to commit the offence because Darbyshire was present at the time. In a sense, alcohol and drugs facilitated the offence, although the extent to which Turner had (in the words of the guideline) "used" the alcohol and drugs to create that effect may have been relatively limited.

In those circumstances, we understand the judge's observation to mean that the weight of the 1A culpability factors in Turner's case was reduced in comparison with other cases where they might also be found, and that the particular circumstances of his case required an adjustment downwards from category 1A towards category 1B, albeit at the top of that range.

In our judgment, that is precisely the approach which an experienced sentencing judge addressing himself to the facts of the particular case which he is required to sentence ought to take. It is not simply a box-ticking exercise whereby factors listed in the culpability 1A range will, even if present only to a very limited extent, always inevitably lead to a sentence within that category range. The judge has to decide on the real weight of those factors and the gravity which they bring to the individual case.

In the circumstances of Turner's case, in our judgment the judge was entitled to take the course that he did. We consider that the position is in his case arguable and we give leave, but we dismiss the Reference.

In the case of Fitzgerald, there was a single offence of assault by penetration committed when he was 29 years old and the victim was 15. She was intoxicated and others were present at the "den of iniquity" where most of this offending occurred.

Fitzerald has a significant criminal record. The judge said that that did not aggravate his position, although he could legitimately have taken the view that it did. The criminal record did not include any sexual offences, but it did include a previous custodial sentence and also offences of stalking and harassment from 2022 (that is after the commission of the offences with which we are concerned). The judge's approach to the previous convictions was, therefore, a lenient one.

The judge took the starting point from the relevant guideline for assault by penetration of eight years' imprisonment, and reduced it to five and a half years. This is perhaps the case which has exercised us the greatest in coming to the conclusion that the judge was entitled to take that course.

The reason why we have come to that conclusion ultimately is that the sentence, although at a markedly lower level than the starting point, was within the category range for the offence for which it was imposed. The judge did not spell out at length the mitigating factors which he took into account in reducing the sentence in the way that he did. He simply referred to the fact that he accepted defence counsel's submissions.

We have reviewed these and have not been able to identify the particular matters which would demand the reduction which resulted. But the pre-sentence report in Fitzgerald's case (in contrast to almost all the others) contained some positive information about him. There were some grounds for optimism in his case. Here in particular we consider that the respect we ought to pay to the trial judge's assessment of the particular offender whom he was sentencing ultimately carries the day. The reduction could, and perhaps should, have been more fully explained in the sentencing remarks, but we are not here to judge the quality of the sentencing remarks. We are here to judge whether a particular sentence was unduly lenient.

As we have said, the sentence was within the category range, and the judge did refer to mitigating factors which he felt were material. In all of those circumstances, although we consider that this case also is arguable and deserves leave, we decline to increase the sentence in Fitzgerald's case.

Corley is the only offender, in our judgment, who was entitled to substantial credit, both for the pleas of guilty and for delay. We have already explained our approach to both of those matters.

Corley pleaded guilty to two offences of sexual activity with a child. He did so in October 2023. At that time he had no idea whether V1 would stand up to cross-examination and be the credible witness she plainly ultimately was. Those were pleas which were entitled to the credit they received.

Corley was 23 years of age at the time of the offending, and the victim was 15. Again, there is a disparity in age, but it is less gross than it is in some of the other cases. Cocaine was involved in that V1 had taken it on the occasions when Corley offended against her. That was not his responsibility. He did not supply it. He understood, so he said, that she was 15 years of age at the time when he had sexual intercourse with her.

In his case also there was a positive pre-sentence report.

The judge said that these were category 1A offences and warranted a starting point of five years' custody. He reduced that to three years to take account of the delay and the personal mitigation which is identified in the pre-sentence report. He then applied a discount of 20 per cent for the guilty plea, which was entered after the plea and trial preparation hearing, which gave rise to a sentence of 28 months' imprisonment.

We find no fault in any of the judge's reasoning. We therefore refuse leave in Corley's case. We also record at this stage the fact that his appeal against sentence was very sensibly abandoned the day before yesterday. We need say no more about that.

The last offender, Bainbridge-Flatters, was convicted of four offences of sexual activity with a child against V1. He also pleaded guilty to possession with intent to supply and aggravated vehicle taking. The offence of possession with intent to supply involved supplying the victim with cocaine. The aggravated vehicle taking was the offence of crashing the car belonging to Corey Barret's father, having taken it without authorisation, which brought all of the offending to light. We mentioned that at the start of this judgment.

In his case, the judge recorded the convictions and pleas and then observed that at the time of the offending Bainbridge-Flatters was a mature adult with little or nothing by way of social deprivation. He was a drug supplier and a heavy user of cocaine. This disinhibited and coarsened his sexual behaviour.

The judge explained why the starting point for the four offences of sexual activity with a child of five years' custody needed to be increased to six years, to take into account the number of offences. He imposed a consecutive term of one year's imprisonment in relation to the drugs offence, and a further consecutive term for the aggravated vehicle taking. That resulted in the term imposed by the judge of seven years' imprisonment.

Bainbridge-Flatters had no relevant previous convictions. In all the circumstances we consider that in his case that was an appropriate sentence and one which is not arguably unduly lenient. In his case, therefore, we refuse leave to refer the sentencing to this court.

All the other orders made by the judge, except the sentences which we have increased in the case of Darbyshire, for the reasons we have already given, are unaffected, and those three increases in respect of those three counts of rape in Darbyshire's case are the only adjustments which results from this process.

The offender, Ashley Darbyshire, is 28 years old, having been born on 1 January 1997. He had no previous convictions, cautions, warnings or reprimands.

He pleaded not guilty to all counts that he faced on 10 May 2023. He was severed from the trial owing to ill health. He pleaded guilty on the day of his trial to 19 counts.

The offences and sentences are summarised in the below table:

Cory Barrett was 24 years of age at the date of sentence. He was born on 8 October 2000. In 2022 he had received a suspended sentence in relation to an offence of fraud.

He was convicted after trial. The offences and sentences are summarised below:

Jack Poulson was born on 25 April 1993. He was 32 years of age at the date of sentence. He had three previous convictions for three offences of violence and disorder. He had no offences since 2013 and had not served a period of imprisonment.

He was convicted of a number of offences after trial. He was sentenced to a total custodial sentence of 17 years.

The sentence is summarised below:

Brandon Harwood was born on 20 September 1999. He was 25 years of age on the day of sentence. He had no previous convictions, cautions, warnings or reprimands. He did accept in evidence that he was a cocaine supplier.

The offender was convicted of three offences at trial. He was sentenced to a total custodial sentence of ten years.

The offences and sentences are summarised below:

This offender was born on 16 February 1989. He was 36 years of age on the date of sentence. He had six convictions for 12 offences, none of which was sexual. He received a 16 month sentence of imprisonment for dangerous driving and assault with intent to resist arrest in 2018. In evidence at trial, he accepted that he was a cocaine dealer.

Haslam was convicted of seven counts after trial. He received a total sentence of 16 years' imprisonment.

The convictions and sentences are set out below:

Elliot Turner was born on 5 June 1998. He was aged 25 at the time of sentence. He had no previous convictions, cautions, warnings or reprimands recorded against him.

He was convicted of two offences after trial. Those offences and their sentences are summarised below:

James Fitzgerald was born on 5 June 1988. He was thirty-six years of age on the date of sentence. He had 17 convictions for 34 offences. The offence for which he was convicted was committed eight days atter he had been made the subject of a Suspended Sentence Order.

He was convicted of a single count at trial. He had admitted a Bail Act offence that related to him failing to attend a pre-trial review.

The sentence can be summarised:

Ross Corley was born on 14 January 1995. He was 30 years of age on the day of sentence. He had a single previous conviction for an offence of disqualified driving in 2021.

The offender had pleaded guilty to two offences on 24 October 2023, at a relatively early stage in the proceedings.

The offences and sentences are summarised below:

The offender was born on 13 May 1990. He was 34 years of age on the date of sentence. He had one previous conviction for a minor public order offence. This offence dated back to 2013.

He was convicted after trial of the sexual offences. He had entered guilty pleas to a drug supply offence (to the victim of the sexual offences) and a road traffic offence when he took Barrett's father's car and crashed it.

The convictions and sentences are set out below: