R v Mason Ibbotson

In the early hours of Sunday 6 October 2024 there was an ugly incident of violence outside a nightclub in Blyth, Northumberland. Shaun Roberts (then aged 35), a married man with four children, and a serving soldier with an outstanding record, was knocked to the ground by this offender. He suffered a head injury which resulted in his death on 1 November 2024. Mason Ibbotson (to whom we shall refer as "the offender") pleaded guilty to manslaughter. He was sentenced to 6 years' detention in a young offender institute. His Majesty's Solicitor General believes that sentence to have been unduly lenient. Application is accordingly made, pursuant to section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, for leave to refer the case to this court so that the sentencing may be reviewed.

We can summarise the facts comparatively briefly. The events are clearly visible on good quality CCTV footage which has been seen by each member of the court.

The nightclub outside which the incident occurred was just closing. Two groups were among those leaving the club: one, a small group of soldiers including Mr Roberts; the other, a somewhat larger group of younger persons including the offender, who was then about 18 years 4 months old. All concerned had consumed at least some alcohol.

A dispute arose between the two groups. Somebody in Mr Roberts’ group heard someone in the other group say that the soldiers were "not from around here". In the course of the dispute, a member of Mr Roberts’ group went to punch the offender but did not make contact with him. The offender for his part took off his jacket and upper outer clothing. He assumed a boxer's stance and swung a number of punches at the man who had tried to hit him. Others intervened and separated them.

Mr Roberts then pushed one of the offender's group. He was held back by others of his friends. The offender goaded Mr Roberts. Mr Roberts approached him but was not showing any violence. The offender delivered a punch to the side of Mr Roberts’ face which caused Mr Roberts to fall to his knees and then backwards on to the ground, striking his head. He was immediately rendered unconscious.

The offender raised his arms in a triumphal gesture and appeared to high-five a female member of his group. Shortly afterwards a further scuffle broke out, and the offender joined in and threw a punch at a member of the other group before moving away.

The blow to Mr Roberts’ head caused a skull fracture which led to bleeding in the brain. He was admitted to hospital and underwent surgery, but despite the best efforts of the medical practitioners, his life could not be saved. The evidence of the pathologist who carried out the post-mortem examination was that the medical cause of death was a blunt head injury.

We have read, as the judge read, victim personal statements and statements from those who knew the deceased well, which vividly set out the manner in which this incident not only ended one life but blighted many others. We have found the statements by Mr Roberts’ widow and by his oldest son particularly powerful and moving. We offer them, and all those bereaved by the death, our condolences.

The judge in his sentencing remarks considered matters in considerable detail. At the outset he referred to the circumstances in which the offender had pleaded guilty. They were as follows.

Initially a charge was brought of unlawfully inflicting grievous bodily harm, contrary to section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. There was a hearing before a magistrates' court which resulted in the charge being sent to the Crown Court. No document has been provided setting out exactly what happened, and in particular there is no explicit record as to whether or not any indication of plea was sought.

By the time the matter came before the Crown Court for a plea and trial preparation hearing ("PTPH") Mr Roberts had sadly died. A charge of manslaughter was laid a few days before the PTPH, but the offender only learned of the death and of the new charge at court on the day of the PTPH. He immediately pleaded guilty to that charge. The judge in his sentencing remarks said of that PTPH:

Turning to the facts of the case, the judge noted that on his viewing of the footage, the aggression had been started by the offender's group. He described the offender, after the initial incident involving another man, taking up a boxer's stance. The judge observed that he had been told that the offender had some training in relation to boxing. Mr Roberts had walked towards him, but, said the judge, "... his hands are down by his side, I cannot see him using violence. ... There is no evidence that I can see that Shaun Roberts was trying to hit you. He was clearly confronting somebody who he had seen being violent and appeared to want to fight, that is you."

The judge read out the entirety of the impact statements to which we have referred.

He then turned to the position of the offender, noting that he had a number of recent previous convictions. Summarising very recent events in chronological order, they were as follows:

The judge had been provided with two medical reports: a psychiatric report by Dr Chipchase and a psychological report by Dr Alison Foster. Summarising these, the judge noted that in 2018 the offender had been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD") and possible oppositional defiant disorder, for which medication had been prescribed. The offender was taking such medication at the time of this offence. However, the judge was told (and it was not disputed by the prosecution) that the offender did not take his medication at weekends. The evidence of Dr Chipchase was that that was a comparatively common phenomenon, particularly amongst young persons, because of side-effects of the medication. The judge noted that there was a history of ADHD in the offender's family.

Dr Chipchase's report confirmed the diagnosis of ADHD, which in his opinion was of a severe combined type, more than moderately severe, and affecting control, concentration and hyperactivity. The condition could be controlled by medication, but the effect of not taking the medication at the weekend was to leave the offender in the same position he would have been in if he had not been medicated at all.

The judge said this:

The judge felt that the stated amount of alcohol consumed by the offender would have had had only a marginal additional effect on his ability to control his actions.

Dr Foster's report showed the offender to be of low average IQ and to have difficulties with executive functioning, that is to say planning, thinking logically and thinking about the consequences of his actions.

The judge also had the assistance of a pre-sentence report. To the author of that report, the offender had accepted full responsibility and had shown evidence of victim empathy and at least some awareness of the impact of his behaviour.

The judge then addressed the sentencing guideline, which divides offences into four categories:

The judge referred to the aggravating features of previous convictions, the influence of alcohol, the location and timing of the offence and the persistence of the offender's violence, including threatening and using violence immediately before and immediately after his attack upon Mr Roberts. The judge noted the extremely unattractive celebratory gesture of the offender after he had punched Mr Roberts to the ground, but accepted that that reaction was at least in part attributable to the offender's immaturity and other difficulties.

In relation to mitigation, the judge identified remorse, young age, lack of maturity and the personal difficulties which the offender had encountered in his childhood: these had included a deprived background, and family bereavements, which had clearly had an impact upon him. The judge noted that it would be the offender's first custodial sentence, and it would be served in circumstances of particular prison difficulties.

The judge then referred to the Sentencing Council's overarching principles guideline on Sentencing offenders with mental disorders, developmental disorders or neurological impairments. He noted that the guideline directed sentencers to ask themselves the following questions:

In those circumstances the judge moved down from the guideline starting point of 12 years' custody to a term of 9 years. Giving full credit for the plea, he imposed the sentence of 6 years' detention in a young offender institution to which we have referred.

His Majesty's Solicitor General submits that that sentence was unduly lenient, in particular for two reasons:

First, because the judge made far too substantial a reduction from the guideline starting point to reflect the mitigating features which it is accepted existed.

Secondly, because it is submitted in the circumstances of this case the offender was not entitled to full credit for his guilty plea to the manslaughter offence.

We think it convenient to address that second point first. The question of whether an offender who is initially charged with one offence but is later charged with a different offence to which he pleads guilty is entitled to full credit for that guilty plea is addressed in the Sentencing Council's definitive guideline on Reduction in sentence for guilty pleas.

The circumstances in which the issue arises commonly involve a case in which an offender has been charged with one offence but ultimately pleads guilty to a less serious offence. The present case of course involves the opposite situation: an offender charged with an offence contrary to section 20 of the 1861 Act who is later charged with the far more serious offence of manslaughter, to which he immediately pleads guilty. The guideline addresses the broad issues in these cases at exception F3 to the general approach to a reduction in plea. Section F3 says:

Mr McGhee for the Solicitor General submits that in the circumstances of this case the offender had the opportunity to indicate a guilty plea to the original charge when he first appeared before the magistrates' court. That opportunity not having been taken, Mr McGhee submits, the plea at the PTPH to the charge of manslaughter should have attracted no more than 25 percent reduction in plea.

Some guidance as to an appropriate approach to this issue may be gained from the decision of this court in R v Ladbrook [2022] EWCA Crim 113. At [28] of the judgment in that case the court said:

Applying that approach here, it seems to us that it is significant that counsel have not been able to assist us with the precise course taken in the magistrates' court. It is not clear whether, in a departure from normal practice, no indication of plea was actually sought on that occasion. In any event, the first time when the charge of manslaughter became part of the prosecution case was only days before the PTPH, and the offender personally was not aware of it until the day of the PTPH hearing. He thereupon immediately pleaded guilty. It seems to us that the judge, in effect, adopted the approach indicated in Ladbrook. He was entitled to reach the conclusion he did, and this ground of the Solicitor General's application cannot succeed.

We therefore turn to the ground principally relied upon by Mr McGhee. We have carefully considered his submissions and those of Ms Proctor, who represents the offender in this court as she did below.

The judge was faced with a difficult sentencing process. In accordance with his duty under section 60(4) of the Sentencing Act 2020, he selected the appropriate category in the guideline. No one now challenges that selection.

Category B identified the starting point of 12 years' custody and the range of 8 to 16 years. The judge then had to consider whether to make an initial adjustment downwards to reflect the presence of a category D factor, before going on to identify and balance the aggravating and other mitigating features. The task was complicated by the need to avoid double counting of any factor, whether favourably or unfavourably to the offender. No criticism is or could be made of the approach which the judge took.

Mr McGhee very fairly and realistically accepts that the judge avoided the trap of double counting. His argument is that, setting aside those factors going directly to culpability, other mitigating factors on which the offender could rely could do no more than balance out the aggravating features. Adopting that approach, Mr McGhee argues that the judge must then have made what was simply too substantial a reduction from the guideline starting point to arrive at a notional sentence of 9 years' custody before reduction for the guilty plea.

Ms Proctor on the offender's behalf challenges the proposition that the mitigating factors other than those going to culpability could do no more than balance out the aggravating factors. She submits they were of significant importance in their own right and that, when the factors affecting culpability are taken into account, the judge was entitled to reach the conclusion he did.

We remind ourselves that the task of this court is not to substitute our own opinion as to what might be an appropriate level of sentence. The question for this court is whether the sentence imposed by the judge was not merely lenient but unduly lenient. There being no suggested substantial error of principle by the judge, the question can be put in these terms: was the sentence which the judge imposed so low as to be outside the range which was properly open to him in all the circumstances of the case?

The judge's approach was, in our view, impeccable. He correctly considered the relevant sentencing guidelines. He correctly identified (as the mental disorders guideline required him to do) his finding that culpability was affected by mental disorder, and as we have already said, he expressed that as being "undoubtedly a significant reduction from the starting point in culpability B".

The judge, in our view, plainly considered all relevant matters both for and against the offender. He had very well in mind the seriousness of the offence and the seriousness of the consequences for the deceased and for the bereaved. He was, however, dealing with an offender who was a very young adult, in respect of whom the expert evidence showed significant reasons why his ability to control his impulsive actions was reduced.

Having carefully reflected upon these matters we would accept a submission by Mr McGhee that the sentence was a lenient one. We are not, however, able to say that it was unduly lenient. It was, in our view, within the range which was properly open to the judge in all the circumstances of this sad case. The principal ground upon which the application is made therefore cannot succeed.

For those reasons we refuse the application for leave.